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CONVENTIONS
1, In many discussions about the subject matter of this thesis 
those states which possess nuclear weapons are often 
referred to as "nuclear weapons powers". (The purpose of 
this usage is to distinguish the countries which possess 
nuclear weapons from those which possess only reactors and 
other peaceful nuclear facilities.) In this thesis the 
less clumsy term "nuclear power" is used to describe only 
those countries which possess nuclear weapons.
2. Strictly speaking the term "enriched uranium" refers to 
uranium which has been enriched in its isotope U235 
beyond the naturally occurring percentage of 0.7.
However in many works on the subject the terms "U235" 
and "enriched uranium" are used interchangeably. This 
is the convention adopted in this thesis.
VPRECIS
I
Opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons has been a major 
objective of U.S. policy since the end of World War II. During this 
time Washington has devised a range of policies designed both to 
prevent other states from acquiring the wherewithal to develop nuclear 
weapons and to deter states with those capacities from converting them 
into military nuclear capabilities. The United States has sought to 
rationalise its opposition to nuclear spread in a number of ways but 
principally on the grounds that the more nuclear powers there are, 
the more there are likely to be, and that the more there are, the 
greater the risks of nuclear war. Underlying much of Washington’s 
concern has been the fear that nuclear spread might reduce America’s 
capacity to regulate crisis situations and to prevent them from 
developing into general war.
II
To date, China is the only country in Asia which has developed 
nuclear weapons. Since 1964 Peking has acquired a modest stockpile 
of nuclear and probably thermonuclear warheads and has made consid­
erable progress in the development and deployment of a missile 
delivery system. Three other countries in the area, India, Japan 
and Australia have, in varying degrees, the potential to eventually 
follow China in the development of nuclear weapons.
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Despite Washington's long-standing opposition to the spread of 
nuclear weapons, the record of American policy in Asia in the period 
1964-71 suggests that the goal of nonproliferation in that area at 
least did not enjoy a very high priority in the hierarchy of U.S. 
policy objectives. The Nixon Administration seems to have accorded 
the goal of nonproliferation in Asia an even lower priority than 
had its predecessor. This appears to have been related to recent 
changes in the structure of world politics and to the Nixon 
Government’s perception of these changes.
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INTRODUCTION
The spread of nuclear weapons represents one of the most 
important developments in post-war International Relations. 
Beginning in 1945 the nuclear club has grown to include the United 
States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China. In addition, 
a number of other countries have acquired the potential to develop 
nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time. Nuclear 
weapons have come to occupy a central place in the military plans 
of those powers which possess them and their presence has had a 
profound impact on the global balance of power. Since acquiring 
its own nuclear capability in 1945 it has been the policy of the 
UoS. to oppose the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, 
for about the first twenty years after World War II America's 
efforts in this regard were focussed primarily on Europe. But 
China's first nuclear test in October 1964 tended to alter this 
picture. Thereafter, the problem of proliferation in Asia in 
particular became a distinct concern of American policymaking.
This thesis has three aims. In Part I an attempt will be 
made to examine in a general way United States efforts to limit 
the spread of nuclear weapons during the period since the end of 
World War II to the time of the signing of the Treaty on 
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (N.P.T.) in July 1968.
The emphasis throughout this first part of the thesis will centre 
on the techniques developed by Washington to counter the threat 
of proliferation, the rationale and underlying motivations of 
America's opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, and the 
significance of America's opposition to the spread of nuclear 
weapons for relations between Washington and its allies and 
between Washington and Moscow.
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In Part II of the thesis an attempt will be made to examine 
the history and the present extent of proliferation in Asia and to 
assess the potential for further nuclear spread in the area from 
the view point of about mid-1971. As the only nuclear power in Asia 
so far, China will of course occupy a special place in this analysis. 
The history of the development of the Chinese nuclear force to about 
mid-1971 will be examined and an assessment made of its present 
scale and likely future character. An effort will also be made to 
examine the rationale for the development of the Chinese nuclear 
force. As regards potential nuclear powers in the area, India,
Japan and Australia have been chosen for consideration. Observers 
are virtually unanimous in regarding these three states as the 
only ones in Asia with,in varying degrees, the potential to 
eventually follow China in acquiring nuclear weapons. The history 
of the development of peaceful nuclear capabilities in each country 
will be examined and an assessment made both about the sort of 
nuclear force that each could construct and how soon these might 
be built. Consideration will also be given to the political, 
economic and strategic factors which have helped to shape each 
nation’s particular stand on the question of the acquisition of 
national nuclear forces. So far as each country’s attitude to the 
issue of arms control helps to explain its attitude to nuclear 
weapons in general, then this matter will also be discussed.
The analysis of nuclear capabilities and incentives in India,
Japan and Australia will not go beyond mid-1971.
Part III of the thesis deals with America's response to 
the problem of nuclear proliferation in Asia from about 1964 to 
mid-1971. The approach will be thematic rather than chronological 
and a number of questions will be examined. These will include:
What methods have been used by Washington to counter the problem 
of proliferation in Asia? What has been the relative importance 
of the goal of nonproliferation in Asia in the hierarchy of
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UcS. policy objectives? How has Washington reconciled the goal of 
nonproliferation in Asia with other objectives of U.S. policy?
Has the problem of proliferation in Asia been viewed differently 
by different American Administrations? It must be emphasised that 
the analysis in this part of the thesis will be concerned primarily 
with American policy rather than with Asian reactions to that 
policy, though, for the sake of analysis there must, from time to 
time, be at least some reference to the latter.
The year 1964 has been chosen as the starting point for 
the analysis in Part III of the thesis because of the importance 
for the question of proliferation in Asia, as well as for America's 
response to this problem, of China's entry into the nuclear club. 
But this is not to suggest that reference to developments prior 
to 1964 has been entirely precluded. The various security 
assurances and guarantees that the U.S, has entered into with 
its Asian allies, as well as certain arrangements in the area of 
co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy can be rightly 
regarded as part of Washington's effort to limit proliferation in 
Asia. Many initiatives of this sort originated before 1964 and 
it has consequently been necessary to make at least some reference 
to developments which took place before China entered the nuclear 
club. Notwithstanding this, the major emphasis in Part III of the 
thesis is on the period from about 1964 to mid-1971.
Towards the very end of this period a number of develop­
ments took place which, by their very nature, were of seemingly 
great significance for the matters under review in Part III of 
the thesis. Chief amongst these were the announcement of 
President Nixon's decision to visit China, the decision by the 
U.S. Government to share the secrets of its gaseous diffusion 
technology with countries abroad, and the first indications that 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union promised to produce an agreement substantially
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limiting American (and Soviet) antiballistic missile (A.B.M.) 
deployments. To the extent that it has been possible these 
developments have been taken into account in the analysis. However, 
especially in the case of recent changes in U.S. policy towards 
China, it is still too early to say very much about the significance 
of this development for U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia.
A word of explanation seems in order regarding the treatment 
of the N.P.T. Obviously, the latter agreement has been an impor­
tant element in American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia 
and elsewhere. But because of the very nature of the issues under 
discussion it has been necessary to refer to different aspects of 
the N.P.T. in a number of different places throughout Part III 
(as indeed, throughout the thesis as a whole) rather than in a 
single chapter.
PART I
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN 
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 
1946-1968
1CHAPTER I
THE TECHNIQUES AND OBJECTIVES OF 
UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION 
POLICY, 1946 - 1968,
The appearance of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II 
was interpreted by most American policy-makers as a development 
capable of having a very profound impact on the future course of 
international relations, Though at the time, speculation about 
the role of the atomic bomb lacked the sophistication character­
istic of subsequent thought on strategic matters, it was neverthe­
less appreciated that the new weapon was one of immense military 
and political significance and could pose unprecedented problems 
for international stability and for the security of states 
everywhere,, Propelled by these considerations, the United States 
Government concluded that it was in America's interests not to 
assist other nations to acquire nuclear weapons. This was clearly 
reflected in measures adopted by Washington during the immediate 
post-war years.
A, The Baruch Plan and the U,S. Atomic
Energy Act,
The aims of American policy at that time were to protect 
the nuclear monopoly which the U,S0 then enjoyed and to lay the 
foundations for the eventual international control of atomic 
energy. The first of these objectives was the special target 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which was passed by the American 
Senate in June of that year. This act contained two main 
provisions: first, it established a government monopoly in the
production of fissionable materials throughout the United States;
2and second, it prohibited the transfer to foreign powers of nuclear
information, equipment and materials."*"
This action had an immediate impact on America's relations with
Great Britain. London complained that the Atomic Energy Act was an
abrogation of the Quebec (August 1943) and Hyde Park (September 1944)
2agreements. In January 1948, partly in response to these complaints
and partly because of America’s urgent need of uranium ore held by
Britain, the U.S. Government agreed to resume collaboration with the
U.K. in the nuclear field. However, the exchanges were to be
strictly limited and were not to include any information on weapons 
3development. It was clear that Washington had no intention of 
helping Britain to acquire the atomic bomb.
1. For the text of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, see Richard G. 
Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939-1946;
A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. I, 
University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1962, Appendix 1, pp. 714-722.
2. At Quebec, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that the U.S. and 
Britain would never use the atomic bomb against each other, and 
that neither without the consent of the other would use it 
against a third nation. The two leaders also set up the 
Combined Policy Committee to give broad direction to the effort 
to produce the bomb. At Hyde Park, Roosevelt and Churchill 
initialed an aid memoire calling for full co-operation in the 
development of the military and peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
See, Francis Duncan, "Atomic Energy and Anglo-American Rela­
tions, 1946-196.4" in Orbis, Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 1969,
pp. 1191-1192. Duncan suggests that the Atomic Energy Act 
was drawn up in almost total ignorance of the details of these 
wartime arrangements. See, ibid., p. 1191.
3. ibid., pp. 1195-1996. See also, Raymond Dawson and Richard 
Rosecrance, "Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance" 
in World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, October 1966, p. 25.
3But why was t h e  U .S . r e l u c t a n t  to  h e lp  even  i t s  c l o s e s t  a l l y  to
a c q u i r e  t h e  bomb? One e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  c o u r s e ,  was t h a t  W ash ing ton
was c u r r e n t l y  s u p p o r t i n g  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  of
a to m ic  e n e rg y .  To have  o p e n ly  a s s i s t e d  B r i t a i n  to  a c q u i r e  t h e
a to m ic  bomb a t  t h i s  t im e ,  would have  c a s t  s e r i o u s  d o u b ts  on A m e r ic a 's
s i n c e r i t y . ^  A no the r  im p o r ta n t  r e a s o n  f o r  A m e ric a ’ s a t t i t u d e  seems
to  have  been  t h e  f e a r  t h a t  i n f o r m a t io n  p a s se d  to  B r i t a i n  m ig h t
e v e n t u a l l y  f i n d  i t s  way to  R u s s i a .  I n  F e b ru a ry  1946, news o f  t h e
Gouzenko spy  r i n g  and t h e  c o n f e s s io n s  o f  A lan  Nunn May a l e r t e d  many
A m ericans to  t h e  s e c u r i t y  r i s k s  in v o lv e d  i n  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i th  
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o t h e r  pow ers .  I n  t a l k s  i n  t h e  U .S . p r i o r  t o  t h e  a g reem en t  of 
J a n u a r y  1948, " t h e r e  was some d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  f i s s i o n ­
a b l e  m a t e r i a l  and a to m ic  e n e rg y  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  B r i t a i n  w ere  more 
v u l n e r a b l e  to  S o v ie t  p r e s s u r e  and t h a t  Am erican s e c u r i t y  from  a 
m i l i t a r y  v iew  would be  b e s t  s e rv e d  i f  t h e  B r i t i s h  had no a to m ic
3
en e rg y  program m e."  R u s s i a ' s  e x p lo s io n  of a  n u c l e a r  d e v ic e  i n  
August 1949 l a r g e l y  s h a t t e r e d  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h i s  c o n c e rn  and 
a f t e r  O c to b e r  1951 t h e r e  was some s o f t e n i n g  i n  t h e  Am erican
4
a t t i t u d e  t o  B r i t a i n ' s  n u c l e a r  programme.
C o n c u r r e n t ly  w i t h  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  of t h e  Atomic Energy  A c t ,  
t h e  U .S . Government worked o u t  a p l a n  f o r  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o n t r o l  o f  a to m ic  e n e rg y .  The B aruch  P l a n ,  a s  i t  came to  be 
c a l l e d ,  was p r e s e n t e d  to  t h e  f i r s t  m e e t in g  o f  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  
Atomic Energy  Commission (U .N .A .E .C .)  on 14 Ju n e  1946, The 
scheme c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  an  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Atomic 
Development A u t h o r i t y ,  t h e  powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  w hich  
would i n c l u d e :  (1) t h e  m a n a g e r i a l  c o n t r o l  o r  o w n ersh ip  o f  a l l
a to m ic  e n e rg y  a c t i v i t i e s  p o t e n t i a l l y  d a n g e ro u s  to  w orld  
s e c u r i t y ,  (2) t h e  power t o  c o n t r o l ,  i n s p e c t  and l i c e n c e  a l l  o t h e r
1. H e w le t t  and A n d e rso n ,  o p . c i t . , p .  574.
2. i b i d . , pp . 4 80 -481 .
3. Duncan, l o c .  c i t . ,  pp .  1194-1195 .
4 . i b i d . , pp . 1201-1202 .
4atomic a c t i v i t i e s ,  (3) th e  du ty  of f o s t e r i n g  th e  b e n e f i c i a l  u s e s  of
atomic energy ,  and (4) th e  conduct of r e s e a r c h  and development so
as to  pu t th e  A u th o r i ty  in  th e  f o r e f r o n t  of a tom ic knowledge. I t
was a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  once a system of c o n t r o l s  and s a n c t io n s  had
been e s t a b l i s h e d  and was e f f e c t i v e l y  o p e r a t in g ,  f u r t h e r  p ro d u c t io n
of atomic weapons by s t a t e s  everywhere would c e a s e ,  e x i s t i n g  s to c k s
would be d e s t ro y e d ,  and a l l  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  in fo rm a t io n  r e l a t i n g  to
atomic energy m a t te r s  would be communicated to  th e  A u th o r i t y .^
At th e  second m eeting  of th e  U.N.A.E.C. on 19 June 1946,
th e  S o v ie t  Union su b m it ted  a d r a f t  co n v en tio n  p r o h ib i t i n g  th e
p ro d u c t io n  and use  of a tom ic  weapons and p ro v id in g  t h a t  w i th in
th r e e  months from i t s  e n t ry  i n t o  f o r c e ,  a l l  a tom ic  weapons were
to  be d e s t ro y e d .  At subsequen t m ee tings  of th e  Commission b o th
th e  R uss ian  and American p ro p o s a ls  were developed  and e l a b o r a t e d ,
bu t by th e  end of 1947 th e  two powers remained deep ly  d iv id e d  on 
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th e  m a t t e r .  In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  W ashington i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  
should  be no p r o v is io n  f o r  th e  e x e r c i s e  of th e  g r e a t  power v e to  
in  ca se s  in v o lv in g  S e c u r i ty  C ouncil a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  s t a t e s  which 
v i o l a t e d  t h e i r  u n d e r ta k in g s  no t to  develop  o r  u se  a tom ic energy  
fo r  d e s t r u c t i v e  p u rp o se s .  The S o v ie t  Union, which even a t  t h i s  
tim e had a l r e a d y  made abundant u se  of th e  v e t o ,  i n t e r p r e t e d  th e  
American i n i t i a t i v e  as  an a t t a c k  on th e  u n d e r ly in g  b a s i s  of th e  
pos t-w ar  s e t t l e m e n t  and co n se q u e n t ly  r e s i s t e d  th e  move. Second, 
Moscow o b je c te d  s t r o n g ly  to  A m erica’s i n s i s t e n c e  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l
1. See , The U nited N a tio n s  and Disarmament, 1945-1965, N.York: 
U nited  N ations  O f f ic e  of P u b l ic  In fo rm a t io n ,  1967, ( h e r e ­
a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as The U nited N ations  and Disarmament) , 
pp. 12-13.
2. For an e x c e l l e n t  acc o u n t of th e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  see  Bernhard 
G. B echhoefe r ,  Postw ar N e g o t i a t io n s  f o r  Arms C o n t r o l , 
W ashington, D .C . : The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1961, p p .5 4 -7 7 .
The m a t e r i a l  in  t h i s  p a rag rap h  i s  drawn from t h i s  s o u rc e .
For an ex tended  d i s c u s s io n  of th e  Baruch P la n ,  see  Joseph
P 0 M urray, From Y a l ta  To D isarm am ent, London: M erlin  P r e s s ,  
1963.
5ownership of p r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  m a t e r i a l s  and f a c i l i t i e s  concerned w ith  
n u c le a r  f i s s i o n .  Such a scheme, th e  S o v ie ts  o b je c te d ,  would lead  
to  unw arran ted  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in  th e  economic a f f a i r s  of s t a t e s  ev e ry ­
where and would a l low  th e  UoS, to  s e c u re  f o r  i t s e l f  a world  monopoly 
of th e  i n d u s t r i a l  u ses  of th e  atom. T h i rd ,  Moscow was only  
p repa red  to  a c c e p t  " p e r io d ic  in s p e c t io n s "  of d e c la re d  n u c le a r  
f a c i l i t i e s .  This was f a r  l e s s  th an  th e  s c a l e  of i n s p e c t io n  which 
th e  U.S. though t n e c e s s a ry  to  en su re  th e  observance  of commitments. 
F o u r th ,  th e  U.S. wanted a l l  n u c le a r  r e s e a r c h  and development of a 
"dangerous"  c h a r a c te r  r e s t r i c t e d  to  th e  proposed Atomic Development 
A u th o r i ty ;  Moscow would have allow ed such a c t i v i t y  to  be c a r r i e d  
on in  n a t io n a l  s t a t e s .  F i n a l l y ,  W ashington i n s i s t e d  t h a t  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  c o n t r o l s  should  be e s t a b l i s h e d  b e fo re  n u c le a r  weapons 
were p r o h ib i t e d ;  th e  S o v ie t  Union i n s i s t e d  t h a t  " p r o h ib i t i o n "  
must p recede  " c o n t r o l s " .
The d iv e rg e n c e s  between th e  S o v ie t  and American p la n s  f o r  
th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  of atom ic energy r e f l e c t e d  v e ry  r e a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  th e  s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  of th e  two powers. The 
U.S. wanted i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  b ecause  i t  f e a re d  t h a t ,  in  
t im e ,  a d d i t i o n a l  s t a t e s  would become cap a b le  of dev e lo p in g  th e  
bomb. As e a r ly  as June 1945 th e  Franck C om m ittee 's  r e p o r t  to  
th e  American S e c re ta ry  of War had s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e  U.S. could 
no t hope to  avoid  a n u c le a r  armament r a c e ,  " e i t h e r  by keeping  
s e c r e t  from competing n a t io n s  th e  b a s ic  s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t s  of 
n u c le a r  power, or by c o rn e r in g  th e  raw m a t e r i a l s  f o r  such a 
race» "^  In  March of th e  fo l lo w in g  y ea r  th e  L i l i e n t h a l  Report 
was r e l e a s e d .  These f i n d i n g s ,  which foreshadowed th e  Baruch 
P lan  i t s e l f ,  emphasised that, th e  b a s ic  s c ie n c e  upon which th e  
new development r e s t e d  was l a r g e l y  known to  com petent s c i e n t i s t s  
th roughou t th e  world and t h a t  th e  in d u s t r y  and techno logy
1. P.M„So B la c k e t t ,  M i l i t a r y  and P o l i t i c a l  Consequences of 
Atomic E nergy , London: T u r n s t i l e  P r e s s ,  1948, p . 104,
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necessary for the production of atomic bombs was essentially no 
different from that which was already in general use^ But regard­
less of its desire for international control, Washington wanted 
to see controls established to ensure that the sharing of nuclear 
knowledge did not endanger America’s security; until such guar­
antees were effectively operating, the U»So was not prepared to 
surrender its nuclear monopoly» As former Secretary of State 
Byrnes said in 1947:
It would be unfortunate if hostile governments 
possessed atomic bombs» But, it would be even 
more unfortunate if we threw our bombs away, gave 
over information to an international organisation 
with inadequate power to exercise effective 
control, and thus enabled another government [the 
UcS.S.Rc] to manufacture bombs without our know­
ledge far sooner than otherwise would have been
possible» 2
But Moscow’s attitude to proposals for the international control 
of atomic energy was strongly influenced by security consider­
ations too. Russia viewed the inspection provisions of the 
Baruch Plan as an attempt by the U,S, to spy on Soviet military 
and industrial facilities» More to the point, however, the 
U„S„S»R» was at that time striving to develop an atomic bomb 
of its own and was understandably quite reluctant to agree to 
any proposal which would have thwarted these efforts. The 
failure to impose international control on the atom was clearly 
one of the early indications of the deepening post-war rift 
between Russia and the U»S»
In May 1948, the UJSLA»E,Co, in its third report to the 
Security Council, acknowledged that an impasse had been reached 
in progress towards a draft treaty on the international control
1» A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (The 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report), Washington, D»C»: United States 
Department of State, March 1946, p, 20,
2, Quoted in Robert V» Edington, "Japan in the United Nations 
on the Issue of Nuclear Weapons," unpublished Ph»D» thesis, 
University of Washington (Seattle), 1968, p, 33»
7of a tom ic energy . The Commission d id  n o t  meet a g a in  a f t e r  J u ly
1949 and in  January  1952 was d i s s o lv e d  by a r e s o l u t i o n  of th e  
2
G eneral Assembly. However, a t  subsequen t m ee tings  of th e  G eneral 
Assembly and th e  Disarmament Commission, th e  q u e s t io n  of i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  c o n t ro l  of atom ic energy was o f t e n  d i s c u s s e d ,  The Baruch 
P lan  remained th e  b a s i s  of American p o l ic y  on th e  m a t t e r ,  though
P r e s id e n t  E isenhow er’s "Atoms f o r  Peace" p la n  of 1953 seemed to
3
imply th e  abandonment of a t  l e a s t  one of i t s  major p r o v i s io n s .
The approach embodied in  th e  Baruch P lan  was no t fo rm a l ly  aban-
4
doned t i l l  September 1955. By th e n ,  th e  development of thermo­
n u c le a r  weapons had " d e s t ro y e d  th e  concept of s e c u r in g  th e  
e l im in a t io n  of n u c le a r  weapons th rough  acc o u n tin g  f o r  a l l  p a s t  
p ro d u c t io n  of n u c le a r  m a t e r i a l s .  The m argin  of e r r o r  in  any 
system of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  had become too  g r e a t  a r i s k . " '*
The American p o s i t i o n  on th e  c o n t r o l  of a tom ic  energy  was 
a r r iv e d  a t  on ly  a f t e r  long and a t  tim es b i t t e r  d e b a te .  Two 
major d i s p u te s  h ig h l ig h te d  th e  n a t io n w id e  d ia lo g u e .  F i r s t ,  
th e r e  was c o n s id e r a b le  d isag reem en t abou t th e  c o n t r o l  of 
A m eric a 's  own n u c le a r  i n d u s t r y .  Though i t  seems to  have been 
w idely  h e ld  t h a t  a tom ic  energy  was n o t  a p ro p er  f i e l d  f o r  
p r i v a t e  e x p l o i t a t i o n ,  no t a l l  Americans were ag reed  as to  where 
a u t h o r i t y  f o r  c o n t r o l  of th e  new development should  r e s i d e .
During th e  l a t t e r  p a r t  of 1945 and th e  e a r l y  months of 1946 
a b i t t e r  p o l i t i c a l  f i g h t  was waged in  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  to  
d e te rm in e  w hether a tom ic  energy development i n  t h a t  co u n try
1. The U nited  N a tio n s  and D isarm am ent, p , 20.
2. i b i d . , p„24.
3. For d e t a i l s  of th e  "Atoms f o r  Peace" p la n ,  see  below , p. 18.
4. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t i a t io n s  on th e  T rea ty  on th e  Non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of N uc lea r  Weapons, W ashington, D .C .: U nited  
S t a t e s  Arms C o n tro l  and Disarmament Agency, 1969, ( h e r e ­
a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t i a t io n s  on N .P .T . ) ,
p . 2.
5. B echhoe fe r ,  op, c i t . ,  pp . 257 and 357,
8should  be c o n t r o l l e d  p r i m a r i l y  by the  m i l i t a r y  or  by c i v i l i a n s .
The i s s u e  was e v e n t u a l l y  r e s o lv e d  by th e  pas sage  of t h e  Atomic 
Energy Act which g ua ran teed  c i v i l i a n  c o n t r o l  th rough  the  United 
S t a t e s  Atomic Energy Commission. S ince  t h a t  t ime t h e  Atomic Energy 
Commission and the  J o i n t  Congres s iona l  Committee on Atomic Energy 
have emerged as the  g u a rd ia n s  of American i n t e r e s t s  in  th e  n u c l e a r  
f i e l d .  Both have proved " c o n s i d e r a b l y  more c o n s e r v a t i v e  and 
s k e p t i c a l  over ex tend ing  th e  a r e a s  of  atomic c o o p e r a t i o n  tha n  
t h e  White House".'*'
But more d i v i s i v e  th a n  t h i s  d i s p u t e  over domest ic  c o n t r o l
was t h e  argument about  A m er ica ' s  r e s p o n s e  to  t h e  e x p l o i t a t i o n
of atomic energy on t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  le v e l«  Few Americans
q ues t ioned  the  need f o r  some form of c o n t r o l  over t h e  use of
th e  atomic bomb, and i t  was g e n e r a l l y  agreed t h a t  t h e  U nited
S t a t e s  should not  s h a r e  w i th  o t h e r  n a t io n s  th e  in fo rm a t io n
2
n ece ss a ry  f o r  th e  m anufac tu re  of  t h e  new weapon« But a d i s p u t e  
a r o s e  over c o l l a b o r a t i o n  i n  n u c l e a r  r e s e a r c h  not  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
r e l a t e d  to  th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  the  bomb. There were many 
Americans,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  s c i e n t i f i c  c i r c l e s ,  who b e l i e v e d  
t h a t  p eop le  everywhere were e n t i t l e d  t o  s h a re  i n  t h e  f r u i t s  
of n u c l e a r  s c i e n c e  and t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  to  be ga ined  from 
r e s e a r c h  could be maximised by a f r e e  exchange of  i n f o r m a t io n  
between a l l  n a t i o n s .  Moreover,  i t  was argued t h a t  such an 
approach could  be expec ted  to  p r e c lu d e  th e  many s u s p i c i o n s  
which migh t  o th e rw is e  sur round  n a t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h  in  t h i s  f i e l d .
1. Will iam B. Bader ,  The United  S t a t e s  and th e  Spread of 
Nuclear  Weapons, N, York: P egasus ,  1968,  p .  28„
2. I t  should be n o te d ,  however,  t h a t  the  Smyth r e p o r t ,  th e  
f i r s t  comprehensive d e s c r i p t i o n  of  th e  war t ime atomic, 
p r o j e c t  was r e l e a s e d  i n  1945. Th is  work was of a f a i r l y  
g e n e r a l  n a t u r e  b u t  i t  d id  g iv e  "gu idance  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  
p a th s  to  fo l l o w  or not  to  f o l l o w  i n  an atomic  weapons 
program."  The r e p o r t  was q u ic k ly  t r a n s l a t e d  and p u b l i s h e d  
in  R u s s ia .  See,  Arnold Kramish,  "The Emergent Genie" i n  
R.N. Rosecrance ,  The D is p e r s io n  of Nuc lea r  Weapons,
N. York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1964,  p.  264«
9O thers  emphasised th e  v a lu e  of such a move in  term s of S o v ie t -
American r e l a t i o n s  s p e c i f i c a l l y .  Indeed ,  Dr Vannevar Bush,
D i r e c to r  of th e  O f f ic e  of S c i e n t i f i c  R esearch  and Development,
warned t h a t  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  a f r e e  exchange of s c i e n t i f i c
in fo rm a t io n  w ith  R uss ia  was a n u c le a r  arms race.'*' I t  was an
e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  of th e  argument f o r  a f r e e  exchange t h a t  a
d i s t i n c t i o n  could  be drawn between in fo rm a t io n  of a g e n e ra l
" s c i e n t i f i c "  n a tu r e  on th e  one hand and " e n g in e e r in g "  d e t a i l s
2more s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  to  bomb c o n s t r u c t io n  on th e  o th e r .
But th e r e  was w idesp read  o p p o s i t io n  to  s u g g e s t io n s  t h a t  
America should  s h a re  even some of i t s  n u c le a r  in fo rm a t io n  w ith  
o th e r s .  Foremost amongst th o s e  who advocated  a p o l i c y  of 
se c re c y  were th e  J o i n t  C h ie fs  of S t a f f .  I t  was t h e i r  view th a t  
any c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union was e s p e c i a l l y  danger­
ous. W ashington, th ey  a rg u ed ,  should  r e f u s e  to  r e v e a l  any
of th e  c o u n t r y 's  n u c le a r  s e c r e t s  w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e p r e s s -
3ing f o r  u rg e n t  c o n t r o l s  on th e  u se  of th e  a tom ic bomb.
The d eb a te  over th e  d i r e c t i o n  of American p o l i c y  was
no t u n r e la t e d  to  a sse ssm en ts  abou t th e  p ro s p e c ts  of n u c le a r
s p re a d .  Those who su p p o r ted  a p o l i c y  of openness emphasised
th e  v iew , w idely  h e ld  amongst s c i e n t i s t s ,  t h a t  any a t te m p t  by
th e  U nited  S ta t e s  to  m a in ta in  i t s  n u c le a r  monopoly would be
4
f u t i l e .  But th e  opponen ts  of openness were confident, t h a t  
t h e i r  c o u n t r y 's  n u c le a r  monopoly would not be d e s t ro y e d  in  
th e  immediate f u t u r e ,  and t h a t  co n seq u en t ly  t h e r e  were r e a l  
g a in s  to  be had from a p o l i c y  of s e c re c y .  Even amongst th o se  
who b e l ie v e d  t h a t  o th e r  n a t io n s  would e v e n tu a l ly  be a b l e  to
1. H arry  S. Truman, Year of D e c i s io n s , London: Hodder and 
S tough ton ,  1955, p . 465.
2. In  l a t e r  y e a r s  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  was reco g n ise d  by s u c c e s s ­
iv e  U.S. A d m in i s t r a t io n s  a l s o ,  and se rved  as a p a r t i a l  
g u id e  to  th e  ty p e  o f  n u c le a r  in fo rm a t io n  America was th en  
p rep a red  to  s h a re  w i th  o th e r  s t a t e s .
3. Truman, op. c i t . , pp . 465-6.
4. See above, p. 5»
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build nuclear weapons there was a tendency to exaggerate the
financial, engineering and technological gap which was assumed
to exist between the United States and the rest of the world.
It was widely predicted for instance that the Soviet Union could
1not acquire nuclear weapons for many years. The explosion of 
an atomic bomb by Russia in 1949 came as a shock to more than 
a few American scientists and statesmen. This belief that 
technological and financial constraints would contribute 
substantially to limiting or retarding the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by additional states characterised American policy till 
well into the following decade,
In terms of the controversy over the appropriate American 
response to the control of atomic energy in the post-war period, 
the Atomic Energy Act and the Baruch Plan together represented 
a victory for the advocates of an American monopoly, at least 
in the short run, in both the military and civilian uses of 
the atom. Not only were other nations to be denied information 
relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but in addition, 
the United States did not intend to exchange any information or 
material related to the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy 
pending the establishment of effective international control.
This insistence on international control as a precondition for 
any exchange of information or material was later abandoned 
under the "Atoms for Peace" programme.
Though it is apparent that from 1945 onwards the U.S. was 
concerned with monopolizing the bomb, it would be erroneous to 
suggest that America had a "nonproliferaiion" policy right from 
the start. The term "proliferation" suggests an awareness of
1. A committee assembled in 1945 by Secretary of War Stimson, 
and which included an impressive array of scientists such 
as Fermi, Oppenheimer and Lawrence, concluded that it would 
probably take the Soviet Union ten years to produce an 
atomic bomb. See Bader, op. cit., p. 21.
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th e  problem of n u c le a r  sp read  in  th e  l a r g e ,  and a b e l i e f  t h a t  any 
in c re a s e  in  th e  number of n u c le a r  powers p r e s e n t s  d a n g e rs .  T h is  
id e a  c e r t a i n l y  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  o f f i c i a l  American th in k in g  in  th e  l a t e  
1950’ s ,  bu t i t  i s  d o u b tfu l  w hether i t  was th e r e  when th e  Baruch 
P lan  and th e  Atomic Energy Act were being f i r s t  p r e s e n te d .  I t  i s  
t r u e  of co u rse  t h a t  some Americans a t  t h i s  tim e saw th e  p o s s i b i l ­
i t y  of n u c le a r  weapons be ing  e v e n tu a l ly  a c q u ire d  by q u i t e  a number 
of s t a t e s .  But W ash ing ton 's  a t t i t u d e  to  n u c lea r  sp read  in  th e  
immediate p o s t-w ar  y e a r s  was p r im a r i ly  a r e f l e c t i o n  of more 
immediate and s p e c i f i c  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  v i z , , i t s  conce rn  no t to  
he lp  R uss ia  a c q u i r e  th e  bomb, I t s  f a i l u r e  to  a s s i s t  B r i t a i n  
r e f l e c t e d  n o t  concern  about ' ' p r o l i f e r a t i o n " ,  or even about a 
U.K, n u c le a r  c a p a b i l i t y ,  sc much as f e a r  th a t  to  h e lp  B r i t a i n  
might r e s u l t  i n  h e lp  to  th e  R u s s ia n s ,
B, The Atomic Energy Act and A m erica’s Cold War S t r a t e g y .
From th e  tim e of i t s  r a t i f i c a t i o n  in  1946, th e  Atomic Energy 
Act q u ic k ly  became th e  c o rn e r s to n e  of American e f f o r t s  to  l i m i t  
n u c le a r  s p re a d .  I t  has  been no ted  t h a t  th e  Act p r o h ib i t e d  most 
forms of n u c le a r  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  between th e  U nited  S t a t e s  and 
o th e r  n a t io n s  and d u r in g  th e  e a r l y  pos t-w ar y e a r s  was invoked 
a g a i n s t  A m erica 's  most t r u s t e d  a l l y ,  G reat B r i t a i n .  Throughout 
th e  1950' s  th e  Atomic. Energy A c t,  d e s p i t e  i t s  amendment on more 
th an  one o c c a s io n ,  rem ained th e  p r i n c i p a l  in s t ru m e n t  of Ameri­
can e f f o r t s  to  m a in ta in  i t s  n u c le a r  monopoly. The c i rc u m s tan c es  
su rro u n d in g  th e  amendments r e f l e c t e d  th e  demands of W ash ing ton 's  
co ld  war s t r a t e g y .  In  o rd e r  to  un d ers tan d  more f u l l y  th e  r o l e  
of th e  Atomic Energy Act i n  American p o l i c y  d u r in g  t h i s  p e r io d  
i t  w i l l  be n e c e s s a ry  to  rev iew  b r i e f l y  th e  p la c e  of a tom ic  
weapons in  European d e fe n c e .
The a b o r t i v e  a t te m p t  by th e  U nited S t a t e s  to  a c h ie v e  
agreem ent w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union over i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  of
12
atomic energy was pursued against a background of worsening 
relations between the two powers. Since the end of the Second 
World War a succession of crises in Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Berlin highlighted a growing rift between Russia and America 
which developed into the Cold War of the 1950’s. This deepening 
confrontation profoundly influenced American thinking about the 
role of nuclear weapons in world affairs6 The enunciation of 
the Truman Doctrine in 1947 marked the commencement of a new 
era in the evolution of America’s post-war diplomacy. There­
after, thinking in the United States about nuclear arms control 
was conducted in a political and strategic environment vastly 
different from that in which the initial decisions about the 
control of atomic energy had been made0 At the time the Baruch 
plan was introduced, American strategy was not heavily dependent 
on nuclear weapons. As Hedley Bull has suggested, "nuclear 
weapons were few, their military implications had not been 
thought out, military planning and organisation had not been 
built around them, and they were largely extraneous to 
military policy."^ But in response to the deepening Cold War» 
and in support of its commitment to N„AaTo0., the United States 
evolved a strategy which accorded a major role to its nuclear 
armaments. The movement of these weapons to the very centre 
of American military policy was a development destined to 
influence, both directly and indirectly, the course of thinking 
in the United States about the spread of nuclear weapons to 
additional countries.
From its inception N.A.T.O. suffered from a shortage of 
conventional forces and tended to rely heavily on the threat 
of nuclear retaliation. During the alliance’s early years this 
capacity was provided exclusively by the strike forces of the
1. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (second edition)» 
N. York: Praeger, 1965, p. 98.
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United States Strategie Air Command (S.A.C.). By the mid-1950's
tactical nuclear weapons were becoming available in quantity:
these included bombs deliverable by light bomber or fighter
bomber; variants of the short-range rocket or guided missile;
and, the 280 mm. nuclear cannon, about 30 of which had been
supplied to N.A.T.O. forces by late 1954.^ In December of that
year, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, it was decided
that the alliance should plan on initiating the use of these
2weapons if ever necessary. This decision led to the diffusion 
of tactical nuclear weapons within N.A.T.O. and necessitated the 
amendment of the United States Atomic Energy Act to allow for 
the transfer to America's allies of information necessary for 
the carrying out of a tactical nuclear strategy. Finally, in 
the wake of Russia's technological breakthrough in 1957, 
symbolised by the launching that year of the world's first earth 
satellite, the United States decided to seek the deployment of 
medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe.
It was hoped that this move would eliminate the dangers inherent 
in any possible 'missile gap'. During 1959 and 1960, four 
American I.R.B.M. squadrons were placed in Britain and agree­
ments were negotiated for similar installations in Turkey and 
Italy. Throughout the 1950's then, nuclear weapons, the 
overwhelming majority of which were American owned, were 
accorded a key role in the defence of Western Europe. Indeed, 
during most of this period, N.A.T.O. strategy called for the 
almost immediate use of nuclear weapons in response to any but 
the most limited of Soviet incursions.
The first major amendment to the Atomic Energy Act was 
made in 1954 and allowed for the sharing of information necessary
1. Coral Bell, Survey of International Affairs, 1954, London, 
O.U.P.: 1957, p, 116.
2. J.I. Coffey, "Strategy, Alliance Policy and Nuclear Prolif­
eration" in Orbis, Vol. 11, No. 4, Winter 1968, p. 977.
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for the execution of a tactical nuclear strategy in Europe.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitted Washington to acquaint 
its N.A.T.O. allies with information on the external character­
istics of nuclear weapons, such as "size, weight and shape, 
yield and effects, and systems employed in the delivery 
thereof."^ But care was taken to exclude the transfer of 
information which was thought may have facilitated allied 
manufacture of nuclear weapons and to ensure that control of 
American warheads would not pass from Washington's hands.
To this end the amended act stipulated that the United States
was to retain physical possession at all times of the war-
2heads dispersed throughout N.A.T.O. As a further precaution,
the Act of 1954 ensured that Congress (through the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy) was given considerable control
3over executive agreements to disseminate nuclear weapons.
This addition to the powers of the Joint Committee assisted 
the emergence of that body as the guardian of America's 
atomic energy legislation. In 1957, the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy moved to block an executive proposal to
4
transfer custody of nuclear stockpiles to N.A.T.O. itself, 
and in 1958 and again in 1960, objected strongly to sugges­
tions that the United States assist France in the development 
of a nuclear submarine engine.^ In more recent times the Joint 
Committee has continued to urge restraint in the dissemination 
of nuclear information. The character of the 1954 amendment 
suggests that Washington, while anxious to find some solution 
to N.A.T.O.'s military problems, was nevertheless reluctant 
to do anything which could help other states to acquire nuclear
1. R.E. Osgood, N.A.T.O.; The Entangling Alliance, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 108.
2. ibid., p. 216.
3. ibid., p. 386, fn.21.
4. ibido, p. 220.
5. ibid,, p. 226.
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weapons of their own. But as Secretary of State Dulles recognised, 
this was difficult to avoid. In commenting, in 1954, on the 
proposed amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, he said:
The art of telling people what a weapon is like, 
what it can do to you, how you can protect your­
self, and at the same time not tell anybody how 
you produce the weapon, that undoubtedly is a 
difficult task of definition.1
The outcome of this attempt to reconcile the demands of strategy
with the desire not to help others produce nuclear weapons will
be reviewed later in this chapter.
The second major amendment to the Atomic Energy Act was
made in 1958. Mainly in response to the concern stimulated by
the launching of Sputniks I and II, Washington decided to
deploy I.R.jb>M.s on allied soil and to establish in Europe
stocks of nuclear warheads intended for release to N.A.T.O.
commanders in the event of hostilities. An agreement along
these lines was reached at a N.A.T.O. Council meeting in 
2December 1957 and approval confirmed when the Atomic Energy
Act was amended in July of the following year. The Act
authorized, under certain specific conditions, the transfer
to America’s allies of : (1) the non-nuclear parts of atomic
weapons, (2) fissionable nuclear materials suitable for the
development of, or use in, nuclear weapons, (3) sensitive
information concerning nuclear weapons, and (4) nuclear
3equipment such as military reactors. As in the case of the 
1954 amendment it was not intended that this latest revision 
of the Atomic Energy Act should make it easier for additional 
states to acquire nuclear weapons. In submitting the proposed 
legislation to Congress, the Atomic Energy Commission 
emphasised that:
1. ibid. , P* 401, fn.3.2c ibid., P- 221.
3. Bader, op . cit., p.
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It is not intended that manufactured components of 
weapons could be transferred under this amendment, 
nor that we promote the entry of additional countries 
into the field of production of nuclear weapons.1
Care was taken to ensure that under the terms of the new agree­
ment warheads would continue to remain in the custody of American 
personnel, I.R.B.M,* deployed in Europe were to be operated 
accordingly to a "two-key" arrangement in which Washington 
controlled the warheads and the host country the missiles.
Joint action by both parties would be required to activate 
the weapons. In addition, the provision in the new legis­
lation relating to the transfer of atomic secrets and 
material was limited to those countries which had displayed
"substantial progress" in the development of a nuclear weapons 
2capability. It was generally understood by those responsible
for the framing of the legislation that this concession was
to apply only in the case of Great Britain and was not to be
interpreted as a willingness on the part of the United States
to assist other nations in the development of nuclear 
3weapons. An offer to assist the United Kingdom was extended
only after Britain, in May 1957, had successfully demonstrated
its own thermonuclear capacity. Finally, it should be noted
that this latest revision of the Atomic Energy Act was
accompanied by numerous claims that an upgrading of the
nuclear factor in America’s European strategy was necessary
partly in order to forestall any movement towards independent
4nuclear capabilities in Europe.
1. ibid,
2. ibid., p, 30.
3, Mr Harold S. Vance, a commissioner of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, was particularly candid about this discrimina­
tory policy. In testifying before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, he said:
Now our dilemma is this: We admit, to ourselves, that we 
want to discriminate among our allies, but we cannot admit 
it to them, Now the way to handle this situation is for you 
gentlemen tc write some criteria into this law that we can 
use as a basis for our refusal to treat all of our allies 
alike. Quoted in, ibid.
4, Osgood, op. cit., pp. 224-5,
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Throughout the 1950s then, Washington remained firmly 
committed to a policy of not helping other states to acquire 
nuclear weapons«» The two amendments to the Atomic Energy Act 
in this period enabled America to maximize its strategic 
flexibility and to provide its European allies with, a sense of 
confidence that they could be defended. However, there was 
clearly no intention of facilitating any increase in the total 
number of nuclear powers, Nevertheless, it can be reasonably 
argued that the increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in 
planning the defence of Western Europe only stimulated the 
desire amongst some N.A.T.O. members for their own independent 
nuclear capabilities. This development will be analysed later 
in the chapter.
C. The "Atoms for Peace" Programme and the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
It was noted earlier chat the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
prohibited the exchange of any nuclear information or material 
between the United States and other countries. In the absence 
of enforceable and effective incernational safeguards this 
refusal to assist other states in the peaceful exploitation of 
atomic energy was viewed by Washington as an essential element 
in its effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. During 
the first half of the 1950s, however, this approach was reversed, 
and following the amendment of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, 
the United States began assisting other governments in the 
development of peaceful nuclear technology. The first bilateral 
agreements were authorized by President Eisenhower in 1955 and 
provided for the export of research reactors and small quantities
18
of enriched uranium,^ During the late 1950s alone, America sold
2about 25 research reactors abroad» By 1968, the U.S. was 
cooperating in the civil uses of atomic energy with no less than 
29 individual countries and two international organizations 
(EURATOM and the I.A 0E.A .).1 23 45
This departure from the previous policy of secrecy was fore­
shadowed in President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal of 
December, 1953. During an address to the General Assembly, the 
American leader proposed that the governments "principally 
involved" make joint, contributions from their stockpiles of 
fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency 
(I.A.E.A.). It would be the responsibility of this agency to
allocate the fissionable material to serve the peaceful
4pursuits of mankind. There were a number of reasons for the 
"Atoms for Peace" initiative. It is clear that Eisenhower was 
anxious to inject an element of optimism into the gloom, 
engendered by the current impasse in progress towards dis­
armament. The proposal to share the fruits of nuclear science 
was comfortingly humanitarian, and at the same time, offered 
the prospect of new channels of communication between Washing­
ton and Moscow.^ Prestige and commercial considerations were
1. See, Questions posed by Senator Cooper and answers by the 
Atomic Energy Commission, Reproduced in Nonproliferation 
Treaty, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Part 2, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 18 and 
20, 1969, Washington, 1969 (hereafter referred to as Senate
Hearings on Nonproliferation Treaty, Part 2, 1969), p. 491» 
The first quantities of enriched uranium were exported to 
Brazil, Turkey and Colombia. See, John A. Hall, "Atoms for 
Peace or War", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No, 4, July 1965,
p. 608.
2. ibid., p. 609.
3. See, Questions posed by Senator Cooper and answers by the 
Department of State. Reproduced in Senate Hearings on 
Nonproliferation Treaty, Part 2, 1969, p. 487.
4. President Eisenhower's speech is reproduced in The Department 
of State Bulletin (hereafter referred to as D.O.S.B.) ,
21 December 1953, pp. 847-851.
5. Hall, loc. cit», p. 603.
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probably also motivating factors and there were possibly some 
Americans who saw in the scheme a means of discovering how far 
the Russians had advanced in the nuclear field. But it seems 
that the "Atoms for Peace" plan was primarily an attempt by the 
United States to replace secrecy with influence. It appears 
to have been anticipated that in some way Washington could 
promote a system of international controls while simultaneously 
encouraging the spread of nuclear technology. This can certain­
ly be deduced from some remarks during 1965 by Glenn T. Seaborg, 
Chairman of the United States Atomic. Energy Commission. In 
discussing the "Atoms for Peace" proposal he said:
We ... considered that if we did not cooperate in 
sharing our peaceful nuclear technology and nuclear 
materials, there would be other countries - not all 
of which would necessarily agree to the need for 
safeguards - other countries which might be willing 
to provide nuclear materials and technology without 
a firm assurance as to their eventual peaceful end 
use. ^
The "Atoms for Peace" programme involved the abandonment of 
the central feature of the Baruch Plan, viz., the concept of 
international ownership or operational control of all atomic 
energy activities considered dangerous to world security. The 
reason for this change in American policy is obvious: by 1953,
national ownership or control of atomic energy activities was 
an established fact and consequently the idea of ownership by 
the proposed international Atomic Development Authority seemed 
impracticable, But if the concept of international ownership 
had been abandoned, that of supervision had not. With few 
exceptions, the assistance in the peaceful nuclear field which 
the U.S. has extended to foreign powers has been accompanied 
by safeguards arrangements to ensure that the materials and
1. Quoted in, ibid., p. 614.
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f a c i l i t i e s  s u p p lie d  a r e  not used f o r  m i l i t a r y  purposes,'*’ These
sa fe g u a rd s  a rrangem ents  p ro v id e  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  w ith  th e  r i g h t
of o n - s i t e  in s p e c t io n  of r e a c t o r s  and o th e r  equipment to  d e te rm in e
t h a t  th e  commitment to  p e a c e fu l  u se s  i s  be ing  o b se rv ed .  In
a d d i t i o n ,  th e  r e c i p i e n t  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  o b l ig ed  to  keep re c o rd s
and submit p e r io d ic  r e p o r t s  on th e  r e l e v a n t  u n d e r ta k in g s .  The
U.S. a l s o  has th e  r i g h t  to  rev iew  th e  d e s ig n  of f a c i l i t i e s  in
2
o rd e r  to  en su re  t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  s a fe g u a rd s  can be a p p l ie d .  In
a d d i t i o n  to  ap p ly in g  sa fe g u a rd s  to  i t s  own b i l a t e r a l  t r a n s f e r s
of n u c le a r  m a te r i a l  and equipm ent, th e  U nited  S t a t e s  has
3
encouraged o th e r  s u p p l i e r s  to  do l ik e w is e .
Through i t s  b i l a t e r a l  a s s i s t a n c e  programme, th e  U.S. has
prov ided  f o r e ig n  c o u n t r i e s  w i th  a c c e s s  to  much of A m erica 's
v a s t  knowledge i n  th e  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  f i e l d .  But i n  some a r e a s
of p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  te ch n o lo g y ,  c o n s id e r a b le  s e c re c y  has been
m a in ta in e d .  Nowhere i s  t h i s  more so th a n  in  th e  f i e l d  of
4
uranium i s o to p e  s e p a r a t io n  (en r ichm en t)  te ch n o lo g y .  E nriched
1. In  1957, th e  European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was 
accorded  th e  p r i v i l e g e  of s e l f - i n s p e c t i o n ,  b u t  i n  acc o rd ­
ance w ith  American s t a n d a r d s .  P r i o r  to  t h i s ,  Canada and 
B r i t a i n ,  which were a l re a d y  co m p e t i to r s  i n  th e  p e a c e fu l  
n u c le a r  f i e l d ,  were th e  only  r e c i p i e n t s  of American a s s i s ­
ta n c e  to  have been exempted from b i l a t e r a l ,  o n - th e - s p o t  
s u p e r v i s io n .  See, Arnold Kramish, The P e a c e fu l  Atom in  
F o re ig n  P o l i c y , No York: Harper and Row, 1963, pp. 155-156.
2. For d e t a i l s  of U.S. b i l a t e r a l  s a fe g u a rd s  a r ra n g e m e n ts ,  see  
Q ues tions  posed by S ena to r  Cooper and answers by th e  Atomic 
Energy Commission. Reproduced in  S ena te  H earings  on Non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  T re a ty ,  P a r t  2, 1969, pp, 491-492,
3. See, L e t t e r  from A s s i s t a n t  S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e  MacArthur to  
Chairman H o l i f ie ld . ,  Reproduced in  N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of 
N uc lea r  Weapons, h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  J o i n t  Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 89 th  Cong,, 2nd S e s s , ,  F ebruary  23, and 
March 1 and 7, 1966, W ashington, 1966 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to  a s  JoC.AoE, H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of N uclear  
Weapons 1966) ,  p , 30,
4. Very r e c e n t l y ,  t h e r e  have been in d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  th e  U.S. i s  
now p re p a re d ,  s u b je c t  to  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  to  s h a re  some of 
i t s  s e c r e t s  r e l a t i n g  to  enrichm ent te ch n o lo g y .  This  d ev e lo p ­
ment has a l a r g e  b e a r in g  on one of th e  b a s ic  themes of t h i s  
t h e s i s  and w i l l  be ta k e n  up in  some d e t a i l  l a t e r  i n  th e  
d i s c u s s io n .  See below, Chapter XI,
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uranium  i s  used as th e  f u e l  in  a l a r g e  m a jo r i ty  of th e  w o r ld ’ s 
n u c le a r  power r e a c t o r s .  However, th e  m a t e r i a l  can a l s o  be 
used as an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  p lu ton ium  in  th e  m anufac tu re  of n u c le a r  
weapons and i s  reg a rd ed  as  h ig h ly  s u i t a b l e ,  i f  n o t  e s s e n t i a l ,  
i n  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of th e rm o -n u c le a r  w e a p o n s T h e  U nited  S t a t e s  
m a n u fa c tu re s  en r ic h ed  uranium by u s in g  th e  gaseous d i f f u s i o n  
method. T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  Washington has m a in ta in ed  a s t r i c t  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  on t h i s  p ro c e s s  and has banned th e  e x p o r t  of
2s p e c i a l i z e d  equipment which could  be used in  d i f f u s i o n  p l a n t s .
In  J u ly  1965, work in  th e  U,S, on th e  gas c e n t r i f u g e  te c h n iq u e ,
an a l t e r n a t i v e  method of uranium i s o to p e  s e p a r a t io n ,  was a l s o  
3
c l a s s i f i e d .  E a r l i e r ,  i n  August 1960, th e  U nited  S ta t e s
Atomic Energy Commission (U .S .A .E .C ,)  had asked th e  West German
4
Government to  c l a s s i f y  work in  t h a t  co u n try  to o .  Concern 
abou t th e  c e n t r i f u g e  p ro c e s s  stemmed from c e r t a i n  advan tages  
i t  en joyed  r e l a t i v e  to  th e  d i f f u s i o n  method; in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
o p e ra t io n s  could  be concea led  more e a s i l y  and could be con­
duc ted  on a sm a l le r  s c a l e , ^  But d e s p i t e  th e s e  e f f o r t s  by th e  
UoS, ,  as w e l l  as  th o se  by B r i t a i n  and R u s s ia ,^  th e  d i f f u s i o n
1, Ia n  B e l la n y ,  A u s t r a l i a  i n  th e  N uclear  Age, Sydney: Sydney 
U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  1972, p p , 20-21,
2, See, te s t im o n y  of Dr, Glenn T, Seaborg , Chairman, UoSoAoE.C,,  
i n  J , C, A, E,  H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of N uclear Weapons, 
1966, p , 62,
3, See, comments by C raig  Hosmer, member of th e  House of 
R e p re s e n ta t iv e s  and Chet H o l i f i e l d ,  Chairman, J .C. A, E,  in  
F u tu re  Ownership of A„E, C, ’ s Gaseous D if fu s io n  P l a n t s , 
h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  J o i n t  Committee on Atomic Energy,
9 1 s t  Cong,, 1 s t  S e s s , ,  J u ly  8-August 8, 1969, W ashington,
1970 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  J ,C,A,Ec H earings  on F u tu re  
Ownership of AoE.Co’ s Gaseous D i f fu s io n  P l a n t s ,  1969) ,  p , 56 ,
4, Kramish, op, c i t , ,  p p , 15-16.
5, See, te s t im ony  of J , T 0 Ramey, Commissioner, U.S=A.EoC„, i n  
JcC.AcE,  H earings  on F u tu re  Ownership of A,EcC, ’s Gaseous 
D i f fu s io n  P l a n t s ,  1969, p , 56 .
6, Both c o u n t r i e s  have c l a s s i f i e d  t h e i r  d i f f u s i o n  te ch n o lo g y . 
See Kramish, op , c i t , , p ,1 5 ,
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p ro cess  has been developed by F rance  and China. But th e  v i r t u a l  
i m p o s s ib i l i t y  of th w a r t in g  th e  sp read  of en richm ent techno logy  
has been dem onstra ted  more v i v i d l y  by r e c e n t  developm ents i n  th e  
c e n t r i f u g e  f i e l d .  These developm ents ,  and t h e i r  impact on American 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y ,  w i l l  be th e  s u b je c t  of more d e t a i l e d  
a n a ly s i s  l a t e r  i n  th e  th e s is .^ "
From th e  s t a r t ,  Washington claim ed to  r e g a rd  i t s  b i l a t e r a l  
n u c le a r  a s s i s t a n c e  programme as an in t e r im  m easure pending th e  
e s ta b l is h m e n t  and e f f e c t i v e  o p e r a t io n  of th e  proposed  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Atomic Energy Agency. I t  was e s p e c i a l l y  env isaged  
t h a t  th e  I .A .E .A . would assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a d m in is te r in g
2
th e  s a fe g u a rd s  and c o n t r o l  a rrangem ents  which had been c r e a te d .  
(Spokesmen f o r  th e  American Government have claim ed to  see  
s p e c i a l  advan tages  in  a m u l t i n a t i o n a l  system  of s a fe g u a rd s :  
they  have been reg a rd ed  as more un ifo rm  and economic th a n  
b i l a t e r a l  ones; as more c r e d i b l e  to  th e  world a t  l a r g e ,  s i n c e ,  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  a t  l e a s t ,  they  a r e  more o b je c t iv e  and d i s i n t e r ­
e s te d ;  and as l e s s  l i k e l y  to  be w atered-dow n i n  th e  i n t e r e s t s
3
of commercial or some o th e r  g a in ,  There i s  ev idence  t h a t  th e
U nited  S t a t e s  has a l s o  viewed th e  s a fe g u a rd s  system of . the
I.A.E.A» as a p o s s i b l e  framework f o r  th e  im p lem en ta t io n  of
w ider disarm ament m easures such as  a " c u t - o f f "  i n  th e  p ro d u c-
4
t i o n  of f i s s i o n a b l e  m a t e r i a l  f o r  weapons p u rp o s e s .  )
1. See C hapter XJ. 2. H a l l ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  p. 608.
3, See, comments by Henry D. Smyth, U„S. R e p re s e n ta t iv e  to  th e  
I .A .E .A . ,  i n  an a d d re s s  b e fo r e  th e  American N uclear  S o c ie ty  
a t  W ashington, on November 17, 1966, Reproduced in  D .0 .S .B =. ,
3 J a n u a ry ,  1966, p ,3 4 .  See a l s o ,  te s t im o n y  of S e c r e ta r y  of 
S t a t e ,  Dean Rusk, i n  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n
of N uclear  Weapons, 1966, p. 8; and te s t im o n y  of Glenn 
Seaborg , Chairman, U .S .A .E .C . ,  i n  i b i d , ,  p . 53,
4. See, te s t im o n y  by Glenn Seaborg , i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Agreements _  
f o r  C o o p e ra t io n , h e a r in g s  b e f o r e  th e  Subcommittee on Agree­
ments f o r  C o o p e ra t io n ,  J o i n t  Committee on Atomic Energy ,
89 th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s , ,  A p r i l  2 9 -Ju ly  27, 1965, W ashington 
1965 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Agreements f o r  C o o p e ra t io n ,  1965) ,  p . 5. See a l s o ,
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The LAaEoA» was eventually established in 1957 but it was 
not till 1960 that a safeguards system was devised and approved 
by the Board of Governors» During the next three years Wash­
ington's attitude changed from one of support for I.AoE.A. 
safeguards to one of insistence on their application« In 
January 1963 the American Government decided to place most of 
its bilateral nuclear assistance agreements under I.A.E.A. 
supervision« Agreements were to become subject to I.A.E.A, 
safeguards as they came up for renewal« As a corollary to this, 
new agreements would also provide for I.A.E.A, safeguards. At 
the same time, America called for the removal of limitations 
on I«A«E«Ao safeguards which had previously restricted their 
application to reactors of 100 M 0W. capacity or less«'*' Since 
1963, the United States has urged that nuclear transfers 
everywhere take place under effective international safeguards 
and has engaged in vigorous diplomacy to persuade its allies 
at least, to insist on I«AoEfA, safeguards on all materials and 
equipment supplied by them,^ As an indication of its approval 
of the IoAoEoA», and in order to assist in the development of 
the Agency's safeguards system, the United States has placed a
number of its own reactors under I.A.E.A. safeguards and has
3encouraged other countries to do likewise. The U.S. Govern­
ment has also offered the I«A«EoA. access to one of America’s
Footnote 4 cont’d. Statement by A.C.DoA« Director W.C« Foster 
to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (E«N»D0C.): 
Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons, February 6, 1964« 
Reproduced in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, Washington: 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1965 
(hereafter referred to as D on D«, 1964), pp» 35-36.
1« See, statement by Henry D» Smyth, in D.0«S.B., 3 January 
1966, p. 34«
2» R.N« Douglas, "United States Anti-Proliferation Policies 
in the 60's," in Australian Outlook, Vol« 21, No» 2,
August 1967, p. 187,
3« For details of these arrangements, see statement by Henry 
D» Smyth, in D«0„S -,.B. , 3 January 1966, p. 32» See also, 
Statement by A.C.D.A. Director W„C. Foster to the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee : Nondissemination of Nuclear 
Weapons, July 2? 1964, Reproduced in D on D., 1964,
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chemical separation plants so as the Agency might develop and test 
inspection techniques relevant to this particular type of nuclear 
facility
Ironically, the "Atoms for Peace" programme, by contributing 
to the world wide spread of nuclear knowledge, equipment and 
material, has made it easier for additional countries to acquire 
nuclear weapons. As Arnold Kramish noted in 1963:
We are confronted with the stark reality that as a 
direct consequence of the Atoms for Peace program 
the United States, aided and abetted by the United 
Kingdom and Soviet Russia, has given the world an 
uncontrolled technology - the technology of plutonium 
- with which any nation, with time and sacrifice, 
can make atomic bombs.^
It is true of course that controls designed to inhibit the 
diversion of nuclear equipment and material to military 
purposes have been a feature of most bilateral agreements.
But the experience gained by any state through participation 
in peaceful nuclear activities, and which could be utilized
Footnote 3 cont'd. pp. 253-254. For an account which 
emphasises the major role played by U.S. in the estab­
lishment of the I.A.E.A., see B.G. Bechhoefer, "Negotiating 
the Statute of the loA.E.A.", in International Organization, 
Vol. 13, Winter, 1959, pp. 38-59.
1. For details of this arrangement, see statement by A.C.D.A. 
Director, W.C. Foster at E.N.D.C. on 28 April 1966.
Quoted in, International Negotiations on the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington: United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 
48, January 1969 (hereafter referred to as International 
Negotiations on the NoE,T.), p. 42. For additional details 
on this matter and for other evidence of strong U.S. 
support for the I.A.E.A., see statement by Glenn Seaborg,
in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
1966, pp. 54-55.
2. Kramish, op. cit., p. 18. For a similar comment on this 
particular effect of the "Atoms for Peace" programme, see 
Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread? Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1966, pp. 88-90,
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in any weapons programme, cannot be similarly controlled. More­
over, as Leonard Beaton observed in 1967, "the real danger with 
growing stockpiles of plutonium is not diversion but the 
denunciation of international agreements."^
D. The Emergence of the "Nth. Country" Problem.
During the closing years of the 1950s there were indica­
tions that some American policy makers were beginning to have 
second thoughts about the adequacy of their country's tradi­
tional approach to the problem of nuclear spread. The first 
flickerings of doubt were visible in 1958 and during the next 
few years a series of developments reinforced the mounting 
conviction that the United States should adopt a more cate­
gorical stand on the matter. Two major developments may be 
said to have nourished this re-examination: a reappraisal
of the nuclear qualifications of a number of states which 
suggested that the capacity to build atomic weapons could 
become more widespread than previously imagined; and, an 
indication that some of America's European allies, dissatis­
fied with arrangements for the control of the N.A.T.O. 
deterrent, might be persuaded to follow the French example 
and embark on their own nuclear weapons programme.
The belief that technological and financial barriers 
could effectively limit the spread of nuclear weapons has been 
a feature of American thinking about the problem since the 
days of the Baruch Plan. But towards the end of the 1950s 
it was becoming apparent that more than a few states could 
be expected to acquire the resources necessary for an atomic 
armaments programme. A report sponsored by the National
1. Leonard Beaton, "Nuclear Fuel-For-All," in Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 45, No. 4, July 1967, p. 664.
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Planning Association in Washington, and published in January I960, 
surveyed the capacities of 26 countries to manufacture nuclear 
explosives. It was estimated that twelve of these states were 
"able to embark on a successful nuclear weapons programme in the 
near future."1 23 The first French nuclear test in February 1960 
added new significance to the latest assessments of world wide 
nuclear potential. Not only did it demonstrate that a nation of 
France's size and level of development was capable of building 
atomic armaments, but also, it had increased the possibility that 
other countries of similar status might be persuaded to do like­
wise. It is difficult to exaggerate the significance that 
Washington attached to the development of the French bomb. The 
American Government had been unenthusiastic about France's 
weapons programme from the start and had consistently declined 
to assist its progress. By 1962, the U.S. had developed a 
fairly sophisticated, strategy-oriented case against the French 
deterrent. But during 1958 and 1959 most American policy-makers 
viewed France's nuclear weapons programme primarily in terms of 
its possible effect on other potential nuclear states. As 
Secretary of State Dulles said to President de Gaulle in 1958:
"the United States would have no objection to France becoming
2a nuclear power, if the nuclear race would stop there." In 
discussion in the United States prior to the explosion of the 
French bomb the possibility of nuclear spread was usually 
referred to as the "fourth country" problem; thereafter, it
3was known as the "Nth country" problem.
The second major reason for America's re-examlnatlon of 
its attitude to nuclear spread stemmed from the Increasing
1. These were: Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France,
West Germany, East Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden and 
Switzerland. See, The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control, 
quoted in Bull, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
2. Bader, op. cit., p. 34.
3. Kramish, op. cit., p. 17.
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agitation in Europe for a larger say in the control of the N.A.T.O. 
deterrent. The dispersion of tactical nuclear weapons amongst 
N.A.T.O. units and the decision to initiate their use at an early 
stage in any hostilities made many of America's European allies 
almost wholly dependent on a strategy, the implementation of which, 
could result in unprecedented destruction of life and property 
in the states involved.^ But custody of the nuclear warheads 
assigned to N.A.T.O. units resided wholly in American hands and 
consequently it was Washington alone which had the final say on 
their use. The dissatisfaction with which many Europeans 
viewed the arrangements for the use of allied nuclear power 
was well reflected in a statement in 1958 by the Western Euro­
pean Union's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
The committee said:
As the employment of an A or H weapon by aircraft 
or missile against a Russian site today spells 
immediate counter bombardment on targets in the 
entire free world, the monopoly of two countries 
to decide unilaterally on the destiny of themselves 
and others cannot any longer be maintained lest the 
alliance be weakened.^
The development by the Soviet Union of an I.C.B.M. capability 
and the successful launching in 1957 of the world's first 
artificial earth satellite was an additional source of 
dissatisfaction amongst America's European allies. Misgivings 
in Europe about the credibility of U.S. guarantees had first 
been raised in 1955 following Russia's acquisition of an
1. "A vivid suggestion of the kind of destruction that a nuclear 
war in Europe might inflict was conveyed by the S.H.A.P.E. 
war game "Carte Blanche", held in West Germany, the Lowlands 
and north-eastern France in June, 1955. In this game it was 
announced that, hypothetically, 335 bombs had been dropped
on military targets, killing 1,700,000 and wounding 
3,500,000, not to mention the numbers affected by radio­
activity." See, Osgood, op. cit., p. 126.
2. ibid., p. 224.
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i n t e r - c o n t i n e n ta l  bomber fo rc e .  The l a t e s t  S o v ie t ach iev em en t,
w hich b rou g h t w ith  i t  an even g r e a te r  th r e a t  to  A m erica 's  c i t i e s ,
on ly  r e in fo rc e d  th e s e  m isg iv in g s . D oubts abou t th e  c r e d i b i l i t y
of A m erica 's  g u a ra n te e  helped  to  c r e a te  a r a t i o n a l e  fo r  th e
B r i t i s h  and F rench d e te r r e n ts  and th e r e  w ere f e a r s  in  W ashington
th a t  th e  same concern  m ight s t im u la te  o th e r  European s t a t e s  to
embark upon s im i la r  program m es.^
S in ce  1946, American e f f o r t s  to  l i m i t  th e  sp read  o f n u c le a r
weapons had been c h a ra c te r i s e d  by two s t r a t e g i e s :  s t r i c t
enforcem ent of th e  Atomic Energy A c t; and , more r e c e n t ly ,
I n s i s te n c e  on th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f s a fe g u a rd s  to  e n su re  t h a t
a s s i s ta n c e  in  th e  p e a c e fu l n u c le a r  f i e l d  was n o t used fo r
weapons p u rp o se s . However, by th e  l a t e  1950s th e r e  w ere
in d ic a t io n s  th a t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f f u r th e r  n u c le a r  sp read  was
g r e a te r  th an  had p re v io u s ly  been im ag ined . T h is  prdm pted a
re a sse ssm e n t of o f f i c i a l  American th in k in g  on th e  m a t te r .
H i th e r to ,  W ash in g to n 's  prim ary co n ce rn  had been  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y
of n u c le a r  sp read  to  p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r i e s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  R u ss ia
and F ran ce . F orebodings of t h i s  s o r t  have rem ained a f e a tu r e
of American th in k in g ; th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  West Germany m ight
2
a c q u ire  n u c le a r  weapons became a s p e c ia l  so u rc e  of co n ce rn . 
However, from th e  l a t e  1950s onw ards, W ashington has tended  
to  view  th e  problem  of n u c le a r  sp read  in  more g e n e ra l te rm s . 
P o licy -m ak ers  have come to  em phasise th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of r a p id  
and w idesp read  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and have in c re a s in g ly  warned th a t  
any in c re a s e  in  th e  number of n u c le a r  powers p re s e n ts  d a n g e rs . 
This has g iv en  r i s e  to  a more c a te g o r ic a l  s ta n d  by W ashington
1. T here a re  u s e fu l  acco u n ts  of th e  B r i t i s h  and French 
programmes i n ,  R o secrance , op . c i t . For an ex tended  
acco u n t of th e  French programme, s e e ,  Lawrence Scheinm an, 
Atomic Energy P o lic y  in  F rance under th e  F o u rth  R e p u b lic , 
P r in c e to n : P r in c e to n  U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  1965.
2. M orton H. H a lp e r in ,  "A Ban on th e  P r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f N uclear 
W eapons", in  Evan Luard ( e d . ) ,  F i r s t  S tep s  to  D isarm am ent, 
London: Thames and Hudson, 1965, p . 137.
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on th e  q u e s t io n  of n u c le a r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
Some r e a c t i o n  to  th e  emerging "Nth co u n try "  problem was 
d i s c e r n i b l e  d u r in g  th e  c lo s in g  y e a r s  of th e  Eisenhower Adminis­
t r a t i o n ,  b u t  i t  was no t t i l l  a f t e r  P r e s id e n t  Kennedy took  o f f i c e  
t h a t  th e  t r e n d  became c l e a r .  Kennedy, i t  seems, came to  o f f i c e  
deep ly  concerned about th e  problem of n u c le a r  sp read  and was 
de term ined  to  g e t  " th e  n u c le a r  g e n ie  back in  th e  b o t t l e . " ^  The 
new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  i n t e r e s t  in  arms c o n t r o l  i n  g e n e ra l  and 
th e  problem of n u c le a r  sp read  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  was a p p a re n t  d u r in g  
i t s  f i r s t  y ear  in  o f f i c e .  In  1961, W ashington e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  
Arms C on tro l  And Disarmament Agency (A .C .D .A .) ,  in c lu d e d  a 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  c l a u s e  in  i t s  l a t e s t  disarm ament p ro p o s a l s ,  
and dec ided  to  su p p o r t  I r e l a n d ' s  G enera l Assembly r e s o l u t i o n  
on n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  During th e  n ex t f i v e  y e a r s  A m erica 's  
concern  abou t p r o l i f e r a t i o n  was c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t e d  in  a number 
of m ajor p o l i c y  i n i t i a t i v e s .  These w ere: su p p o r t  f o r  a n u c le a r
t e s t  ban agreem ent; in c re a s e d  c o - o p e r a t io n  w ith  th e  I .A .E .A . ;  
a d ip lo m a t ic  o f f e n s iv e  aimed a t  d is c o u ra g in g  th e  sp read  of 
n u c le a r  weapons in  Europe; and f i n a l l y ,  th e  p u r s u i t  of a n u c le a r  
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  ag reem en t.  One of t h e s e ,  th e  q u e s t io n  of 
v ig o ro u s  American s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  I .A . E .A . , e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  
Jan u ary  1963, has a l r e a d y  been m en tioned . The o th e r s  w i l l  be 
review ed in  th e  rem ainder  of t h i s  c h a p te r .
E, N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  and th e  N.A.T.O. N uc lea r  D e t e r r e n t .
During th e  e a r l y  1960s , th e  r e g io n  of most immediate con­
c e rn  to  W ashington so f a r  as  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  was con ce rn ed ,  was 
W estern Europe. T h ere ,  f o r  th e  re a s o n s  a l r e a d y  m en tioned ,  
i n c e n t iv e s  e x i s t e d  f o r  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  n u c le a r  
d e t e r r e n t s .  M oreover, a s  th e  N a t io n a l  P lan n in g  A s s o c i a t i o n 's
1. Bernard B ro d ie ,  E s c a l a t i o n  and th e  N uclea r  O p t io n , 
P r in c e to n :  P r in c e to n  U n iv e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1966, p. 6.
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r e p o r t  had in d i c a t e d ,  th e re  were no l e s s  than  s ix  c o u n t r i e s  in  th e
a re a  cap a b le  of b u i ld in g  n u c le a r  weapons " i n  th e  n ear  f u t u r e . " ^
At th e  c e n t r e  of American concern  abou t p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  Europe
a t  t h i s  tim e was th e  s p e c t r e  of a n u c le a r  armed Germany. Because
of i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  th e  co ld  w ar,  Germany’s a c q u i s i t i o n  of
n u c le a r  weapons was expected  to  have a d e v a s ta t in g  e f f e c t  on th e
peace and s t a b i l i t y  of Europe» A d m it ted ly ,  Bonn had d e c la re d
2
i t s e l f  a g a in s t  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of n u c le a r  weapons, b u t  many
Americans were n e v e r th e le s s  f e a r f u l  t h a t  i t  m ight be tempted to
3
em ula te  th e  French example, T h is  was viewed as e s p e c i a l l y  
l i k e l y  i f  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  in  Europe such as Sweden, S w itz e r la n d  
or I t a l y  went n u c l e a r ,
W ash ing ton’s f i r s t  r e sp o n se  to  th e  t h r e a t  of p r o l i f e r a t i o n
in  Europe was to  i n t e n s i f y  i t s  p ropaganda o f f e n s iv e  a g a i n s t  th e
growth of independen t c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  American spokesmen, bo th
o f f i c i a l  and u n o f f i c i a l ,  expounded a mass of s o p h i s t i c a t e d
argument and s c i e n t i f i c  a n a l y s i s  d es ig n ed  to  show t h a t  th e
s t a t e s  of W estern Europe n o t  on ly  had no need of n u c le a r  weapons
of t h e i r  own, b u t  a l s o ,  t h a t  i t  would n o t  be in  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s
4
to  develop  such f o r c e s .  The h igh  p o in t  i n  t h i s  campaign was
1. One of th e s e  was F rance which conducted  i t s  f i r s t  n u c le a r  
t e s t  i n  J a n u a ry ,  1960.
2. Germany’s u n d e r ta k in g  " n o t  to  m a n u fa c tu re  i n  i t s  t e r r i t o r y  
, , ,  a to m ic ,  b i o l o g i c a l  and chem ica l weapons" was made on
3 O ctober 1954, in  an appendix  to  th e  t r e a t y  p ro v id in g  f o r  
West German membership in  th e  W estern  European Union. See,
Theo Sommer, "The O b je c t iv e s  of Germany", i n  A l a s t a i r  Buchan 
( e d , ) ,  A World of N uc lea r  P ow ers? , Englewood C l i f f s ,  N . J . :  
P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  1966, p . 40,
3. John  Wo S p a n ie r ,  American F o re ig n  P o l ic y  S in ce  World War I I ,
N. York: P r a e g e r ,  1968, p, 238, See a l s o ,  W.B. B ader,  "N uclear 
Weapons S haring  and ’The German Pr ob l e m’ i n  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , 
V o l. 44 , No. 4, J u ly  1966, p, 696,
4. One of th e  most d e t a i l e d  and o b v io u s ly  r e l e v a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
to  t h i s  d ia lo g u e  was; A lb e r t  Wohlst e t t e r ,  "N uc lear  S h ar in g :  
N.A.ToO, and th e  N + 1 C o u n try ,"  i n  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , Vol. 39, 
No. 3 , A p r i l  1961, See a l s o ,  Malcolm W, Hoag, "What Inde­
pendence f o r  NoAoT.O.?",  i n  World P o l i t i c s , Vol. 12 , No. 3, 
pp. 369-390.
31
reached  by S e c re ta ry  of Defence McNamara d u r in g  a speech  a t  Ann 
A rbor, M ichigan, in  June 1962. Mr. McNamara emphasised th a t  
independen t d e t e r r e n t s  would t h r e a t e n  N.A.T.O. u n i t y  and endanger 
th e  s t r a t e g y  of " c o n t r o l l e d  r e s p o n s e " .  L im ite d ,  independen t 
c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  he i n s i s t e d ,  would be "d an g ero u s ,  e x p e n s iv e ,  prone 
to  o b s o le s c e n c e ,  and la c k in g  in  c r e d i b i l i t y  a s  a d e t e r r e n t . " ^
The campaign a g a in s t  independen t d e t e r r e n t s  in  Europe was 
accompanied by m easures aimed a t  enhancing th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of 
th e  U.S, commitment. To t h i s  end, P r e s id e n t s  Kennedy and Johnson 
and t h e i r  s e n io r  o f f i c i a l s  c o n s t a n t ly  r e a f f i rm e d  A m erica’s 
su p p o r t  f o r  N.A.T.O. M oreover, d u r in g  1962 and 1963, th e  
number of t a c t i c a l  n u c le a r  weapons deployed  in  Europe was i n ­
c rea sed  by s ix ty  per  c e n t ,  and i n  1962, W ashington earmarked
2
a f u l l y  o p e r a t io n a l  P o l a r i s  f o r c e  to  th e  N.A.T.O. Command.
But th e  a n x ie ty  in  Europe over dependence on American 
n u c le a r  f o r c e s ,  and th e  consequen t t h r e a t  of f u r t h e r  p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n ,  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  th e  U .S. f in d  some s o l u t i o n  to  th e  problem 
of n u c le a r  s h a r in g  w i th in  th e  a l l i a n c e .  T h is  gave r i s e  to  a 
number of s u g g e s t io n s  in v o lv in g  some form of j o i n t  a l l i e d  
c o n t r o l  of n u c le a r  weapons. The most s e r i o u s l y  canvassed  of 
th e s e  schemes was th e  p ro p o s a l  f o r  a M u l t i l a t e r a l  N uc lea r  Force 
(M .L .F .) .  In  November 1960, G enera l N o rs ta d ,  th e n  Supreme
A l l i e d  Commander in  Europe, advoca ted  th e  c r e a t i o n  of an I.R .B .M .
3
fo r c e  under h i s  c o n t r o l .  One month l a t e r ,  a t  a m ee ting  of th e  
North  A t l a n t i c  C o u n c i l ,  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  Government announced
i t s  endorsement of th e  id e a  of a N.A.T.O. medium-range b a l l i s t i c
4
m i s s i l e  f o r c e .  In  May of th e  fo l lo w in g  y e a r ,  P r e s id e n t  Kennedy
1. The t e x t  of Mr. McNamara’ s speech  i s  rep roduced  in  J .C .A .E . 
H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of N uc lea r  Weapons, 1966,
pp. 127-132.
2. W.W. Kaufmann, The McNamara S t r a t e g y , N„ York: H arper and 
Row, 1964, p , 124.
3. Thomas C. W iegele ,  "The O r ig in s  o f  th e  M.L.F. C oncep t, 
1957-1960 ,"  in  O r b i s , Vol. 12, No. 2 , Summer 1968, p p . 483-484.
4. Osgood, op. c i t . , p .  233.
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enlarged on the idea and pointed to "the possibility of eventually
establishing a N.A.T.O. sea-borne missile force which would be
truly multilateral in ownership and control."'*' In February 1963,
the U.S. Government suggested that the proposed multilateral force
2should consist of surface ships armed with Polaris missiles. The
M. L.F. proposals which from the very beginning received strong 
support from elements in the State Department, was intended prim­
arily as a way of preserving the effectiveness and cohesion of
N. A.T.O. In particular, it was hoped that the scheme would go
part of the way towards meeting the concern in Europe about
America’s nuclear monopoly. But the M.L.F. was supported by
different people for different reasons and undoubtedly some of
its backers saw in the scheme a way of heading off any drift
towards national nuclear capabilities in Europe. This idea was
implicit in the initial thinking about the proposed force and
was a recurrent theme in statements on the plan by American
spokesmen. As late as March 1965, the Secretary of State noted
that the M.L.F. had been suggested as a way of precluding the
3spread of national deterrents in Europe.
The proposal to establish a multilateral nuclear force was 
coolly received in many quarters. In Europe, opposition to the 
scheme in France, Britain, and at a later date, in Germany, 
undermined the arguments of its American supporters that 
Washington needed the M.L.F. to placate its European allies.
In addition, the scheme ran into serious trouble in the United 
States itself. By 1964, widespread opposition to the M.L.F. 
had developed in Congress. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs, who had 
never been enthusiastic about the idea, eventually advised
1. Quoted in Bader, op» cit., p. 46.
2. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, May 4-11, 1963, p. 19390. 
3» D.OoS.B., 22 March 1965, p. 429.
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McNamara not to  commit th e  U nited  S t a t e s  to  an agreem ent.  One of 
th e  lo u d e s t  c r i t i c s  of th e  scheme was th e  Arms C o n tro l  And D is ­
armament Agency, whose c h ie f  p r o j e c t  was seen  as th r e a te n e d  by th e  
M.L.F. A,C„D,Ao was anx ious to  ach iev e  a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  
and was c u r r e n t l y  su p p o r t in g  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i th  R u ss ia  to  t h i s  end. 
However, Moscow had i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  M.L,,F. would a l lo w  A m erica 's  
a l l i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  Germany, a c c e s s  to  n u c le a r  weapons, and t h a t
R uss ia  would th e r e f o r e  oppose any n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreement
2
which d id  n o t  p re c lu d e  such a f o r c e .  In  t h e i r  p u b l i c  u t t e r a n c e s
American spokesmen den ied  t h a t  t h e r e  was any c o n f l i c t  between th e
M.L.F. and a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y ,  s in c e  th e  M0L„F. would n o t
r e s u l t  in  any in c r e a s e  i n  th e  t o t a l  number of independen t n u c le a r  
3
d e c i s io n  m akers. However, i t  seems t h a t  w i th in  th e  c o u n c i l s  of 
th e  A d m in i s t r a t io n ,  W. C„ F o s t e r ,  d i r e c t o r  of A .C .D .A ., argued 
t h a t  S o v ie t  o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  M.L.F. was so i n s i s t e n t  t h a t  any 
d e c i s io n  to  e s t a b l i s h  th e  f o r c e  would bury a l l  chances of a 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y .  In  November 1964 a com mittee was 
e s t a b l i s h e d  under th e  cha irm ansh ip  o f  th e  form er Deputy S e c re ta ry  
of Defence Roswell G i l p a t r i c ,  to  e n q u i re ,  amongst o th e r  t h i n g s ,  
i n t o  th e  q u e s t io n  of American n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y .  Though
1. For a good account of th e  f a c t o r s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  th e  demise 
of th e  M .L .F . , s ee  J .D .  S te in b r u n e r ,  "The Mind and M il ie u  of 
P o l ic y -m a k e rs :  A Case Study of th e  M .L .F ." ,  u n p u b lish e d  Ph.D. 
t h e s i s ,  M .I .T o ,  F ebruary  1968, pp. 181-196.
2. See, r e f e r e n c e s  to  s ta te m e n ts  on th e  S o v ie t  p o s i t i o n ,  made 
d u r in g  s e s s io n s  a t  th e  EoN.D.C. i n  1964. Quoted in  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  N e g o t ia t io n s  on th e  N .P .T e> p . 9.
3. For r e f e r e n c e s  to  o f f i c i a l  U .S. s ta te m e n ts  on th e  m a t te r  
d u r in g  1964, se e  i b i d , , p .  10. For a p a r t i c u l a r l y  compre­
h e n s iv e  s ta te m e n t  on th e  U,S, p o s i t i o n ,  se e  S ta tem en t by 
AoC.DoA. D i r e c to r  F o s te r  to  th e  E ig h te e n  N a tio n  Disarmament 
Committee: N o nd issem ina tion  of N uc lea r  Weapons, J u ly  2, 1964. 
Reproduced in  D on D. ,  1964, pp. 254-255.
4. S te in b r u n e r ,  op. c i t . , p .  188.
5. See, F o u r th  Annual R eport of th e  U nited  S t a t e s  Arms C o n tro l  
and Disarmament Agency [ E x t r a c t s ] ,  Jan u ary  21, 1965. 
Reproduced in  D on D. ,  1964, p . 537.
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i t s  f in d in g s  have s t i l l  no t been r e l e a s e d ,  th e  com mittee seems to  
have concluded t h a t  measures such as  th e  M.L.F, should  no t be 
allow ed to  h in d e r  p ro g re s s  tow ards a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreem ent. 
In  a d i r e c t i v e  p u b l i sh e d  l a t e  i n  December, P r e s id e n t  Johnson made 
i t  c l e a r  t h a t  Washington would no lo n g e r  encourage th e  e s t a b ­
l ish m en t of th e  MoL .Fo'*"
Washington was s t i l l  consc ious  of th e  need to  make a t  l e a s t
some co n cess io n  to  European demands f o r  a l a r g e r  say in  th e
c o n t ro l  of th e  N A,T„0, d e t e r r e n t ,  To t h i s  end, th e  U.S. took
th e  lead  in  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t ,  i n  November 1965, of th e  N.A.T.O.
2
S p e c ia l  Committee of Defence M i n i s t e r s ,  This com m ittee ,  which
in c lu d ed  te n  members of th e  a l l i a n c e ,  im m ediate ly  sought
a d d i t i o n a l  in fo rm a t io n  on th e  n a tu r e  of th e  N.AoToO. d e t e r r e n t ,
th e  p o t e n t i a l  u se  of i t ,  th e  l i k e l y  r e s u l t s  of such u s e ,  and
3
th e  p la n s  f o r  f u t u r e  changes in  th e  f o r c e .  In  December 1966, 
th e  N.A.T.O, M i n i s t e r i a l  C o u n c i l ,  on th e  recommendation of th e  
S p e c ia l  Committee of Defence M i n i s t e r s ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  two perm­
anen t b o d ie s  f o r  th e  h an d lin g  of a l l i a n c e  n u c le a r  p la n n in g .
These were : a po licy -m ak ing  body c a l l e d  th e  N uclear  A f f a i r s  
Defence Committee which was open to  a l l  N„A.T,0. members; and ,
4
th e  N uclear  P lann ing  Group of seven  members. This  c o n s u l t a t i v e  
m achinery  has se rved  th e  trem endously  im p o r ta n t  f u n c t io n  of 
p ro v id in g  W ashington w ith  a f a c e - s a v in g  fo rm ula  f o r  th e  
abandonment of th e  M.L.F. M oreover, th rough  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
on th e  v a r io u s  com m ittees ,  A m erica’s a l l i e s  have no doubt been 
r e a s s u re d  about th e  s t r e n g th  of th e  d e t e r r e n t  and t h e i r  a cc es s  
to  n u c le a r  p la n n in g  and po licym aking  has p robab ly  gone some of 
th e  way tow ards sa lv a g in g  European p r e s t i g e .  But so long as 
th e  U nited  S ta t e s  i s  f r e e  to  a c c e p t  or r e j e c t  th e  views of i t s
1. S te in b r u n e r ,  op, c i t . ,  p, 193,
2, See, s ta te m e n t  by Defence S e c r e t a r y  McNamara, in  J ,C ,A ,E . 
H earings  on N o n p r c l i f e r a t i o n  of N uc lea r  Weapons, 1966, 
pp, 82-83 .
3 o i b i d .
4, DoOnS-B. , 9 Jan u ary  1967, pp. 50 -51 .
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fellow committeemen, the Europeans must remain content with the 
status of advisers only-, Clearly, in the expansion of allied 
participation in nuclear planning and policymaking there has been 
no dilution of American control over its nuclear weapons.
Fr Nonproliferation and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The increasing concern with which many Americans viewed 
the problem of nuclear spread was clearly reflected in Wash­
ington’s support after 1957, for a test ban agreement«, The 
first important proposal on the subject was made by the Indian 
Prime Minister in April 1954«, Mr Nehru called for a 'stand­
still agreement’ in respect of atomic explosions and suggested
that such a measure need not be part of a general disarmament 1programme. However at this stage, and again in 1955, the 
United States indicated that it would be forced to reject all 
such proposals on testing unless they were included as part 
of a comprehensive disarmament agreement«, In October 1956, 
in response to a Soviet proposal to stop testing, the U.S. 
reaffirmed its position. On this occasion President Eisenhower 
said:
We must continue - until a properly safeguarded 
international agreement can be reached - to 
develop our strength in the most advanced weapons 
- for the sake of our own national safety, for the 
sake of all free nations, for the sake of peace 
itself,2
But this insistence by Washington on coupling a test ban
with a larger disarmament programme was soon to be dropped.
3The development of thermonuclear weapons and a realization
lo The United Nations and Disarmament, p. 135«,
2«, Bader, op. cit«,, p«, 25.
3, The U.S. detonated its first thermo-nuclear device in Nov­
ember, 1952. On 20 August 1953, Moscow announced the 
successful, explosion of Russia’s first thermo-nuclear 
device.
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of th e  i n a b i l i t y  to  account fo r  a l l  p a s t  p ro d u c t io n  of f i s s i o n a b l e  
m a te r i a l  had made i t  n e c e ssa ry  fo r  th e  U,S„ (and R uss ia )  to  rev iew  
i t s  whole disarmament n e g o t i a t i n g  p o s i t io n , ,  W ashington was f a s t  
i n c l i n i n g  towards the  view t h a t  th e  f r u i t l e s s  s e a rc h  f o r  a compre­
h e n s iv e  disarmament agreement would have to  g iv e  way to  th e  
p u r s u i t  of p a r t i a l  " c o n f id e n c e -b u i ld in g "  measures»'*' The r e s u l t s  
of t h i s  r e a p p r a i s a l  were announced in  J a n u a ry ,  1957» In  a 
s ta te m e n t  to  th e  F i r s t  Committee of th e  G eneral Assembly, th e  
American d e l e g a te  p re s e n te d  a package of p a r t i a l  disarmament
m easures which he in d i c a te d  could  be c o n s id e re d  s e p a r a t e ly  r a t h e r
2
than  as a s in g l e  i n d i v i s i b l e  scheme» One of th e s e  m easures
was a p ro p o s a l  l i n k in g  a t e s t - b a n  to  an in s p e c te d  " c u t - o f f "
of n u c le a r  p ro d u c t io n  f o r  weapons purposes» In  n e g o t i a t i o n s
l a t e r  t h a t  y e a r ,  however, W ashington proposed t h a t  a t e s t
c e s s a t i o n  become th e  f i r s t  s te p  in  an agreed  s e r i e s  of p a r t i a l  
3
measures» ' In  O ctober 1958, America fo llow ed  th e  S o v ie t  Union 
in  a v o lu n ta ry  c e s s a t i o n  of a l l  n u c le a r  t e s t s  and in  th e  same 
month, n e g o t i a t i o n s  fo r  an agreem ent p r o h i b i t i n g  t e s t i n g  were 
commenced in  Geneva»
The se a rc h  fo r  a t e s t  ban was long and f r u s t r a t i n g  and 
was dogged by r e c u r r i n g  c r i s e s  i n  E ast-W est r e l a t i o n s »  More­
o v e r ,  from th e  b e g in n in g ,  th e  d i s c u s s io n s  were marked by 
s e r io u s  d isag ree m en ts  over in s p e c t io n »  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  
S o v ie t  and W estern d e l e g a te s  found i t  im p o ss ib le  to  a g re e  
over th e  q u e s t io n  of o n - s i t e  in sp e c t io n »  Throughout th e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  th e  W estern powers i n s i s t e d  on a minimum number 
of o n - s i t e  in s p e c t io n s  f o r  th e  d e t e c t i o n  of s u sp e c ted  un d er­
ground t e s t s »  However, th e  S o v ie t  Union denounced such 
in s p e c t io n s  as unw arranted  and as a p o t e n t i a l  t h r e a t  to  i t s
1» For an account of th e s e  deve lopm en ts ,  s e e  B echhoefe r ,  
op» c i t » , p p , 241, 243-47, and 256-58»
2» i b i d », pp„ 327-330,
3 » I b i d o, p » 331»
37
security. Eventually it was resolved to defer the question of 
underground tests and to proceed to the formulation of a partial 
ban. Under the terms of the treaty agreed to in August 1963, 
signatories undertook not to conduct nuclear weapon test 
explosions or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, 
including outer space; underwater; or, in any other environment 
if such explosions could cause radioactive debris to be present 
outside the territorial limits of the state concerned„ The 
agreement is of unlimited duration, but each party has the 
right to withdraw, on three months notice, "if it decides that 
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of [the] 
Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country#"^ 
In explaining why the U,S, supported the test ban treaty, 
President Kennedy said:
First, this treaty can be a step toward reduced 
world tension and broader areas of agreement.
Second, the treaty can be a step toward freeing 
the world from fears and dangers of radioactive 
fallout. Third, this treaty can be a step toward 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to 
nations not. now possessing them. Fourth, and 
finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear arms 
race in ways, which, on balance, will strengthen 
our nation's security far more than the continu­
ation of unrestricted testing,2
On another occasion, President Kennedy remarked that, in his 
judgment, "the major argument for the test ban treaty [was]
3
the limiting effect it might have on proliferation," The 
view that a test ban could prove a useful nonproliferation 
measure was a common theme in American statements on the 
matter. During the early deliberations of the Eighteen Nation
1, For the full text of the treaty, see, Appendix 111*
2, Quoted in J,H, McBride, The Test Ban Treaty, Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1967, p, 122,
3, See, remarks made by President Kennedy during Press 
Conference on 21 February 1963, Reproduced in D on D ,,
1963, p, 59,
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Disarmament Committee (E N D C ) in 1962, the American represen­
tative emphasised that a test ban was probably the earliest
practical action that the committee could take to limit further 
1prolif eratioti, Later in the year the same spokesman reminded 
the committee that even a partial ban would make weapons develop­
ment so difficult "that a significant portion of the nuclear
2arms race could be prevented from spreading tc other countries," 
The American Secretary for Defence also shared this view. In 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
August 1963, Mr, McNamara argued that:
With testing limited to the underground environ­
ment, the potential cost of a nuclear weapons devel­
opment programme would increase sharply for all 
signatory states» And, since testing underground 
is not only more costly but also more difficult and 
time consuming, the proposed treaty would retard 
progress in weapons development in cases where the 
added cost and other factors were not sufficient 
to preclude it altogether» One of the great advan­
tages of this treaty is that it will have this 
effect of retarding the spread of nuclear weapons»^
1o Verbatim Record of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation 
Comni1 1 1ee on Dlsarmament, Geneva (hereafter referred to 
as E N ,,D»C» /PoVo ) , 31, p~ 23»
2» EoN,D ,Co /PoV o "/5, p, 11» For other off icial U»S» comments 
on the usefulness of a test ban treaty in limiting the 
further spread of nuclear weapons, see testimony by 
A,C»D,A, Director Foster before the J»C»A.Eo on 11 March 
1963» Reproduced in D on D ,, 1963, p» 100» See also, 
the remarks by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk on 11 March 
1963, Reproduced in ibid», p, 109»
3» Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong», 1st Sess,,
August 12-15, 19-23, 26-27, 1963 (hereafter referred to 
as Senate Hearings on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963) , 
p, 108» it was the conclusion of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that the test ban treaty "should strongly 
inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons," See, Report by the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Test-Ban Treaty, 
September 3, 1963, Reproduced in D on D» , 1963, p, 453T,
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But. i s  th e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  as e f f e c t i v e  a b a r r i e r  to  th e
spread  of n u c le a r  weapons a s  many Americans imagined? I t
c e r t a i n l y  d id  nor p rev en t China from a c q u i r in g  n u c le a r  weapons
and has nor i n h i b i t e d  F rance from c o n t in u in g  to  t e s t  i n  th e
atmosphere»'*' Fu rtherm ore , though th e  advan tages  to  be gained
from t e s t i n g  would i n  most c a s e s  be f a i r l y  g r e a t  -  th e  added
2
co n f id e n ce  th a t  th e  weapon w i l l  work, and th e  p r e s t i g e  b e n e f i t s  
of a dem onstra ted  c a p a c i ty  -  i t  i s  n e v e r th e le s s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
p o t e n t i a l  n u c le a r  powers m ight f in d  i t  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  no t 
to  t e s t  : I s r a e l ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  would a lm ost s u r e ly  in c u r  
g r e a t  lo s s e s  as a r e s u l t  of a t e s t  e x p lo s io n ,  For an o th e r  
th in g ,  i t  i s  no t a t  a l l  c e r t a i n  t h a t  th e  f i n a n c i a l  and te c h ­
n i c a l  req u ire m en ts  f o r  underground t e s t i n g  make th e  t e s t  ban 
t r e a t y  a w holly e f f e c t i v e  h a r r i e r  to  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  In  
te s t im o n y  b e fo re  th e  Senate  F o re ig n  R e la t io n s  Committee i n  
1.963, Dr, Edward T e l le r  argued t h a t  an underground t e s t  of 
a m agnitude t h a t  has been t r a d i t i o n a l  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t e s t  of
any n a t io n  would c o s t  on ly  s l i g h t l y  more th an  a t e s t  of
3
comparable p r o p o r t io n s  in  th e  atmosphere» In  any c a s e ,  as 
Dr, T e l l e r  argued :
1» N e i th e r  F rance nor China a r e  s i g n a t o r i e s  of th e  t e s t  ban 
t r e a t y ,
2, I t  should  be emphasised in  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  however, t h a t  th e  
f i r s t  U235 bomb was " t e s t e d " o v e r  H irosh im a, See, B ader,  
op, e i t », p» 56,
3, McBride, op, c i t , ,  p, 138, There seems to  be ev idence  to  
su p p o r t  t h i s  c la im ,  in  a U0N, r e p o r t  on n u c le a r  weapons 
r e le a s e d  in  1967, C e r t a i n l y ,  th e  c o s t  e s t im a te s  i n  t h i s  
r e p o r t ,  of a c t i v i t i e s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  to  underground 
t e s t i n g  (such as d r i l l i n g ) ,  a r e  no t e x c e s s iv e ly  h ig h ,  See, 
Report of th e  S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l  on th e  e f f e c t s  of th e  
p o s s i b l e  u se  of n u c le a r  weapons and on th e  s e c u r i t y  and 
economic im p l ic a t io n s  of th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  and f u r t h e r  
developm ent of th e s e  w eapons, U nited  N a t io n s ,  G enera l 
Assembly document A /6858, O ctober 1967 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to  as  U J o  R eport on N uclea r  Weapons) ,  Annex IV, pp, 8-11»
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. . .  no m a tte r  how [ th e ]  two c o s ts  com pared, once a 
n a t io n  has gone to  th e  expense of d ev e lo p in g  a n u c le a r  
e x p lo s iv e , th e  a d d i t io n a l  s in g le  m i l l io n  d o l l a r s  th a t  
i s  needed fo r  underground t e s t i n g  w i l l  c e r t a in l y  no t 
be a f in a n c ia l  d e t e r r e n t . 1 2
As to  th e  te c h n ic a l  problem  of underground t e s t i n g ,  i t  has been
su g g es ted  th a t  d e t a i l s  of th e  v a r io u s  te c h n iq u e s  a r e  no lo n g e r
s e c r e t  and can be g lean ed  from a p e ru s a l  of h e a r in g s  o f th e
2
J o in t  C o n g re ss io n a l Committee on Atomic E nergy. A nother 
d e f e c t  in  th e  t r e a ty  i s  th e  ab sen ce  of any p r o h ib i t io n  on th e  
r e c e ip t  of n u c le a r  weapons from a b ro ad . But th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
of r e n u n c ia t io n  rem ains th e  s t r o n g e s t  re a so n  fo r  d o u b tin g  th e  
lo n g -ru n  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f th e  t r e a t y .  Any p a r ty  to  th e  
agreem ent has th e  r i g h t  to  w ithdraw  i f  i t  c o n s id e rs  i t s  
n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t s  a re  je o p a rd iz e d  by e x tra o rd in a ry  e v en ts  
r e l a t i n g  to  th e  s u b je c t  m a tte r  of th e  t r e a t y .  M oreover, i t  
seems u n l ik e ly  th a t  any s t a t e ,  hav ing  made th e  momentous 
d e c is io n  to  go n u c le a r ,  would be d e te r r e d  by th e  u n c e r ta in  
consequences of r e n u n c ia t io n .
The p ro p o sa l to  ban weapons t e s t s  was u n fav o u rab ly  re c e iv e d  
in  some q u a r te r s  in  th e  U n ited  S ta t e s .  C h ief amongst th o se  
wary o f th e  move w ere th e  J o in t  C h ie fs . I t  was c laim ed  by 
th e se  and o th e r  c r i t i c s  o f th e  p ro p o sa l t h a t  a t e s t  ban cou ld  
je o p a rd iz e  American s e c u r i t y .  However, i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  
d e l ib e r a t e  on j u s t  how l i t t l e  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  e v e n tu a lly  
conceded under th e  term s o f th e  t r e a t y .  By th e  tim e th e  
agreem ent e n te re d  in to  fo r c e  Am erica had p e r fe c te d  a w ide 
ran g e  o f h ig h ly  s o p h is t ic a te d  t a c t i c a l  and s t r a t e g i c  w eapons.
The g a in s  to  be had from f u r th e r  t e s t i n g  in  th e  atm osphere 
w ere , by th i s  tim e , s u re ly  m a rg in a l. M oreover many e x p e r ts  
argued  t h a t ,  by underground t e s t i n g  a lo n e , Am erica cou ld
1. Quoted in  M cBride, op. c i t . ,  pp. 138-139.
2. B ad er, op. c i t . , pp. 57-58 .
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continue to develop its weapons capability. Dr. N. E. Bradbury, 
Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, said:
Underground testing will permit, I am convinced, 
essentially every technical warhead development 
which would be possible with atmospheric testing 
up to yields as great as a megaton «.. With under­
ground testing, I believe we can develop and test 
whatever type of warhead may be required for an 
anti-ballistic missile system if one is required.
Small weapons to the extent that any of these are  ^
needed and practical, can be worked on and improved.
It is clear from this that the test ban agreement contained 
an element of discrimination which was also to characterise 
the nonproliferation treaty« Non-nuclear states were, in 
effect, being asked to renounce their options on going nuclear. 
At the same time, there was no obligation on the nuclear 
powers to disarm« Indeed, the superpowers hardly disguised 
the fact, that through underground testing, they would 
continue to enlarge and diversify their already vast stock­
piles .
But the test ban treaty was a forerunner to the non­
proliferation agreement in more ways than this. The former 
agreement was a tremendously important development in 
relations between the United States and Russia. Through 
their negotiations and signature of the test ban treaty, both 
countries clearly reflected their joint interest in resisting 
the spread of nuclear weapons* Moreover, it was apparent 
that the U.S. was prepared to co-operate with Moscow on this 
matter even at the cost of some weakening of its relations 
with certain of its friends and allies. America's vigorous 
pursuit of a nonproliferation agreement was a further blow to 
the already strained state of relations between Paris and
1* ibid *, p, 58*
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Washington,, M oreover, by f a i l i n g  to  a d e q u a te ly  c o n s u l t  Bonn
over th e  s t a t u s  to  be accorded  E as t  Germany in  th e  a c c e s s io n
c la u s e s  of th e  proposed t e s t  ban t r e a t y ,  W ashington seems to
2
have a n tag o n ised  th e  West Germans» F i n a l l y ,  by bowing to  S o v ie t
demands t h a t  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n s  n o t  be a llow ed under
th e  t r e a t y ,  W ashington damaged i t s  p o s i t i o n  w ith  a number of
3
a s p i r i n g  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s »  The le n g th s  to  which W ashington 
was p rep a red  to  go in  o rd e r  to  s t r e n g th e n  th e  d e t e n t e  between 
i t  and th e  S o v ie t  Union became an even g r e a t e r  so u rce  of d i s ­
agreement between th e  U»S. and some of i t s  a l l i e s  d u r in g  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  le a d in g  to  th e  N„P»T.
Go The N uclear  N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  T r e a ty »
I m p l i c i t  i n  a number of th e  disarmament and arms c o n t r o l  
m easures proposed by th e  U.S» s in c e  th e  end of World War I I ,  
has been th e  id e a  of h a l t i n g  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons.
This  was t r u e  of th e  Baruch P la n ,  and of c o u r s e ,  of th e  t e s t  
ban t r e a t y .  S im i l a r l y ,  P r e s id e n t  E isenhow er’s p ro p o s a l  of 
March 1956 f o r  a " c u t - o f f "  i n  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of f i s s i o n a b l e  
m a t e r i a l  f o r  weapons p u rposes  had , as one of i t s  a im s ,  th e  
r e s t r i c t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons to  th o s e  powers which a l re a d y
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p o sse ssed  them» But th e  f i r s t  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p ro p o s a l  of
1» P r e s id e n t  Kennedy i s  r e p o r t e d  to  have s a id  t h a t  " C h a r le s  
de G au lle  w i l l  be remembered f o r  one th in g  o n ly ,  h i s  
r e f u s a l  to  ta k e  t h a t  [ t e s t  ban] t r e a ty » "  See, A rth u r  M. 
S c h le s in g e r ,  J r » ,  A Thousand D ays, N» York: F a w c e t t ,  1967, 
p. 835,
2» B ader,  op» c i t o , pp, 52-53 ,
3» i b i d . ,  p 0 53» For a more le n g th y  d i s c u s s io n  of th e  p rob­
lems f a c in g  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  i n  re g a rd  to  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  
w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union on th e  one hand and A m eric a 's  Euro­
pean a l l i e s  on th e  o t h e r ,  see  C urt G a s te y g e r ,  The American 
Dilemma: B ip o l a r i t y  o r  A l l i a n c e  C ohes ion , A delph i Paper 
No, 24, London: The I n s t i t u t e  For S t r a t e g i c  S tu d ie s ,  1966.
4» P r e s id e n t  E isenhow er’s p ro p o s a l  was made i n  a l e t t e r  to  th e  
S o v ie t  P rem ie r ,  Mr, Bulganin» In  J u ly  1957, i t  was fo rm a l ly  
p r e s e n te d  to  th e  Disarmament Subcommittee. See, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
N e g o t ia t io n s  on th e  N . P . T », p» 2.
a n o n -d is s e m in a t io n ,  n o n - a c q u i s i t io n  ty p e  was p re s e n te d  i n  th e  
package of W estern disarmament p ro p o s a ls  subm it ted  to  th e  D is ­
armament Subcommittee in  A ugust,  1957. This was a s u g g e s t io n  
t h a t  each p a r ty  to  th e  proposed disarmament agreem ent should  un d er­
ta k e  "no t to  t r a n s f e r  ou t of i t s  c o n t r o l  any n u c le a r  weapons, or 
to  a c c e p t  t r a n s f e r  to  i t  of such w eapons", excep t under a r r a n g e ­
ments which would a s s u r e  t h e i r  u se  only  f o r  d e f e n s iv e  purposes."^ 
S im i la r  p ro v is io n s  were in c lu d ed  i n  p la n s  f o r  g e n e ra l  and com plete
disarmament (G.C.D.) p re s e n te d  by th e  U.S. in  September 1961
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( to  th e  G enera l Assembly) and A p r i l  1962 ( to  th e  E .N .D .C .) .
Though a p p a re n t ly  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreem ent,
th e  U.S, was n e v e r th e le s s  c a u t io u s  about p ro p o s a ls  on th e  m a t te r
which could  th r e a t e n  A m erica 's  s t r a t e g i c  f l e x i b i l i t y .  In
December 1961, W ashington came ou t s t r o n g ly  a g a in s t  a Swedish
s u g g e s t io n  th a t  th e  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s  form a "n o n -n u c le a r"
c lu b .  America o b je c te d  t h a t  t h i s  p ro p o s a l  s h i f t e d  th e  emphasis
in  th e  m a t te r  e n t i r e l y  to  " n o n - a c q u i s i t io n "  of n u c le a r  weapons
by n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s  and cou ld  c o n seq u en t ly  p r e ju d i c e  e x i s t i n g
3
d e fen se  a r ran g em en ts .  C le a r ly ,  W ashington was r e l u c t a n t  to  
a c c e p t  any n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  m easure which promised to  i n t e r f e r e  
w ith  i t s  a l l i a n c e  n u c le a r  a r ra n g e m e n ts ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th o se  in
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1. i b i d , ,  p. 3.
2. i b i d . ,  pp, 4 and 6.
3. i b i d . ,  p p .4 -5 .  In  March 1962, th e  U.S. Government ex p ressed  
s im i l a r  views in  a l e t t e r  to  th e  U.N. S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l .
The l e t t e r  was in  r e p ly  to  one s e n t  to  a l l  members of th e  
U.N. and which sought to  d e te rm in e  " th e  c o n d i t io n s  under 
which c o u n t r i e s  not p o s s e s s in g  n u c le a r  weapons might be 
w i l l i n g  to  e n te r  in t o  s p e c i f i c  u n d e r ta k in g s  to  r e f r a i n  from 
m an u fac tu r in g  or o th e rw is e  a c q u i r in g  such weapons and to  
r e f u s e  to  r e c e iv e ,  in  th e  f u t u r e ,  n u c le a r  weapons in  t h e i r  
t e r r i t o r i e s  on b e h a l f  of o th e r  c o u n t r i e s . "  See, O f f i c i a l  
Records of th e  Disarmament Commission, Supplement f o r  
Jan u a ry  1961 to  December 1962, N. York: U nited  N a t io n s ,
1963 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  Reply to  th e  S e c r e t a r y -  
G e n e ra l ) , pp. 52, and 100-102.
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r e s p e c t  of N ,A .T ,0 . The q u e s t io n  of a l l i a n c e  n u c le a r  a rrangem ents  
h in d e red  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreem ent t i l l  w e l l  
i n t o  1967,
S ince about 1958, however, A m erica’s p rim ary  arms c o n t r o l  
o b je c t iv e  had been the  t e s t  ban t r e a t y ,  Agreement was reached  on 
a p a r t i a l  ban in  August 1963, However, c l e a r  d i f f e r e n c e s  s t i l l  
remained between th e  U S ,  and R uss ia  over th e  i s s u e  of o n - s i t e  
i n s p e c t io n ,  thus  making e a r ly  agreem ent on a com prehensive ban 
u n l i k e l y .  C onsequen tly ,  a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreem ent seemed 
th e  l o g i c a l  n ex t s te p  in  th e  d i r e c t i o n  of h a l t i n g  th e  spread  of 
n u c le a r  weapons. From th e  very  beg inn ing  th e r e  w ere s t ro n g  
pocke ts  of su p p o r t  f o r  a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  w i th i n  th e  
American A d m in is t r a t io n ,  The Arms C o n tro l  and Disarmament 
Agency (A,C,DoA,), where th e  p ro p o s a ls  f o r  a t r e a t y  p robab ly  
o r i g i n a t e d ,  was anx ious to  cap th e  s u c c e s s f u l  t e s t  ban nego­
t i a t i o n s  w ith  a fo rm al agreem ent p r o h ib i t i n g  th e  d i s s e m in a t io n  
and a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons. The Pentagon was s i m i l a r l y  
in c l in e d  and i t  i s  obvious t h a t  P r e s id e n t  Johnson h im se lf  
a t ta c h e d  s p e c i a l  im portance  to  th e  achievem ent of a non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  trea ty , '* ' C h in a ’s f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t  i n  October
1964 was an a d d i t i o n a l  and pow erfu l s t im u lu s  to  th o s e  i n  th e
2
U,,S. p r e s s in g  fo r  a ban on th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons.
A m erica’s f i r s t  d r a f t  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  was p r e s e n te d  
to  th e  E.NcDoC, in  August 1965, One month l a t e r  R u ss ia  ta b le d  
i t s  f i r s t  d r a f t  a t  a m eeting  of th e  G eneral Assembly, Almost
1, For a comment on P r e s id e n t  J o h n s o n 's  a t t i t u d e  to  th e  N„P,T, 
and to  th e  problem of p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  g e n e r a l ,  se e  below
p . 57,
2, In  an a r t i c l e  p u b l ish e d  in  J u ly  1965, A,C.D,A. D i r e c to r  
W„C, F o s te r  claim ed th a t  th e  C hinese  t e s t s  (O ctober 1964 and 
May 1965) had p a r t l y  c o n t r ib u te d  to  c o n s id e ra b ly  in c re a s e d  
concern  about p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  O ther c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  
c i t e d  w ere: an a p p r e c i a t i o n  th a t  g e n e ra l  and com plete  d i s ­
armament would not be ach ieved  q u ic k ly ,  and a r e a l i z a t i o n  
t h a t  an I n c r e a s in g ly  l a r g e  q u a n t i ty  of p lu ton ium  was be ing  
produced in  r e a c t o r s  around th e  w o rld .  See, "New D ir e c t io n s  
in  Arms C on tro l and D isarm am ent,"  in  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s ,
Vol, 43, No, 4 , J u ly  1965, p , 588,
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th r e e  y e a r s  of n e g o t i a t i o n s  fo llow ed  b e fo re  th e  f i n a l  v e r s io n  of 
th e  N .P .T . was opened fo r  s ig n a t u r e  on 1 J u l y ,  1 9 68 .^
The co re  of th e  N .P .T . i s  to  be found in  th e  n o n -d is s e m in a t io n  
and n o n - a c q u i s i t io n  o b l i g a t i o n s  c o n ta in ed  i n  A r t i c l e s  I  and I I  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  These p r o v is io n s  were worked ou t on ly  a f t e r  y e a r s  
of d i s c u s s io n  on th e  m a t te r  between th e  U.S. and th e  S o v ie t  Union, 
and between th e  two superpow ers and t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  a l l i e s .  
A t t e n t io n  in  th e s e  d i s c u s s io n s  was fo cu ssed  m a in ly  on th e  ques­
t i o n  of th e  t r a n s f e r  and r e c e i p t  of n u c le a r  weapons th rough
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t io n s  o r  m u l t i l a t e r a l  fram eworks. The
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f i r s t  American d r a f t  l e f t  open th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a n u c l e a r -
3
s h a r in g  arrangem ent i n  W estern Europe such as th e  M.L.F.
According to  W ashington, t h i s  o r  s i m i l a r  p ro p o s a ls  f o r  m eeting  
N .A .T .O . 's  n u c le a r  de fen ce  problem s would no t r e s u l t  in  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  because  no t r a n s f e r  of c o n t r o l  over n u c le a r  
weapons was e n v isag e d :  " c o n t r o l "  was d e f in e d  by th e  U .S. i n
March 1966 as th e  " r i g h t  or a b i l i t y  to  f i r e  n u c le a r  weapons 
w ith o u t  th e  c o n c u r re n t  d e c i s i o n  of an  e x i s t i n g  nuc lea r-w eapon  
S t a t e . T h e  American d r a f t  a l s o  allow ed f o r  a "European
1. The t e x t  of th e  N .P .T . ( J u ly  1968) i s  rep roduced  as 
Appendix IV,
2. The f i r s t  American d r a f t  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  was 
p r e s e n te d  to  th e  E.N.D.C. on 17 August 1965. The t e x t  of 
t h i s  d r a f t  i s  rep roduced  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t i a t io n s  on 
th e  N .P .T . , pp. 133-135. The S o v ie t  d r a f t  of 24 Septem­
ber  1965 i s  rep roduced  in  i b i d . ,  pp . 135-138.
3. S te in b ru n e r  e x p la in s  t h a t  though th e  M.L.F. was r e l e g a t e d  
to  th e  s t a t u s  of a low p r i o r i t y  i tem  a f t e r  December 1964, 
i t  n e v e r th e le s s  remained o f f i c i a l  p o l i c y .  See , S t e i n ­
b ru n e r ,  op. c i t . ,  p . 194. M oreover, i t  seems t h a t  c e r t a i n  
p eo p le  in  W ashington, e s p e c i a l l y  i n  th e  S t a t e  D epartm ent,  
were v e ry  r e l u c t a n t  to  p a r t  w i th  th e  id e a  of th e  M.L.F.
One of th e s e  was Mr. George B a l l ,  Under S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e .  
See h i s  s ta te m e n t  in  D .O .S .B . , 25 O ctober 1965, p .  654.
4. See , A r t i c l e  IV of A m erica’ s amended d r a f t  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
t r e a t y ,  which was su b m it ted  to  th e  E.N.D.C. on 21 March 
1966. Quoted in  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t i a t io n s  on N .P .T . ,
p. 36.
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o p t i o n " ,  i . e . ,  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some f u t u r e  European union  
might a c q u i r e  n u c le a r  weapons tu rn ed  over to  i t  by a n u c le a r  power 
member which gave up i t s  own independen t n u c le a r  f o r c e .  Such a 
developm ent, W ashington c la im ed , would no t c o n s t i t u t e  p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n  e i t h e r ,  b ecau se  th e  t o t a l  number of e n t i t i e s  w ith  indepen­
d en t power to  f i r e  n u c le a r  weapons would no t be increased .'* '
Moscow v ig o ro u s ly  o b je c te d  to  A m erica 's  emphasis on "con­
t r o l "  and to  W ash in g to n 's  d e f i n i t i o n  of what c o n s t i t u t e d  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  R u ss ia  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  mere " a c c e s s "  to  n u c le a r  
weapons was s u f f i c i e n t  to  c o n s t i t u t e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and t h a t  
co n se q u e n t ly  no t r a n s f e r s  of th e s e  armaments w hatsoever should  
be a l lo w e d .  The S o v ie t  Union was e s p e c i a l l y  concerned t h a t  
th e  F e d e ra l  R epub lic  of Germany should  not g a in  a c c e s s  to
2
n u c le a r  weapons th rough  some a l l i a n c e  s h a r in g  a rrangem en t.
T h is  im passe b locked  p ro g re s s  tow ards a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
agreem ent f o r  two y e a rs  (August 1965 -  August 1967) b u t  d u r in g  
t h i s  tim e W ashington and Moscow were a b le  to  work out a form 
of words which r e s o lv e d  th e  problem and which was e v e n tu a l ly  
in c o rp o ra te d  i n t o  A r t i c l e s  I  and I I  of th e  f i n a l  d r a f t  of th e  
N .P .T . But i n  a g re e in g  w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union no t to  t r a n s f e r  
" to  any r e c i p i e n t  w ha tsoever"  n u c le a r  e x p lo s iv e  d e v ic e s  or 
c o n t r o l  over them, d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  and n o t  to  a s s i s t  
any n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e  to  a c q u i r e  such d e v ic e s ,  W ashington 
c l e a r l y  s a c r i f i c e d  some of i t s  freedom of ch o ic e  in  re g a rd  to  
a l l i a n c e  n u c l e a r  p la n n in g .  Schemes such as th e  M .L .F .,  or any 
o th e r  a r rangem en t in v o lv in g  j o i n t  c o n t r o l ,  or th e  t r a n s f e r  of
1. The American p o s i t i o n  was s t a t e d  on numerous o c c a s io n s  d u r in g  
1965 and 1966, p r i n c i p a l l y ,  a t  m ee tings  of th e  E.N.D.C. See 
e s p e c i a l l y ,  E „N„D.C./P .V . 228, p p .38-40; E .N .D .C ./P .V . 232, 
p p . 17-18; EoN.DcC./P.V. 241, p p . 34-41; E .N .D .C ./P .V . 250, 
p p .6 -1 2 .  See a l s o ,  s ta t e m e n t s  by A.C.D.A. D i r e c t o r ,  W.C. 
F o s t e r ,  i n  D .O .S .B . , 12 J u ly  1965, p .8 0  and 20 September 
1965, p p . 471-472 , See a l s o ,  s ta te m e n t  by Mr. George C,
McGhee, U .S. Ambassador to  West Germany, i n  D. 0 , S . B c , 6 
December 1965, p p , 905-6 ,
2. For an e x c e l l e n t  s ta te m e n t  of th e  S o v ie t  p o s i t i o n ,  s ee  
E .N .D .C , /P .V , 252, p p .4 -1 2 .
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n u c le a r  weapons to  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s ,  now seem to  be p rec luded  by 
th e  N .P.T .
The n o n -d is se m in a t io n  and n o n - a c q u i s i t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  of th e  
N .P .T . a r e  r e in f o r c e d  by th e  s a fe g u a rd s  p r o v is io n s  of A r t i c l e  I I I .  
Two req u ire m en ts  a r e  co n ta in ed  in  t h i s  A r t i c l e ,  F i r s t ,  a l l  
s i g n a t o r i e s  must u n d e r ta k e  to  app ly  s a fe g u a rd s  to  n u c le a r  f a c i l i ­
t i e s  or m a te r i a l s  su p p l ie d  to  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s .  Second, a l l  
n o n -n u c le a r  s i g n a t o r i e s  must a c c e p t  s a fe g u a rd s  on t h e i r  p e a c e fu l  
n u c le a r  a c t i v i t i e s .  These s a fe g u a rd s  a r e  to  be " s e t  f o r t h  in  an 
agreement to  be n e g o t ia te d  and concluded w ith  th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Atomic Energy Agency in  acco rdance  w ith  th e  S t a t u t e  of th e  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Atomic Energy Agency and th e  Agency’s s a feg u a rd  
sy s tem ."  N e g o t i a t io n  of th e  sa fe g u a rd s  a r t i c l e  proved esp ec ­
i a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  and th e  superpow ers d id  no t re a c h  agreem ent on 
t h i s  a s p e c t  of th e  t r e a t y  t i l l  Jan u ary  1968, R u ss ia  i n s i s t e d  
a l l  along t h a t  t h e r e  should  be no in s p e c t io n  of th e  p e a c e fu l  
n u c le a r  a c t i v i t i e s  of th e  n u c le a r  s t a t e s .  At f i r s t  g la n c e  t h i s  
might no t seem a w holly  u n a c c e p ta b le  demand: a f t e r  a l l ,  th e
prim ary  aim of th e  t r e a t y  was to  p re v e n t  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  
weapons to  s t a t e s  which d id  n o t  a l r e a d y  p o sse ss  them. But th e  
req u ire m en t  t h a t  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s  on ly  shou ld  a c c e p t  s a f e ­
guards  was condemned by a number of n o n -n u c le a r  c o u n t r i e s  
which a l re a d y  w ere , or promised to  be , m ajor c o m p e t i to r s  in  
th e  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  f i e l d .  They complained t h a t  th e  system  
was d i s c r im in a to r y  and could  cause  them to  s u f f e r  com m ercia lly .
In  an e f f o r t  to  make th e  i n s p e c t io n  p ro v i s io n s  o f  th e  N .P .T . 
more a c c e p ta b l e ,  th e  U.S, announced in  December 1967 t h a t  i t  
would p e rm it  th e  I .A .E .A .  to  app ly  sa fe g u a rd s  to  n u c le a r
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  th e  U.S, ex ce p t " th o s e  w i th  d i r e c t  n a t io n a l
2
s e c u r i t y  s i g n i f i c a n c e . "  A nother problem in  th e  s a fe g u a rd s
1» The views of some n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s  on th e  s a fe g u a rd s  and 
o th e r  p ro v is io n s  of th e  N .P .T . w i l l  be examined in  g r e a t e r  
d e t a i l  l a t e r  in  th e  t h e s i s .  See P a r t  L I , -  .
2. See, a d d re s s  by P r e s id e n t  Johnson ,  quoted in  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
N e g o t ia t io n s  on N .P .T . ,  p ,8 2 ,
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field was that concerning the relationship between the I»A»E.A. 
and regional organisations such as EURATOM» The U.S» regarded 
EURATOM safeguards as equivalent to those of the I»A»E.A», but 
Russia objected on the grounds that the EURATOM system amounted 
to inspection by " a l l i e s " T h e  safeguards article which was 
eventually agreed upon provides that non-nuclear signatories 
should negotiate inspection agreements with the I»A»E.A. either 
individually or together with other states» The actual extent 
of EURATOM's role in the inspection of its members remains to 
be worked out in these negotiations between that organisation 
and the I 0A 0 E 0A.
The discrimination inherent in Articles I, II and III of
the N.P.T» also characterises the peaceful uses provisions of
the agreement» Non-nuclear states are forbidden to develop
peaceful nuclear explosive devices: the U»S. was the first to
push for the inclusion of this ban, on the grounds that the
technology necessary for making nuclear explosive devices for
peaceful purposes was essentially indistinguishable from that
2required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. However, 
the treaty stipulates that potential benefits from any peace­
ful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available 
to non-nuclear signatories on a non-discriminatory basis.
The charge for such services will be as low as possible and 
is to exclude any charge for research and development» The 
treaty also affirms that states have an "inalienable right" 
to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and stipulates 
that signatories must facilitate "the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
3information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." Hedley 
1. ibid», p» 70»
2» E cN.D.C»/P»V» 280, pp»14-15»
3. See Article IV of the N r,P»T» (July 1968)»
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Bull has suggested that the promise of the n\iclear states to perform
peaceful nuclear explosive services for non-nuclear countries has
about it the suggestion of a bribe,'*' It could be added, that
implicit in the peaceful uses provisions of the treaty generally,
is not just the promise of rewards for those who sign, but also
the threat of punishments for those who do not.
Another discriminatory feature of the N.P.T« is that relating
to the disarmament obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear parties
to the treaty respectively. While non-nuclear signatories must
renounce their options on building nuclear weapons, there is no
corresponding obligation on the nuclear powers to reduce their
armaments. During negotiations leading to the N.P.T., some
non-nuclear states sought to link the proposed treaty to specific
collateral disarmament measures such as a comprehensive test ban
and a "cut-off" in the production of fissionable material for
weapons purposes<> The UoS. firmly resisted these moves on the
grounds that only one measure could be dealt with at a time and
2that to attempt more would damage the prospects of the N.P.T.
Under Article VI of the present treaty the nuclear powers have 
undertaken to pursue arms control negotiations "in good faith". 
However, apart from the reference to general and complete 
disarmament, there is no mention of any specific disarmament 
measures which might be negotiated; nor is there any suggestion 
of a time limit within which progress towards arms control must 
be registered.
The NoP,T, is not just the latest in a series of devices 
employed by the U„S. to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
It is, in addition, the clearest indication so far of America's 
changing relationship with the Soviet Union, More so than the
I. Hedley Bull, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Impli­
cations for Australia," in Australian Outlook, Vol. 22,
No, 2, August 1968, p,168o
20 E,N,DoCr/P,Vo 268, pp„15-16 and E J , D tC,/P,V. 336, pp,20-21.
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t e s t  ban t r e a t y ,  i t  r e v e a l s  Washington’s d e t e r m in a t io n  to reac h
agreement w i th  Moscow even a t  th e  c o s t  of some d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  i t s  f r i e n d s  and a l l i e s .  Bonn was e s p e c i a l l y
s u s p i c i o u s  of  the  S ov ie t -U .S ,  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  a f a c t  which i s
h a r d ly  s u r p r i s i n g  in  view of R u s s i a ’s p e r s i s t e n t  d e n u n c i a t i o n
1
of t h e  F e d e r a l  R epub l ic .  The West German Government was unhappy
about  th e  ban on th e  development of  p e a c e fu l  n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i v e s
by the  no n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s  and th e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  between n u c l e a r
2
and n on -nuc le a r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  m a t t e r  of s a f e g u a r d s .  More
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  however, Bonn was concerned t h a t  th e  N.P.T,
3
seemed to  r u l e  out  the  "European o p t i o n .  U nder ly ing  t h e s e
m i s g i v i n g s ,  was t h e  f e a r  that: the  agreement between Washington
and Moscow somehow implied  a l e s s e n i n g  of  America’ s commitment
to  th e  de fenc e  of  Western Europe i n  g e n e r a l  and Germany i n  
4p a r t i c u l a r .  France  was even more c r i t i c a l  of  t h e  N.P .T .
1. E l i z a b e t h  Young, The Con tro l  of  P r o l i f e r a t i o n :  The 1968 
T re a ty  i n  H in d s ig h t  and F o r e c a s t , Adelph i  Paper No. 56,  
London: The I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  S t u d i e s ,  1969,  p , 8 .
2. i b i d . See a l s o ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t i a t i o n s  on N , P T . , 
p p . 63-65 and 70-71.
3. Young, op.  e i t . , p . 8 .  A r t i c l e  I  of  t h e  N.P .T .  p r o h i b i t s  
th e  t r a n s f e r  of n u c l e a r  weapons to  any r e c i p i e n t  w h a t s o e v e r . 
I t  seems th e n ,  t h a t  any s i g n a t o r y  of  the  N.P .T ,  would be 
u n ab le  to t u r n  over i t s  n u c l e a r  weapons t o  a f u t u r e  European 
u n io n .  E a r l i e r ,  the  American Ambassador to  West Germany had 
a s s u re d  t h e  German peop le  t h a t  th e  U.S. d r a f t  n o n p r o l i f e r a ­
t i o n  t r e a t y  of August 1965 had " t a k e n  f u l l  acc oun t"  of  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of g r e a t e r  German p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  the  n u c l e a r  
de fenc e  of t h e  a l l i a n c e  and of  t h e  u l t i m a t e  development of
a European n u c l e a r  f o r c e .  See,  D. 0 . S . B, ,  6 December 1965, 
p .905 .
4. In  December 1965,  the  UfS. Ambassador to  West Germany 
r e f e r r e d  to  the  " p e r s i s t e n t  c r i e s  of  al arm [ i n  West Germany] 
t h a t  the  Americans a r e  so i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
agreement as to  be w i l l i n g  to  endanger European and German 
s e c u r i t y  i n  i t s  b e h a l f , "  See,  D, 0 , S , B- ,  6 December 1965,  
p-905.  The same m a t t e r  was t h e  s u b j e c t  of some d i s c u s s i o n  
d u r in g  h e a r i n g s  on th e  N .P .T ,  i n  1968, See,  N o n p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n  T r e a t y , h e a r i n g s  b e f o r e  the  Sena te  Committee on 
F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s ,  90th Cong. ,  2nd S e s s , ,  J u l y  19-12 and 
17,  1968,  Washington,  1968, p p . 80-82,
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t h a n  Germany d id  n o t  s ig n  t h e  a g re e m e n t .
One f u r t h e r  i s s u e  r e l e v a n t  to  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  N .P .T . 
i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  s e c u r i t y  a s s u r a n c e s  g iv e n  by t h e  n u c l e a r  powers 
to  t h e  n o n - n u c l e a r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e i r  s i g n a t u r e  of 
t h e  t r e a t y .  The r o l e  of s e c u r i t y  a s s u r a n c e s  i n  A m erican  e f f o r t s  
to  l i m i t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n  Europe h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  n o t e d .  T h e re ,  
W ash in g to n  h a s  a t t e m p te d  to  p e r s u a d e  i t s  a l l i e s  t h a t  t h e  U .S . 
commitment t o  N .A .T.O . i s  a c r e d i b l e  one i n  a l l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  
and t h a t  c o n s e q u e n t ly  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of W este rn  Europe have  no 
need  o f  t h e i r  own n u c l e a r  w eapons. I n  O c to b e r  1964, P r e s i d e n t  
J o h n s o n  d e c l a r e d  t h a t :
. . .  t h e  n a t i o n s  t h a t  do n o t  s e e k  n a t i o n a l  n u c l e a r  
weapons can  be s u r e  t h a t  i f  th e y  need ou r  s t r o n g  
s u p p o r t  a g a i n s t  some t h r e a t  of n u c l e a r  b l a c k m a i l ,  
t h e n  th e y  w i l l  have  i t . ^
T h is  d e c l a r a t i o n  was v e r y  g e n e r a l  in  i t s  te rm s  and m ust be 
v iew ed  a s  p a r t  o f  W a sh in g to n ’ s g l o b a l  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
s t r a t e g y .  However, coming a s  i t  d id  j u s t  two day s  a f t e r  C h i n a 's  
f i r s t  n u c l e a r  t e s t ,  and b e a r in g  i n  mind A m e ric a ’ s e x i s t i n g  
d e f e n c e  comm itm ents in  t h e  a r e a ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  was p r im ­
a r i l y  d e s ig n e d  to  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  n o n - a l i g n e d ,  n o n - n u c l e a r  s t a t e s
2
of A s i a ,  e s p e c i a l l y  I n d i a .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  n o n - p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n  t r e a t y  r a i s e d  im p o r ta n t  s e c u r i t y  p rob lem s f o r  t h e  non­
n u c l e a r  s t a t e s ,  and a f t e r  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  f i r s t  U .S . 
and S o v i e t  d r a f t s  i n  A u g u s t-S ep tem b er  1965, many of  t h e s e  
c o u n t r i e s  began  to  a g i t a t e  f o r  a s s u r a n c e s  o r  g u a r a n t e e s  from
1. S e e ,  A d d re s s  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  O c tobe r  18 , 1964. Reproduced 
i n  J .C .A .E .  H e a r in g s  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of N u c le a r  W eapons, 
1 9 6 6 , p .1 2 0 .
2. T h is  m a t t e r  w i l l  be t a k e n  up i n  d e t a i l  l a t e r  i n  t h e  t h e s i s .  
See C h a p te r  IX.
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th e  n u c le a r  pow ers„ In  February  1966, th e  S o v ie t  P rem ier  Mr.
Kosygin o f f e r e d  to  in c lu d e  in  h i s  c o u n t r y ’s d r a f t  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n
t r e a t y  a c l a u s e  "on th e  p r o h i b i t i o n  of th e  u se  of n u c le a r  weapons
a g a i n s t  n o n -n u c le a r  S ta t e s  p a r t i e s  to  th e  t r e a t y  which have no
n u c le a r  weapons in  t h e i r  t e r r i to r y . " '* '  This  o f f e r  amounted to  what
2
has been c a l l e d  a n e g a t iv e  a s s u ra n c e  to  th e  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s .
However, t h e  im plem en ta tion  of such a scheme would have s e r i o u s l y
d i s r u p te d  American defence  a rran g em en ts  i n  W estern  E urope , and
though th e  o f f e r  was e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  r e c e iv e d  by a number of
n o n -a l ig n e d  s t a t e s ,  th e  U.S. r e j e c t e d  i t .
W ashington was r e l u c t a n t  to  in c lu d e  a s e c u r i t y  g u a ra n te e
in  th e  t e x t  of th e  NoP.T. Such a s te p  m ight have r e s u l t e d  in
a c o n s id e r a b le  e x te n s io n  in  th e  n a t i o n ’s commitments and would
3
a lm o st  c e r t a i n l y  have been r e j e c t e d  by C ongress .  A m er ic a 's
c l e a r  p r e f e r e n c e  was fo r  an a rrangem ent in v o lv in g  th e  U.N. In
March 1968, th e  two superpow ers ,  t o g e th e r  w i th  G rea t B r i t a i n ,
d e c la re d  t h a t  th ey  were w i l l i n g  to  recommend to  th e  S e c u r i ty
C ouncil  a r e s o l u t i o n  in  which th e  C ouncil  would: (1) fo rm a l ly
re c o g n i s e  th e  g r a v i t y  of any a g g re s s io n  or t h r e a t  of a g g re s s io n
w i th  n u c le a r  weapons, and (2) welcome the  i n t e n t i o n  ex p ressed
by " c e r t a i n  S t a t e s "  to  p ro v id e  or s u p p o r t  immediate a s s i s t a n c e
to  any n o n -n u c le a r  s i g n a t o r i e s  of th e  N .P .T . who were v ic t im s
4
of such a g g r e s s io n .  A r e s o l u t i o n  a long  th e se  l i n e s  was 
s u b se q u e n t ly  adopted  by th e  S e c u r i t y  C ouncil  on 19 J u n e ,  1968.
In  c o n ju n c t io n  w ith  t h i s  a c t i o n ,  B r i t a i n ,  th e  U .S. and R uss ia  
made fo rm al d e c l a r a t i o n s  of t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  to  su p p o r t  th e  
p r i n c i p l e s  of th e  r e s o l u t i o n . ^
1. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t i a t io n s  on N .P .T . , p .3 2 .
2. B u l l ,  l o c . c i t . ,  p p . 170-171.
3. The q u e s t io n  of W ash in g to n 's  a t t i t u d e  to  s e c u r i t y  g u a ra n te e s  
w i l l  be examined in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  l a t e r  i n  th e  t h e s i s .
See C h ap te rs  IX And X.
4. The t e x t  of th e  t r i p a r t i t e  r e s o l u t i o n  i s  rep ro d u ced  as 
Appendix Y,
5. The t e x t  of th e  American d e c l a r a t i o n  i s  rep roduced  as  
Appendix VI.
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The tripartite resolution on security assurances does not
impose any new obligations on its three sponsors, but merely
reaffirms those they already have under the U.N. Charter.^- The
nuclear powers have not indicated what type of assistance they
would be prepared to render, and in particular, have not committed
themselves to the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, as Hedley
Bull has argued, "they do not say they would act in the case of
nuclear attack, but merely in the case of nuclear 'aggression’,
2a term notoriously subject to private definition." Finally,
any decision to support a victim of nuclear aggression will be
determined by the nuclear powers in the light of how they see
their interests at the time and not by a prior undertaking like
3the tripartite declaration.
In recent years the N.P.T. has been accorded great 
prominence in most discussions of American nonproliferation 
policy. However, the analysis in this chapter suggests that 
the N.P.T. is only one of many measures which Washington has 
mobilized in its campaign to limit proliferation. Broadly 
speaking these measures may be divided into two main categories.
In the first place, there have been those policies aimed at 
denying other nations the capacity to build nuclear weapons.
This was the major aim of the Atomic Energy Act and, more 
recently, of Washington's support for the application of safe­
guards to international transfers of nuclear facilities and 
materials. Second, there have been those policies designed to
1. This was confirmed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
See, Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., September, 1968 (hereafter referred to as 
Senate Report on N.P.T., 1968), p.ll.
2. Bull, loc. cit., p.171.
3. This point was emphasised by Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
See report of his testimony, in Senate Report on N.P.T.,
1968, p.ll.
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persuade  s t a r e s  no t to  ta k e  up th e  n u c le a r  o p t io n s  they  a l re a d y  
have or w i l l  p ro b ab ly  come to  possess»  One of th e se  has invo lved  
th e  e x te n s io n ,  to  a number of n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s ,  of a s s u ra n c e s  
and g u a ra n te e s  of su p p o r t  a g a i n s t  agg ress ion«  Another has 
invo lved  th e  sp o n so rsh ip  of fo rm al arms c o n t ro l  agreem ents  such 
as  th e  t e s t  ban and th e  N0PoT» A lso ,  in  an e f f o r t  to  encourage 
o th e r  s t a t e s  to  rem ain  n o n -n u c le a r ,  th e  U.S. has t r i e d  to  e x e rc i s e  
some r e s t r a i n t  in  i t s  own n u c le a r  weapons p o l i c i e s «  P r e s id e n t  
Kennedy in  p a r t i c u l a r  seems to  have r e a l i s e d  t h a t  some r e d u c t io n  
in  A m erica’ s dependence on n u c le a r  weapons to  r e s i s t  a g g re s s io n  
was an e s s e n t i a l  e lem ent of any campaign to  g e t  " th e  n u c le a r  
g e n ie  back in  th e  b o t t l e «
I t  should be c l e a r  from th e  a n a l y s i s  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  t h a t  
th e  p o l i c y  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  has  no t been pursued  in  a vacuum. 
S ince  th e  end of World War I I ,  th e  aim of l i m i t i n g  th e  sp read  
of n u c le a r  weapons has had to  ta k e  i t s  p la c e  w ith  o th e r  o b je c ­
t i v e s  of American po licy«  M oreover, i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  aim 
of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  h as ,  on a number of o c c a s io n s ,  c o n f l i c t e d  
w i th  some of th e se  o th e r  U-, S. p o l i c y  goals»  The Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946, which h a l t e d  f o r  th e  tim e being c o - o p e r a t io n  in  
th e  n u c le a r  f i e l d  between th e  U S» and B r i t a i n ,  was i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w ith  th e  prom otion of good r e l a t i o n s  between London and Washing­
ton» L a t e r ,  A m erica’ s o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  French n u c le a r  
programme helped  to  s t r a i n  r e l a t i o n s  between the  U»S. and
1, B ro d ie ,  op« c i t », p«6« I t  i s  im p o rtan t  to  n o te ,  however, 
t h a t  W ash ing ton 's  e f f o r t s  to  d is c o u ra g e  a d d i t i o n a l  s t a t e s  
from a c q u i r in g  n u c lea r  weapons, has  been i n h i b i t e d  by 
A m erica 's  d e c la re d  p o l ic y  of r e l i a n c e  upon n u c le a r  weapons 
f o r  l o c a l  d e fe n c e ,  a t  l e a s t  in  c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n s .  See, 
Morton H» H a lp e r in ,  "A Ban on the  P r o l i f e r a t i o n  of N uclear  
Weapons," i n  L uard , op« c i t », pp«151-152, The q u e s t io n  
of A m erica 's  dependence on n u c le a r  weapons i n  i t s  A sian  
s t r a t e g y  and th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h i s  dependence fo r  U.S. 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y  in  A sia  and th e  P a c i f i c  w i l l  be the  
s u b je c t  of a n a l y s i s  in  P a r t  I I I  of t h i s  t h e s i s .  See 
e s p e c i a l l y ,  C hapters  VIII* IX ftfld X.
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a n o th e r  of i t s  European a l l i e s 0 F u r th e r ,  f o r  a w h i le  a t  l e a s t ,  
t h e r e  was a c o n f l i c t  i n  th e  UoSo A d m in is t r a t io n  between th o se  who 
wanted a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y ,  and th o se  e lem en ts ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  
in  th e  S t a t e  Department^ who wanted to  r e t a i n  the  o p t io n  of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  some form of a l l i a n c e  n u c le a r  f o r c e  i n  Europe 
F i n a l l y ,  i n  i t s  n e g o t i a t i o n  of bo th  th e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y  and the  
NcPoTo, Washington was p repa red  to  s u f f e r  some s e t - b a c k  in  i t s  
r e l a t i o n s  w ith  F rance and Germany»
This ch ap te r  has looked a t  th e  v a r io u s  te c h n iq u e s  and 
o b je c t iv e s  of U.So n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y ;  the  n ex t  c h a p te r  
w i l l  review  the  r a t i o n a l e  and m o t iv a t io n s .
1» As l a t e  as 1966, Under S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e  George B a l l  s t i l l  
he ld  ou t hopes f o r  some form of a l l i a n c e  n u c le a r  fo rce»
For ev idence  of t h i s  and of h i s  l a c k  of en thusiasm  f o r  th e  
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  th e n  under d i s c u s s io n ,  see  
Uni t e d  S t a t e s  P o l ic y  Towards Europe (and R e la ted  M a t t e r s ) , 
h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  Sena te  Committee on F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s ,  
89th  Congo, 2nd Sess»» June 20-23, 27-28, 30, and J u ly  13 
and 22, 1966, W ashington, 1966, pp»294-6, 335-6 , 342-5.
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CHAPTER II
THE RATIONALE AND MOTIVATIONS OF AMERICAN NON- 
PROL1FERATION POLICY
It was noted in the previous chapter that opposition to 
the spread of nuclear weapons has been a cardinal objective of 
United States Policy ever since the end of World War II. 
Successive American Governments have regarded the prospect of 
nuclear proliferation with the gravest forebodings. During 
the Kennedy and Johnson years, this concern was often expressed 
in the most explicit and desperate terms. In July 1963, 
President Kennedy noted that the four nuclear powers then in 
existence could soon be joined by a "small but significant 
number" of other nations which were also capable of developing 
nuclear weapons. Commenting on this prospect, the President 
said:
I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it 
would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many 
hands, in the hands of countries large and small, 
stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, 
scattered throughout the world. There would be no 
rest for anyone then, no stability, no real 
security, and no chance of effective disarmament.
There would only be the increased chance of acci­
dental war and an increased necessity for the great 
powers to involve themselves in what otherwise 
would be local conflicts.^
But if the prospect of nuclear proliferation could be said to 
have greatly worried President Kennedy, it seems to have fairly 
obsessed his successor. In 1965, President Johnson described
I. See, Nationwide Address by President Kennedy, July 26, 1963. 
Reproduced in Documents on Disarmaments, 1963, Washington: 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1964 
(hereafter referred to as D on D ., 1963), p.254.
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th e  problem of n u c le a r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  as  n o th in g  l e s s  th an  the
" g ra v e s t  of a l l  u n reso lv ed  human i s s u e s " . ^  In  a message to  th e
EoNoDoCo in  January  1966, th e  P r e s id e n t  emphasised t h a t  th e  U nited
S ta t e s  had "w ith  a l l  mankind, a common i n t e r e s t  in  a c t in g  . . .  to
2
p rev en t  n u c le a r  spread"» Such was th e  im portance t h a t  Johnson 
a t ta c h e d  to  th e  t a s k  of p re v e n t in g  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons, 
t h a t  in  a message to  th e  U.S. S en a te  i n  J u ly  1968, he s a id :
I  c o n s id e r  t h i s  t r e a t y  [ th e  N J . T , ]  to  be th e  most 
im portan t i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agreement l i m i t i n g  n u c le a r  
arms s in c e  th e  n u c le a r  age began, I t  i s  a tr ium ph 
of s a n i t y  and of m an 's  w i l l  to  s u r v iv e .^
1. Quoted in  W illiam  B. B ader, The U nited  S t a t e s  and th e  Spread 
of N uclear  Weapons, New York: P eg asu s ,  1968, p»59. Sena to r  
R obert F, Kennedy i s  r e p o r te d  to  have s a id  t h a t  a lo n g s id e  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  c o n t r o l  " n o th in g  e l s e  means a n y th in g " .  Quoted 
in  James R» S c h le s in g e r ,  "The S t r a t e g i c  Consequences of 
N uclear  P r o l i f e r a t i o n , "  in  James E. Dougherty and J .  F,
Lehman, J r . ,  Arms C o n tro l  For The L a te  S i x t i e s , New York:
Van N o stran d ,  1967, p»175. Some u n o f f i c i a l  o b s e rv e r s  have 
been e q u a l ly  d e s p a i r in g  i n  t h e i r  a s s e s sm e n ts .  In  1960,
Hans Morgenthau w ro te :  " I f  th e  n u c le a r  armaments r a c e  cannot 
be b rought under c o n t r o l  b e fo r e  any number of n a t io n s  w i l l  
have n u c le a r  weapons, on ly  a m i r a c le  w i l l  save m ankind ,"
See, L e t t e r  to  th e  W ashington P o s t , February  23, 1960,
Quoted i n ,  W alter  R. F i s h e r  and R ichard  D. Burns ( e d s , ) ,  
Armament and Disarmament, Belmont, C a l i f o r n i a :  Wandsworth, 
1964, p .311 , f n . l .
2. See, Text of Message from P r e s id e n t  Johnson to  th e  18-N ation  
Disarmament Committee, Jan u a ry  27, 1966, Reproduced in  
N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of N uclear  Weapons, h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  J o i n t  
Committee on Atomic E nergy , 89 th  Cong., 2nd S e s s . ,  February  
23, and March 1 and 7, 1966 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  JoC .A .E . 
H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of N uclear  Weapons, 1966) ,  p .100 .
3» See, Message from P r e s id e n t  Johnson to  th e  Sena te  on th e  
N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  T re a ty ,  J u ly  9, 1968» Reproduced i n ,  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t i a t io n s  on th e  T re a ty  on th e  N o n p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n  of N uclear Weapons, W ashington: U nited  S ta t e s  Arms 
C on tro l  and Disarmament Agency, P u b l i c a t i o n  48, January  1969 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t ia t io n s  on the  
N,P-Tc.) , p .181 .
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E a r l i e r ,  i n  te s t im ony  b e fo re  th e  S ena te  F o re ig n  R e la t io n s  
Committee in  J u ly  1968, th e  American S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e  Dean Rusk, 
advanced fo u r  main rea so n s  fo r  h i s  c o u n t ry ’s o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  
sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons» F i r s t ,  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  made i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  more complex and more d angerous ,  and s u b s ta n ­
t i a l l y  in c re a s e d  th e  r i s k s  and dangers  of war. Second, i f  th e  
number of n u c le a r  powers con tinued  to  in c r e a s e  i t  would become 
more d i f f i c u l t  to  n e g o t i a t e  n u c le a r  arms c o n t r o l  ag reem en ts .
T h i rd ,  A m erica’s e f f o r t s  to  m a in ta in  f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  as 
many n a t io n s  as p o s s i b le  would become more d i f f i c u l t  by v i r t u e  
of n u c le a r  weapons s p re a d .  F o u r th ,  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  would i n t e r ­
f e r e  w ith  economic growth in  th e  l e s s  developed c o u n t r ie s » ^
This  was a r e a s o n a b le  summary of th e  r a t i o n a l e  th en  be ing  used 
by th e  U.S. to  su p p o r t  i t s  campaign a g a i n s t  n u c le a r  sp re a d .  
However, on o th e r  o cca s io n s  s in c e  th e  end of World War I I ,  th e  
UoS. has advanced d i f f e r e n t  re a so n s  f o r  i t s  s tan d  a g a i n s t  th e  
a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons by a d d i t i o n a l  c o u n t r i e s .
Moreover, i t  i s  a p p a re n t  t h a t  u n d e r ly in g  th e  o f f i c i a l l y  s t a t e d  
r a t i o n a l e ,  have been c o n s id e r a t io n s  of American n a t io n a l  
i n t e r e s t  which c o n s t i t u t e  an im p o rtan t  b a s i s  f o r  W ash ing ton’s 
o p p o s i t io n  to  p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  In  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  an a t tem p t 
w i l l  be made to  examine bo th  th e  fo rm al r a t i o n a l e  and th e  
u n d e r ly in g  m o t iv a t io n s  of A m erica 's  o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  spread  
of n u c le a r  weapons s in c e  1945,
A. I n i t i a l  Thoughts About The Need For C o n tro l  Of N uclear  Weapons
Fear of th e  immense d e s t r u c t iv e n e s s  of n u c le a r  weapons 
has always been a m o t iv a t in g  f a c t o r  in  American e f f o r t s  to
1, N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  T r e a t y , h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  Sena te  Comm­
i t t e e  on F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s ,  90th  Cong», 2nd S e s s , , J u ly  
10-12 and 17, 1968, W ashington, 1968 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to  as Senate  H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  T re a ty ,  P a r t  I , 
1968) ,  pp»4-5.
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c o n t ro l  atomic energy . But t h i s  was p robab ly  never more so th an  
d u r in g  th e  immediate p o s t  war y e a r s .  The development of th e  
a tom ic bomb came tow ards th e  end of th e  most d e s t r u c t i v e  war in  
h i s t o r y .  Long b e fo re  th e  f i r s t  t e s t  of th e  new weapon a t  
Alamagordo in  J u ly  1945, th e  t e r r i b l e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  of modern 
c o n v e n t io n a l  weapons had been amply dem onstra ted  in  many t h e a t r e s  
of c o n f l i c t .  A ir a t t a c k s  a lo n e  had d e v a s ta te d  hundreds of 
c i t i e s  and towns in  Europe and Japan  on a s c a l e  h i t h e r t o  unknown. 
But th e  a s s a u l t s  on H iroshima and N agasaki in  August 1945 were 
of a d i f f e r e n t  o rd e r  a l t o g e t h e r .  In  r a i d s  on th e s e  c i t i e s  th e  
damage i n f l i c t e d  by j u s t  two a tom ic bombs was equa l to  t h a t  
which could only  have been ach ieved  by th e  u se  of hundreds of 
a i r c r a f t  and te n s  of thousands  of to n s  of c o n v e n t io n a l  h igh  
e x p lo s iv e .  Moreover, as  th e  American Government con tem pla ted  
th e  f u l l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of th e s e  l a t e s t  a t t a c k s  on Ja p a n ,  i t  d id  
so i n  th e  knowledge t h a t  a n o th e r  s c a l e  of m agnitude in  n u c le a r  
weapons was cap ab le  of being  e v o lv ed .^  I t  i s  h a rd ly  s u r p r i s in g  
th e n ,  t h a t  most s c i e n t i s t s  and s ta te sm en  were p reoccup ied  w ith  
th e  d e s t r u c t iv e n e s s  of th e  atom ic bomb. Few were p rep a red  to  
s p e c u la te  about th e  im p l ic a t io n s  of th e  new weapon excep t in  
th e  most p e s s im i s t i c  te rm s ,  In  th e  weeks and months fo l lo w ­
ing th e  a t t a c k s  on H iroshim a and N agasak i,  o f f i c i a l  and sem i­
o f f i c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  warned of th e  u n p a r a l l e l e d  d e s t r u c t i o n  of 
l i f e  and p ro p e r ty  and even of th e  a n n i h i l a t i o n  of c i v i l i z a t i o n  
i t s e l f  i n  any f u t u r e  g lo b a l  w ar. P r e s id e n t  Truman’s rem ark
t h a t ,  " th e  atomic bomb [was] too dangerous to  be lo o se  i n  a 
2
la w le s s  w orld"  may be sa id  to  have r e f l e c t e d  th e  views of 
most Americans a t  th e  t im e ,
1, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n tro l  of Atomic Energy: Growth of a 
P o l i c y , W ashington: U n ited  S ta t e s  Department of S t a t e ,  
1947 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as Growth of a P o l i c y ) , p ,9 8 ,
2, Quoted in  i b i d , ,  p ,107 .
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Flowing from an aw areness of th e  tremendous d e s t r u c t iv e n e s s
of th e  new weapon was a b e l i e f  he ld  by many t h a t  t h e r e  could  be
no adequa te  m i l i t a r y  de fen ce  a g a i n s t  a tom ic weapons.'*' In  reac h in g
t h i s  c o n c lu s io n ,  American p o licy -m ak e rs  were no doubt m ind fu l of
th e  f a c t  t h a t  h e n c e fo r th ,  n o th in g  l e s s  than  one hundred per  cen t
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  would be r e q u i r e d  of a n a t i o n ' s  d e fen c e  system i f
i t s  c i t i e s  were to  avoid  damage on th e  s c a l e  s u f f e r e d  a t  H iroshima
and N agasak i,  Moreover, t h e r e  was a tendency  a t  th e  time to
im agine t h a t  n u c le a r  weapons would prove e s p e c i a l l y  p o te n t  in
more novel forms of a t t a c k .  I t  was b e l ie v e d  by many, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,
t h a t  atomic bombs, e i t h e r  s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y  p la ced  on an o p p o n e n t 's
t e r r i t o r y  or d e l iv e r e d  th e r e  by u n co n v e n t io n a l  means, could
2overwhelm even th e  most s t r o n g ly  p r o te c te d  s t a t e .  The u s e f u l ­
ness  of t a c t i c s  such as th e s e  has been su b se q u e n tly  q u e s t io n e d ,  
bu t a t  th e  t im e, s p e c u la t io n  of t h i s  s o r t  o n ly  added to  th e  
f e e l i n g s  of i n s e c u r i t y  accompanying th e  development of atom ic 
weapons.
This  aw areness of th e  tremendous p o t e n t i a l  f o r  d e s t r u c ­
t i o n  of th e  new weapon ap p ea rs  to  have p r e c i p i t a t e d  two s t r a n d s  
of th in k in g  amongst American p o l ic y -m a k e rs .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  was 
c o n s id e r a b le  f e a r  and ap p reh e n s io n  about a f u t u r e  i n  which 
atomic armaments were acc ep ted  as l e g i t i m a t e  weapons of war.
As th e  L i l i e n t h a l  Report s a id :
1, A R eport on th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n tro l  of Atomic Energy 
( L i l i e n t h a l  R e p o r t ) ,  W ashington: U nited  S ta t e s  Department 
of S t a t e ,  1946 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s ,  The L i l i e n t h a l  
R ep o r t) , p , 19 o
2» See, f o r  example, te s t im o n y  of Dr. Harold D. Urey, P ro fe s s o r  
of C hem istry , U n iv e r s i ty  of Chicago, i n  C re a t in g  a S p e c ia l  
Committee to  I n v e s t i g a t e  Problems R e la t in g  to  D evelopm ent, 
Use and C on tro l  of Atomic E nergy , h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  Sena te  
S p e c ia l  Committee on Atomic Energy, 79 th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s , , 
P a r t  I ,  December 1945, W ashington, 1946, pp»81 and 86.
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Enough has been s a id  to  make u n n ecessa ry  a r e p e t i t i o n  
of th e  p ro b ab le  h o r r o r s  of a war in  which atom ic 
weapons were used by b o th  com batants  a g a in s t  th e  c i t i e s  
of t h e i r  enemy« But i t  i s  h a rd ly  p o s s ib le  to  o v e r­
e s t im a te  th e  deep im p ress io n  of h o r ro r  and concern  
which i n s i g h t  i n t o  th e s e  f u t u r e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  has made 
so w idesp read« !
This f e e l i n g  gave r i s e  to  th e  r a t h e r  g e n e r a l i s e d  n o t io n  t h a t  th e  
atomic bomb was so f r i g h t f u l  a weapon t h a t  i t  would be b e s t  
done away w ith  com plete ly« There seems to  be an  analogy h e re  
w ith  th e  w orld -w ide re sp o n se  in  former tim es to  th e  development 
of po iso n  gas» The second s t r a n d  of th in k in g  was of a more 
s p e c i f i c  na tu re«  Many Americans q u ic k ly  a p p re c ia te d  th a t  th e  
atomic bomb was a weapon of u n p receden ted  m i l i t a r y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
and t h a t  no e f f o r t  should  be spared  in  an a t te m p t  to  keep i t  
from th e  c o u n t r y 's  m ajor p o t e n t i a l  enemy, th e  S o v ie t  Union, 
Indeed ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  to  conclude  t h a t  f o r  about fo u r  y ea rs  
a f t e r  th e  end of World War I I ,  t h i s  was th e  p rim ary  s t im u lu s  
behind A m erica 's  e f f o r t s  to  l i m i t  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  
weapons, R u s s i a 's  a c q u i s i t i o n  of th e  atom ic bomb in  1949 
l a r g e l y  undermined t h i s  m o t iv a t io n .  However, by t h i s  t im e , 
th e  p o l i c y  of no t a s s i s t i n g  o th e r  s t a t e s  to  a c q u i r e  n u c le a r  
weapons seems to  have developed  a momentum of i t s  own.
B, The Nth Country R a t io n a l e .
I t  was noted in  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r  t h a t  d u r in g  th e  
c lo s in g  y e a rs  of th e  1950s American th in k in g  on th e  q u e s t io n  
of n u c le a r  spread  underw ent a profound change. S t im u la ted  
by a new-found b e l i e f  t h a t  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons to  
a d d i t i o n a l  c o u n t r i e s  was a g r e a t e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  th an  had h i t h e r ­
to  been im agined, W ashington embarked on a more v ig o ro u s
1« The L i l i e n c h a l  R e p o r t , p«19.
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cam paign a g a in s t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  Accompanying t h i s  grow ing p re ­
o c c u p a tio n  w ith  what became known as  th e  "n th  c o u n try "  prob lem , 
th e r e  developed  in  th e  U .S. a body of id e a s  abou t th e  co n se ­
quences fo r  w orld peace and Am erican s e c u r i ty  o f r a p id  and w ide- 
ran g in g  n u c le a r  spread» T h is  " n th  co u n try "  r a t i o n a l e  p rom ptly  
became an im p o rta n t component of Am erican n o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  
p o lic y  and has rem ained as such  to  t h i s  day .
S ta te d  s im p ly , th e  n th  co u n try  r a t i o n a l e  has a s s e r te d  
th a t  any in c re a s e  in  th e  number of n u c le a r  powers p r e s e n ts  
d a n g e rs : th e  more n u c le a r  powers th e re  a r e ,  th e  more th e re
a re  l i k e ly  to  b e ; and th e  more th e r e  a r e ,  th e  g r e a te r  th e  chances 
of n u c le a r  c o n f l i c t .  T here a r e  a number o f e lem en ts  in  a l l  o f 
t h i s  and i t  w i l l  be u s e f u l  to  lo o k  a t  each of th e se  in  some 
d e t a i l »
In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e ,  i t  needs to  be no ted  th a t  th e  n th  
co u n try  r a t i o n a l e  has a s s e r te d  th a t  any in c re a s e  in  th e  number 
of n u c le a r  powers i s  to  be a v o id ed . As D efence S e c re ta ry  
McNamara s a id  in  1966:
I  do n o t b e l ie v e  th a t  c irc u m sta n c e s  w i l l  a r i s e  
in  which i t  i s  in  our n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  to  
in c re a s e  th e  number of n u c le a r  pow ers, w hatever 
th a t  number may b e . [em phasis ad d ed .] 1
Q uestioned  as to  w hether o r n o t he th o u g h t i t  would make a
d i f f e r e n c e  which a d d i t io n a l  n a t io n s  a c q u ire d  n u c le a r  weapons
(Sweden and S w itze rlan d  on th e  one hand, and C zech o slo v ak ia
and In d o n e s ia  on th e  o th e r ,  w ere c i t e d ) ,  McNamara answ ered :
"w ith  a m inor q u a l i f i c a t i o n  we can come to  i f  you w ish , I
2
would sa y , ’No; i t  does n o t make any d i f f e r e n c e ’ ."  He added:
I  do no t th in k  i t  makes any d i f f e r e n c e  w hether 
i t  be Sweden o r S w itz e rla n d  or any o th e r  n a t io n  
you c a re  to  name, b eca u se  each  one o f th e se  a d d i t io n s
1» See h i s  te s tim o n y  in  J .C .A .E . H earings on N o n p ro l if e ra t io n  
of N uclear Weapons, 1966, p .7 5 .
2, i b i d , ,  p »89.
63
to  th e  number of n u c le a r  powers c a r r i e s  w i th  i t  
im p l ic a t io n s  fo r  o th e r  n a t io n s .  Those im p l i ­
c a t io n s  w i l l  move o th e r  n a t io n s  more r a p id l y  to  
a c q u i r e  n u c le a r  weapons. And t h i s  a t  a v e ry  
minimum, in c r e a s e s  th e  danger of a c c id e n t a l  
d e t o n a t i o n . !
This g iv e s  r i s e  to  th e  second elem ent in  th e  n th  c o u n try  
r a t i o n a l e ,  v i z . ,  th e  id e a  t h a t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i s  a h ig h ly  dynamic
p ro c e s s .  As McNamara has p u t  i t ,  " th e  more n u c le a r  powers
2
t h e r e  a r e ,  th e  more th e r e  a re  l i k e l y  to  b e . "  In  1965, a noted 
u n o f f i c i a l  o b se rv e r  w ro te :
We may . . .  be a t  a c ro s s ro a d s  in  which the  
q u e s t io n  of w hether t h e r e  a r e  f i f t e e n  o r  f i v e  (or 
th r e e )  n u c le a r  powers i n  1975 w i l l  be soon d e t e r ­
mined. I f  s e v e r a l  l e s s e r  c o u n t r i e s  develop   ^
n u c le a r  weapons th e  sp read  may become v e ry  g r e a t .
In  1966, A drian  F i s h e r ,  A c ting  D i r e c to r  of A .C .D .A ., warned th a t  
i f  one more c o u n try  went n u c le a r  t h e r e  would be a " c h a in  
r e a c t i o n " ;  t h i s  could  soon r e s u l t ,  he im p lie d ,  i n  th e  e x i s t e n c e
4
of "10, 11, or 12 n u c le a r  p ow ers ."  The same y e a r ,  A.C.D.A. 
D i r e c t o r ,  W.C. F o s t e r ,  warned t h a t  f a i l u r e  to  p re v e n t  p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n  could  r e s u l t  i n  th e  emergence of t e n  new n u c le a r  powers 
in  th e  nex t t e n  to  tw enty y e a r s .  Though most members of th e
U.S. A d m in is t r a t io n  who have spoken on th e  m a t te r  seem agreed
1. i b i d ,
2. i b i d . , p . 74.
3o Morton H, H a lp e r in ,  A Ban on th e  P r o l i f e r a t i o n  of N uclear  
Weapons, in  Evan Luard ( e d . ) ,  F i r s t  S teps  to  D isarm am ent, 
London: Thames and Hudson, 1965, p .138 .
4. See h i s  te s t im ony  i n  U nited  S t a t e s  P o l ic y  Towards Europe 
(and R e la ted  M a t t e r s ) ,  h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  Sena te  Committee 
on F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s ,  89 th  Cong», 2nd S e s s . ,  June 20-23, 
27-28, 30, and J u ly  13 and 22, 1966, W ashington, 1966 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as S ena te  H earings  on U nited  S ta t e s  
P o l ic y  Towards Europe, 1 9 6 6 ) , p .2 4 3 .
5, See h i s  s ta te m e n t  in  E „N.D.C./P .V . 264, p . l l .
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on t h i s  p o in t ,  t h e r e  has  been some d i s s e n s io n  amongst u n o f f i c i a l  
o b s e rv e r s ,  James S c h le s in g e r  has p o in te d  ou t t h a t  th e  a c t u a l  
pace of p r o l i f e r a t i o n  has been slow er th an  o f t e n  a n t i c i p a t e d  and 
t h a t  th e r e  a r e  re a s o n s  which, i n  th e o ry  a t  l e a s t ,  i n c r e a s in g ly  
work a g a in s t  f u r t h e r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n ;  r e c o g n i t io n  t h a t  th e  a c q u is ­
i t i o n  of even a minimum d e t e r r e n t  r e q u i r e s  a v e ry  e x te n s iv e
e f f o r t ,  and a r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  such a d e t e r r e n t  i s  of dubious 
1
m i l i t a r y  v a lu e ,  R ichard  R osecrance has  a l s o  f o r e c a s t  t h a t
th e  r a t e  of n u c le a r  sp read  w i l l  no t be r a p id ;  in  1966 he
p r e d ic te d  t h a t  "no t many more s t a t e s  w i l l  j o i n  th e  n u c le a r
c lub  in  th e  n ex t twenty y e a rs  than  d id  so in  th e  g e n e ra t io n
2
a f t e r  th e  Second World War,
But th e  h e a r t  of th e  n th  co u n try  r a t i o n a l e  l i e s  in  the  
a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  an in c r e a s e  in  th e  number of n u c le a r  powers 
in c r e a s e s  th e  chances of n u c le a r  c o n f l i c t .  As S e c r e ta r y  of 
S t a t e  H e r te r  s a id  i n  1960: " th e  more n a t io n s  t h a t  have the
power to  t r i g g e r  o f f  a n u c le a r  w ar, th e  g r e a t e r  th e  chance t h a t
3
some n a t io n  might u se  t h i s  power i n  h a s t e  or b l in d  f o l l y . "
A somewhat more p r e c i s e  re n d e r in g  of th e  id e a  was p rov ided  by 
S e c re ta ry  of Defence McNamara i n  O c to b e r ,  1964, He s a id :
You can im agine th e  danger t h a t  th e  world would 
f a c e  i f  10, 20, or 30 n a t io n s  posse ssed  n u c le a r  
weapons in s te a d  of th e  fo u r  t h a t  p o sse ss  them today 
. . .  The danger to  o th e r  n a t io n s  in c r e a s e s  g e o m e tr i ­
c a l l y  w ith  th e  in c r e a s e  i n  th e  number of n a t io n s  
p o s se s s in g  th e s e  w a r h e a d s . . . 4
1, James R. S c h le s in g e r ,  "N uclear  Spread" i n  Yale Review,
Vol, 57, No. 1 , October 1967, p .6 9 .
2, R, No R osecrance , Problems of N uclear  P r o l i f e r a t i o n , 
S e c u r i ty  Study Paper No. 7 , Los A ngeles: U n iv e r s i t y  of 
C a l i f o r n i a ,  1966, p ,4 7 ,
3, Quoted by S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e ,  Dean Rusk, i n  S en a te  H earings  
on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  T r e a ty ,  P a r t  I ,  1968, p .4 ,
4, Quoted i n  Bader, op, c i t . ,  p . l l .
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But just how is an increase in the number of nuclear powers supposed 
to heighten the risk of conflict, especially nuclear conflict? In 
recent years, especially in testimony at the many congressional 
hearings on the N.P.T. and related subjects, spokesmen for the 
American Administration have gone to considerable lengths to 
answer this question. Their explanations have been many and varied 
but may be conveniently summarised as follows.
In the first place, it has been alleged that proliferation 
tends to make the management of international relations more 
difficult. As Secretary of Defence McNamara said in February,
1966:
Nuclear weapons in the hands of more countries could 
have consequences for world security which no one 
can foresee. Every additional country having nuclear 
weapons, ... is an additional centre of independent 
decision making on the use of nuclear weapons.
International relations are thereby made more complex 
and more dangerous, ...1
Later, McNamara stated the same argument in a slightly different
way: "the more [nuclear powers] there are, the more unsettling
will be the too rapid shifts in the often delicate power balance2and political relationships." To quote the words of an
1. See his testimony in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.4. See also, Consideration of 
the Problem of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (a report 
by A.C.D.A.). Reproduced in Arms Control and Disarmament 
Act Amendments, 1968, hearings before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 1, 5-8, 
19, 20, 1968, Washington, 1968 (hereafter referred to as 
House Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amend­
ments, 1968), p„222. This particular report is one of the 
most comprehensive official accounts available on U.S. 
Government attitudes towards the problem of proliferation.
2. See his testimony in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, pp,74-75.
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u n o f f i c i a l  o b s e rv e r ,  t h i s  l i n e  of argument amounted to  say ing  th a t  
Ma world made up of n u c le a r  powers would be more u n f a m i l i a r  than  
our p r e s e n t  world (which i s  u n f a m i l i a r  enough), more complex in  
i t s  power r e l a t i o n s ,  and hence more d i f f i c u l t  to  u n d ers tan d  and 
d e a l  with®"^
Second, i t  has been f u r t h e r  a l le g e d  t h a t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n
in c re a s e s  th e  r i s k s  of a c c id e n t a l  or i l l - c o n s i d e r e d  use  of n u c le a r
weapons« I t  i s  g e n e r a l ly  h e ld  amongst American c r i t i c s  of
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t h a t  th e  m a jo r i ty  of n th  c o u n t r i e s  would be
c ap a b le  of a c q u i r in g  only r e l a t i v e l y  u n s o p h i s t i c a te d  d e t e r r e n t s ,
i®e®, c a p a b i l i t i e s  which a re  unhardened and c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by
poor command and c o n t r o l  system s. These f o r c e s ,  i t  i s  a rgued ,
would be h ig h ly  v u ln e r a b le  to  a f i r s t  s t r i k e  and would depend
fo r  t h e i r  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  on a lm ost com plete  a u to m a t i c i t y  of 
2
response® I t  has a l s o  been emphasised by some American 
spokesmen t h a t  th e  weapons system s which most n th  c o u n t r i e s  
would be cap a b le  of a c q u i r in g  would be u n l i k e ly  to  f e a t u r e  th e  
more s p e c i f i c  s a f e ty  f e a t u r e s  which a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of th e  
American and presum ably , the  S o v ie t ,  d e te r re n ts®  Mr«McNamara 
has e l a b o ra te d  t h i s  p o in t  a t  some le n g th :
1» Thornton Read, A P ro p o sa l  to  N e u t r a l i z e  N uc lea r  Weapons,
P r in c e to n :  Woodrow Wilson School of P u b l ic  and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
A f f a i r s ,  1960, p®53® Quoted i n  R.W, T ucker,  S t a b i l i t y  
and th e  Nth Country Problem , Study Memorandum No® 5, 
W ashington D®C® : I n s t i t u t e  f o r  D efence A n a ly ses ,  1961, p®4® 
For a r a t h e r  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  e l a b o r a t i o n  of t h i s  l i n e  of 
argum ent, see  S ta n le y  Hoffmann, "N uclear P r o l i f e r a t i o n  
and World P o l i t i c s , "  in  A l a s t a i r  Buchan (ed®), A World 
of N uclear Pow ers? , Englewood C l i f f s ,  N,J®: P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  
1966, p®107»
2® This was one of th e  major argum ents i n  McNamara’s speech 
a t  Ann Arbor in  June ,  1962® The speech i s  rep roduced  in  
JoCoAoEs H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of N uc lea r  Weapons, 
1966® See e s p e c i a l l y ,  p®130® E a r l i e r ,  a s im i l a r  a rg u ­
ment had been exp lo red  in  one of th e  most im p o rtan t  un­
o f f i c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  th e  American case  a g a i n s t  
p ro l i f e r a t io n ®  See, A lb e r t  W o h l s t e t t e r ,  "N uclear S haring :  
NATO and th e  N+l Country" i n  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , V o l. 39,
No® 3, A p r i l  1961, pp®362-363®
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We [ th e  American Government] have sp en t  l i t e r a l l y  
b i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s  on s a f e t y  m easures .  There i s  
no o th e r  n a t io n  i n  th e  world which has s p e n t  as 
much as we have. We know v e ry  w e l l  t h a t  th e  sm all  
n a t io n s  t h a t  a r e  c o n s id e r in g  a c q u i r in g  n u c le a r  
w e a p o n s , . . .  have n e i t h e r  th e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u rc e s  
nor th e  t e c h n ic a l  r e s o u rc e s  to  dev o te  to  s a f e t y .
But arguments abou t th e  in c r e a s in g  r i s k s  of a c c id e n t a l
or i l l - c o n s i d e r e d  u se  of n u c le a r  weapons have no t always
r e f l e c t e d  c o n s id e r a t io n s  about th e  t e c h n ic a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
of n th  co u n try  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  O f ten ,  they  have stemmed from
American concern  abou t th e  e f f e c t s  of e r r a t i c  and u n s ta b l e
p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h ip  on th e  management of n u c le a r  weapons.
There were h i n t s  of t h i s  in  a s ta te m e n t  by S e c re ta ry  of S ta t e
D u lle s  in  1957. He s a i d :  "as  m a t t e r s  a re  going th e  tim e
w i l l  come when th e  p e t t i e s t  and most i r r e s p o n s i b l e  d i c t a t o r
could g e t  hold of [n u c le a r ]  weapons w ith  which to  t h r e a t e n  
2
immense harm ."  L a t e r ,  as has a l r e a d y  been in d i c a t e d ,  
P r e s id e n t  Kennedy spoke of th e  dangers  of n u c le a r  weapons 
" i n  th e  hands of c o u n t r i e s  l a r g e  and s m a l l ,  s t a b l e  and un­
s t a b l e ,  r e s p o n s ib le  and i r r e s p o n s i b l e ,  s c a t t e r e d  th ro u g h o u t
3
th e  w o r ld ."  Sometimes, th e s e  w eaknesses i n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
l e a d e r s h ip  of many n th  c o u n t r i e s  have been a t t r i b u t e d  by 
W ashington to  t h e i r  l a c k  of d ip lo m a t ic  e x p e r ie n c e .  This  was 
c l e a r l y  a p p a re n t  i n  P r e s id e n t  Jo h n so n 's  r e a c t i o n  to  C h in a 's  
f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t .  In  O ctober 1964, the  P r e s id e n t  s a id :
1. See h i s  te s t im o n y ,  i n  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n  of N uclear  Weapons, 1966, p .9 0 .  See a l s o ,  
C o n s id e ra t io n  of th e  Problem of P r o l i f e r a t i o n  of N uclear  
Weapons (a r e p o r t  by A .C .D .A .) .  Reproduced in  House 
H earings  on Arms C o n tro l  and Disarmament Act Amendments, 
1968, p .222.
2. Quoted in  Memorandum su b m it ted  by A.C.D.A. conce rn ing  th e  
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y .  Reproduced i n  i b i d . ,  p ,2 8 .
3. See above, p. 56,
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U n t i l  t h i s  week, only fo u r  powers had e n te re d  the  
dangerous world of n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n s .  Whatever 
t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  a l l  fo u r  a r e  sober  and s e r io u s  
s t a t e s ,  w ith  long e x p e r ien ce  as  m ajor powers in  
th e  modern w orld . ^
Communist China has no such e x p e r ie n c e .
A v a r i a n t  of t h i s  g e n e ra l  l i n e  of argument which has been some­
tim es u se d ,  i s  t h a t  some n th  c o u n t r i e s  might too e a s i l y  r e s o r t  
to  th e  u se  of n u c le a r  weapons b eca u se ,  i t  i s  a l l e g e d ,  u n l ik e
th e  S o v ie t  Union and th e  U .S . ,  they  have r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  to  
2
l o s e .  A l l  of th e s e  s ta te m e n ts  imply t h a t  amongst the  
w o r ld 's  many p o t e n t i a l  n u c le a r  powers t h e r e  a re  some in  
p a r t i c u l a r  whose p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h ip s  could  no t be r e l i e d  
upon to  e x e r c i s e  c a u t io n  and r e s t r a i n t  i n  the  management of 
n u c le a r  weapons. I t  could be argued th a t  t h i s  was incon ­
s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  a s s e r t i o n  p re v io u s ly  n o te d ,  t h a t  a l l  forms 
of p r o l i f e r a t i o n  were e q u a l ly  r e p r e h e n s i b l e .  This  p o in t  
w i l l  be examined s h o r t l y .
T h i rd ,  some American spokesmen have a l le g e d  th a t  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  would h e ig h te n  th e  r i s k s  and dangers  of war 
through i t s  e f f e c t  on r e g io n a l  d i s p u t e s .  As S ena to r  R obert 
Kennedy s a id  in  Ju n e ,  1965:
There would be no s t a b i l i t y  anywhere in  the  world -  
when n u c le a r  weapons m ight be used between Greeks 
and Turks over Cyprus.; between Arabs and I s r a e l i s  
over th e  Gaza S t r i p ;  between In d ia  and P a k is ta n  in  
th e  Rann of Kutch. But i f  n u c le a r  weapons s p re a d ,  
i t  i s  dang ero u s ly  l i k e l y  t h a t  they  w i l l  be so used -  
f o r  th e s e  a r e  m a t t e r s  of th e  d e e p e s t  n a t io n a l  
i n t e r e s t  to  th e  c o u n t r i e s  in v o lv e d .3
1. See, Address of th e  P r e s i d e n t ,  18 O ctober 1964. Repro- 
duced in  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of N uclear 
Weapons, 1966, p .120 .
2. See f o r  example, W illiam  C. F o s t e r ,  "New D ir e c t io n s  in  
Arms C o n tro l  and D isarm am ent," i n  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , Vol. 
43, No. 4, J u ly  1965, p .5 9 1 .
3. The New York Tim es, 24 June 1965.
69
Admittedly, this was a somewhat exaggerated statement of the problem, 
but it did reflect the deep concern of many congressmen about the 
possible effects of proliferation on regional disputes. In 1968, 
A.C.D.A. stated the problem more soberly, though no less emphat­
ically. It was A.C.D.A.’s view that if parties to a regional 
dispute came to possess nuclear weapons, the results could be quite 
alarming.
... then there is clearly a risk, and in some cases 
there would be a high risk, that the nuclear weapons 
would be used. Also, if nuclear weapons are used in 
such "local" wars, any assistance from a nuclear- 
weapon state would very likely begin at that level.^
There are two ideas contained in the above quote from 
A.C.D.A. : the notion that nuclear-armed parties to a regional 
conflict will almost inevitably use their nuclear weapons; and 
that of the alleged connection between the use of nuclear 
weapons in a regional conflict and the likelihood of great 
power involvement. On the first of these claims, neither 
A.C.D.A., nor American spokesmen generally, have had much to 
say in the way of supporting argument : it has been alleged, 
though, that the likelihood of pre-emptive attack would be
especially high in regional conflicts if nuclear weapons were
2introduced. However, the second of these allegations has 
received considerably more attention in American statements 
on the dangers of proliferation. McNamara has attempted to 
explain the theory behind the claim:
1. See, Replies furnished by A.C.D.A. to questions by Hon. 
Donald M. Fraser concerning nuclear weapons. Reproduced 
in, House Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act 
Amendments, 1968, p.77.
2. See, Consideration of the Problem of Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (a Report by A.C.D.A.). Reproduced in 
ibid. , p.222. See also, testimony by Secretary of State, 
Dean Rusk, in Senate Hearings on Nonproliferation Treaty, 
Part I, 1968, p.5.
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i f  c o u n t r y  A a t t a c k e d  c o u n t r y  B w i th  conven ­
t i o n a l  weapons i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  i t  would s t r i k e  
a t  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  c o u n t r y  B o r  ru n  t h e  r i s k  o f  
o v e r r u n n in g  c o u n t r y  B i n  a s h o r t  t im e .  The p rob lem  
c o u ld  be b ro u g h t  to  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i te d  
N a t io n s ,  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  co u ld  t a k e  
p l a c e .  I t  would n o t  be  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  e i t h e r  t h e  
S o v ie t  Union o r  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  to  i n t e r v e n e  
m i l i t a r i l y ,  q u i c k l y .
I n  t h e  c a s e  of a n u c l e a r  a t t a c k  by c o u n t r y  A on 
c o u n t r y  B, t h e  v e r y  s u r v i v a l  o f  c o u n t r y  B would b e  
im m e d ia te ly  a t  i s s u e  and i t  m ig h t  w e l l  r e q u i r e  
m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by one o f  t h e  g r e a t  powers 
im m e d ia te ly ,  w i th o u t  t im e  f o r  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  and 
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  forum s t h a t  would 
o t h e r w i s e  t a k e  p l a c e . 1
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i t  has  been  a rg u e d  t h a t  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f
A m erican in v o lv e m e n t  i n  r e g i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s  w i l l  be  d e te rm in e d
p r i m a r i l y  by p o l i t i c a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  s t r a t e g i c  f a c t o r s .  The
s t r e s s  i n  t h i s  s o r t  o f  a rgum ent h as  b een  on th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s
of A m e r ic a 's  w o r ld -w id e  commitments r a t h e r  th a n  on t h e
2
c o n seq u e n c e s  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  n u c l e a r  weapons a s  s u c h .
To sum m arise ,  t h e  n th  c o u n t r y  r a t i o n a l e  a s s e r t s  t h a t  
any i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number o f  n u c l e a r  powers p r e s e n t s  d a n g e rs  : 
t h e  more n u c l e a r  powers t h e r e  a r e ,  t h e  more t h e r e  a r e  l i k e l y  
t o  b e ;  and th e  more t h e r e  a r e ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  c h a n ce s  o f  
n u c l e a r  c o n f l i c t .  The l a t t e r  i s  a l l e g e d  to  happen  i n  t h r e e  
ways : by making t h e  management of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s  more
1. See h i s  t e s t im o n y  i n  J .C .A .E .  H e a r in g s  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
of  N u c le a r  Weapons, 1 9 6 6 , p .8 8 .  See a l s o ,  s t a t e m e n t  by
A.C.D.A . D i r e c t o r  W.C. F o s t e r  a t  m ee t in g  o f  E .N .D .C . on 
6 F e b ru a ry  1964. Reproduced  i n  E .N .D .C . /P .V . 164 , p . 3 ,
2, F o s t e r ,  "New D i r e c t i o n s  i n  Arms C o n t r o l  and D isa rm a m e n t,"  
p .5 9 0 .  For a c o n t r a r y  v iew  w hich  a rg u e s  t h a t  t h e  r i s k s
of l o c a l i z e d  n u c l e a r  c o n f l i c t s  e s c a l a t i n g  i n t o  n u c l e a r  war 
i n v o lv in g  t h e  s u p e rp o w e rs ,  have  been  e x a g g e r a t e d , s-ee Fred 
C h a r le s  I k l e ,  "Nth C o u n t r i e s  and D isarm am ent"  i n  F i s h e r  
and Burns ( e d s . ) ,  op. c i t . , p .3 1 2 .  See a l s o ,  James R. 
S c h l e s i n g e r ,  " N u c le a r  S p r e a d , "  p p . 67 -68 .
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complex and more dangerous; by raising the chances of accidental 
or ill-considered use of nuclear weapons; and, by aggravating 
regional disputes. The American Government’s response to the 
prospect of nuclear spread amongst its N.A.T.O. allies embodied 
most of the elements which made up the nth country rationale.
In the first place, Washington argued that the spread of nuclear 
weapons to even one member of the alliance would stimulate 
additional pressures for proliferation; it was stressed, for 
instance, that to admit that one member of the alliance needed 
nuclear weapons for its own protection was to concede, in 
effect, that the others needed them also. This was one reason 
why the U.S. was opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
by Germany and to the continued development of these forces by 
Britain and France.'*' But equally important, was Washington's 
argument that the existence of independent nuclear forces in 
Europe would hinder the rational conduct of any nuclear war 
in which the U.S. and Europe might find themselves involved.
In his address at Ann Arbor (1962) on the defence arrangements 
of the North Atlantic community, Secretary of Defence McNamara, 
said:
1. Morton Halperin, loc. cit., p.137. For an emphatic state­
ment of the American position from a vocal unofficial 
observer, see Malcolm W. Hoag, "Nuclear Policy and French 
Intransigence" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 
1963, pp.288-289. Hoag, it seems, remains unrepentant.
He has recently argued, that the logic of the case made 
by certain people during the early 1960s, for national 
nuclear forces in Europe, would have led N.A.T.O. to a 
need for "fifteen nuclear forces, not three or less."
See, his "Political and Strategic Relations : A View From 
Washington," in Bruce Brown (ed.), Asia and the Pacific 
in the 1970s, Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 1971, p.173.
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There must not be competing and conflicting strategies 
to meet the contingency of nuclear war. We are 
convinced that a general nuclear war target is 
indivisible and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear 
war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a 
centrally controlled campaign against all of the 
enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining 
reserve forces, all centrally controlled.
We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having 
only part of the strategic force launched in isolation 
from our main striking power.^
The implications of this statement are clear to see. The 
mere existence of a number of decision makers, each with their 
own plans and targeting arrangements, could mean that any 
exchange might start in an uncoordinated way. This, it was 
alleged, would reduce the effectiveness of any strike by 
N.A.T.O. and almost certainly increase the damage suffered 
by the alliance as a whole.
In the same speech it was explained how the very nature
of nth country capabilities, rather than the simple fact of
their existence, could hinder the rational conduct of a N.A.T.O.
strike. The jumping-off point for such an assertion was the
revelation that the United States had come to the conclusion
that the "principal military objectives, in the event of a
nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance,
should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not
2of this [sic] civilian population." But, it was an important 
part of the American argument that nth country capabilities 
were, or would be designed, to strike primarily at cities.
It followed that their use in this capacity would prove dis­
astrous for the whole strategy of controlled response. The
1. See, text of Mr. McNamara’s address. Reproduced in 
J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons , 
1966, p.131.
2, ibid., p,130.
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type of argument against proliferation which was advanced at Ann 
Arbor is, of course, of special relevance to Europe. So far, 
Europe is the only place where the spread of independent 
capabilities to additional countries has resulted in the 
difficulties for American strategy which McNamara outlined.
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Britain and France 
raised the possibility, however remote it may have seemed, 
of independent action by either or both of these powers during 
any exchange between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance. 
It was this possibility which, among other things, haunted 
American policy-makers and drove them to emphasise the 
disadvantages of national nuclear forces in Europe.
Hedley Bull has argued that the campaign the U.S. waged 
against independent nuclear deterrents in Europe was an attempt 
by Washington to ward off the challenge to American primacy in 
European political affairs posed by the threat of prolifera­
tion.1 It would be difficult to deny that there were probably 
some Americans who viewed the prospect of nuclear prolifer­
ation in Europe in these terms. But to regard these consid­
erations as the primary, or indeed even a major, motivation 
for American policy, would be to ignore the large measure of 
logic and conviction which was apparent in much of the formal 
U.S. rationale against proliferation in Europe. The American 
argument that the acquisition of independent nuclear forces 
by nations in Europe would create problems for both the 
Europeans and for their American allies is very persuasive, 
and there seems little reason to doubt the sincerity or clear­
ness of purpose of most of those who advanced it.
1. Hedley Bull, Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance: A Critique 
of United States Doctrine, Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School 
of Public and International Affairs, 1964, p.9.
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Mention of th is  la s t  m atter r a is e s  the q u estion  o f another 
p o s s ib le  m otive fo r  U .S. o p p o sitio n  to p r o li f e r a t io n ,  not ju s t  in  
Europe, but g lo b a lly  as w e l l .  I t  seems reasonab le to  argue th at  
behind much of the concern in  Washington about the nth  country  
problem was the f e a r ,  not so much th a t th e spread of nuclear  
weapons would undermine Am erica’s power in  the world in  some 
gen era l se n se , but th at i t  would reduce W ashington's a b i l i t y  to  
r eg u la te  c r i s i s  s i t u a t io n s ,  and in  p a r t ic u la r , to  prevent such 
s itu a t io n s  from develop ing in to  gen era l war. This concern was 
c le a r ly  one exp lan ation  for  W ashington's emphasis on th e  d o ctr in e  
of c e n tr a liz e d  co n tro l of nuclear weapons in  Europe. But i t  
seems to have been more g e n e r a lly  re lev a n t as w e l l .  In 1965, 
A.C.DcA. D ir e c to r , F o s te r , sa id :
When we consider the c o s t  to  us of try in g  to  stop  
th e spread of nuclear weapons, we should not lo s e  
s ig h t  of the fa c t  th at widespread nuclear p r o l i f ­
era tio n  would mean a su b s ta n t ia l ero sio n  in  the  
margin of power which our great w ealth  and indus­
t r i a l  base have long g iven  us r e la t iv e  to  much of 
the r e s t  of the w o r ld .l
James R. S c h le s in g e r , in  d isc u ss in g  F o s te r 's  remarks, noted
th a t a r e la t iv e  d e c lin e  in  A m erica's power could render the
task  of "keeping the world r e la t iv e ly  s ta b le  and peacefu l"
2
much more d i f f i c u l t .  An A.C.D.A. report published in  1968, 
took up the same theme. Commenting on the consequences for  
th e U .S. of a world of many nuclear powers, th e  rep ort sa id :
». .  U .S. in f lu en ce  over even ts in  c e r ta in  areas  
may w e ll be d im in ish ed . U .S. p o lic y  ch o ices  may 
become more d i f f i c u l t ,  and the tim e period  
a v a ila b le  for s u c c e s s fu l m ed ia tion , c o n c i l ia t io n
1. W.C. F o ster , "New D ir e c tio n s  in  Arms C ontrol and 
Disarmament," p .5 9 1 .
2. James R. S c h le s in g er , "The S tr a te g ic  Consequences of 
Nuclear P r o life r a t io n ,"  in  James E. Dougherty and J .F .  
Lehman, Jr . ( e d s . ) ,  Arms Control for  the Late S i x t i e s , 
New York: Van N ostrand, 1967, p .175 . See a l s o ,  James 
R, S ch le s in g e r , "Nuclear Spread," in  Yale Review, V ol. 
57, No. 1 , October 1967, p.75 .
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or good offices ... may be drastically shortened 
should nuclear weapons be employed.l
In 1966, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had put the matter 
slightly differently. He said:
o o. one can imagine situations where the irres­
ponsible use of modest nuclear forces could serve 
as the stimulus that would move events out of 
control of the major nuclear powers themselves.
This is the thing that bothers me - the chain 
reactions that could be involved. I hate to 
speculate about such hypotheses, but the instab­
ility which is added to the world situation by 
proliferation creates greater dangers for those 
who have a tremendous interest in stability in the 
use of these nuclear weapons.1  *3[emphasis added.]
Implied in this statement by Dean Rusk was the idea that
proliferation posed a threat to Soviet as well as to American
interests. Also implicit, was the idea that a bipolar world
3was a relatively stable one. In a situation where the two 
superpowers retained their margin of power relative to the 
rest of the world, the U.S. and Russia could exercise some 
management in crisis situations; they could prevent such crises 
from moving "out of control of the major nuclear powers." But 
proliferation, it was alleged, would threaten this relatively 
stable situation. That the U.S. and Russia had a common 
interest in limiting proliferation was a popular theme in
I, See, memorandum on the problem of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons (a report by A.C.D.A.). Reproduced in House 
Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 
1968, p,222,
20 See his testimony in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.22.
3, For a theoretical presentation of this notion, see Kenneth 
N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World" in Daedalus, 
Summer, 1964, pp.881-909.
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American statements in support of the nonproliferation treaty«
The notion that proliferation would reduce America's (and 
Russia’s) ability to regulate international crises has an obvious 
self-serving ring about it« For this and other reasons, 
arguments of this sort have usually been kept in the background 
of America's public position on nonproliferation. Nevertheless, 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the desire to 
retain as much control as possible over crisis situations has 
been an important motivation underlying America's opposition 
to the spread of nuclear weapons.
Before concluding this analysis of the nth country 
rationale it will be useful to discuss one further matter«
Despite their many assertions to the contrary, it is difficult 
to accept that U.S. spokesmen really believed that all forms 
of proliferation were equally reprehensible; that the acquis­
ition of nuclear weapons by say, Switzerland, was regarded as 
no less menacing than that by say, Cuba. In fact, there is 
sufficient public evidence to suggest that U.S. officials, 
implicitly at least, did make hierarchical distinctions 
amongst various forms of proliferation. In some of the 
statements already referred to, U.S. spokesmen distinguished 
between the "stable and the unstable", the "responsible and 
the irresponsible" so far as potential nuclear powers are 
concerned. Implicit in these distinctions is the suggestion 
that American spokesmen regarded the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by some countries as more "tolerable" than that by 
others. The more prevalent theme, viz., that all forms of 
proliferation were equally reprehensible, seems to be linked 
to Washington's drive for universal acceptance of the test-ban
1« See especially, Statement by President Johnson to the 
E.NoD.Co in February 1966. Quoted by W.C. Foster in 
EoN.DTo/PnV. 235, p.22. See also, Address by the Presi­
dent at the National Reactor Testing Center for the 
Atomic Energy Commission, Arco, Idaho, August 26, 1966« 
Reproduced in D .0.S.B „, 19 September 1966, pp.410-413.
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t r e a t y ,  and more p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  th e  N .P .T . To have condoned 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  to  c e r t a i n  c o u n t r i e s  would have seemed h y p o c r i t i c a l  
and would have undermined e f f o r t s  to  g a in  th e  su p p o r t  of th o se  
s t a t e s  to  w hich, by im p l i c a t io n ,  W ashington c o n s id e re d  th e  
spread  of n u c le a r  weapons to  be u n d e s i r a b l e .
F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  w orth  n o t in g  t h a t  th e  emphasis on th e  id e a  
t h a t  a l l  forms of p r o l i f e r a t i o n  were e q u a l ly  r e p r e h e n s i b le  has 
tended  to  d i s g u i s e  th e  f a c t  t h a t  W ash ing ton 's  campaign a g a i n s t  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  was aimed p r im a r i ly  a t  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  or 
a r e a s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im e s .  I t  has been noted t h a t  i n  th e  e a r ly  
p o s t-w ar  y e a rs  th e  c h ie f  concern  was t h a t  R uss ia  would a c q u i re  
th e  bomb and t h a t  t h i s  was a f a c t o r  in  W ash ing ton 's  r e lu c t a n c e  
to  a s s i s t  G reat B r i t a i n  i n  dev e lo p in g  n u c le a r  weapons. L a t e r ,  
th e  U nited  S ta t e s  came out s t r o n g ly  a g a i n s t  F r a n c e 's  n u c le a r  
f o r c e ;  th e  f o r c e  de f r a p p e , i t  was a l l e g e d ,  was of dubious 
m i l i t a r y  v a lu e ,  and in  a d d i t i o n ,  would d i s r u p t  bo th  N.A.T.O. 
s t r a t e g y  and a l l i a n c e  c o h e s io n ,  and s t im u la t e  an i n t e r e s t  in  
independen t n u c le a r  s t r i k e  f o r c e s  i n  Germany and o th e r  
European s t a t e s .  L a te r  s t i l l ,  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons 
to  China became th e  s p e c i a l  conce rn  of many o f f i c i a l  and 
u n o f f i c i a l  o b s e rv e rs  i n  th e  U .S .^  More r e c e n t l y ,  th e  non­
n u c l e a r - c o u n t r i e s  of A sia  seem to  have become th e  prim ary  
a re a s  of concern  fo r  U.S. n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y .  This  was
sugges ted  in  1968 by form er Under S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e  (1961- 
2
1966) George B a l l  and th e r e  i s  c o r ro b o ra t in g  ev idence  in  th e  
p u b l ic  pronouncements of A.C.D.A. o f f i c i a l s ,  a t  l e a s t .  In  
1965, A.C.D.A. D i r e c t o r ,  W.C. F o s t e r ,  argued t h a t  of a l l  th e  
n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s  i n  the  w o r ld ,  I n d ia  was th e  one most l i k e l y  
to  go n u c le a r .  Such a developm ent,  he added , would g r e a t l y
1. The American G overnm ent's  r e sp o n se  to  th e  Chinese fo r c e  
w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  below i n  C hap te rs VII, VIII ftnd IX.
2. George W. B a l l ,  The D i s c i p l i n e  of Power, Boston: L i t t l e ,
Brown and Co. ,  1968.
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increase the pressure on Pakistan, and even Japan, to do likewise. 
The following year, another senior A.C.D.A. official implied that
the most immediate threat of proliferation was not in Europe, but
2in Asia. An A.C.D.A. report in 1968 cited the Middle East and
the India-Pakistan area as regions where proliferation would be
3especially dangerous.
The nth country rationale has been a feature of American 
nonproliferation policy ever since the late 1950s. However, 
during the same period, two additional arguments have been used 
by Washington to support its campaign against nuclear spread.
Each is of a rather special character and needs to be dealt with 
separately from those which make up the nth country rationale.
C, Arms Control Considerations
One of these arguments alleges that proliferation makes 
progress in the arms control field exceedingly difficult. This 
theme has been characteristic of American opposition to nuclear 
spread from the earliest days of concern about the nth country 
problem. In a report on disarmament published in 1960 and 
covering the period from 1955 to 1958, the State Department 
concluded that "the problem of controlling nuclear weapons 
would be complicated enormously, if not made impossible, once 
the capability to produce such weapons spread to many additional4countries." This concern provided at least part of the
lo See his testimony in To Amend Further the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Act, hearings before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., January 26 and 27,
1965, Washington, 1965, pp.47 and 64.
2p See testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director of A.C.D.A., 
in Senate Hearings on United States Policy Towards Europe,
1966, p,243. See also, his statement at E.N.D.C. in March 
1966, in E.NoD.C./P.V. 253, p.16.
3. See, memorandum on the problem of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Reproduced in House Hearings on Arms Control and 
Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968, pp.78 and 222.
4. Disarmament: The Intensified Effort, 1955-1958, Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of State, October 1960, p.19.
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stimulus for subsequent American proposals for agreement to halt 
the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and 
for a test ban treaty. In 1963, President Kennedy warned that 
there would be "no chance of effective disarmament" if 
proliferation continued* The theme has figures prominently in 
more recent American statements on nuclear proliferation. In 
testimony at hearings before the J.C.A.E. in 1966, Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk argued:
Efforts of the present nuclear powers to negotiate 
mutually advantageous nuclear arms control agree­
ments will be more complex and hence more difficult 
as the number of such powers increases, . ..1
There has been relatively little attempt over the years to 
explain just how the spread of nuclear weapons would frustrate 
the achievement of arms control. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that widespread proliferation would add to international 
mistrust and suspicion thus making negotiations less likely.
In addition, it is obvious that any negotiations which did 
take place and which had to take account of the special inter­
ests of a large number of nuclear weapons powers, would be 
considerably more complex than discussions involving two, 
three, or even five such participants. Finally, in those 
cases where arms control was to be effected through adherence 
to an international treaty, special difficulties would arise 
as a result of proliferation. One of these difficulties was 
highlighted by Senator Robert Kennedy in 1965. He said:
There could be no effective disarmament - when each 
nation would want guarantees, not from one or two 
or five powers, but from a dozen or a score or even 
more nations. But if nuclear weapons spread, such 
guarantees would be necessary.^
1, See, J.CoA.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1966, p,4. For a contrary argument, see Ikle, 
loco c.ito, p,315.
2„ The New York Times, 24 June 1965.
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It should be noted in passing that the effort to achieve a non­
proliferation treaty was made more difficult by the failure of 
the United States and Russia themselves to make progress in 
other areas of nuclear arms control. Throughout the course of 
negotiations leading to the N.P.T. a number of non-nuclear 
states alleged that the Soviet and American approach was 
discriminatory. It was repeatedly argued that while the non­
nuclear states were being asked not to produce nuclear weapons, 
the nuclear powers were themselves not prepared to enter into 
any specific undertakings to disarm. Special meaning was given 
to this criticism by Washington’s decision, during the closing 
stages of the N,PoT. negotiations, to deploy a "light" Anti- 
ballistic Missile (ADB.M„) system.'*'
Do Economic Arguments
Yet another American argument against proliferation has 
been based on the cost of nuclear weapons. That the acquisi­
tion of national nuclear forces would seriously hurt the 
economies of many nth countries has long been an important 
component of America’s nonproliferation rationale. It is 
tempting to think that these economic arguments are only a 
reflection of concern in Washington that some aspiring nuclear 
states may be forced to divert resources from much-needed 
conventional forces. This was certainly true of American 
thinking about the problem in Europe and has most probably 
coloured Washington's attitude to the prospect of proliferation 
to some of the countries around the periphery of China. But 
there seems little cause to doubt the apparent altruism in
1„ The A.B.M. issue and its implications for American non­
proliferation policy in Asia will be discussed at some 
length later in this thesis. See Chapter VIII,
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American concern  abou t th e  economic consequences of p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  
The c o s t  of m a in ta in in g  c o m p e t i t iv e  n u c le a r  c a p a b i l i t i e s  was 
mentioned as a m o t iv a t in g  f a c t o r  when W ashington sponsored i t s  
f i r s t  p ro p o sa l  of a " n o - t r a n s f e r "  n a tu re  i n  August 1957,^  The 
argument became more common as  i t  was in c r e a s in g ly  r e a l i s e d  in  
th e  U,S„ t h a t  s e c u r i t y  and o th e r  c o n s id e r a t io n s  might f o r c e  a 
number of poor c o u n t r i e s  to  c o n s id e r  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of n u c le a r  
weapons ,
In  most c a s e s ,  the  economic argument a g a in s t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n
has s t r e s s e d  th e  u n f o r tu n a t e  consequences of th e  d iv e r s i o n  of
2
r e s o u rc e s  from n a t i o n a l  developm ent. Sometimes i t  has been 
emphasised t h a t  many poor c o u n t r i e s  a r e  a l re a d y  th e  r e c i p i e n t s  
of l a r g e  amounts of American a id  and t h a t  n u c le a r  weapons
3
programmes would c a n c e l  ou t th e  b e n e f i t s  of such a s s i s t a n c e .
In  a v a r i a t i o n  of t h i s  argum ent, i t  has been a l le g e d  th a t  
w idespread p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons would red u ce  the  
amount of f o r e ig n  a id  g e n e r a l ly ,  th u s  a f f e c t i n g  the  deve lop ­
ment of poor c o u n t r i e s  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  w hether or no t they  had
4chosen to  b u i ld  n u c le a r  weapons.
The a n a l y s i s  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  and th e  p re v io u s  one s u g g e s ts  
t h a t  o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  spread  of n u c le a r  weapons has been a 
g o a l  of American p o l i c y  s in c e  th e  end of World War I I .
However, th e  m o t iv a t io n s  u n d e r ly in g  t h i s  p o l i c y  have been 
many and v a r i e d .  M oreover, from tim e to  t im e ,  W ash ing ton’s 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y  has been aimed p r im a r i ly  a t  d i f f e r e n t
1, See, C o n s id e ra t io n  of th e  Problem of P r o l i f e r a t i o n  of 
N uclear  Weapons (a r e p o r t  by A.CoD.A,), Reproduced in  
House H earings  on Arms C o n tro l  and Disarmament Act Amend­
m ents ,  1968, p ,217 .
2, i b i d , ,  p ,222 ,
3c See, te s t im ony  of A,CcD,A. D i r e c t o r ,  F o s t e r ,  in  J fC,A,E,  
H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of N uclear  Weapons, 1966, p , 4 ,  
4,  i b i d ->, p , 75 .
PART II
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN 
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CHAPTER I I I
THE CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCE
N u c le a r  weapons have  b een  a f a c t o r  i n  A s ia n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s  s i n c e  th e  A m erican  a to m ic  a t t a c k s  on J a p a n  i n  1945« 
S in c e  t h a t  t im e ,  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  h a s  had t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  
d e p lo y  n u c l e a r  f o r c e  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  i t s  p o l i c i e s  anyw here i n  
t h e  a re a «  R u s s ia  a l s o ,  h a s  long  b e e n  a b l e  to  p r o j e c t  i t s  
n u c l e a r  power i n t o  Asia« More r e c e n t l y ,  t h e r e  h a s  a l s o  been  
a B r i t i s h  n u c l e a r  p r e s e n c e  i n  t h e  area."*" But in d ig e n o u s  
n u c l e a r  weapons a c t i v i t y  i n  A s ia  i s  o f  much m ore r e c e n t  o r i g i n .  
So f a r ,  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n  A s ia  h a s  b een  r e s t r i c t e d  to  C h in a ,  
b u t  a  number of o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  a r e a  a r e  a l s o  c a p a b le  
o f  g o in g  n u c l e a r .  In  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  an  a t t e m p t  w i l l  be made 
to  t r a c e  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  t h e  C h in e se  n u c le a r  f o r c e  and th e n  
to  exam ine t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  b eh in d  C h i n a 's  d e c i s i o n  to  b u i ld  an  
i n d e p e n d e n t  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n t .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w in g  c h a p t e r s ,  th e  
n u c l e a r  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and i n c e n t i v e s  o f  J a p a n ,  A u s t r a l i a  and 
I n d i a  w i l l  be  exam ined .
A, The Development o f  t h e  C h in e se  N u c le a r  F o r c e .
S in c e  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  Communist power i n  1949 , China 
has  p r o g r e s s e d  r a p i d l y  i n  i t s  u n d e r s t a n d in g  and e x p l o i t a t i o n  
of a to m ic  e n e rg y ,  U n t i l  195 9 -6 0 ,  t h i s  deve lopm en t d rew  h e a v i l y  
on S o v i e t  s u p p o r t .  T h e r e a f t e r ,  C hina became a lm o s t  e n t i r e l y
1 .  E x c e p t  i n  t h e  c a s e s  of  t h e  n u c l e a r  t e s t s  a t  Woomera (Aus­
t r a l i a )  and C h r is tm a s  I s l a n d ,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  B r i t i s h  
n u c l e a r  weapons i n  A s ia  has  n e v e r  been  p u b l i c l y  a d m i t t e d .
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s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  i n  a l l  phases  of n u c le a r  weapons r e s e a r c h ,  deve lop ­
m ent, e n g in e e r in g ,  t e s t i n g  and p ro d u c t io n ,  China exploded i t s  
f i r s t  a tom ic bomb i n  O ctober 1964 and j u s t  over two and a h a l f  
y e a r s  l a t e r ,  s u c c e s s f u l ly  t e s t e d  i t s  f i r s t  H-bomb, I t  has a l s o  
made c o n s id e r a b le  p ro g re s s  tow ards th e  development of a m i s s i l e  
d e l iv e r y  c a p a b i l i t y ,
C h ina ’s i n t e r e s t  in  n u c le a r  r e s e a r c h  and development was 
e v id e n t  as  e a r l y  as  1950, In  t h a t  y e a r ,  th e  I n s t i t u t e  of Atomic 
Energy of th e  Chinese Academy of Sc iences  was e s t a b l i s h e d  in  
P e k i n g A l s o  in  1950, Moscow and Peking e n te re d  in to  an
agreem ent f o r  th e  j o i n t  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of uranium r e s o u r c e s  in
, 2S in k ia n g ,  During th e  next few y e a r s ,  China s u p p lie d  R uss ia
w ith  ’atom ic raw m a t e r i a l s ’ and i t  seems r e a s o n a b le  to  conclude
3
t h a t  th e s e  o r ig i n a t e d  in  S in k ia n g .  In  1955, R uss ia  agreed  to
4t r a n s f e r  i t s  s h a re  in  the  S ink iang  uranium e n t e r p r i s e  to  China, 
Peking th u s  o b ta in e d  com plete  c o n t r o l  over th e s e  q u i t e  c o n s id ­
e r a b l e  uranium d e p o s i t s  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  a s s o c ia t e d  e x t r a c t i o n  
and s e p a r a t io n  f a c i l i t i e s 0 A lso in  1955, th e  S ino- S o v ie t  Atomic 
C o -o p e ra t io n  T re a ty  was s ig n e d .  Under th e  terms of t h i s  a g re e ­
ment R u ss ia  u n d e r to o k  to  su p p ly  China w ith  a 10 M,W, e x p e r i ­
m en ta l r e a c t o r  to g e th e r  w ith  a c y c lo t r o n  f o r  th e  Peking 
I n s t i t u t e ,
I t  has been e s t im a te d  t h a t ,  in  1950, China had l e s s  th an  
900 s c i e n t i s t s ,  170 of whom were s tu d y in g  o u t s id e  th e  c o u n t r y , “* 
A f te r  th e  Korean War, however, Peking i n i t i a t e d  a number of 
moves des igned  to  p ro v id e  China w ith  th e  s c i e n t i s t s  and en g in e e rs
1, Lewis Ao F rank , "N uclear Weapons Development in  C h in a ,"  in  
B u l l e t i n  of the Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , Vol, 22, No, 1 , January  
1966, p ,1 2 ,
2, W illiam  R, H a r r i s ,  "Chinese N uclear  D o c tr in e :  The Decade 
P r i o r  to  Weapons Development (1945-1955)" ,  in  China 
Q u a r t e r l y , No, 21, January-M arch 1965, p ,9 4 ,
3, George A, M odelsk i,  Atomic Energy in  The Communist B lo c , 
M elbourne: Melbourne U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  1959, p ,1 8 1 ,
4c i b i d , ,  p -183,
5, F rank , l o c , c i t , ,  p ,1 3 .
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n e c e ssa ry  fo r  a n u c le a r  r e s e a r c h  programme. Agreements s igned
w ith  R uss ia  in  1954 and 1955 a s s i s t e d  Peking in  d eve lop ing  r e s e a r c h
f a c i l i t i e s  and t r a i n i n g  programmes which l a t e r  p layed  an im p o rtan t
p a r t  in  C h in a 's  n u c le a r  weapons program m ed In  1956, R u ss ia  agreed
to  supp ly  sm all r e a c t o r s  fo r  s i t e s  i n  N orthw est China and M anchuria,
In  a d d i t i o n ,  the  S o v ie t  F i r s t  F ive-Y ear P la n  f o r  F o re ig n  A id ,
which was a l s o  launched in  1956, p rov ided  f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  in  the
2development of 39 a tom ic r e s e a r c h  c e n t r e s  th roughou t China, I t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t ,  in  view of th e  a l l e g e d  c u t -b a c k  in  S o v ie t
3
a s s i s t a n c e  a f t e r  1958, no t a l l  of th e s e  f a c i l i t i e s  were p ro v id ed .
N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  to  assume t h a t  R u ss ian  a s s i s t a n c e
was an im p o r ta n t  f a c t o r  in  th e  r a p id  and s u b s t a n t i a l  growth of
C h in a 's  poo l of s k i l l e d  p e r s o n n e l .  I t  has been e s t im a te d ,  th a t
by 1957, th e r e  were no l e s s  th a n  10,000 s c i e n t i s t s  and te c h n ic i a n s
4e n ro l l e d  a t  th e  Peking i n s t i t u t e  a lo n e .
One of th e  most im p o rtan t  s t e p s  in  th e  development of Chinese 
e x p e r t i s e  in  n u c le a r  r e s e a r c h  was ta k e n  when Peking agreed  to  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  the  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of th e  J o i n t  I n s t i t u t e  of 
N uclear R esearch  a t  Dubna, in  R u s s ia .  This  c e n t r e  which was s e t  
up in  March 1956, p rov ided  r e s e a r c h  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  the  t r a i n i n g  
of s c i e n t i s t s  and e n g in e e rs  from S o v ie t -b lo c  c o u n t r i e s .  The 
c o s t s  of th e  I n s t i t u t e  were borne  by member s t a t e s .  In  1956, 
C h in a 's  s h a re  was 20% of the  t o t a l  and was second in  s i z e  only  
to  R u s s i a ' s ,  an i n d i c a t i o n  o f  th e  im portance Peking th e n  p laced  
on r e s e a r c h  i n  th e  n u c le a r  f i e l d , ^  I t  was a l l e g e d  in  1965 t h a t  
some 950 Chinese s c i e n t i s t s  had been e n ro l le d  in  or g radua ted  
from th e  Dubna I n s t i t u t e .
1, H a r r i s ,  l o c . c i t . ,  p ,9 5 ,
2, F rank ,  lo c .  c i t . ,  p .1 3 .
3, There i s  r e a s o n  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  c u t -b a c k  in  S o v ie t  
a s s i s t a n c e  to  th e  Chinese n u c le a r  programme may no t have 
been as g r e a t  a s  p r e v io u s ly  e s t im a te d .  See below, p. 87,
4, Frank , lo c ,  c i t , ,  p ,1 3 ,
5, M odelsk i,  op, c i t . , p .1 3 6 ,
6, Morton H. H a lp e r in ,  China and th e  Bomb, N. York: P r a e g e r ,
1965, p >74„
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An im portant a sp e c t  of the d r iv e  fo r  tr a in e d  p erso n n e l was
th e  campaign to  "welcome back th e  C hinese  s p e c i a l i s t s  s t i l l  in  the
1
c a p i t a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  to  tak e  p a r t  in  c o n s t r u c t io n  work i n  C h ina ,"  
A pparen tly  Peking ach ieved  some su ccess  in  t h i s  endeavour , The 
e l i t e  group of p h y s i c i s t s  working in  China in  1965 was r e p o r te d  
to  in c lu d e  Wang Han-chang, fo rm er ly  of th e  U n iv e r s i ty  of C a l i ­
f o r n i a  and now b e l ie v e d  to  be in  charge  of C h ina ’s n u c le a r  
weapons programme« Other s k i l l e d  s c i e n t i s t s  who r e tu rn e d  to  
China p r i o r  to  1964 inc luded  Ch’ ie n  H sueh-sen , fo rm erly  of the  
C a l i f o r n i a  I n s t i t u t e  of Technology, and Dr Chao Chung Yao, a l s o
from t h a t  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  and an o b se rv e r  a t  th e  American n u c le a r  
2
t e s t s  a t  B ik in i«  The f i r s t  of t h e s e ,  C h ' i e n ,  was an e x p e r t  in
m i s s i l e  techno logy  and became head of C h in a 's  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e
3
programme w i th in  a decade of h i s  r e t u r n .
During 1958 im p o rtan t  a d d i t i o n s  were made to  C h in a ’ s 
expanding n u c lea r  p o t e n t i a l .  Yet an o th e r  atomic i n s t i t u t e  
was s e t  up, t h i s  tim e a t  Shanghai and , a g a in ,  w ith  S o v ie t  
a s s i s ta n c e «  In  September 1958, th e  r e a c t o r  promised by R uss ia  
t h r e e  y e a rs  e a r l i e r  became f u l l y  o p e r a t io n a l .  This  i n s t a l l a ­
t i o n ,  which was f u e l l e d  by e n r ic h e d  uranium , appea rs  to  have 
been used m ain ly  fo r  purposes  of r e s e a r c h .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  
seems re a s o n a b le  to  assume t h a t  knowledge a c q u i re d  in  o p e ra t in g  
th e  r e a c to r  a t  Peking helped  C hinese en g in e e rs  to  d e s ig n  and 
b u i ld  th e  p lu ton ium -p roduc ing  r e a c t o r s  which appeared  l a t e r  
in  o th e r  p a r t s  of China, F i n a l l y ,  i n  December 1958, th e  D ra f t  
Twelve-Year P lan  f o r  the  Development of Science and Technology 
was i s s u e d .  I t  e s t a b l i s h e d  57 s p e c i f i c  p r i o r i t i e s ,  th e  h ig h e s t  
l o  M odelsk i,  op» c i t «, pol90„
2, The B u l l e t i n  (Sydney), 5 A ugust,  1967, p , 6 i ,
3« F rank ,  lo c ,  c i t , , p ,1 3 ,
4, In  1964, a Japanese  t e c h n i c a l  p u b l i c a t i o n  c r e d i t e d  th e  
Shanghai f a c i l i t y  w ith  a m ajor c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  C h ina’ s 
u l t i m a t e  development of a tom ic  weapons th rough  i t s  p a r t  in  
th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  of th e  f i r s t  Chinese-made e l e c t r o n  
a c c e l e r a t o r .  See, i b i d , ,  p 014,
5, Helper i n ,  op, c i t »s p, 7 5.
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of which were atom ic energy , e l e c t r o n i c s  and j e t  p ro p u ls io n  
te c h n o lo g y . ^
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of th e  e a r l y  growth of C h in a 's  n u c le a r  p o t e n t i a l
was th e  heavy dependence on S o v ie t  a i d .  However, some u n c e r t a in t y
su rro u n d s  th e  e x te n t  of S o v ie t  a s s i s t a n c e  to  th e  Chinese n u c le a r
programme a f t e r  1958. In  1963, d u r in g  one of th e  v e r b a l  exchanges
which marked th e  S in o -S o v ie t  d i s p u t e ,  China r e v e a le d  t h a t  in
October 1957 i t  had s igned  w ith  R u ss ia  an agreem ent on "new
techno logy  f o r  n a t io n a l  d e fe n c e " .  This  ag reem en t,  Peking a l l e g e d ,
was u n i l a t e r a l l y  b roken  by th e  R uss ians  in  June 1959, when they
re fu s e d  to  p ro v id e  th e  Chinese w ith  "a sample of an a tom ic bomb
2
and t e c h n ic a l  d a ta  conce rn ing  i t s  m a n u fa c tu re ."  Moscow 
confirm ed th e  e x i s t e n c e  of some such agreement b u t  accused  Peking
3
of " p r e s e n t in g  th e  f a c t s  t e n d e n t io u s ly  and in  a d i s t o r t e d  l i g h t . "
Arnold Kramish a g re e s  t h a t  th e  d e fe n c e - te c h n o lo g y  agreem ent
was ab roga ted  in  1959 b u t  t h a t  t h e r e a f t e r ,  R u ss ia  co n t in u ed  to
4
go on h e lp in g  China in  the  p e a c e fu l  u se s  o f  a tom ic energy .
According to  th e  American Government, R uss ian  a s s i s t a n c e  to  the  
Chinese nuclear-w eapons programme was te rm in a te d  in  1960,^  This 
i s  th e  l a t e s t  d a te  y e t  su g g es ted  f o r  th e  s ev e ran ce  of S o v ie t  
a s s i s t a n c e  to th e  Chinese n u c le a r  weapons programme. Whether
1. F rank , l o c . c i t . ,  p .1 4 .
2. H a lp e r in ,  o p . c i t , ,  p .8 0 .
3. i b i d .
4. Arnold Kramish, "The G rea t  C hinese Bomb P u z z le  -  and a 
S o lu t io n ,"  in  F o r tu n e , June 1966, pp.248 arid 250. Kramish 
a s s e r t s  t h a t  a l a r g e  c o n t in g e n t  of Red C hinese  s c i e n t i s t s  
remained a t  th e  n u c le a r  r e s e a r c h  c e n t r e  a t  Dubna (R ussia)  
t i l l  June 1965.
5. H a lp e r in ,  op. c i t . ,  p .8 0 .  See a l s o ,  S ta tem en t by S e c re ta ry  
of S t a t e ,  Dean Rusk, a t  P re s s  Conference on 16 August 1963. 
Reproduced in  Documents on Disarmament, 1963, Washington: 
U nited  S ta t e s  Arms C o n tro l  and Disarmament Agency, 1964 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as D on D. , 1963), p .3 6 6 .  For a 
comment on th e  p o l i t i c a l  and i d e o lo g ic a l  background to  th e  
sev e ran ce  of S o v ie t  a s s i s t a n c e ,  se e  Harry G. G e lb e r ,  "N uclear 
Weapons i n  Chinese S t r a t e g y , "  i n  Problems of Communism,
Vol. 20, November-December, 1971, p p .34-35 .
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or not Soviet assistance to China’s peaceful nuclear programme
continued after 1960 is difficult to say» However, there is little
disagreement that after that date, if not earlier, Peking was
forced to continue its weapons programme unaided»
As the flow of Russian aid petered out, China embarked on
a policy aimed at making the country self-sufficient in the
production of nuclear weapons» Projects which had been started
with Soviet aid were hastily completed, and construction of
entirely new facilities commenced» In 1959, the Institute of
Atomic Energy created branch institutes or research organs in
every province, major city and autonomous region in China.^
In addition, a small research reactor, the first all-Chinese
model but constructed from Soviet plans, was completed at Peking.
It was fuelled with enriched uranium supplied by Russia before 
2aid was suspended» By 1962, China's nuclear capacity had been 
immensely strengthened by the completion of additional facili­
ties in many parts of the country» Between 1959 and 1961, 
small research reactors were built in Wuhan, Shensi and Kirin
provinces and the first entirely Chinese designed and produced
3research reactor was installed at Nankai University. More
importantly, during 1961-62, reactors capable of producing
weapons grade plutonium in substantially larger quantities than
facilities previously in existence, were established in Sian 
4and Chungking»
Probably the most impressive of China’s achievements in 
the field of weapons development: prior to 1964 was the con­
struction of a gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow. There is 
some uncertainty as to when construction of this plant was
1. Frank, loc. cito, p.14.
2. ibid.
3» ibid.
4» ibid.
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s t a r t e d  but i t  i s  u n l i k e ly  t h a t  China embarked upon such a scheme
w ith o u t  some S o v ie t  a s s i s t a n c e , ^  Though th e  e x i s t e n c e  of th e
p la n t  was known to  Washington p r io r  to  C h in a 's  f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t
2
i t  had been assumed t h a t  i t  was e i t h e r  not in  o p e r a t io n ,  o r  in
any c a s e ,  was in a d e q u a te  fo r  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of s u b s t a n t i a l
q u a n t i t i e s  of U235 in  the  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  fo r  n u c le a r  
3
e x p lo s io n s d C onsequen tly ,  th e  use  of U235, r a t h e r  th a n  p lu ton ium , 
in  P e k in g 's  f i r s t  t e s t  e x p lo s io n  s u r p r i s e d  many Americans and gave 
r i s e  to  s p e c u la t i o n  as to  how China came by th e  m a te r ia l«  Some 
sugges ted  t h a t  th e  Chinese e i t h e r  s t o l e  or r e c e iv e d  th e  U235 
from th e  Russians« Kramish has advanced th e  th e o ry  t h a t  China 
produced i t s  own U235 u s in g  a com bination  of gaseous d i f f u s i o n  
and e le c t ro m a g n e t ic  s e p a r a t io n ,^  Whatever th e  so u rce  of t h i s  
i n i t i a l  q u a n t i ty  of U235 may have been , China has  s in c e  shown t h a t  
i t  can m anufac tu re  i t s  own : so f a r ,  a l l  of th e  n u c le a r  d e v ic e s  
t e s t e d  by China have been based on U235,
The use  of U235 in  t h e i r  f i r s t  n u c le a r  d e v ic e s  was an 
i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  China had chosen th e  l e s s  popu la r  of th e  two 
t r a d i t i o n a l  p a th s  to  an i n i t i a l  weapons c a p a b i l i t y , ^  I t  a l s o
1, Kramish has argued t h a t  he lp  i n  the  c o n s t r u c t io n  of th e  g a s ­
eous d i f f u s i o n  p l a n t  could  have been p a r t  of th e  a s s i s t a n c e  
in  the  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  f i e l d  which he a l l e g e s  R u ss ia  ex­
tended to  China even a f t e r  1959. See, l o c . c i t , ,  pp .248  and 
250.
2, H a lp e r in ,  o p » c i t . ,  p ,7 5 ,
3, Kramish, lo c ,  e i t «, p ,246 ,
4o i b i d , See a l s o ,  Manfredo M a c io t i ,  " S c i e n t i s t s  Go B a r e f o o t , "  
in  S u r v iv a l , Vol. 13, No« 7, J u ly  1971, p p , 232-238« T h is  
could p o s s ib ly  accoun t f o r  the  r e l a t i v e l y  sm all  s i z e  of th e  
gaseous d i f f u s i o n  plant: a t  Lanchow, I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  n o te  
t h a t  i t  was by a com bination  of gaseous d i f f u s i o n  and e l e c ­
tro m ag n e tic  s e p a r a t io n  t h a t  th e  M anhattan  P r o j e c t  produced 
U235 fo r  th e  H iroshima A-bomb,
5, France* th e  U .S . ,  R u ss ia  and B r i t a i n  a l l  used p lu ton ium  as  
th e  f i s s i o n a b l e  m a te r i a l  f o r  t h e i r  f i r s t  n u c le a r  e x p lo s iv e  
d e v ic e s ,  P lu tonium  i s  cheaper and e a s i e r  to  p roduce  th a n  
U235, This  no doubt accounted  f o r  i t s  p o p u la r i t y  w i th  th e  
f i r s t  fo u r  n u c le a r  powers. On th e  o th e r  hand, a bomb made 
from U235, once th e  U235 i s  a v a i l a b l e ,  i s  e a s i e r  to  c o n s t r u c t  
th a n  one made from P lu ton ium , For a n o te  on th e s e  r e l a t i v e  
m e r i t s  of P lutonium  and U235, see  Ian  B e l la n y ,  A u s t r a l i a  in  
the  N uclear  Age, Sydney: Sydney U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  pp ,13  and 21.
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meant t h a t  China had a l re a d y  ta k e n  a s u b s t a n t i a l  s t e p  in  the  
d i r e c t i o n  of a th e rm o -n u c lea r  weapons c a p a b i l i t y P e k i n g ' s  
ach ievem ents  thus  f a r  in  the  n u c lea r  f i e l d  r e p re s e n te d  an 
immense e f f o r t  fo r  a co u n try  c o n s id e re d  to  be backward econom ica lly  
and i n d u s t r i a l l y o  I t  i s  t r u e ,  t h a t  d u r in g  the  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of the  
programme, R uss ian  a s s i s t a n c e  had been c o n s id e r a b le ,  But a f t e r  
1960, i f  no t e a r l i e r ,  Chinese s c i e n t i s t s  and e n g in e e rs  were a b le  
to  f r e e  t h e i r  co u n try  of dependence on f o r e ig n  a s s i s t a n c e  in  
th e  weapons f i e l d ,  a t  l e a s t ,  and s u c c e s s f u l ly  conc lude  th e  
development of C h in a 's  f i r s t  atomic bomb.
S ince October 1964, China has conducted a t o t a l  of e lev en
2n u c le a r  and th e rm o -n u c le a r  t e s t s ;  10 of th e s e  t e s t s  have taken  
p la c e  in  the  atm osphere  and one, i n  September 1969, was
3
conducted u n derg round„ The e s t im a te d  y i e ld s  of th e  n u c le a r  
d e v ic e s  China has  so f a r  t e s t e d  a r e  in  the  20 -  500 k i l o to n s  
ra n g e ,  C h in a 's  f i r s t  f u l l  th e rm o -n u c le a r  d e v ic e  was exploded 
in  June 1967 s in c e  th e n  t h e r e  have been th r e e  o th e r  su c c e s s ­
f u l  th e rm o -n u c le a r  t e s t s .  A l l  th e  th e rm o -n u c le a r  d e v ic e s  t e s t e d  
so f a r  have been i n  th e  t h r e e  megaton ra n g e .  The I n s t i t u t e
1, U235 i s  c o n s id e re d  to  be h ig h ly  s u i t a b l e ,  i f  n o t  e s s e n t i a l ,  
f o r  th e  m an u fac tu re  of th e rm o -n u c lea r  weapons. See,
I b i d , ,  p p , 20-21,
2, The M i l i t a r y  B a lance ,  1971-1972, London: The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  S tu d ie s ,  p ,4 0 .  For a summary of 
th e  Chinese t e s t  programme, se e  G e lb e r ,  l o c ,  c i t , ,  p ,3 7 ,
3, S t r a t e g i c  Survey, 1970, London: The I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S t r a t e g i c
S tu d ie s ,  1971, p ,3 4 .  There  were no r e p o r t s  of any n u c le a r
t e s t s  i n  China between October 1970 and J u ly  1971. I t  has 
been suggested  th a t  one e x p la n a t io n  f o r  the  underground t e s t  
of September 1969 may have been C h in a 's  i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  
c o n s t r u c t io n  of t a c t i c a l  n u c le a r  weapons. See, G e lb e r ,
lo c ,  c i t . , ,  p ,3 8 ,
4, S t r a t e g i c  Survey, 1970, p ,3 4 ,
5, i b i d . Therm o-nuclear m a t e r i a l  was p r e s e n t  i n  two p re v io u s  
t e s t s ,  one on 9 May 1966, and an o th e r  on 28 December 1966,
6, i b i d , What a p p ea rs  to  have been  an u n s u c c e s s fu l  t e s t  of a 
th e rm o -n u c le a r  d e v ic e  took p la c e  on 24 December 1967,
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For S t r a t e g i c  S t u d ie s  ( I . S . S . )  n o te d  i n  1970, t h a t  C h in a ’s
programme of  n u c l e a r  t e s t s  i n d i c a t e d  " c o n t i n u in g  r e s e a r c h  on
compact weapons s u i t a b l e  f o r  m i s s i l e  o r  a i r c r a f t  d e l i v e r y .
S u c c e ss  i n  t h i s  endeavour a p p e a r s  to  have been  d e m o n s t ra te d
i n  t h e  t e s t s  th e m s e lv e s ;  o f  t h e  10 d e v ic e s  ex p lo d ed  i n  t h e
a tm o s p h e re ,  s e v en  have  been  a i r - d r o p p e d  and one was d e l i v e r e d  
2
by m i s s i l e .  L a t e s t  e s t i m a t e s  by t h e  I . S . S .  s u g g e s t  t h a t  China
may now have s u f f i c i e n t  f i s s i o n a b l e  m a t e r i a l  f o r  a t o t a l  of
3
a b o u t  120 f i s s i o n  and f u s i o n  w eapons.
China has  made c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r o g r e s s  i n  t h e  deve lopm en t
of a d e l i v e r y  sy s tem  f o r  i t s  n u c l e a r  w a rh e a d s .  D uring  t h e
1950s, R u s s ia  s u p p l i e d  China w i th  bomber a i r c r a f t  c a p a b le  of
4
d e l i v e r i n g  n u c le a r  weapons; t h e s e  w ere  I l - 2 8 s  and T U -4s .
However, by t o d a y ’ s s t a n d a r d s ,  n e i t h e r  a i r c r a f t  c o u ld  be
c o n s id e r e d  a t r u l y  e f f e c t i v e  d e l i v e r y  v e h i c l e .  The fo rm er
i s  o n ly  a t w i n - j e t  l i g h t  bomber and t h e  l a t t e r  (w hich th e
lo S eS .  c la im s  i s  a copy of t h e  B -29 )^  i s  o f  a ty p e  w hich  f i r s t
came i n t o  s e r v i c e  w i t h  t h e  R u s s ia n s  i n  1946 and c o u ld  t h e r e -
f o r e  be r e g a r d e d  a s  o b s o l e t e .  For a w h i l e ,  i t  seemed t h a t
C hina  i n te n d e d  to  b y - p a s s  t h e  bomber a i r c r a f t  deve lopm en t
s t a g e  and p ro ce e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  deve lopm en t and dep loym en t
o f  m i s s i l e s , ^  However, i n  1971 , t h e  I . S . S .  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  China
The M i l i t a r y  B a la n c e ,  1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 1 , London: The I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
S t r a t e g i c  S t u d i e s ,  1970, p ,5 6 .
The S t r a t e g i c  S u rv e y ,  1 9 7 0 , p .3 4 .
The M i l i t a r y  B a la n c e ,  1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 2 , p ,4 0 ,
Leonard  B ea ton  and John  Maddox, The Spread  o f  N u c le a r  W eapons, 
London: C h a t to  and W indus, 1962, p .1 2 6 .
The M i l i t a r y  B a la n c e ,  1 9 7 0 -7 1 , p ,5 8 ,
B e l l a n y ,  op , c i t , ,  p ,5 3 .
I n  1967, t h e  J .C .A .E ,  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was no e v id e n c e  
t h a t  China in te n d e d  to  d e v e lo p  i t s  own heavy bom bers . S ee ,  
Im pact o f  C h in e se  Communist N u c le a r  Weapons P r o g r e s s  on 
U n i ted  S t a t e s  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y , R e p o r t  by J o i n t  Committee 
on Atomic E n e rg y ,  9 0 th  C o n g , ,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  J u l y  1967,
W ash ing ton  1967 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  J .C .A .E .  R e p o r t  
on C h in a ’ s N u c le a r  Weapons Programme) , p ,3 ,
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had begun to build copies of the Soviet TU-16 medium bomber, an
aircraft with an operational range of up to 1000 miles and
capable of carrying nuclear weapons."*" Latest reports indicate
that China has now produced at least 30 TU-16s and has established
2a production rate of about five a month. As Gelber has suggested, 
this movement into the area of medium range bomber production, 
as well as China’s emphasis in the late 1960s, on the develop­
ment of McRJoM.s, may have been related to Peking’s growing
perception of a Soviet threat and of China’s need for something 
3to counter ito
Despite its recent activity in the medium range aircraft
field, China has been primarily interested in the development
of a missile delivery force. The decision to develop such a
system was made in 1958 and seems to have been taken in
4anticipation of Soviet assistance. The first missile test 
reported by Peking was carried out in October 1966 in conjunc­
tion with China's fourth nuclear explosion. It is believed 
that the missile used in the test had a range of 600-700 
kilometers 0 In April 1970, China launched into earth orbit 
an artificial satellite weighing 173 kilograms. This feat 
seemed to indicate that China had developed a booster vehicle 
of somewhat similar proportions to the early American Thor 
I.R.B.M. A second earth satellite weighing 230 kilograms 
was launched by China in March 1971,^
The military significance of this activity in the missile 
field began to emerge in 1971» A report by the I.S.S»,
1» Strategic Survey, 1970, p»33.
2» The Military Balance, 1971-1972, p,40.
3» Gelber, op, cit. , p.37.
4o Halperin, op. cit», p»77.
50 Kishida Junnosuke, ’’Chinese Nuclear Development" in 
Survival, Vol. 9, No. 9, September 1967, p.299,
6» The Military Balance, 1970-1971, p»56.
7. The Military Balance, 1971-1972, p~40.
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c u r r e n t  to  J u ly  of t h a t  y e a r ,  in d ic a te d  t h a t  China had d ep loyed ,
m ain ly  i n  th e  n o r th -w e s te rn  and n o r t h - e a s t e r n  p a r t s  of th e  c o u n t ry ,
about 20 m i s s i l e s  (M.R.B.M.s) w i th  a range  of up to  1000 m i le s .^
In  March 1971, U.S. Defence S e c r e t a r y ,  L a i r d ,  r e p o r te d  t h a t  th e
emphasis in  Chinese R and D d u r in g  1970 appeared to  have s h i f t e d
2
from M.R.B.M, to  I.R .B .M . developm ent. O ther so u rc e s  in d ic a te d
t h a t  an I .R .B .M . was c e r t a i n l y  be ing  t e s t e d  on a new ran g e  which
3
had been b rough t in to  u se  in  M anchuria d u r in g  1970-71.
( S u i t a b l e  deployment of I .R .B .M .s ,  w ith  a p ro b a b le  ran g e  of 
1500-2500 m i l e s ,  would g iv e  China th e  c a p a c i ty  to  r e a c h  t a r g e t s
4
in  th e  U r a l s ,  I n d ia  and a l l  of South E as t  A s ia . )  The deve lop ­
m ent, so f a r ,  of C h in a ’s m i s s i l e  f o r c e ,  has accorded  w e l l  w ith  
e s t im a te s  made in  March 1971 by U.S. Defence S e c re ta ry  M elvin 
L a i rd ;  Mr. L a ird  p r e d ic te d  th e n ,  t h a t  by th e  m idd le  of 1971,
China would have "a sm all  number of M.R.B.M.s d e p lo y e d ."  He 
a l s o  p r e d ic te d  t h a t  by m id-1972, China could  have o p e r a t io n a l  
"a  modest number of m i s s i l e s  w ith  a mix of M.R.B.M.s and
I .R .B .M .s . " 1 2345
But what of C h in a ’s development of an I .C .B .M .? In  1967, 
U.S. Defence S e c re ta ry  McNamara, s a id :
With r e g a rd  to  an ICBM, we b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  Red 
C hinese  n u c le a r  weapons and b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e v e l ­
opment programs a r e  be ing  pursued  w ith  h igh  p r i o r i t y .
On th e  b a s i s  of r e c e n t  e v id en ce ,  i t  appea rs  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  they  may conduct e i t h e r  a space  or a lo n g -ra n g e  
b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  lau n ch in g  b e fo re  th e  end of 1967.
1. i b i d .
2. See, S ta tem en t of S e c re ta ry  of Defence M elvin R. L a i rd  B efo re  
th e  House Armed S e rv ic e s  Committee on th e  FY 1972-1976 
D efence Program and th e  1972 Defence Budget, March 9, 1971, 
W ashington, 1971 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  1971 D efence 
P o s tu r e  S ta te m e n t , ) p .4 8 .
3. See, S t r a t e g i c  Survey , 1971, p .57 and The M i l i t a r y  B a la n c e , 
1971-1972, p p . 40-41 .
4. S t r a t e g i c  Survey , 1971, p .5 7 .
5» 1971 Defence P o s tu r e  S ta te m e n t ,  p .4 8 .
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However, i t  appea rs  u n l i k e ly  t h a t  th e  Chinese cou ld  
deploy a s i g n i f i c a n t  number of o p e r a t io n a l  ICBMs 
b e fo re  th e  m id-1970s, o r  t h a t  th o se  ICBMs would have 
g r e a t  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  speed of r e s p o n s e ,  o r  s u b s t a n t i a l  
p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  a t t a c k . 1
S ince  th e n ,  th e  U,S. Government has shown no d e s i r e  to  a l t e r
i t s  b a s ic  assum ption  t h a t  th e  development of an I.C .B .M .
f o r c e  i s  an im p o rtan t  g o a l  of Chinese m i l i t a r y  p la n n in g .
O f f i c i a l  e s t im a te s  of th e  d a t e  when China could  have an
o p e r a t io n a l  I.C .B.M . c a p a b i l i t y  have ranged  from th e  m idd le
2
to  th e  l a t e  1970s. Recent r e p o r t s  su g g es t  t h a t  a reduced
1. See h i s  s ta te m e n t  in  Departm ent of Defence A p p ro p r ia t io n s  
f o r  1968, h e a r in g s  b e fo re  a subcom m ittee of th e  House 
Committee on A p p ro p r ia t io n s ,  90th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  P a r t  
2, March 1967, W ashington, 1967 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  
as  House H earings  on D epartm ent of Defence A p p ro p r ia t io n s  
fo r  1968) ,  p .158 .
2o In  March 1969, Mr. L a ird  e s t im a te d  th a t  China could  have 
an o p e r a t io n a l  I.C .B.M . c a p a b i l i t y  (15 o r  more m i s s i l e s )  
by th e  m id-1970s. See h i s  te s t im o n y  in  S t r a t e g i c  and 
F o re ig n  P o l ic y  I m p l ic a t io n s  of ABM System s, h e a r in g s  
b e fo re  th e  Subcommittee on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O rg a n iz a t io n  
and Disarmament A f f a i r s  of th e  S ena te  Committee"on F o re ig n  
R e la t io n s ,  91s t Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  P a r t  I ,  March 6, 11, 13, 
21, 26 and 28, 1969, W ashington , 1969 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to  as S ena te  H earings  on S t r a t e g i c  and F o re ig n  P o l ic y  
Im p l ic a t io n s  of ABM System s, 1969) ,  pp.178 and 181. In  
January  1970, Mr. L a ird  p r e d ic te d  t h a t  by th e  mid-1970s 
China could  have a f o r c e  of some 80 -  100 M.R.B.M.s or 
20 -  40 I .C .B .M .s  or some s ix  of th e  two. See, The New 
York T im es, 8 January  1970. However, o th e r  o f f i c i a l  
American s ta te m e n ts  have h in te d  t h a t  China might n o t  have 
an o p e r a t io n a l  I .C .B .M . c a p a b i l i t y  t i l l  th e  l a t e  1970s. 
See, P r e s id e n t  N ixon’s News C onference of 30 Jan u a ry  1970. 
Reproduced in  D .O .S .B . , 16 F ebruary  1970, p .1 7 6 .  In  
March 1971, Mr. L a ird  s a id  t h a t  China was no t l i k e l y  to  
a t t a i n  an i n i t i a l  o p e r a t io n a l  c a p a b i l i t y  ( I .O .C .)  w ith  
I .C .B .M .s  t i l l  1974 o r  1975. M oreover, he added , " th ey  
p robab ly  could  no t have s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers of ICBMs 
deployed u n t i l  l a t e  i n  th e  d e c a d e ."  See, 1971 D efence 
P o s tu re  S ta te m e n t , p .4 8 .
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ran g e  t e s t  of an I.C .B.M . may have been conducted on th e  new
M anchuria -S ink iang  range  in  1 9 7 0 ,1 23456*8 However, th e  lo n g -aw a i ted
o cea n ic  t e s t  of an I.CoB.M, has y e t  to  o c c u r ,  though a t r a c k in g
2
v e s s e l  f o r  u se  in  such a t e s t  seems to  have been p re p a re d .
I t  i s  th e  view of th e  I . S . S . ,  t h a t  " f u l l  development o f  an
3
ICBM, „oo must s t i l l  be a few y e a r s  away."
There has been some comment r e c e n t l y  on th e  p o s s i b i l i t y
th a t  China might t r y  to  develop  a subm arine-launched  m i s s i l e  
4
f o r c e ,  China a l re a d y  p o s se s s e s  one subm arine of S o v ie t  d e s ig n  
w ith  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  launch ing  m iss i le s ." *  M oreover, i t  has been 
noted  t h a t  Chinese sh ip y a rd s  have begun to  b u i ld  advanced
£
w a rs h ip s ,  in c lu d in g  a t  l e a s t  one nuc lea r-pow ered  subm arine . 
O ther q u e s t io n s  r e g a rd in g  th e  f u t u r e  development of C h in a 's  
n u c le a r  f o r c e  have a l s o  been ex p lo red  r e c e n t l y  in  C o n g ress io n a l  
h e a r in g s  and u n o f f i c i a l  w r i t i n g s  on Chinese s e c u r i t y  a f f a i r s .  
These have in c lu d ed  i s s u e s  such as m i s s i l e  s i t e  h a rd en in g  and 
m o b i l i t y ,  and m i s s i l e  accu racy  and p e n e t r a t a b i l i t y .  ^ However, 
as China has no t in d i c a te d  p u b l i c ly  what i t s  i n t e n t i o n s  a r e  
in  th e s e  a r e a s ,  f o r e ig n  a sse ssm en ts  must rem ain  h ig h ly  
s p e c u la t iv e .
I t  would be w ise  no t to  be too  dogmatic i n  o n e 's  a s s e r ­
t i o n s  about th e  f u t u r e  of C h in a 's  n u c le a r  programme; a f t e r  
a l l ,  a number of o f f i c i a l  p r e d i c t i o n s  on th e  s u b je c t  have
g
a l re a d y  proved i n c o r r e c t .  Peking may y e t  have to  overcome a
1. The M i l i t a r y  B a lance ,  1971-1972, p p .40-41.
2, S t r a t e g i c  Survey, 1971, p .5 7 ,
3. i b i d »
4, See G e lb e r ,  lo c .  c i t . ,  p p . 38-39 and B e l la n y ,  o p . c i t . ,  p. 53,
5, The M i l i t a r y  B a lance ,  1971-1972, p .4 2 .  China i s  n o t  known 
to  have any m i s s i l e s  f o r  t h i s  b o a t .
6. G e lb e r ,  l o c . c i t . ,  p ,3 9 .
7o For a comment on some of th e s e  m a t t e r s ,  s ee  i b i d .
8. In  1967, th e  J.C.AoE. p r e d ic te d  t h a t  Peking would have an 
o p e r a t io n a l  I.C .B .M . c a p a b i l i t y  b e fo re  1972. See, J . C. A!.E . 
Report on C h in a 's  N uclear  Weapons Programme, p .3 .  A lso ,  
i t  has a l re a d y  been no ted  t h a t  S e c r e ta ry  McNamara p r e d ic te d  
t h a t  China might conduct a space  o r  lo n g - ra n g e  b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e  launch ing  b e fo re  th e  end of 1967.
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number of hurdles in the path of its nuclear development, The
present scientific community in China appears to have escaped the
worst excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.1
However, as Gelber has pointed out, China's nuclear development
may nevertheless be limited, among other things, by a shortage
of highly-qualified scientists and engineers, and by the effect
2of overall resource limitations on weapons-related R and D» 
Finally, it needs to be remembered that the eventual size and 
composition of the Chinese nuclear force will be determined 
not just by China's scientific, industrial and financial 
capacity, but also, by its expectations about the future 
character of Soviet and U.S. strategic systems, and by the 
role which Peking has in mind for its own nuclear force. It 
is this latter question which, among others, will now be 
examined 0
B „ The Political and Military Objectives of the 
Chinese Nuclear Force.
Chinese leaders have had plenty to say about the military 
and political significance of nuclear weapons and about the 
role they envisage for their own nuclear forces. Information 
on these matters has been revealed in many contexts : in 
interviews granted by Chinese spokesmen to foreign journalists 
and writers; in the official statements China has released to 
coincide with its nuclear tests; in official pronouncements on 
arms control; and, in the verbal exchanges which have marked 
the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking. Much of 
this material has been well researched by authorities on
lo Gelber, loc, cito, p,37. 
2, ibidn, pp,36-37*
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Chinese s e c u r i t y  a f f a i r s . From a re a d in g  of t h e i r  work, i t  i s
p o s s i b le  to  c o n s t r u c t  a l i s t  of r e a s o n s  why China has chosen to
develop  i t s  own n u c le a r  d e t e r r e n t .
F i r s t ,  China c l e a r l y  a s p i r e s  to  th e  s t a t u s  of a g r e a t  power
and q u i t e  c o r r e c t l y  b e l ie v e s  t h a t  th e  p o s s e s s io n  of n u c le a r
weapons i s  a n e c e ss a ry  c o n d i t io n  f o r  such  s t a t u s .  As P rem ier
Chou E n - l a i  s a id  of C h ina’s d e c i s i o n  to  go n u c l e a r :  " o th e r
g r e a t  n a t io n s  had such weapons and s m a l le r  ones would have them 
2
in  due c o u r s e . "  Peking i s  o b v io u s ly  q u i t e  unhappy w ith  what
i t  sees  as  S o v ie t  and American e f f o r t s  to  dom inate th e  world
3
by m a in ta in in g  a n u c le a r  a u ta rc h y .  M oreover, i t  i s  agg rieved
th a t  in  th e  p a s t  R uss ia  and th e  U .S. have no t t r e a t e d  w ith
4
China on a b a s i s  of e q u a l i t y .  C le a r ly ,  Peking se e s  i t s  
p o s s e s s io n  of n u c le a r  weapons as  a means of h e lp in g  to  b reak
1. See, B„W. A u g en s te in ,  "The C hinese  and French  Programs fo r  
th e  Development of N a t io n a l  N uclea r  F o r c e s ,"  in  O r b i s ,
Vol. 11, No. 3 ,  F a l l  1967, p p .846-863; Harry G. G e lb e r ,  
"China and S .A .L .T ." ,  in  S u r v i v a l , Vol. 12, No. 4, A p r i l  
1970, p p .122-126; "N uclear Weapons i n  Chinese S t r a t e g y , "
in  Problems of Communism, Vol. 20, November-December, 1971, 
p p .33-44; and "The Impact of C hinese I .C .B .M .s  on S t r a t e g i c  
D e te r r e n c e ,"  in  O r b is , V ol. 13, No. 2, Summer 1969, pp .407 -  
434; Morton H. H a lp e r in ,  op. c i t . ,  and China and N uclear 
P r o l i f e r a t i o n , Chicago: The U n iv e r s i t y  of Chicago P r e s s ,  
1966; A l ic e  Langley H sieh , Communist C h ina’ s M i l i t a r y  P o l i ­
c i e s ,  D o c t r in e ,  and S t r a t e g y  : A L e c tu re  P re s e n te d  a t  th e  
N a t io n a l  Defence C o llege  Tokyo, September 17, 1968, Rand 
P-3960, Santa  Monica: The Rand C o rp o ra t io n ,  1968; "C h in a ’s 
N u c le a r -M is s i le  Programme: R eg ional or I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l ? "  
in  The China Q u a r t e r l y , No. 45, J a n u a ry-M arch, 1971, p p .8 5 -  
99; and Communist C h in a 's  S t r a t e g y  in  the  N uclear  E r a ,
N. York: P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  1962; A rth u r  Huck, op. c i t . The 
m a t e r i a l  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  l a r g e l y  d e r iv e d  from th e s e  
works o
2. P rem ier Chou E n - l a i ,  i n  F ie ld  M arshal V iscoun t Montgomery, 
"China on th e  Move", Sunday Times (London), 15 O ctober 1961. 
Quoted in  A u g en s te in ,  lo c .  c i t . , p ,8 5 2 .
3. See below, p p . 101-102,
4. Huck, op. c i t . ,  p p , 65-67.
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the super-power monopoly, of winning the respect of Washington
and Moscow, and of acquiring for China a voice equal with the other
major powers in decisions affecting Asia and the world generally.1
Second, there can be little doubt that Peking views its
nuclear force as a means of acquiring greater influence in the
Communist world» China has violently split with its major
ally on questions of ideology»nuclear strategy and relations with
the non-Communist world, especially the U.S. It strongly
disagrees that Moscow has any particular right to speak on
behalf of the Communist bloc in these matters. Peking has
clearly reasoned that only through developing its own nuclear
weapons can it secure an independent voice in intra-alliance 
2questions»
The third reason for China's development of a nuclear
force, was its desire for a credible deterrent against American
attack» It seems reasonable to assume that this was the most
important of Peking's motives. Ever since the Communists came
to power in China they have been aware that the U.S. could attack
them with nuclear weapons at any time while they could do little
in return. Indeed, on more than one occasion, Peking seems to
have been the recipient of quite specific American nuclear
threats» In 1953, President Eisenhower made it clear that if
a truce in Korea was not rapidly agreed upon, the war would be
3widened and that nuclear weapons might be used against China»
1. ibido, pp»70-71, Augenstein, loc» cit., p.854 and Alice
Langley Hsieh, Foreword to the Japanese Edition of "Communist 
China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era" : Implications of the 
Chinese Nuclear Detonations, Rand P-3152, Santa Monica: The 
Rand Corporation, 1965, p.4. That the nuclear component of 
China's strength has impressed Western advocates of Peking's 
admission to the U.N» has not gone unnoticed in China» See 
Gelber, "Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy", p»41.
2» Augenstein, loc» cit. , p»861, and Halperin, China and the 
Bomb, pp.49-53»
3» Huck, op» cit., p»64.
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D uring  th e  Taiwan S t r a i t s  c r i s i s  i n  1954-55  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  
D u l le s  t h r e a t e n e d  t h e  u s e  of  t a c t i c a l  n u c l e a r  weapons a g a i n s t  
C h i n a F i n a l l y ,  d u r in g  th e  Quemoy c r i s i s  o f  1958 E isenhow er  
seems to  have  been  r e a d y  to  u s e  n u c l e a r  weapons i n  d e f e n c e  o f  
t h e  i s l a n d
The d e s i r e  f o r  a  d e t e r r e n t  a g a i n s t  A m erican  a t t a c k  was 
a p p a r e n t  i n  t h e  New C hina News A g e n c y 's  announcem ent of P e k i n g ' s  
f i r s t  n u c l e a r  t e s t .  P a r t  of t h e  s t a t e m e n t  s a i d :
C hina c a n n o t  r e m a in  i d l e  and do n o th in g  i n  t h e  f a c e  
of t h e  e v e r  i n c r e a s i n g  n u c l e a r  t h r e a t  posed  by th e  
U n i ted  S t a t e s .  C h ina  i s  f o r c e d  to  co n d u c t  n u c l e a r  
t e s t s  and d e v e lo p  n u c l e a r  w eapons. . . .  The d e v e lo p ­
ment o f  n u c l e a r  weapons by C hina i s  f o r  d e f e n s e  and 
f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  C h in e se  p e o p le  from  th e  d a n g e r  o f  
t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s '  l a u n c h in g  a n u c l e a r  w a r .3
T h is  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i th  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  A m erican  a t t a c k  has
b een  a c o n s i s t e n t  rheme i n  C h in e se  s t a t e m e n t s  on s t r a t e g y  and
arms c o n t r o l  and goes  a long  way to w a rd s  e x p l a i n i n g  P e k i n g ' s
a t t i t u d e  to  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  I n  t h e i r  o p p o s i t i o n
to  n u c l e a r  s p r e a d ,  t h e  two s u p e r -p o w e rs  have  s t r e s s e d  t h a t
t h e r e  i s  a r e a l  d a n g e r  of  a c c i d e n t a l  war and t h a t  t h i s  d a n g e r
i n c r e a s e s  a s  more s t a t e s  a c q u i r e  n u c l e a r  w eapons. However,
as  H a l p e r i n  h a s  s u g g e s t e d ,  t h e  C h in e se  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  g r e a t e s t
dan g e r  o f  war s tem s from  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a d e l i b e r a t e
Am erican a t t a c k  on C hina  and t h a t  t h i s  d a n g e r  i s  n o t  l i k e l y
to  i n c r e a s e  w i th  t h e  s p re a d  o f  n u c l e a r  w eapons. On th e  c o n t r a r y ,
P ek ing  h a s  a rg u e d  t h a t  to  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  China  and o t h e r
s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e s  a r e  a b l e  to  eq u ip  th e m s e lv e s  w i th  n u c l e a r
weapons t h e  d a n g e r  o f  d e l i b e r a t e  A m erican a t t a c k ,  and by
4
i n f e r e n c e ,  o f  war g e n e r a l l y ,  becomes l e s s  l i k e l y .
1. i b i d . ~  — — —  2. i b i d . "
3. New China  News Agency announcem ent of 16 O c to b e r  1964.
Quoted i n  H a l p e r i n ,  C hina and th e  Bomb, p .4 4 .
4o H a l p e r i n ,  China  and N u c le a r  P r o l i f e r a t i o n , p .3 2 .
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An im p o r ta n t  f a c t o r  i n  C h i n a 's  d e s i r e  f o r  a d e t e r r e n t  o f  i t s  
own was i t s  r e f u s a l  to  depend on S o v i e t  a s s u r a n c e s  o f  s u p p o r t .  
T h is  was c l e a r  a t  t h e  tim e  of  t h e  f i n a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  to  
t h e  t e s t  ban  t r e a t y  i n  1963» P e k in g  m a in ta in e d  t h a t  i t  would n o t  
be a p a r t y  to  t h e  t e s t  ban u n l e s s  i t  i n c lu d e d  a p r o h i b i t i o n  on 
th e  p o s s e s s i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons by s t a t e s  everywhere»'*' More­
o v e r ,  i t  warned Moscow t h a t  t h e  t e s t  ban  was s im p ly  an  a t t e m p t
by th e  U S ,  to  p r e v e n t  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  th e  S o v ie t
2
Union from d e v e lo p in g  n u c l e a r  w eapons. T ha t  i t  was p r o p e r  and 
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  C h in a ,  to  d e v e lo p  
n u c le a r  weapons was made a p p a r e n t  in  a C h in e se  Government 
s t a t e m e n t  of  August 1963, P a r t  o f  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  s a i d :
I n  f i g h t i n g  i m p e r i a l i s t  a g g r e s s i o n  and d e fe n d in g  
i t s  s e c u r i t y ,  ev e ry  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r y  h a s  t o  r e l y  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  on i t s  own d e fe n c e  c a p a b i l i t y ,  
and th e n  -  and o n ly  t h e n  -  on a s s i s t a n c e  from 
f r a t e r n a l  c o u n t r i e s  and th e  p e o p le  o f  t h e  w o r ld .
For t h e  S o v ie t  s t a t e m e n t  to  d e s c r i b e  a l l  t h e  
s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  a s  d e p e n d in g  on th e  n u c l e a r  
weapons of t h e  S o v ie t  Union f o r  t h e i r  s u r v i v a l  i s  
to  s t r i k e  an  o u t - a n d - o u t  g r e a t -p o w e r  c h a u v i n i s t i c  
n o t e  and t o  f l y  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  th e  f a c t s .
The C h in ese  Government h as  a lw ays  f u l l y  a p p r e ­
c i a t e d  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  S o v i e t  U n io n ’ s p o s s ­
e s s i o n  of n u c l e a r  weapons» However, such  p o s s e s s i o n  
m ust i n  no way be  made a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  p r e v e n t ­
ing  o t h e r  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  from i n c r e a s i n g  t h e i r  
own d e fe n c e  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  , . .  I f  t h e  S o v ie t  G overn­
ment i s  e a r n e s t  a b o u t  a b id i n g  by th e  Moscow S ta te m e n t  
and r e a l l y  w an ts  to  f i g h t  t h e  i m p e r i a l i s t  p o l i c i e s  of 
a g g r e s s i o n  and war and to  d e fe n d  w orld  p e a c e ,  t h e r e  
i s  no r e a s o n  why i t  s h o u ld  t r y  so  h a rd  to  o b s t r u c t  
o th e r  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  from  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e i r  
d e fe n c e  c a p a b i l i t i e s »3
1» H a l p e r i n ,  C hina and th e  Bomb, p»46»
2» i b i d ■>
3» See , S ta te m e n t  by t h e  Spokesman o f  t h e  C h in e se  Government -  
A Comment on th e  S o v i e t  G overnm en t’ s S ta te m e n t  of A ugust 
3 , d a te d  August 15 , 1963» From t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  i n  P ek in g  
R ev iew, No, 33, 16 A ugust 1963 , p p , 1 2 -1 3 .  Quoted i n  i b i d . ,  
pp »46-47»
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Clearly implicit in this Chinese statement was the idea that 
the Soviet Union might not always be prepared to place nuclear 
weapons at the disposal of other socialist states. The idea was 
made more explicit in some remarks by Foreign Minister Chen-Yi 
in September 1963. He said:
How can any one nation say that they will defend 
another - these sort of promises are easy to make, 
but they are worth nothing. Soviet protection is 
worth nothing to us. Atomic weapons are in use by 
other powers - so therefore we need atomic weapons 
for our defence.1
But it was not simply a question that the Soviet Union might 
be unwilling to use nuclear weapons on China’s behalf. Peking 
was fast inclining to the view that Moscow placed the detente
between it and the U.S. ahead of the interests of the other 
socialist states: worse still, that Moscow was prepared to
co-operate with Washington in some sort of nuclear plot against 
China. There was some evidence of this thinking on Peking's 
part in 1963. As an official Chinese statement of August that 
year said: "the real aim of the Soviet leaders is to com­
promise with the United States in order to seek momentary
ease and to maintain a monopoly of nuclear weapons and lord
2it over the socialist camp." Since then, the theme has 
become more common in Chinese statements. On the occasion
of America’s decision, in September 1967,to deploy an anti-
ballistic missile (A.B.M.) system, Peking said:
Facts have proved to the hilt that the nuclear 
weapons in the hands of the Soviet revisionist 
clique, like those in the hands of the United 
States imperialists, are for the purpose of 
intimidating the revolutionary people of the 
whole world, ...^
1. From transcript of interview with John Dixon, 30 September 
1963. Quoted in Huck, op, cit., p.65.
2. See, Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government - 
A Comment on the Soviet Government’s Statement of August 3, 
15 August 1963. Quoted in Augenstein, loc. cit., p.861.
3. Text in Peking Review, No. 44, 27 October, 1967. Quoted 
in Huck, op. cit., p.70.
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But Peking's bitterest attacks on alleged super-power collusion 
were evoked by the N.PrT. and the Tripartite Proposal on 
Security Assurances. Its response to these agreements deserves 
to be quoted at some length:
It must be pointed out that this nuclear fraud of 
United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism 
is also a component part of their anti-China plot.
They not only want to fan up anti-China feelings 
internationally through the so-called "treaty on 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" but also want 
to accelerate the rigging up of an anti-China 
encirclement by providing their "nuclear umbrellas" 
to India and other countries bordering China. The 
United States imperialists and the Soviet revisionists 
have thus taken a big step forward in their military 
collaboration against China. [They] are incorrigible 
devotees of nuclear fetishism. They believe that 
with a scrap of paper such as the "treaty on non­
proliferation of nuclear weapons" they will be able 
to preserve their nuclear monopoly and, on the 
strength of the nuclear weapons in their hands, to 
hold back the tide of the revolution of the world's 
people.1
China’s desire for some means to protect itself from U.S. 
(and Soviet) attack raises the question of the sort of 
deterrent force Peking might be satisfied with. For the 
foreseeable future, China cannot hope to develop a force of 
similar size and composition to those possessed by the two 
super-powers. But a deterrent of this sort would not seem 
to be necessary for China’s purposes. The capacity to strike 
at just a few American (or Soviet) cities would be sufficient 
to make either super-power very wary about attacking China. 
Obviously, Peking would like a force capable of retaliating 
against U.S. cities even after an American attack on China.
But such a capability will probably be difficult to achieve,
1. Text in Peking Review, No. 25, 21 June 1968, Quoted in 
ibid., pp.70-71,
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at least in the short-run : indeed McNamara predicted in 1967 
that Peking was unlikely to have a second-strike capability for 
at least 15 to 20 years, ^  Nevertheless, even a force wholly 
vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike would serve a useful purpose 
so far as China is concerned« Harry Gelber has said of such a 
Chinese capability:
ooo in a variety of conflict situations short of 
all-out war, either great power would be faced with 
the unpleasant alternative of launching a first 
strike, with all its political and other costs, 
or accepting some risk of a Chinese strike. The 
need to avoid such a choice would itself be a9powerful constraint in many circumstances.
So far as other possible uses of the Chinese nuclear
force are concerned, there is relatively little evidence on
which to speculate. One possible motive, which Peking is
understandably reluctant to discuss itself, is the belief that
nuclear weapons would enable China to more easily establish
hegemony in Asia. In 1968, Alice Langley Hsieh predicted that
China would give priority to the deployment of a M.R.B.M.
3system. Such a capability, she argued,could create intense
anxiety amongst neutrals and America’s allies in Asia and lead
them to assert pressure on the U.S. to avoid any confrontation
4with China - nuclear or conventional. Halperin has argued 
that a nuclear force would reinforce Peking's conventional
1. See, Interview With Secretary of Defence McNamara in Life 
Magazine, 29 September 1967. Reproduced in Scope, Magni­
tude, and Implications of the United States Antiballistic 
Missile Program, hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., November 6 and 7, 1967, 
Washington, 1968, p,113.
2, Gelber, "China and SALT", p.124. See also, his "Nuclear 
Weapons in Chinese Strategy," p.41.
3. Communist China's Military Policies, Doctrine and Strategy, 
p. 42,
4, ibid., pp,45-46. See also, her argument in "China's Nuclear 
Missile Programme : Regional or Intercontinental?",
pp,98-99,
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c a p a c i t y  and i t s  a b i l i t y  to  s u p p o r t  w ars  of  n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  
"by e n a b l in g  China  to  make i m p l i c i t  t h r e a t s  of  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  
a g a i n s t  h e r  n e ig h b o u r s  w h i le  d ep e n d in g  on p o l i t i c a l  moves to  b r in g  
t h e s e  n a t i o n s  i n t o  h e r  o r b i t , " ^  N e i th e r  w r i t e r  t h in k s  i t  l i k e l y ,  
h ow ever ,  t h a t  Pek ing  would r e s o r t  t o  o v e r t  t h r e a t s  o r  n u c l e a r  
b la c k m a i lo  E v id e n ce  educed e a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  c h a p te r  seems to  
have  b o rn e  o u t  H s i e h ’ s p r e d i c t i o n  t h a t  C hina would g iv e  p r i o r i t y  
i n  th e  s h o r t  ru n  a t  l e a s t ,  t o  t h e  dep loym en t of a r e g i o n a l  
n u c l e a r  c a p a b i l i t y - ,  However, i t  m ust be em phasised  t h a t  P ek ing  
do es  n o t  a p p e a r  to  have  abandoned i t s  g o a l  o f  an  o p e r a t i o n a l  
IiCoB.Mo c a p a b i l i t y .
F i n a l l y  i n  t h i s  r e v ie w  o f  m o t i v a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  C h in ese
d e t e r r e n t ,  i t  needs  to  be n o te d  t h a t  P e k in g  h a s  h a i l e d  i t s
bomb t e s t s  a s  "a  g r e a t  i n s p i r a t i o n  and s u p p o r t "  f o r  r e v o l u -
2
t i o n a r y  p e o p le s  everyw here» However, d e s p i t e  t h e s e  c l a i m s ,
C hina  d o e s  no t  seem to  c o n te m p la te  u s in g  i t s  n u c l e a r  weapons
3
d i r e c t l y  on b e h a l f  o f  any r e v o l u t i o n a r y  group»
T h is  c h a p te r  has  a t t e m p te d  t o  t r a c e  t h e  deve lopm en t o f  
C h in a ’ s n u c l e a r  f o r c e  and to  examine th e  u s e s  t o  w hich  Pek ing  
m ig h t  p u t  t h i s  c a p a b i l i t y .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w in g  c h a p t e r s  t h e  
fo c u s  w i l l  be  s h i f t e d  to  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  n u c l e a r  powers i n  A s i a ,  
and i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  to  t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n  t h e s e  s t a t e s .
1 «, C hina  and th e  Bomb, p ,54o  On t h i s  p o i n t ,  s e e  a l s o ,  G e lb e r ,  
" N u c le a r  Weapons i n  C h in e se  S t r a t e g y , "  p p , 4 0 -4 1 ,
2, Huck, op , e i t », p„6 9 . See a l s o ,  H a l p e r i n ,  China and th e  
Bomb, p ,5 3  and A u g e n s te in ,  l o c . c i t . , p»862,
3, Huck, op , c i t o , p ,6 9 „
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CHAPTER IV
THE POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS OF ASIA : INDIA
The p r o l i f e r a t i o n  problem i n  A sia  a r i s e s  from th e  p o s s i b i l ­
i t y  t h a t  a number of n a t io n s  i n  t h e  a r e a  might  f o l l o w  China i n  
t h e  development of n u c l e a r  weapons* I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a g re e d ,  
t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n  most l i k e l y  to  do t h i s  i s  India*  Though not  
amongst t h e  f r o n t  r ank  of the  w o r l d ' s  i n d u s t r i a l  powers,  I n d i a  
has long been cons ide red  a p o t e n t i a l  n u c l e a r  power*^ The b a s i s  
of t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  i s  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  q u i t e  remarkab le  p r o g r e s s  i n  
th e  p e a c e f u l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of atomic energy* I n d i a ' s  development 
of n u c l e a r  te chnology  has been m o t iv a t e d  p r i m a r i l y  by t h e  need 
f o r  r a p i d  and s u b s t a n t i a l  i n d u s t r i a l  growth* N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
l a r g e l y  as a r e s u l t  of t h i s  deve lopm en t , t h e  c oun t ry  has 
a c q u i r e d  many of th e  f a c i l i t i e s  n e c e s s a ry  fo r  a n u c l e a r  weapons 
programme* Moreover, t h e r e  has long been c o n s i d e r a b l e  s u ppo r t  
fo r  n u c l e a r  weapons i n  India* Many have argued t h a t  fo r  
r e a s o n s  of p o l i t i c a l  p r e s t i g e  and m i l i t a r y  s e c u r i t y  the  c oun t ry  
should  e x e r c i s e  i t s  n u c l e a r  option* But so f a r ,  t h e  In d ia n  
Government has r e s i s t e d  th e s e  p r e s s u r e s ,  though i t  i s  by no 
means c e r t a i n  t h a t  i t  w i l l  con t in u e  to  do so-
Ac I n d i a ' s  Nuclear  Weapons P o t e n t i a l
In d ia ' s  nuc lea r  weapons p o t e n t i a l  s tems from th e  advances 
made by t h a t  count ry  i n  t h e  p e a c e fu l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of atomic
1. The N a t i o n a l  P lann ing  A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  (Washington) r e p o r t  of 
1960 (The Nth Country Problem and Arms C o n t r o l ) concluded 
t h a t  I n d i a  was one of  t h e  twelve c o u n t r i e s  " a b l e  to  embark 
on a s u c c e s s f u l  n u c l e a r  weapons programme i n  th e  near f u t u r e * "  
Quoted i n  Hadley B u l l ,  The Con tro l  of t h e  Arms Race ,
('2nd e d i t i o n ) ,  New York: P r a e g e r ,  1965,  pp*150-151*
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en erg y .  The r o o ts  of t h i s  development may be t r a c e d  back to  th e
e s ta b l i s h m e n t ,  i n  1945, of th e  T a ta  I n s t i t u t e  of Fundamental
R esearch , This  body was founded by Dr, H ,J ,  Bhabha, who, fo r
n e a r ly  two d eca d es ,  guided th e  development of I n d i a ' s  atom ic
energy  programme,^ When th e  In d ia n  Atomic Energy Commission was
e s t a b l i s h e d  in  1948, i t  a l re a d y  had a v a i l a b l e  a team of n u c le a r
2
p h y s i c i s t s  who had t r a i n e d  a t  th e  T a ta  I n s t i t u t e ,  By th e  
m id-50s I n d ia  had been in f e c te d  by th e  optim ism , th en  c u r r e n t  
th ro u g h o u t th e  w o rld ,  abou t th e  p e a c e fu l  u ses  of a tom ic energy .  
P robab ly  th e  most immediate r e f l e c t i o n  of t h i s  was th e  e s t a b ­
l i sh m e n t  i n  1954, of a n a t i o n a l  la b o ra to r y  f o r  atomic d ev e lo p ­
ment a t  Trombay, L a te r  i n  th e  same y e a r ,  a Department of
Atomic Energy was e s t a b l i s h e d  as  a s e p a r a t e  M in is t ry  of th e
3
C e n t ra l  Government,
I n d ia  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  w e ll  p la ced  in  re g a rd  to  th e  a v a i l ­
a b i l i t y  of n u c le a r  f u e l s ,  S u b s t a n t i a l  r e s e r v e s  of uranium 
occur i n  B ih a r ,  R a ja s th a n ,  Punjab and U t ta r  P rad esh ,  Four 
d e p o s i t s  i n  B ihar a lo n e  a r e  b e l ie v e d  c a p a b le  of y i e ld in g  some
20 m i l l i o n  m e tr ic  to n s  of o re  (15 ,600  to n s  of uranium con-
#
c e n t r a t e ) ,  I n d i a ' s  uranium r e s e r v e s ,  however, a r e  only  about 
o n e - th i r d  th e  s i z e  of F r a n c e ' s ,  and t h e s e ,  i t  should  be n o te d ,  
have proved in a d e q u a te  f o r  th e  French n u c le a r  programme,"*
I n d ia  i s  one of about s ix  n a t io n s  in  th e  world cap a b le  of 
f a b r i c a t i n g  i t s  own n a t u r a l  uranium f u e l  elements,** but i t  
does n o t  have th e  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  e x t r a c t i n g  U235 from n a t u r a l  
uran ium . There has been some r e s e a r c h  on uranium i s o to p e
1, G,Gc M irchandan i,  I n d i a ' s  N uclear  Dilemma, New D e lh i :
P o p u la r  Book S e r v ic e s ,  1968, p p ,199-200,
2, i b i d , , p ,199,
3, i b i d , ,  p , 201,
4, W, Van C leave and H arold  Rood, "A T e c h n o lo g ic a l  Comparison 
of Two P o t e n t i a l  N uc lea r  Powers: I n d ia  and J a p a n ,"  in  
A sian  S u rvey ,V ol, 7, No, 7, J u ly  1967, p ,484 ,
5, Leonard Beaton in  A l a s t a i r  Buchan (ed»>, A World of N uclear  
P ow ers? , Englewood C l i f f s ,  N ,J ,: -  P r e n t i c e  H a l l ,  1966, p ,1 8 ,
6, M irchandan i,  o p » c i t » , p ,211 .
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Separation techniques,'*’ but one report suggests that the Indian
Government has ruled out the possibility of constructing a gaseous
2diffusion plant to produce U235* India's reluctance to enter 
the highly complex and expensive field of U235 separation has no 
doubt been influenced by the possibility of utilising an alter­
native fissile material based on thorium*, The thorium process 
is still being developed, but preliminary work suggests that 
when combined with plutonium in a reactor, thorium turns into
U233, a material which fissions easily like U235* The U233 may
3then be used on its own as a reactor fuel*. It has been 
estimated that India possesses about 500,000 tons of thorium -4roughly half of the world’s known resources» It is hardly 
surprising then, that reactors fueled by U233 are planned for 
the last phase of India's three-stage nuclear programmed In 
addition to uranium and thorium, India is well endowed with other 
materials used in nuclear programmes and strict government
la Maharaj K» Chopra, "India on the Nuclear Path," in Military 
Review, Vole 47, No0 1, January 1967, p*61»
2c Mirchandani, op, cite, p»209»
3- U233 may also be used with thorium in a "breeder" reactor*
Such a reactor, besides producing electric power, will 
produce more U233 than it consumes» See, ibid», po209»
The whole future of thorium-based breeder reactors is very 
uncertain and it would probably be decades before India 
could exploit this path to nuclear self-sufficiency» For 
a note on the difficulties associated with U233, thorium 
232 breeders, see V» Gilinky, Fast Breeder Reactors and 
the Spread of Plutonium, Rand Memorandum RM-5148-PR, Santa 
Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967, p»7» It is almost 
certain that a weapon has never been designed around U233»
But the possibility that U233 might prove more suitable 
than plutonium in the fabrication of thermo-nuclear bombs 
is no doubt being investigated by Indian scientists» Such 
a discovery would relieve India of the expense and diffi­
culty of constructing a U235 separation plant should the 
Government ever decide to develop hydrogen bombs»
4» Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 
London: Chatto and Windus, 1962, p»137»
5» Van Cleave and Rood, loc» eit», p»486»
108
Controls are maintained over dealings in these minerals»'*"
Since the mid-1950s, successive Indian Governments have
hoped that, atomic energy would eventually account for a large
2proportion of the country's power capacity0 Consequently,
an ambitious reactor programme has been embarked upon0 India’s
first research reactor went critical in August, 1956, This
was the first reactor to go into operation in Asia outside the 
3U,S,S,Ro By 1962, India could beast of three research 
reactorso One of these, the 40 M W ,  Canada India Reactor, 
was the first major international atomic project anywhere in 
the worido^ But it is India's power reactors which are really 
significant in any discussion of the country's nuclear weapons 
potentialo The only power reactor presently in use in India 
is the one installed in the power station at Tarapur, near 
Bombay^ This facility, which was supplied by the United States, 
uses enriched uranium fuel and has an output of 380 M,W, It 
commenced operations early in 19690 Two other reactors are 
presently under construction in India» One of these is being 
built in Rajasthan in collaboration with the Canadians, It 
will be fuelled with natural, uranium and is expected to have 
an output of 400 M.W» The other is a 400 M,W, natural uranium 
fuelled facility being built in Madras (Kalpakkam) by the 
Indians themselves,^
1, Michael A, Michaud, "India as a Nuclear Power", unpublished 
seminar paper, Los Angeles: University of California, June 
1963, p,21,
2, It is planned that nuclear energy will supply five percent 
of the total installed capacity in 1971, eight percent in 
1976, 17 percent in 1981 and 22 percent by 1986, See, 
Mirchandani, op, cit», p,20/»
3, Beaton and Maddox, op, cit,, p»138,
4, ibid ,
5, For information on India's nuclear reactors, see Australian 
Atomic Energy Commission, Nineteenth Annual Report, June 
1971, pp«36-39; Ian Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, 
Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972, pp,57-59; Leonard 
Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread?, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966, 
pp,72-4; The limes of India, 3 July 1967; and Van Cleave 
and Rood, loc.. cit,, pp,486-7,
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I n d i a ’ s power r e a c t o r s ,  l i k e  th o s e  e lse w h e re ,  can be expected
to  p roduce q u a n t i t i e s  of f i s s i l e  m ateria l« , I n d ia  p ro b ab ly  began
accum ula ting  i t s  f i r s t  s to ck s  of p lu ton ium  sometime a f t e r  th e
Canada In d ia  R eac tor  went c r i t i c a l  i n  J u ly  1960»^ But o u tp u t
from th e  c o u n t r y 's  power r e a c t o r s  can be expec ted  to  add g r e a t l y
to  t h i s  s to c k p i le »  I t  was p r e d ic te d  i n  1967 t h a t  th e  r e a c t o r
a t  T arapur a lo n e  would p robab ly  produce in  excess  of 200 k i l o -
2
grams of weapons g rade  p lu tonium  each n in e  month period»  The
T arapur r e a c t o r  and th e  one schedu led  fo r  com ple tion  a t
R a ja s th a n  w i l l  b o th  be s u b je c t  to  I»A»E0A» or e q u iv a le n t  
3
sa feguards»  However, th e  p la n t  in  Madras w i l l  be s u b je c t  to  
s u p e r v is io n  only  i f  In d ia  a g re e s  to  p la c e  i t  under I»A»E»Ä» 
in s p e c t io n  * Assuming t h a t  I n d ia  would be r e l u c t a n t  to  renounce 
i t s  agreem ents  w ith  Canada, th e  U»S» and th e  I»A.E,A», th e  
p la n t  a t  Kalpakkam would seem th e  most t r o u b l e - f r e e  p a th  to  
th e  bomb should  D elh i ever d e c id e  to  deve lop  n u c le a r  weapons»
Two a s p e c t s  of I n d i a ' s  n u c le a r  programme, th e  d r iv e  fo r  
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  and th e  e a r ly  c o n s t r u c t io n  of a p lu ton ium  
s e p a r a t io n  p l a n t ,  c r e a t e  th e  s u s p ic io n  t h a t  a weapons capa­
b i l i t y  may have been s p e c i f i c a l l y  p rov ided  f o r -  As Ian  
B e l lany  has su g g e s te d ,  th e  im p ress io n  t h a t  In d ia  has sought 
to  ac h ie v e  n u c le a r  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  i s  s t r e n g th e n e d  by th e  
f a c t  t h a t  "a lm ost h a l f  of I n d i a ' s  spending  on r e s e a r c h  and 
developm ent of a l l  k inds  i s  i n  the  f i e l d  of n u c le a r  energy»"^
In  a d d i t i o n ,  of th e  th r e e  r e s e a r c h  r e a c t o r s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  
Trombay p r i o r  to  1962, two were des igned  and b u i l t  by In d ian s» ^
1» The Canada In d ia  R eac to r  i s  a r e s e a r c h  f a c i l i t y  b u t ,  in  
con t in u o u s  o p e r a t io n  a t  f u l l  power i t s  f u e l  e lem ents  a r e  
cap a b le  of y i e ld in g  up to  e ig h t  k i log ram s of p lu tonium  
a y e a r ,  See, Beaton and Maddox, op» c i t », p»138,
2» Van C leave and Rood, lo c ,  c i t », p»486,
3» A t r i l a t e r a l  s a fe g u a rd s  agreement co v er in g  th e  s t a t i o n  
a t  Tarapur was s igned  between I n d i a ,  th e  U nited  S ta t e s  
and th e  I»A,E,A» i n  January  1971»
4» B e l la n y ,  op» c i t » , p»58, fn»39,
5» Beaton and Maddox, op, c i t , , p p ,138-9,
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S i m i l a r l y ,  bo th  th e  power p la n t  being c u r r e n t l y  b u i l t  i n  Madras 
and th e  p lu ton ium  s e p a r a t io n  p la n t  a r e  p ro d u c ts  of In d ia n  know­
how» These achievem ents  r e f l e c t  b o th  th e  h igh  s ta n d a rd s  of In d ia n  
s c ie n c e  and technology  and a d e s i r e  to  be r i d  of dependence on 
f o r e i g n e r s  and th e  c o n t ro l s  a s s o c ia t e d  w i th  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o o p e ra t io n  in  n u c lea r  m a tte rs ' .
The e s ta b l i s h m e n t ,  in  1964, of a p lu ton ium  s e p a r a t io n  
p la n t  a l s o  g iv e s  r i s e  to  some s u s p ic io n  about th e  f u t u r e  
d i r e c t i o n  of th e  In d ia n  n u c lea r  programme» I t  could  h a rd ly  be 
argued  t h a t  the  f a c i l i t y  was n ece ssa ry  f o r  th e  p ro v i s io n  of 
f u e l  f o r  a second g e n e ra t io n  of r e a c to r s »  P lutonium  b u rn ing  
r e a c t o r s  a r e  not scheduled  to  be b u i l t  u n t i l  th e  second s ta g e  
of I n d i a ' s  n u c le a r  programme i s  commenced, sometime a f t e r  
1971»^ F u r th e rm o re ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  to  a rg u e ,  t h a t  even 
when i t s  p lu ton ium  burn ing  r e a c to r s  a r e  r e a d y ,  I n d ia  would 
f in d  i t  cheaper to  depend on B r i t i s h  or American r e p ro c e s s in g  
s e rv ic e s »  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  avoid th e  c o n c lu s io n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
t h a t  I n d ia  acq u ired  a p lu tonium  s e p a r a t io n  p la n t  so as  to  
accu m u la te ,  as  q u ic k ly  as  p o s s i b l e ,  a s t o c k p i l e  of weapons 
g rade  p lu ton ium  which would be f r e e  of any r e s t r i c t i o n s  over 
how I t  could  be used»
In d ia  f a c e s  d i f f i c u l t  problems in  r e s p e c t  of a d e l iv e r y  
system  f o r  any n u c le a r  warheads i t  m ight develop» For th e  
immediate f u t u r e ,  i t  seems t h a t  th e  In d ia n  A ir  Force  would 
have to  r e l y  on i t s  Canberra bombers» These a r e  c a p a b le  of 
c a r ry in g  a 4,000 lb  bomb load but would need r e f u e l i n g  f o r  
s t r i k e s  over long d is ta n c e s »  M oreover, they  would prove 
h ig h ly  v u ln e r a b le  a g a i n s t  modern a n t i - a i r c r a f t  defences»  I t  
i s  p o s s i b l e ,  t h a t  should  In d ia  go n u c l e a r ,  a i r c r a f t  such as 
th e  Tu-16 or th e  B-47 could  be purchased  from overseas»  I t  
i s  u n l i k e l y ,  however, t h a t  long ran g e  s t r a t e g i c  bombers such 
as th e  B-52 or th e  Tu-20 could be ob ta ined»  Work on r o c k e t s
1» M ichaud, op» e i t » , pp»29-30»
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i s  be ing  pushed forw ard a t  th e  Space S c ience  and Technology c e n t r e
a t  Thumba in  Kerala» The work being  done th e r e  could  le ad  to  th e
development of a s h o r t - r a n g e  m i s s i l e  d e l iv e r y  capab ili ty» '* ' E a r ly
in  1969, an In d ia n  v e r s io n  of th e  French  designed  C entaur r o c k e t
was s u c c e s s f u l ly  f l i g h t - t e s t e d »  This  i s  a tw o -s ta g e ,  s o l i d -
f u e l l e d  r o c k e t ,  which i f  co n v er ted  to  m i l i t a r y  p u rp o s e s ,  could
d e l i v e r  a 70 lb  warhead up to  200 m iles»  In d ia  has a l s o  des igned
and b u i l t  a s m a l le r  r o c k e t  c a l l e d  th e  R ohin i Rh-75» D e lh i  i s
p lan n in g  to  develop  l a r g e r  r o c k e t s  and has  hopes of launch ing
an e a r t h - s a t e l l i t e  by th e  mid-1970s» However, t h e r e  i s  a r e a l
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  weaknesses i n  I n d i a ' s  i n d u s t r i a l  c a p a c i t y ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  th e  f i e l d s  of m e ta l lu rg y  and e l e c t r o n i c s ,  m ight
2
y e t  l i m i t  p ro g re s s  i n  th e  development of ro ck e ts»
I n d i a ' s  r e l a t i v e l y  advanced n u c le a r  in d u s t ry  has  c e r t a i n l y
p rov ided  th e  fo u n d a t io n s  f o r  a f u t u r e  weapons programme should
t h i s  be d e s i r e d .  However, i t  needs to  be emphasised t h a t  th e
c o u n t r y 's  a b i l i t y  to  m a n u fa c tu re  n u c le a r  weapons i n  th e  v e ry
near f u t u r e  i s  s t i l l  f a i r l y  l im ited »  Indeed ,  i n  August 1970,
Ia n  B e l lany  su g g es ted  t h a t  I n d ia  could s c a r c e l y  assem ble
enough p lu ton ium  f o r  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of s i x ,  2 0 - k i lo to n
3
e q u iv a le n t  warheads» M oreover, any a t te m p t  by In d ia  to  use  
th e  p lu ton ium  producing  r e a c t o r  (C»I»R») a t  Trombay f o r  
weapons purposes  would no doubt be announced to  th e  world 
in  advance by the  r e a c t o r ' s  Canadian s u p p l ie r s »  F i n a l l y ,  
i t  seems u n l i k e ly  t h a t  I n d ia  could  p e r f e c t  a long ran g e  d e l iv e r y  
c a p a b i l i t y  in  th e  immediate fu tu re »  But th e  d e c i s i o n  to  b u i ld
1» The m a te r i a l  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  based l a r g e l y  on d i s c u s s io n s  
w ith  Dr» Ia n  B e l la n y ,  D epartm ent of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e l a t i o n s ,  
A u s t r a l i a n  N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i t y ,  Canberra» See a l s o ,
B e l la n y ,  op» c i t », p p . 59-60»
2. The D i r e c to r  of I n d i a ' s  Atomic Energy Commission has 
ad m itted  as  much» See, The Times of I n d i a , 4 June 1966»
3» See h i s  rev iew  of S h e l to n  L» W il l iam s ,  The U»S»,  I n d ia ,  
and th e  Bomb, in  A u s t r a l i a n  O u tlo o k , Vol» 24, No» 2,
August 1970, p»213»
4» ib id»
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nuclear weapons is not likely to be a function of economic and 
technical capacity alone. Save for the presence of a number of 
strategic and political incentives, it is unlikely that the 
possibility of India going nuclear would have been considered 
as great as it has» It is these incentives which must now be 
examined»
Bo The Growth of Support for Nuclear Weapons in India
During the first decade after Independence, suggestions 
that the country should acquire nuclear weapons were rarely 
heard in India» There seem to have been two main reasons for 
this, In the first place, few Indians could conceive of any 
threat to the country’s security which would have warranted 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the doctrine 
of non-violence which had characterised the nation’s fight 
for independence still held sway over large sections of the 
population. Because of this, many Indians, and in particular 
some of the country’s political leaders, regarded the emergence 
of the atomic bomb as an especially evil development in man’s 
affairs and one with which they did not wish to be associated, 
Mahatma Gandhi, and his political heir, Nehru, appear to have 
been particularly concerned about the manufacture and use of 
nuclear weapons»1 This concern about the threat posed by 
nuclear weapons and the special responsibility felt by many 
Indians for the elimination of these armaments, was reflected 
in Delhi’s early and energetic efforts in support of arms 
control»
But from the beginning, India was anxious to exploit the 
power of the atom for peaceful purposes. Like people in many
lo Mirchandani, op, cit, , p,3,
2» India’s performance in the arms control field will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
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countries during the mid-1950s, India’s leaders were optimistic
about prospects in the nuclear energy fieldo In 1957, Nehru 
declared that, through the peaceful exploitation of atomic 
energy, Indians could be assured of higher living standards»
But despite its interest in nuclear research at this time, there
could be little doubt about India's dedication to the non­
military application of the new source of energy» In January 
1957, while opening India's first research reactor, the Prime 
Minister said:
No man can prophesy the future» But I should like 
to say on behalf of my Government - and I think 1 
can say with some assurance on behalf of any future 
Government of India - that whatever might happen, 
whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this 
atomic energy for evil purposes« There is no condi­
tion attached to this assurance, because once a 
condition is attached* the value of such an assurance 
does not go very far»2
Early in 1958, China's Foreign Minister, Chen-Yi, indicated
3that his country intended to go nuclear» Knowledge that China 
had nuclear ambitions precipitated stirrings of dissatisfaction, 
in the Indian Parliament and press, about the exclusively non-4military nature of India's nuclear programme» In the wake of 
these developments, the Indian Government felt it prudent to 
restate its position in regard to nuclear weapons» In August 
1960, while replying to a debate on the annual report of the 
Department of Atomic Energy, the Prime Minister said:
1» Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi: Ministry of External 
Affairs, Government of India (hereafter referred to as 
Foreign Affairs Record), July 1957, p»137»
2« Quoted in Mirchandani, op» eit», p»6»
3« ibid», p»ll.
4» For a comment on some of this early discussion about
China's nuclear ambitions and its significance for India, 
see ibid», pp»12-14»
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So f a r  as we a r e  concerned^ we a re  de term ined  not 
to  go in  fo r  making atomic bombs and th e  l i k e .  * e..
No d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  I can make today  w i l l  n e c e s s ­
a r i l y  b ind peop le  i n  th e  f u t u r e ,  bu t 1 do hope th a t  
we s h a l l  c r e a t e  an a tm osphere  i n  t h i s  co u n try  which 
w i l l  b ind  every  Government in  f u t u r e ,  so t h a t  i t   ^
may no t u se  t h i s  [atom ic] power fo r  e v i l  p u rp o se s .
A pprehension  about C h in a ’s n u c le a r  i n t e n t i o n s  was he ig h ten ed
fo l lo w in g  th e  b o rde r  c l a s h  between In d ia n  and Chinese fo rc e s
d u r in g  O ctober and November, 1962, in  th e  p r e s s ,  t h e r e  was
e v id en ce  of much u n e a s in e s s  about th e  n u c le a r  a m b it io n s  of
a c o u n try  which had so d r a m a t i c a l ly  e x h ib i te d  i t s  h o s t i l i t y
tow ards I n d ia .  In  p a r l i a m e n t ,  th e  r ig h t -w in g  Ja n  Sangh
fo rm a l ly  recommended th a t  I n d ia  develop  n u c le a r  weapons as
2
p a r t  of th e  c o u n t ry ’ s long term d e fen c e  a g a i n s t  China, This 
was th e  f i r s t  i n s ta n c e  of an In d ia n  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  fo rm a l ly  
v o ic in g  such  a demand. However, a f t e r  sh a r in g  th e  l im e l ig h t  
d u r in g  th e  h e ig h t  of th e  b o rde r  c r i s i s ,  th e  i s s u e  of n u c le a r  
weapons s l ip p e d  from prominence as a s u b je c t  of d i s c u s s io n  in  
I n d ia n  p o l i t i c a l  c i r c l e s .  O ccas iona l r e p o r t s  of C h in a 's  
p ro g re s s  in  th e  development of an atom ic bomb co n t in u ed  to 
f i g u r e  in  th e  In d ia n  p r e s s  but t h i s  i s s u e  tended to  be 
f o r g o t t e n  i n  th e  w e l te r  of dom estic problems c o n f ro n t in g
3In d ia  i n  th e  wake of th e  c o n f l i c t  w ith  i t s  n o r th e rn  n e ighbour,  
C h in a ’ s f i r s t  n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n  in  October 1964 marked 
a tu r n in g  p o in t  in  In d ia n  th in k in g  about n u c le a r  weapons and, 
f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e, th e  i s s u e  became a m ajor s u b je c t  of 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  bo th  p u b l i c  and p o l i t i c i a n s  a l i k e .  The 
In d ia n  Government responded  calm ly to  th e  announcement of 
C h in a 's  t e s t .  Defence M in is te r  Chavan d e c la re d  t h a t  the  
a tom ic  bomb would not %dd to  C h in a 's  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  and 
t h a t  th e  s h o r t - te r m  t h r e a t  from a c ro s s  I n d i a ’ s n o r th e rn
1, i b i d , ,  p , 15,
2, i b i d , , p , 21,
3, i b i d , ,  p , 23,
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borders continued to be primarily a conventional one» Mr, Chagla,
another minister, also doubted whether China's nuclear test
represented any real increase in the threat from that country,
"If China ever dares to use it against India," he commented, "it1will mean a world war, a nuclear holocaust," But there were
many in the ruling Congress Party who disagreed with the
government's assessment of the situation. Moreover, these
dissident members of the Congress Party found support for their
position from some of the opposition parties in the Indian 
2Parliament, Reaction to the Chinese test amongst Indians 
generally is more difficult to gauge. However, a number of
3prominent public figures came out in support of an Indian bomb.
1, ibid,, p,26,
2, The relative strengths of the various parties in the Lok
Sabha in November 1964 was: Congress 362; Communist 31;
Swatantra 28; Jan Sangh 13; Praja Socialist 12; Samyukta 
Socialist 7; Independents 21; Other Parties 41, Source, 
India: A Reference Annual, Delhi: The Ministry of Inform­
ation and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1964, p,34. 
Following China's nuclear test, the Jan Sangh restated its 
support for an Indian nuclear force. See, text of resolu­
tion adopted by the Jan Sangh in January 1965, Quoted in 
AoB, Shah (ed,), India's Defence and Foreign Policies, 
Bombay: Manakatalas, 1966, p,168. Moreover, on this 
occasion, the Jan Sangh was supported in its call for 
nuclear weapons by the Samyukta Socialist Party, See,
The Times of India, 31 October 1964, The Praja Socialist 
Party appears to have been somewhat hesitant in arriving 
at a position on the bomb. In March 1965, the National 
Executive of the Party decided that there was no need for 
India to build the bomb, See, Mirchandani, op, cit,, p,37. 
However, in May of the same yaar, the National Executive 
resolved that India should strive for "self-sufficiency
in every branch of weaponry, conventional as well as 
nuclear," See, Shah (ed,), op, cit,, p,168,
3, Possibly the most important of these was Dr, H, Bhabha, 
Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Agency who broadcast 
his appeal on 25 October 1964, See, The Times (London),
28 October 1964, In the Lok Sabha, Dr, Bhabha's statement 
was loudly condemned by opponents of an Indian bomb.
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In August 1965, one observer noted that foremost amongst the non­
par liamentary supporters of nuclear weapons in India were younger
members of the civil service, some military planners, some1scientists, and young nationalistic intellectuals-;
The controversy which followed the Chinese detonation
resulted in a polarisation of forces and opinions which,
generally speaking, has characterised the debate over nuclear
weapons in India to this very day* An insight into this
controversy can be gained from an analysis of the debate on
the matter in the Lower House of the Indian Parliament,, The
arguments advanced by the opponents of traditional government
policy in regard to nuclear weapons were many and varied, but
may be conveniently summarised as fellows, First, it was
argued that the Chinese bomb was a threat to Indian security,
In its most general form, this argument took refuge in appeals
to the alleged tradition of Chinese chauvinism and expansion- 
2ism, Of a more specific nature, the threat of blackmail was
3alluded to by many spokesmen, Mr, Nath Pai, a prominent 
member of the Praja Socialist Party was convinced that China 
would use its bomb to blackmail "India, Burma and all the 
Asian nations," To many Indians, the Chinese bomb was of 
special significance in respect of the territories lost to 
Peking in the border conflict two years earlier, Mr, Masani, 
the leader of the Swatantra Party, and even though himself 
an opponent of nuclear weapons for India, noted that the 
Chinese bomb was "not meant for strategic purposes across the 
Atlantic or the Pacific, it [wasj meant: for intimidating
1, Alastair Buchan, "The Dilemma of India’s Security," in 
Survival, Vol, 7, No, 5, August 1965, pp,206-7,
2, e,g-, Speech by Mr, Nath Pai (Praja Socialist Party), in 
Lok Sabha Debates, 23 November 1964, Col,, 1296,
3, One of the strongest statements along these lines was made 
in the Lok Sabha by Mr, Masani, leader of the Swatantra 
Party, See, ibid,, 23 November 1964, Col,, 1240,
4, ibid,, 23 November 1964, Cols,, 1298-9,
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neighbours nearer home"»'*' One result of this, he added, was 
clear to see:
So far as we are concerned, Peking has given notice 
that we might as well forget about any hopes of 
recovering our lost territory - leave aside liber­
ating our neighbours in Tibet - because if anything 
of that kind were tried, nuclear force would be used 
against us,^
There was some support for nuclear weapons on security grounds
which were only indirectly related to the alleged threat from
China» Some Indian politicians felt that it was only right
that the country's troops should be provided with the most 
3modern weapons® Among other things, the addition of nuclear 
weapons to India's armoury, it was stressed, would considerably 
enhance the morale of the country's armed forces»^ It was 
more commonly argued that by acquiring nuclear weapons India 
could reduce its expenditure on conventional forces®** Members 
who argued this way were especially anxious to stress the 
cheapness of nuclear weapons and drew heavily on estimates 
advanced in the broadcast by Dr» H» Bhabha, Chairman of the 
Indian Atomic Energy Commission®
1» M.R» Masani, "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb," in
India Quarterly, Vol® 21, No® 1, January-March 1965, p»16® 
Mr® Masani and the Swatantra Party tended to favour an 
alliance with the IKS® as the solution to India’s 
security problem®
2» ibid,
3® Lok Sabha Debates, 24 November 1964, Col®, 1470®
4® ibido, 24 November 1964, Col®, 1508, '
5» ibid»,' 23'’November 1964, Col®, 1319 and 24 November, 1964,
Col®, 1508®
6® In his broadcast on 25 October 1964, Dr® Bhabha stressed 
the cheapness of building plutonium bombs, and estimated 
a unit cost of 18 lakh rupees (about 250,000 dollars)®
K® Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, claimed recently that 
Bhabha "was referring to the unit cost of a warhead after 
all the investment had been made in the reactors®" See, 
Peter King, "How Wide is a Nuclear Threshold? India and 
the Bomb," in Australian Outlook, Vol® 25, No® 2, August 
1971, p®200 (including his fn»6®)®
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Second ,  many I n d i a n  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s  a p p e a r  t o  have  wanted
n u c l e a r  weapons f o r  r e a s o n s  o f  p r e s t i g e ,  China  and I n d i a ,  i t  was
a r g u e d ,  were locked i n  a s t r u g g l e  f o r  s t a t u s  i n  A s i a 1 2345 and t h e
C h in e se  bomb, i t  was a l l e g e d ,  had g i v e n  Pek ing  a s u b s t a n t i a l
l ea d  i n  t h i s  c o n t e s t :  C h i n a ' s  p r e s t i g e  i n  t h e  A f r o - A s i a n  wor ld
2
had " r o c k e t e d " .  The re  were  c l a i m s  t h a t  t h e  C h in e s e  bomb would
open t h e  way to  P e k i n g ' s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a t  d i sa rm am en t  c o n f e r -
3
ences  and make i t  e a s i e r  f o r  China t o  a n c e r  t h e  U,N, Some 
p o l i t i c i a n s  had v e r y  d e f i n i t e  i d e a s  a bou t  t h e  c o n s eq u e n c e s  
f o r  I n d i a ’ s p r e s t i g e  sho u ld  D e l h i  no t  a l s o  a c q u i r e  t h e  bomb,
A few a g r e e d  w i t h  Mr, Azad t h a t  I n d i a  would e v e n t u a l l y  be
4
r e l e g a t e d  to a " p o s i t i o n  i n  the  background" of  As ian  a f f a i r s ,
A p a r t i c u l a r l y  gr im  w arn ing  was sounded by Mr, I r i v e d i ,  a 
member of  t h e  s t r o n g l y  n a t i o n a l i s t  J a n  Sangh P a r t y :
I n  A s i a  t h e r e  a r e  two g i a n t s ;  one  of them i s  
I n d i a  and t h e  o t h e r  i s  C h in a ,  I f  one g i a n t  
grows and t h e  o t h e r  r e m a in s  a d w a r f ,  c e r t a i n l y  
t h e  dwar f  w i l l  be k i l l e d 5
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  to  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  p r e s t i g e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of many s u p p o r t e r s  of  an  I n d i a n  n u c l e a r  f o r c e  
was n o t  w h o l ly  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  C h i n a ' s  n u c l e a r  weapons 
d e v e lo p m en t ,  Ever s i n c e  In d e p e n d e n c e ,  I n d i a ' s  p o l i t i c a l  
l e a d e r s  had h a r b o u r e d  a s p i r a t i o n s  towards  g r e a t  power s t a t u s  
f o r  t h e i r  c o u n t r y .  For  a w h i l e  t h e s e  y e a r n i n g s  a p p e a r  to  
have be e n  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  s a t i s f i e d ;  t h e  r e s p e c t  w i t h  which 
Mr, Nehru was h e l d  i n  many p a r t s  of t h e  world was a l o n e  a 
s o u r c e  of  g r e a t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  to  many I n d i a n s ,  I n  a d d i t i o n ,
I n d i a  had long  be e n  r e c o g n i s e d  as  a l e a d i n g  spokesman f o r  t h e  
n o n - a l i g n e d  wor ld  and ,  l a r g e l y  because  of  t h i s ,  and i t s
1, Lok Sabha D e b a t e s , 23 November 1964,  C o l , ,  1 3 0 8 , and 
24 November 1964,  C o l , ,  1512,
2, i b i d , ,  23 November 1964, C o l s , ,  1276 and 1337,
3, i b i d - , C o l s - ,  1306-7 and i b i d , ,  24 November 1964,  C o l , ,  1484,
4, i b i d , ,  23 November 1964,  C o l , ,  1276,
5, i b i d , ,  24 November 1964,  C o l , ,  1512,
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e n e r g e t i c  a c t i v i t y  in  th e  U nited  N ations  and i t s  a g e n c ie s ,  had won 
th e  r i g h t  to  be co n su l ted  about many of th e  problems o f  A sia and 
of th e  w orld  i n  g e n e ra l ,  But by l a t e  1964, i t  was being in c r e a s ­
in g ly  f e l t  t h a t  In d ia  was lo s in g  th e  p r e s t i g e  and s t a t u s  i t  had
once enjoyed,^" I t  seemed to  many th a t  th e  only  way In d ia  could
2
re c o v e r  i t s  former p o s i t i o n  was to  b u i ld  n u c lea r  weapons, C h in a 's  
a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons was c l e a r l y  a g r e a t  s t im u lu s  to  
t h i s  growing d i s c o n te n t  about I n d i a ’ s p la c e  in  th e  w orld .
The t h i r d  argument in  su p p o r t  of n u c le a r  weapons was 
s l i g h t l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  second. For many y e a r s ,  In d ia n s  had 
looked upon th e  achievem ents of t h e i r  s c i e n t i s t s  and t e c h n ic i a n s  
w i th  immense f e e l i n g s  of p r id e  and s a t i s f a c t i o n .  I t  was g r a t e ­
f u l l y  acknowledged t h a t  th rough  t h e i r  e f f o r t s ,  th e  co u n try  had 
become a l e a d e r  in  th e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of n u c le a r  energy f o r  
p e a c e fu l  p u rp o ses .  But th e  C hinese t e s t s  tended  to  dampen 
t h i s  p r id e  in  I n d i a ' s  ach ievem ents .  In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  i t  
was w ide ly  f e l t  t h a t  P ek in g ’s s in g l e  b l a s t  had l a r g e l y  c a n c e l le d  
o u t  any p r e s t i g e  In d ia  may have accrued  on account of i t s  
e f f o r t s  in  th e  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  f i e l d .  This a lo n e  was 
s u f f i c i e n t  cause  fo r  r e g r e t ,  b u t ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  Chinese 
t e s t  had f o s te r e d  th e  b e l i e f  amongst some In d ia n s  t h a t ,  in  
o rd e r  to  keep a b re a s t  of th e  l a t e s t  developm ents in  th e
n u c le a r  f i e l d ,  t h e i r  coun try  would have to  b u i ld  bombs as
3w e l l  as  power s t a t i o n s ,
1„ In  th e  In d ia n  P a r l i a m e n t ,  t h i s  com plain t was tak en  up
e s p e c i a l l y  by some r ig h t -w in g  members of th e  Congress P a r ty  
and by members of th e  Jan  Sangh, and S w atan tra  P a r t i e s ,
See, e g , ,  speeches in  Lok Sabha D e b a te s , 23 November 1964, 
C o l s , ,  1255-7 and 1276,
2, That n u c le a r  weapons were re c o g n ise d  as  symbols of g r e a t  power 
s t a t u s  was c l e a r l y  in d ic a te d  in  a s ta te m e n t  by Mr, K, S ingh,
a member of th e  S w atan tra  P a r ty ,  He s a id :  "The N-bomb has a 
m ora l a s p e c t .  I t  has th e  a s p e c t  of m oral p r e s t i g e .  Those 
who p o sse ss  i t  s tan d  as i f  they  a re  a c l a s s  a p a r t ,  a s u p e r io r  
c l a s s , "  Lok Sabha D e b a te s , 27 November 1964, C o l s , ,  2273-4,
3, Lok Sabha D ebates,  27 November 1964, C o l s , ,  2273-4,
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Finally, amongst the supporters of an Indian nuclear force,
there were some who argued that nuclear weapons would eventually
spread to all countries in the world, It was inevitable, they
insisted, that India also would one day acquire nuclear weapons
and that this day might as well be sooner as later."*"
The case against India having nuclear weapons was usually
argued on four grounds; moral, diplomatic, military and economic,
There can be little doubt that the moral issue was important to
many Indians and the Prime Minister, Mr, Shastn, usually
accorded it a prominent place in his statements about Indian 
2nuclear policy. Often, objections of a fairly general nature
were raised. Foremost amongst these were complaints about the
contamination of the atmosphere through testing and appeals to
3the alleged illegitimacy of weapons of mass destruction. 
Frequently, it was argued that it would be especially unthink­
able for India to acquire nuclear weapons. Such claims drew 
heavily on references to the spirit of non-violence which it 
was alleged had characterised India's recent past and to the 
country's long and active association with the world disarm­
ament movement, In opposing those who wanted to arm India 
with nuclear weapons, Mr, Moraji Desai, a former member of 
the government, declared:
Where is your loyalty to Gandhlji or Nehru if you 
now demand the manufacture of this weapon which 
constitute [sic] a big menace to the whole world 
and is meant to obliterate the human race,^
1, ibid,, 23 November 1964, Cols,, 1316 and 1335,
2, e, g^ statement in Lok Sabha, reported in The Times of India 
28 November 1964, For an extreme example of the use of the 
moral argument against manufacturing nuclear weapons see 
speech by H,N, Mukerjee, in Lok Sabha Debates, 27 November 
1964, Cols., 2279-2282,
3, This point was made with some force by Mr, R„K,Nehru, a 
former Secretary-General in the Ministry of External 
Affairs, See his "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb - 1" 
in India Quarterly, Vol, 21, No, 1, January-March 1965, 
pp,9-10,
4, The Times of India, 8 January 1965, India's Ambassador to 
the U.N, had asserted earlier that "the country of Gandhi 
and Nehru" should not produce nuclear weapons. See, ibid., 
15 December 1964.
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On a n o t h e r  o c c a s i o n ,  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  rem inded  t h o s e  c la m o u r in g  
f o r  t h e  bomb o f  " I n d i a ’ s c r u s a d e  f o r  w or ld  peace", '*'  Mr, K r i s h n a  
Menon, a fo rm er  D efence  M i n i s t e r ,  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t o  even c o n s i d e r  
t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of n u c l e a r  weapons,  I n d i a  would be  " b r e a k i n g  t h e
2
p r o m i s e  t h a t  [ i t  had]  made to  t h e  wor ld  f o r  t h e  l a s t  15 y e a r s , "
The d i p l o m a t i c  and p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  an  I n d i a n
d e t e r r e n t  were  p a r t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  m ora l  a rg u m e n t s .  Many
I n d i a n s  were  r e l u c t a n t  t o  s e e  t h e i r  c o u n t r y  a c q u i r e  n u c l e a r
weapons b e c a u s e  of  t h e  a l l e g e d  impac t  of  such  a move on e f f o r t s
3
c u r r e n t l y  be in g  made i n  t h e  f i e l d  of  d i sa rm a m en t .  L i k e w i s e ,
i f  I n d i a  was t o  c o n t i n u e  i t s  "work f o r  p e ace"  i t  cou ld  n o t  be
4
a p a r t y  t o  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  n u c l e a r  weapons .  T h i s  l a s t
p o i n t  h i g h l i g h t e d  one of  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  I n d i a n
n u c l e a r  d e b a t e .  I t  was an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  of  t h e  a n t i - b o m b
c a s e  t h a t  I n d i a ' s  r o l e  a s  " peacem aker"  had e a rn e d  t h e  c o u n t r y
much p r e s t i g e  and i n f l u e n c e  and went  some of  t h e  way tow ards
s a t i s f y i n g  D e l h i ' s  g r e a t  power a s p i r a t i o n s .  Opponents  of  an
I n d i a n  d e t e r r e n t  h a s t e n e d  to  remind  t h e i r  l i s t e n e r s  t h a t  i t
would be  u nw ise  f o r  I n d i a  t o  abandon t h i s  r o l e  i n  exchange
5
f o r  t h e  u n c e r t a i n  b e n e f i t s  of n u c l e a r  s t a t u s .
The t h i r d  argument  used  a g a i n s t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of 
n u c l e a r  weapons was t h a t  t h e y  were n o t  j u s t i f i e d  on m i l i t a r y  
g r o u n d s .  I t  was e x t r e m e l y  u n l i k e l y ,  some c l a i m e d ,  t h a t  China  
would l a u n c h  a n u c l e a r  a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  I n d i a ,  Pek ing  e i t h e r  
d id  n o t  w i s h  t o  do so or  was d e t e r r e d  from d o in g  so by t h e  
c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  such  a c t i o n  would r e s u l t  i n  a w or ld  c o n f l a g r a t i o n ,
1,  i b i d , ,  25 November 1964,
2, Lok Sabha D e b a t e s , 24 November 1964,  C o l , ,  1554,
3,  The Times of  I n d i a , 10 J a n u a r y  1965,  See a l s o ,  t h e  v iew s  
of  Mr, R,K, Nehru ,  i n  Nehru ,  l o c , c i t , ,  p , 1 0 ,
4,  E d i t o r i a l ,  The Times of I n d i a , 9 J a n u a r y  1965,
5,  E d i t o r i a l ,  The Times of  I n d i a , 25 November 1964,
6,  T h i s  argument  was e s p e c i a l l y  p o p u l a r  amongst  Pek ing  
o r i e n t e d  Communists ,
7, Lok Sabha D e b a t e s , 24 November 1964,  C o l , ,  1521,  The Pr ime 
M i n i s t e r ,  Mr, S h a s t r i ,  o f t e n  used  t h i s  a rg u m e n t .  S e e ,  e , g , ,  
The Times of  I n d i a , 10 J a n u a r y  1965,
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The l a t t e r  argument was e s p e c i a l l y  p o p u la r  amongst some Congress
P a r ty  spokesmen* I t  was argued i n s t e a d ,  t h a t  th e  g r e a t e s t
c h a l le n g e  to  I n d i a ’s s e c u r i t y  stemmed from th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of
low l e v e l  a g g re s s io n  a long  th e  c o u n t r y ’ s n o r th e rn  b o rd e r s ;  and
as a re sp o n se  to  t h i s  ty p e  of t h r e a t ,  n u c le a r  weapons were a l l
b u t  u s e le s s *  What th e  co u n try  needed , i t  was u s u a l ly  added,
was no t n u c le a r  weapons but s t r o n g e r  c o n v e n t io n a l  fo rc e s * ^
T his  was an argument which found read y  acc ep tan c e  i n  m i l i t a r y
c i r c l e s *  C onsequen tly ,  d u r in g  th e s e  e a r ly  months of th e
n u c le a r  d eb a te  i n  I n d ia ,  spokesmen fo r  th e  armed f o r c e s  u s u a l ly
2l e n t  t h e i r  su p p o r t  to  th e  an ti-bom b fa c t io n *
Probab ly  th e  most s t r o n g ly  he ld  of a l l  o b je c t io n s  to
I n d ia  a c q u i r in g  n u c le a r  weapons, was economic* Few, i f  any,
of th e  w o r ld 's  p o t e n t i a l  n u c le a r  powers a re  faced  w ith
developm enta l problems as g r e a t  as  I n d i a ’s* M oreover, as
Gupta has p o in ted  o u t ,  even b e fo re  th e  d e b a te  on n u c le a r
weapons go t under way, t h e r e  had been a p re o c c u p a t io n  in
In d ia  w ith  economic problem s and an in c r e a s in g  emphasis on
3economic growth as th e  key to  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y *  Conse­
q u e n t ly ,  i t  i s  h a rd ly  s u r p r i s i n g  th a t  th e  c o s t  of going n u c le a r  
was g r e a t l y  emphasised by opponents of th e  bomb* In  a major 
speech  in  th e  Lok Sabha in  November 1964, th e  Prime M in is te r  
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  an In d ia n  n u c le a r  programme would " c r i p p l e "  th e
4
c o u n t r y 's  economy* Mr* M asani, spokesman fo r  th e  S w atan tra
1* E d i t o r i a l ,  The Times of I n d i a , 9 January  1965, and R*K* 
Nehru, i n  Nehru, loc* c i t *, p . l l *
2* In  December 1964, th e  J o in t  C h ie f s ,  a f t e r  e v a lu a t in g  th e  
e f f e c t s  of th e  C hinese  e x p lo s io n ,  concluded : "An immediate 
and r e a l  t h r e a t  i s  th e  c o n v e n t io n a l  t h r e a t  and any e f f o r t  
to  d i v e r t  our r e s o u rc e s  from th e s e  p r e p a r a t io n s  would 
weaken our p o s i t io n " *  Quoted i n ,  M irchandan i,  op* c i t *, 
p* 243*
3* On t h i s  p o in t ,  s ee  S* Gupta in  LB* S h a s t r i ,  H*M, P a t e l  
and S* Gupta, " I n d ia  and th e  Bomb", in  S u r v iv a l , Vol* 7, 
No* 2, M arch-A pril 1965, p*63*
4* The Times of I n d ia ,  25 November 1964*
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P a r t y ,  c i t e d  th e  economic f a c t o r  as  p robab ly  t h e  main r e a s o n  why
I n d i a  should  seek an a l l i a n c e  w i th  t h e  U,S,  r a t h e r  tha n  t r y  to
deve lop  i t s  own n u c l e a r  weapons, I n d i a ,  Mr» Masam a rgued ,
would r e q u i r e  a f a i r l y  advanced n u c l e a r  f o r c e  which inc luded
lo n g - r a n g e  d e l i v e r y  v e h i c l e s » ^  Such a f o r c e  was c l e a r l y  beyond
th e  c o u n t r y ’ s c a p a c i t y  and any a t t e m p t  to  deve lop i t  would r u i n
t h e  economy and p r e c i p i t a t e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  u n r e s t .  The
2
r e a l  b e n e f i c i a r y  of such "madness” he added,  would be Peking ,
There was y e t  ano the r  a n g le  to th e  economic argument used
a g a i n s t  an I n d ia n  d e t e r r e n t .  Some In d ia n s  were concerned t h a t
a d e c i s i o n  to  go n u c l e a r  might  i n h i b i t  t h e  f low of economic
a s s i s t a n c e  to  t h e i r  c o u n t ry ,  Mr, Desai  argued t h a t  i f  I n d i a
b u i l t  n u c l e a r  weapons i t  would no longe r  have any grounds fo r
3
seek ing  f o r e i g n  a i d .  Others  were convinced t h a t  i n  t h e  event
1, Mr, Masani c o r r e c t l y  observed t h a t  im por tan t  t a r g e t s  in  
China such as Peking and th e  Manchurian i n d u s t r i a l  complex 
were some 2,500 m i le s  from I n d i a ,  On th e  o th e r  hand,  D e lh i ,  
B iha r  and Bengal were only 300 m i le s  from Chinese  bases  i n  
T i b e t ,  See,  Lok Sabha D e b a te s , 23 November 1964,  Cols» ,  
1249-50,
2, i b i d , A s i m i l a r  p o i n t  was made by a former S e c r e t a r y -  
G enera l  of  th e  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s  M i n i s t r y ,  Mr, M,J,  D esa i ,
He s a i d :  " I n d i a  w i l l  be p la y in g  s t r a i g h t  i n t o  th e  hands
of China i f  because  of  f e a r  of  em otional  r e a c t i o n  or 
p r e s t i g e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  i t  e n t e r s  i n t o  a n u c l e a r  r a c e  w i th  
China ,  The enormous d i v e r s i o n  of r e s o u r c e s  and t a l e n t s  
r e q u i r e d  w i l l  r e t a r d  I n d i a ' s  economic and s o c i a l  d eve lop ­
ment programmes i n d e f i n i t e l y  and by c r e a t i n g  s c a r c i t y  and 
economic d i s l o c a t i o n  and s o c i a l  d i s c o n t e n t  not  only  weaken 
I n d i a  i n t e r n a l l y  bu t  e l i m i n a t e  i t  as  a p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r  i n  
A s ia  and A f r i c a , "  See,  M,J,  D esa i ,  " I n d i a  and Nuclear  
Weapons," i n  Disarmament.and Arms C o n t r o l , Autumn 1965» 
Quoted i n  S i s i r  Gupta,  "The In d ia n  Dilemma," in  Buchan 
( e d , ) ,  A World of Nuclea r  Powers?, p»63. I t  should  be 
no ted  t h a t  no t  a l l  In d ia n s  were convinced t h a t  n u c l e a r  
weapons were beyond t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  means» Some, such as 
t h e  economist  Raj K r i sh n a ,  argued t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y  speak­
i n g ,  e x p e n d i tu r e  i n  armaments had a c c e l e r a t e d  c a p i t a l  
f o rm a t io n  and a h igh  r a t e  of growth» See,  i b i d , , p ,6 4 ,
3, The Times of I n d i a , 9 January  1965»
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of such a move by D e lh i ,  a id  from Russ ia  and America could  c e a s e «
2
C h in a ’s i n i t i a l  atomic t e s t s  were c l e a r l y  a mass ive
s t im u lu s  to  whatever sympathy e x i s t e d  i n  In d i a  f o r  a n a t i o n a l
n u c l e a r  f o r c e ,  As a r e s u l t  of t h e  Chinese t e s t s  p a r l i a m e n t a r y
s u p p o r t  f o r  n u c l e a r  weapons, which p r e v i o u s l y  had been c o n f in e d
to  t h e  J a n  Sangh P a r t y ,  i n c re a s e d  to  i n c lu d e  members of  th e
r u l i n g  Congress P a r ty  as wel l  as  many S o c i a l i s t s 0 O u ts id e  of
p a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e r e  was a s i m i l a r  upsurge  of  s u ppo r t  f o r  n u c l e a r
weapons,  e s p e c i a l l y  amongst some members of th e  C i v i l  S e r v i c e ,
s c i e n t i s t s ,  and prominent  f i g u r e s  i n  the  academic community«
But d e s p i t e  t h e  clamour which b u i l t  up i n  t h e  wake of C h in a ’ s
f i r s t  n u c l e a r  t e s t ,  th e  In d ia n  Government adhered  to i t s
d e c i s i o n  not  to  manufac tu re  atomic weapons« Moreover,  i t  i s
c l e a r  t h a t  even a t  th e  he igh t  of  th e  h y s t e r i a ,  a m a j o r i t y  of
the  Congress P a r l i a m e n ta ry  P a r ty  remained l o y a l  to  the  
3
government« The government ' s  d e c i s i o n  not  to  produce n u c l e a r  
weapons was a l s o  suppor ted  i n  p a r l i a m e n t  by th e  Communists and 
by t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  Swatantra Par ty« The l a t t e r  group was as 
v o c a l  i n  i t s  d e n u n c i a t i o n  of China as s e c t i o n s  of the  pro-bomb 
lobby« I t  was Swatant ra  p o l i c y ,  however,  t h a t  I n d i a  should  
eschew p r o d u c t io n  of i t s  own n u c l e a r  weapons and,  i n s t e a d ,
4should  e n t e r  i n t o  a mutual  s e c u r i t y  p ac t  w i th  th e  United  S ta t e s «  
O u ts ide  of P a r l i a m e n t ,  the  government p o s i t i o n  enjoyed f a i r l y  
w idesp read  support«  Most of  th e  c o u n t r y ' s  major n a t i o n a l  
d a i l i e s  were opposed to  I n d i a  having i t s  own n u c l e a r  weapons«^
1« E d i t o r i a l  i n  jLbid« , 3 November 1964,
2« China conducted i t s  second n u c l e a r  t e s t  i n  May, 1965«
3« This  was app a re n t  du r ing  th e  d e b a t e  on th e  i s s u e  i n  t h e
Lok Sabha i n  November 1964 and a t  subsequent  n o n -p a r l i a m e n -  
t a r y  g a t h e r i n g s  of the  Congress P a r t y ,
4« The Times of I n d i a , 3 November 1964«
5« In  an e d i t o r i a l  on 28 October  1964, The Times of I n d i a  
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  two h u r d l e s  s tood  i n  I n d i a ’ s pa th  to th e  
bomb: th e  agreement w i th  Canada t h a t  the r e a c t o r  a t  Trom-
bay should  be used fo r  p e a c e f u l  purposes  on ly ;  and I n d i a ’s 
adherence  to  t h e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y .  As l a t e  as October of 
th e  fo l low ing  yea r  th e  same paper  d i sc o u n te d  th e  idea  t h a t  
China could s u c c e s s f u l l y  p r a c t i c e  n u c l e a r  b lackm ai l  a g a i n s t  
I n d i a ,  See,  i b i d «, 14 October 1964«
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This was also the view of some leading army officers and most of 
the nation's economists,^
It is clear, however, that Delhi had been shaken by China's
acquisition of even a primitive nuclear capability, In the
first place, it no longer stressed that India would never produce 
2nuclear weapons«, Speaking at the Annual Session of the Indian
Congress Party in January 1965, the Prime Minister strongly
endorsed the government's decision not to produce atomic weapons
but emphasised that no commitment could be made about the 3distant future«, In addition, Indian Government spokesmen used 
every opportunity to remind their countrymen that India was in 
no way inferior to China in the development and understanding 
of nuclear technology«, Moreover, the Prime Minister declared 
that in view of China's emerging nuclear capability, it was 
necessary for India to be fully acquainted with all aspects of 
the manufacture of atomic weapons«,
Second, the Indian Government's concern about the politi­
cal and military implications of China's nuclear weapons 
development was reflected in Delhi's current activity in the 
arms control field. Just prior to Peking's first test, Indian 
representatives in Geneva indicated that they were no longer 
in favour of wholesale and immediate disarmament by the U,S,
1, Sisir Gupta has argued that too much emphasis has been 
placed on the cost aspects of the atom bomb in the debate 
over nuclear weapons in India, This he attributes to the 
"disproportionate importance given in India to the econo­
mist's view in determining all major State policies,"
See, LcBo Shastri, H,M. Patel and S, Gupta, "India and the 
Bomb," in Survival, Vol, 7, No, 2, March-April 1965, p,63,
2«, Assertions that India would never produce nuclear weapons 
were characteristic of some earlier government statements, 
especially those by the former Prime Minister, Mr, Nehru,
3, The Times of India, 10 January 1965, Earlier, in a debate 
in the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister declared that it was 
not India's intention to manufacture nuclear weapons "at 
present",
4, The Times of India, 25 November 1964,
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and Russia« I n s t e a d ,  they new wanted some ar rangement whereby
th e  superpowers  would be p e r m i t t e d  to  r e t a i n  some of t h e i r  n u c l e a r
weapons d u r in g  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of  any programme f o r  g e n e r a l  and
1
com ple te  d isa rm ament .  I t  seems r e a s o n a b l e  to  assume t h a t  t h i s  
was a r e a c t i o n  to  I n d ia n  f e a r s  t h a t  e x t e n s i v e  and p r e c i p i t a t e  
d isarmament by R uss ia  and the U,S,  would l e a v e  A sia  a t  the  mercy 
of P ek ing ,  F u r th e rm o re ,  i t  was a t  t h i s  s t a g e  t h a t  I n d ia  began 
to  adopt  a more o b s t r u c t i o n i s t  l i n e  on th e  proposed t r e a t y  to  
h a l t  t h e  sp r e a d  of  n u c l e a r  weapons. This  was s u r e l y  an i n d i ­
c a t i o n  of D e l h i ’ s a n x i e t y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  the  wake of  the  
Chinese  bomb, to  p r e s e r v e  an o p t i o n  on m a nufa c tu r ing  n u c l e a r  
weapons i n  th e  f u t u r e  should t h i s  prove n e c e s s a r y .  T h i r d ,  t h e r e  
i s  ev idence  t h a t  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  Chinese  t e s t ,  D e lh i
approached th e  g r e a t  powers fo r  some form of p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t
2a Chinese  n u c l e a r  a t t a c k .
There m a t t e r s  r e s t e d  f o r  th e  t ime b e in g .  The In d ia n
Government had s u c c e s s f u l l y  w i th s to o d  the  a s s a u l t  on i t s
"no-bomb" p o l i c y ,  though e f f o r t s  .were no doubt  being made to
r e d u c e  th e  l e a d - t i m e  the  n a t i o n  would r e q u i r e  to  b u i l d  n u c l e a r
weapons shou ld  i t  ever  d e c id e  to  do so .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  D elh i
had made i t s  f i r s t  t e n t a t i v e  approaches  to  th e  g r e a t  powers
about  some form of p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  the  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s .
On 1 September 1965,  f i g h t i n g  b roke  out  between In d ian
and P a k i s t a n i  f o r c e s .  Th is  b i t t e r  and d e s t r u c t i v e  c o n f l i c t
l a s t e d  on ly  22 days  but  by t h e  t ime i t  had conc luded ,  the
demand f o r  n u c l e a r  weapons was a g a i n  be ing  lo u d ly  r a i s e d  i n
Lndia,  Once a g a i n  t h e  Government’ s n u c l e a r  p o l i c y  was widely
3
c r i t i c i s e d  by members of t h e  r u l i n g  Congress P a r ty  and a 
l e t t e r  to  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r ,  s igned  by 86 p o l i t i c i a n s
1, i b i d , ,  2 October  1964, This  m a t t e r  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  a t  
g r e a t e r  l e n g t h  l a t e r  i n  th e  c h a p t e r ,
2, Th is  m a t t e r  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  a t  some l e n g t h  l a t e r  i n  the  
t h e s i s ,  See Chapter  IX,
3, M i rch an d a n i ,  o p , c l t , , p p , 39-40,
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representative of all parties in the Indian Parliament, demanded 
the immediate manufacture of nuclear weapons»^ The conflict with 
Pakistan involved two features which were seized upon by 
supporters of nuclear weapons in India« In the first place, 
evidence of Peking’s support for Pakistan heightened Indian
2fears of collusion between the country’s two major antagonists«
Such a development it was argued, could only be met by India
3acquiring its own nuclear weapons« Secondly, many Indians
were angered by the British and American decisions to cease
arms supplies to India (and Pakistan) during the conflict« This
was proof, it was argued, that it was unwise to depend on foreign
support and a clear indication of the necessity for India to
4make itself self-supporting in respect of nuclear weapons«
1« The New York Times, 20 October 1965«
2« One week after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, 
China demanded that India dismantle certain military 
structures on the China-Sikkim border, withdraw its armed 
forces, and "stop all acts of aggression and provocation 
against China in the western, middle and eastern sectors 
of the Sino-Indian border"« See, The Times of India,
9 September 1965« A demand to dismantle what Peking 
described as "56 illegal structures" near the Sikkim-Tibet 
border was later delivered in the form of an ultimatum«
See, The Times of India, 18 September 1965« Most Indian 
and foreign observers regarded the Chinese action as 
highly provocative and as an attempt by Peking to improve 
its diplomatic standing in the eyes of Pakistan«
3c, In their letter to the Prime Minister, the 86 members of 
the Indian Parliament said: "India's survival both as a
nation and as a democracy, in the face of the collusion 
between China and Pakistan, casts a clear and imperative 
duty on the Government to make an immediate decision to 
develop nuclear weapons«" See, The T.imes of India,
20 October 1965« An informal poll conducted by the United 
News of India concluded that alleged Pakistani aggression 
and evidence of Pakistani-Chinese collusion were factors 
influencing Indian politicians in their criticism of the 
government’s nuclear policy« See, Mirchandani, op» cit», 
p»40o
4» The Times of India, 14 October 1965»
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D e s p i te  th e  wave of p r o t e s t  in s p i r e d  by th e  war w i th  P a k i s t a n ,
th e  In d ia n  Government a g a in  r e j e c t e d  p ro p o s a ls  t h a t  th e  co u n try
go n u c lea ro  The rea so n s  g iven  on t h i s  o cc a s io n  in c lu d e d :  th e
c o s t  of n u c le a r  bombs and d e l iv e r y  sy s tem s ;^  th e  f o l l y  of
2
d e fy in g  w orld  o p in io n  on the  n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i s s u e ;  and,
f e a r s  t h a t  P a k is ta n  would fo l lo w  In d ia  in  p roducing  n u c le a r  
3weapons »
During 1966, China conducted no l e s s  th a n  t h r e e  n u c le a r
t e s t s  and each provoked new demands, bo th  i n s i d e  and o u ts id e
4
of p a r l i a m e n t ,  f o r  an In d ia n  bomb» There  was p a r t i c u l a r  
co n ce rn  abou t th e  im p l ic a t io n s  f o r  I n d ia  of C h in a 's  m i s s i l e  
t e s t  i n  O c to b e r ,^  and once a g a in ,  t h e r e  was w idespread  
d e n u n c ia t io n  of the  id e a  of n u c le a r  g u a ra n te e s  from f o r e ig n  
powers» However, th e  government was no t to  be s h i f t e d  from 
i t s  n o n -n u c le a r  s ta n d .  T h is  was made amply c l e a r  i n  March by 
th e  new Prime M in i s t e r ,  Mrs» Gandhi and was r e a f f i rm e d  l a t e r  
i n  th e  y e a r »* 67
I n d i a ' s  F ourth  G enera l E l e c t io n  in  F eb ruary  1967 p rov ided  
a f r e s h  o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  th e  c o u n t r y ' s  major p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
to  r e s t a t e  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  on th e  n u c le a r  weapons is su e»  The
1» The Times (London), 4 December 1965»
2o The Times of I n d ia ,  20 November 1965»
3» I n  a rg u in g  t h i s  way, th e  F inance  M in i s t e r ,  Mr» D esa i ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  claim ed t h a t  an  "overwhelming m a jo r i t y "  of 
p eo p le  i n  I n d ia  wanted n u c le a r  weapons» See, Dawn 
(K a ra c h i ) ,  14 December 1965,
4 0 At a m eeting  in  May of th e  E xecu tive  Committee of th e  
Congress P a r ty ,  th e  Prim e M in is te r  i s  r e p o r te d  to  have 
fa c e d  an "a lm ost unanimous demand" f o r  a change in  In d ia n  
p o l i c y  i n  reg a rd  to  n u c le a r  weapons, See, The Times 
(London), 12 May 1966,
5» The Times of I n d i a , 29 O ctober 1966»
6, i b i d », 12 May 1966»
7, M irch an d an i,  op» c i t », pp ,43  and 46» Mrs, Gandhi became 
Prim e M in is te r  i n  Jan u a ry  1966 a f t e r  th e  d e a th  of Mr, 
S h a s t r i  in  T ashken t,
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election manifestos of two of the major parties - the Jan Sangh, 
and the Praja Socialist - included explicit demands that India 
acquire nuclear weapons. Those of the Congress Party, the 
Swatantra Party and both Communist Parties were devoid of direct 
references to the nuclear issue. Recent research suggests that 
in the period since 1967, parliamentary opinion on the question 
of the acquisition of nuclear weapons has, with minor excep­
tions, remained fairly stable, Peter King has shown that at 
the General Elections in 1971, the Praja Socialists and the Jan 
Sangh, again came out in favour of nuclear weapons for India,^ 
Moreover, it seems that to this day, the Congress Party, the 
Swatantra Party and the Communist Party of India (pro-Soviet)
remain officially opposed to India's acquisition of nuclear 
2weapons, Krish Nanda has shown, though, that even within 
the Congress and Swatantra parties there is substantial "pro­
bomb" feeling; to the question of whether, taking everything 
into consideration, they thought it would be an advantage for 
India to have atomic weapons, a representative sample of
members of the Congress parliamentary party divided 46 per
3cent for and 49 per cent against. Members of the Swatantra
4Party divided 36 per cent for and 55 per cent againstg Of 
the sample of parliamentarians as a whole, 49 per cent were 
against and 47 per cent for India having a nuclear deterrent,^ 
These figures are consistent with the point established earlier 
in this analysis, viz,, that since about the time of China's 
first nuclear test in 1964, there has been substantial (though 
not majority) support in the Indian Parliament for a national
1, King, loc, cit,, pp,204-206,
2, ibid,, pp,202-203 and Krish Nanda, "Will India Go Nuclear?" 
in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , Vol, 27, No. 10, 
December 1971, p,39.
3, ibid,
4, ibid.
5, ibid.
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nuclear force, Though it is still too early to assess the full
significance of the 1971 election results for the nuclear debate
in India, it seems reasonable to agree with Peter King that "the
ruling Congress Party’s massive victory will strengthen Mrs-
Ghandi’s ability to pursue any foreign and defence policies of
her choosing, and her choices so far since 1966 have been anti- 1nuclear. It is also worth noting that the strongly pro-bomb 
Jan Sangh had Praja Socialist parties lost considerable ground 
in the 1971 elections,
No analysis of current attitudes in India on the question 
of nuclear weapons should leave out of account the views of the 
country's specialist writers on defence and foreign policy. 
Amongst this group, there has in recent years been fairly 
considerable support for an Indian deterrent, or at least, for
1, King, loc, cit-, p,201, The magnitude of the Congress (Ruling)
Party’s victory can be seen in the following 
ELECTION RESULTS, 1967 AND 1971,
table: 
1967 1971
Congress 283 -
Congress (Ruling) - 350
Congress (Organization) - 16
Swatantra 44 8
Communist Party of India (CPI) 23 23
Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) 19 25
Jan Sangh 35 22
Praja Socialist Party (PSP) 13 2
Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) 23 3
Others and Independents 80 66(a)
Total 520 515(b)
(a) Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), ruling party in Madras, 
23; other parties and independents, 43,
(b) Elections in three constituencies were to be held late; 
other seats are held by government nominees,
Note: Prior to the 1971 elections, the Congress Party had
split into two factions, Ruling and Organisation, The latter 
faction held 100 seats in the old parliament.
Source: King, loc, cit,, p,202.
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t h e  r a p i d  deve lopm ent  of I n d i a ’ s n u c l e a r  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  t o  t h e  p o i n t
where  any d e c i s i o n  t o  embark upon an  e f f e c t i v e  n u c l e a r  weapons
programme can be pu t  i n t o  immedia te  e f f e c t .  G e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,
t h e  v iew s  of  t h e s e  w r i t e r s  have been  m o t i v a t e d  b o t h  by a n x i e t y
a bou t  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  I n d i a ’ s s e c u r i t y  posed  by China  and by a
c o n c e r n  t h a t  w i t h o u t  n u c l e a r  weapons I n d i a ’ s i n f l u e n c e  and s t a t u s
i n  A s i a  and t h e  w or ld  as  a whole  w i l l  be  d i m i n i s h e d , ^
C l e a r l y ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  i n  I n d i a ,  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s u p p o r t  f o r
t h e  deve lopm en t  of  a n a t i o n a l  n u c l e a r  f o r c e .  However ,  d e s p i t e
t h e s e  p r e s s u r e s ,  b o t h  i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  o f  p a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e
I n d i a n  Government  has  adhe re d  t o  i t s  p o l i c y  of  n o t  p r o d u c i n g
n u c l e a r  weapons .  E v ide nce  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  D e l h i  i s  s t i l l  a c u t e l y
c o n s c i o u s  of  t h e  t remendous  economic b u r d e n  which  any d e c i s i o n
t o  go n u c l e a r  would impose on I n d i a , ^  and i t  i s  no d oub t  a l s o
i n h i b i t e d  by u n c e r t a i n t i e s  a b o u t  t h e  l i k e l y  r e a c t i o n  of  t h e
s upe rpow ers  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a i d  and t e c h n i c a l
a s s i s t a n c e  shou ld  t h e  d e c i s i o n  be  t a k e n  t o  a c q u i r e  a n u c l e a r
f o r c e .  Moreover ,  D e l h i  i s  no d oub t  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  knowledge
t h a t  I n d i a  i s  no t  y e t  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  b u i l d  n u c l e a r  warheads
i n  any g r e a t  number o r  a m i s s i l e  d e l i v e r y  sys tem  c a p a b l e  of
3
r e a c h i n g  im p o r t a n t  t a r g e t s  i n  Ch ina ,
1, For a s t r o n g  s t a t e m e n t  of s u p p o r t  f o r  an I n d i a n  n u c l e a r  
d e t e r r e n t  by K, Subrahmanyam, D i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  
f o r  Defence  S t u d i e s  and A n a ly s e s  i n  New D e l h i ,  s e e  h i s ,  
" I n d i a ’ s S e c u r i t y " ,  i n  S u r v i v a l , Vo l ,  13,  No, 5 ,  May 1971,  
p p . 154-159 ,  For comments on t h e  I n d i a n  n u c l e a r  d e b a t e  
which  t a k e s  a c c o u n t  of  some of  t h i s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  o p i n i o n ,  
s e e  S i s i r  Gup ta ,  "The I n d i a n  Dilemma" i n  A l a s t a i r  Buchan,  
op,  c i t , ,  pp ,  55 -67 ;  Ashok Kapur ,  " N u c le a r  Weapons and 
I n d i a n  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  : a p e r s p e c t i v e " ,  i n  The World T oda y , 
Vol ,  27,  No, 9 ,  September  1971,  p p , 379-389 ;  and P e t e r  
K ing ,  loco c i t ,
2, See a comment on t h i s  i n  The A u s t r a l i a n ,  11 May 1970 ,
See a l s o ,  K ing ,  l o c - c i t , ,  p , 2 0 0 ,
3, On t h i s  p o i n t ,  s e e  D i l i p  M u k e r j e e ,  " I n d i a ' s  Defence  
P e r s p e c t i v e s " ,  i n  S u r v i v a l , V o l ,  11,  No, 1 ,  J a n u a r y  1969,
p, 6,
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But though Delhi is reluctant to build nuclear weapons at the 
moment, it has struggled hard to create and maintain an option on 
doing so in the future* No effort has been spared to improve 
the self-sufficiency and the capacity of the country’s peaceful 
nuclear establishment - the basis of any future weapons programme» 
In particular, work is being pressed ahead on the reactor in 
Madras : the fissile material (plutonium) output from this 
facility will be available for whatever use India might want to 
put it» Finally, as was indicated earlier, India has devoted 
considerable attention to its space programme and is currently 
developing a rocket launcher which could be the basis for some 
future missile delivery capability o'*" The Indian Government is 
clearly working to reduce the time it would require between any 
decision to go nuclear and the production of a fairly large 
number of sophisticated weapons»
The growth of widespread support for nuclear weapons in 
India dates from the first demonstration of China’s nuclear 
capability* The Chinese bomb has contributed to the growth 
of support for an Indian deterrent in two ways» In the first 
place, many Indians have come to believe that the security 
threat from China or from Pakistan supported by China, has been 
substantially increased as the result of China’s acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, The only effective response, it has been 
argued, is for India to acquire its own nuclear deterrent.
The second way in which ehe Chinese bomb has stimulated 
support for an Indian deterrent concerns the question of 
prestige. Even prior to the Chinese nuclear tests an increas­
ing number of Indians were inclining to the belief that the 
maintenance and extension of their country’s prestige in Asia
I, After China’s satellite launching in April 1970, the Indian 
Government promised to look into its space programme to see 
what could be done to accelerate it. See, The Australian,
15 May 1970, See also, ibid», 31 August 1970»
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and th e  world in  g e n e ra l  n e c e s s i t a t e d  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of a n a t io n a l  
n u c le a r  f o r c e .  The development of n u c le a r  weapons by China has 
s t re n g th e n e d  t h i s  b e l i e f  in  two ways: f i r s t ,  by a f f o r d in g  Peking
an ap p aren t  le ad  over In d ia  i n  th e  s t r u g g le  fo r  p r e s t i g e  and 
in f lu e n c e  amongst th e  o th e r  n a t io n s  of A s ia ;  and second , by 
drawing a t t e n t i o n  once ag a in  to  th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of n u c le a r  
weapons as symbols of g re a t  power s t a t u s .
C, In d ia  and Arms C on tro l
The In d ia n  Government has been a r e g u la r  p a r t i c i p a n t  in  
pos t-w ar  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on arms c o n t r o l  : i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
have f ig u re d  p rom inen tly  in  d i s c u s s io n s  on th e  s u b je c t  i n  th e  
U0No G enera l Assembly, th e  Disarmament Commission, th e  E .N .D ,C ,,  
and a t  m ee tings  of th e  I .A .E .A . There seem to  be t h r e e  rea so n s  
f o r  D e lh i ’ s v e ry  a c t i v e  r o l e  in  t h i s  f i e l d .  In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  
as noted e a r l i e r ,  many of I n d i a ’ s p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  were 
s t r o n g ly  in f lu e n c e d  by th e  Ghandian creed  of n o n -v io le n c e  w ith  
i t s  emphasis on p e a c e fu l  c o - e x i s t e n c e ,  th e  s u p e r i o r i t y  of m oral 
f o r c e  over p h y s ic a l  f o r c e ,  and th e  p e a c e fu l  s e t t l e m e n t  of 
d i s p u te s .  I t  i s  no t s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  th e s e  men should  have 
taken  an e a r l y  i n t e r e s t  in  d isarm am ent. Indeed ,  some In d ia n  
l e a d e r s ,  no t th e  l e a s t  of whom was Prime M in is te r  Nehru him­
s e l f ,  f e l t  t h a t  t h e i r  co u n try  had a s p e c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  
t h i s  f i e l d ;  a tendency to  m o ra l iz e  and to  ap p ea l  to  I n d i a ' s  
s o - c a l l e d  " s p e c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "  has c h a r a c te r i z e d  o f f i c i a l  
In d ia n  s ta te m e n ts  on disarmament to  t h i s  day. Second, D e lh i  
has used p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  arms c o n t r o l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  to  r e ­
in f o r c e  i t s  c la im  to  g r e a t  power s t a t u s ,  I t s  e f f o r t s  in
t h i s  reg a rd  have been f a i r l y  s u c c e s s f u l .  I n d ia  has a c q u i re d
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e p u t a t i o n  as  a spokesman on disarmament 
m a t t e r s ,  and l a r g e ly  because  of t h i s ,  i t s  s ta n d in g  w i th ,  and 
acc ess  t o ,  th e  super-pow ers  i s  g r e a t e r  th an  i t  might o th e rw is e
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have been , The th i r d  re a so n  f o r  I n d i a ' s  prominence in  t h i s  f i e l d  
stems from i t s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i th  the  n a t io n s  of th e  n o n -a l ig n e d  
w orld . These c o u n t r i e s  have tended  to  view th e  arms r a c e ,  e sp ec ­
i a l l y  th e  n u c le a r  arms r a c e ,  as a t h r e a t  to  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  
C onsequen tly ,  they  have been consp icuous in  u rg in g  th e  need fo r  
arms c o n t r o l .  As a le a d in g  spokesman fo r  th e  n o n -a l ig n e d  g roup , 
In d ia  has thus  had a s p e c i a l  r o l e  to  p lay  in  disarm ament 
n e g o t i a t i o n s ,
D e lh i 's  f i r s t  im p o r tan t  i n i t i a t i v e  in  th e  arms c o n t r o l  
f i e l d  r e l a t e d  to  th e  i s s u e  of n u c le a r  t e s t i n g .  In d eed ,  i t  was 
In d ia  which f i r s t  b rough t th e  q u e s t io n  of th e  s u sp e n s io n  of 
n u c le a r  weapons t e s t s  b e fo re  th e  U,N. In  a l e t t e r  to  th e  S e c re ­
ta ry -G e n e ra l  in  A p r i l  1954, th e  In d ia n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  r e f e r r e d  
to  h i s  governm ent 's  w ish f o r  some s o r t  of in t e r im  " s t a n d s t i l l  
agreem ent" covering  n u c le a r  t e s t s ,  and re q u e s te d  t h a t  th e s e  
views be communicated to  th e  Disarmament Commission,-^- During 
subsequen t y e a r s ,  i n  b o th  th e  Disarmament Commission and th e  
G eneral Assembly, I n d ia  p layed  a le a d in g  r o l e  in  m o b i l i s in g  
support f o r  an agreement banning n u c le a r  weapons t e s t s .  L ike  
many o th e r  s t a t e s ,  I n d ia  wanted a ban on n u c le a r  t e s t s  so as 
to  reduce  th e  h aza rd s  of f a l l - o u t .  But in  a d d i t i o n ,  D e lh i  
obv io u s ly  f e l t  t h e r e  was a need f o r  an agreement banning  n u c le a r  
t e s t s  in  o rd e r  to  p re v e n t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  During 1956 and 
1957, I n d i a ' s  spokesmen a t  th e  Disarmament Commission warned 
t h a t  i t  was becoming cheaper to  produce n u c le a r  weapons and
2
t h a t  m easures were u r g e n t l y  needed to  p re v e n t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
In  1957, Prime M in is te r  Nehru w arned, t h a t  i n  t im e ,  hydrogen 
bombs would be produced in  " k i tc h e n  gardens"  and would be
1, O f f i c i a l  Records of The Disarmament Commission, Supplement 
f o r  A p r i l ,  May and June 1954, New York: U nited  N a t io n s ,
1954, document D ,C ,/44  and C orr ,  1,
2, e , g , ,  O f f i c i a l  Records of th e  Disarmament Commission 
(Verbatim R eco rd ) ,  1956-1957 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  
D, C, / P , V, ) 58, p p ,16  and 23,
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acq u ired  no t only by n a t io n s  b u t  by o th e r  " e n t e r p r i s i n g  groups"
as  w e l l , ^  By th e  e a r ly  1960s, I n d i a ’s p re o c c u p a t io n  w ith  th e
a n t i - p r o l i f e r a t i o n  a s p e c t s  of a t e s t - b a n  seems to  have in c re a s e d .
This  was c l e a r l y  ap p aren t  in  s ta te m e n ts  d u r in g  th e  e a r l y  s e s s io n s
2
of th e  E.N.D.C. i n  1962, The mood of th e  In d ia n  Government was 
w e ll  r e f l e c t e d  in  a speech by one of t h a t  c o u n t ry ’s r e p r e s e n t a ­
t i v e s  in  May of t h a t  y e a r .  He s a id :
I want to  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  f a c t ,  and I  beg th e  t h r e e  
n u c le a r  powers to  ta k e  n o te  of i t :  n o t  once in
t h e i r  d is c u s s io n s  -  n o t  once -  e i t h e r  in  th e  Sub­
committee or t h i s  room have they  been r e a l i s t i c  
enough to  even m ention  t h a t  i f  they  go on t a lk in g  
and t a lk in g  about t h i s  m a t te r  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  
soon s t a r t  t e s t i n g  weapons. In  f a c t  to d a y ,  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  a r e  t e s t i n g  weapons, and a n o th e r  co u n try  
has g iv en  an i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  soon i t  may be t e s t i n g  
weapons a g a in ;  and th e r e  a r e  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  in  th e  
world which a r e  a b le  to  t e s t  weapons. L et us say 
t h i s  q u i t e  f r a n k ly  and b r u t a l l y  to  th e s e  th r e e  
c o u n t r i e s :  i f  they  th in k  t h a t  t h e i r  s c i e n t i s t s  a r e
b e t t e r  th a n  our s c i e n t i s t s  -  by "our"  I  mean th e  
s c i e n t i s t s  of th e  r e s t  of th e  world -  they  a r e  
m is ta k e n ,  p l a i n  m is ta k e n .  L et t h e r e  be no doubt 
about t h i s .  They a r e  by t h e i r  u n r e a l i s t i c  t a l k  
b r in g in g  n e a re r  th e  tim e when th e r e  w i l l  be more 
t e s t i n g  in  th e  w o r ld ,3
When th e  T es t  Ban T rea ty  was concluded in  1963 I n d ia  was one
of th e  f i r s t  n a t io n s  to  s ig n  th e  agreement and s t r o n g ly  urged
4
th a t  i t  be extended to  cover underground t e s t s  as  w e l l .
Though i t  tended to  c o n c e n t r a te  on th e  i s s u e  of n u c le a r  
t e s t i n g ,  I n d ia  has been a v o c a l  ad v o ca te  of o th e r  disarmament
1, F o re ig n  A f f a i r s  R eco rd , December 1957, p .2 3 2 .
2, e , g , ,  Verbatim Record of th e  Conference of th e  E ig h te e n -  
N ation  Committee on Disarmament, Geneva ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to  as E .N .D .C ./P .V . ) ,  24, p ,2 6 ;  E .N .D .C ./P .V . 28, p ,3 0 ;
E.NoDoC,/P,V, 35, p p ,3 5 -6 ;  E .N .D .C ./P .V . 47, p p ,13-14 and 
E .N .D .C ./P .V . 60, pp, 9-10,
3, E .N .D .C ./P .V . 34, p p . 33-34,
4, See, s ta te m e n t  by In d ia n  Government, i n  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s  
Record , J u ly  1963, p ,153 .
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measures as well. On a number of occasions it has loudly applauded
the idea of general and complete disarmament and has expressed
support for various partial measures such as nuclear-free zones
and a "freeze" on the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear1delivery vehicles.
By the early 1960s, Delhi's pronouncements on disarmament
increasingly reflected India's concern about the growing power
of China. In an obvious reference to the Sino-Indian situation,
Delhi's representative at the E.N.D.C, referred in 1962 to the
"frightful" trouble "which neighbours could cause to each other
2with even primitive nuclear weapons". In addition, Indian 
statements reflected the hope that the conclusion of a non­
proliferation agreement could directly or indirectly deter
3China from proceeding with its nuclear weapons programme.
Just seven months before China conducted its first nuclear test, 
Delhi's representative at the E.N.D.C. referred to those states 
"possessed by the mad urge to have their own bomb". Continuing, 
he said:
They would call it the "Asian bomb". It is our 
duty and the duty of the international community 
to endeavour to prevent this proliferation of 
nuclear weapons; otherwise the world will never 
forgive us.4
This desire to influence, or at least embarrass China, was 
undoubtedly one reason why India signed the Test Ban Treaty 
in 1963. When China denounced the latter agreement, India 
condemned its giant neighbour in the harshest of terms.^
1. e.g., ibid. See also, E.N.D.C./P.V. 5, p.35.
2. EoN.D.C./P.V. 47, p.14.
3. e.g., E.N.D.C./PcV. 5, p.35, E.N.D.C./P.V. 24, p.26; 
E.N.D.C./P.V. 28, p »30; E.N.D.C./P.V. 60, p.10,
4» EcN»DoC»/P.V. 174, p.12.
5. See, statement by the leader of India's delegation to the 
U.N», in the First Committee of the General Assembly, on 
15 October 1963. Reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record,
October 1963, pp.225-227.
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An i n t e r e s t i n g  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  a s p e c t  of I n d i a ' s  a t t i t u d e  
to  disarmament and r e l a t e d  measures has been i t s  s t r o n g  d i s l i k e  of 
most forms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s u p e r v i s io n  of i t s  n u c l e a r  a c t i v i t i e s .  
There was e a r l y  evidence  of I n d i a ' s  g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n  on t h i s  
m a t t e r  when D e lh i  came out a g a i n s t  t h e  v a r i o u s  American v e r s i o n s  
of t h e  Baruch Plan,'*' Moreover,  I n d ia  was on ly  m ode ra te ly  
e n t h u s i a s t i c  about  E isenhower ' s  "atoms f o r  peace"  p l a n  and
warned t h a t  i t  would not  be a p a r ty  to  any system "dominated
2
over by c e r t a i n  c o u n t r i e s , "  But D e l h i ' s  lo u d e s t  d e n u n c i a t i o n s
of th e  i d e a  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t ro l  or s u p e r v i s i o n  were prompted
by th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of th e  I , A eE,A, Though i t  agreed  to j o i n
th e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  I n d i a ,  along w i th  R uss ia  and o th e r
s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e s ,  was prominent  i n  o b s t r u c t i n g  p ro g r e s s  towards
3
t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of th e  I . A , E , A . ' s  s a feg u a rd s  system. When 
th e  Agency's  s a fegua rds  system was expanded i n  1964 so as to 
be a b l e  to  cope w i th  r e a c t o r s  of more than  100 M,W, c a p a c i t y  
In d i a  s t i l l  s tood  out  in  o p p o s i t i o n ,  though,  by t h i s  t ime i t
4
no longer  had th e  suppor t  of th e  S ov ie t  Union i n  t h e s e  m a t t e r s .
1,  Michael J .  S u l l i v a n ,  " In d ian  A t t i t u d e s  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Atomic Energy C on t ro l s"  i n  P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s , Vol,  43,  No, 3,  
F a l l  1970, p ,355,
2, See,  s ta t em en t  i n  Lok Sabha by Prime M i n i s t e r  Nehru,
Quoted i n  i b i d ,
3, S u l l i v a n ,  l o c , c i t , ,  p ,356 ,  See a l s o ,  B,G, B echhoefer ,  
" N e g o t i a t in g  t h e  S t a t u t e  of  the  I ,A .E ,A , "  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
O r g a n i z a t i o n , Vol,  13,  Winter  1959, p p , 38-59,
4, R,S.  B u t l e r ,  "The Safeguards System of t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Atomic Energy Agency",  unpubli shed M,A, t h e s i s ,  Canberra :  
A u s t r a l i a n  N a t io n a l  U n i v e r s i t y ,  1968, p ,137 .
S ince  1963, th e  U,S,  and the  U,S ,S ,R,  had come i n t o  a g re e ­
ment on t h e  need f o r  e f f e c t i v e  and p r a c t i c a l  I ,A ,E ,A ,  s a f e ­
g ua rds ,  See,  S u l l i v a n ,  l o c ,  c i t , ,  p p , 356-7,  See a l s o ,  
te s t im ony  of Glenn T, Seaborg,  Chairman,  U.S.A,E„C, i n  
N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of Nuclear  Weapons, h e a r i n g s  b e f o r e  the  
J o i n t  Committee on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong, ,  2nd S e s s , ,  
February  23, and March 1 and 7, 1966,  Washington,  1966, 
p, 53 o
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India's opposition to international control has been partly 
of a technical nature®^ It has been alleged, for instance, that 
safeguards could result in restraints on the liberty of persons 
trained in the operation, design and construction of reactors and 
other facilities® In addition, it has been a long-standing 
Indian complaint that international safeguards, especially 
those of the I0A®E®A®, impose an unnecessary burden by covering 
the whole nuclear fuel cycle; Delhi has argued that to ensure 
that material is not being diverted to military purposes, 
inspection of chemical separation plants and gaseous diffusion 
facilities alone is sufficient® But the most important Indian 
objections to international supervision have been those of a 
political nature® Time and again, Delhi has denounced what 
it regards as discrimination in the operation of international 
controls® Not only, it has been argued, must the under­
developed states accept safeguards on their nuclear activities 
while many developed states remain free of international 
control, but in addition, the I®A®E®A® is "dominated over" 
by the developed states® Indeed India has denounced the
arrangements for international supervision as tantamount to
2"atomic colonialism-"
That Delhi has adopted this particular position on safe­
guards seems hardly surprising® As noted earlier, India has 
long been proud of the progress it has made in the development 
of atomic energy® The reminder, therefore, Implicit in the 
whole concept of safeguards, that India (and other states)
1® For more lengthy accounts of India's attitude to inter­
national controls, see Sullivan, loc® cit®, pp®356-357 and 
361-362; and Homi J® Bhabha, "Safeguards and the Dissemin­
ation of Military Power" in Disarmament and Arms Control,
II, Autumn, 1964® See also, official Indian statements on 
the IoA EoA® and its safeguards system, in Foreign Affairs 
Record, May 1956, pp®66-67 and ibid®, July 1957, p®139®
See also, statements by Indian representatives at E®N®D0C®, 
in Er,N»DoC»/PeV. 51 (1962), p„27 and E-N.D.C./P.V. 174 
(1964), pp®17-19®
2® See, statement by Prime Minister Nehru in Lok Sabha on 
23 July 1957® Reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record,
July 1957, p®139®
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still occupies a relatively inferior position in the nuclear field, 
has consequently been difficult for many Indians to accept. But 
in addition to this, there seem to have been broader political 
motivations behind the Indian stand* In its criticism of I.A.E.A. 
safeguards Delhi adopted a line of argument that was popular 
amongst non-aligned states generally* It seems reasonable to 
argue that this tactic was not unrelated to India's close 
identification with, and indeed claims to leadership of, the 
nations of the non-aligned world. However, this is not meant 
to imply that in recent years Delhi has not had an additional 
reason for wanting to keep the I,A,E,A, from meddling in India's 
nuclear affairs, viz,, its desire to retain an option on 
producing nuclear weapons,
Ever since Independence, India has displayed more than an 
average interest in arms control and has supported a wide range 
of measures relevant to both conventional and nuclear weapons. 
However, notwithstanding this history of support for arms 
control, and in particular, its early enthusiasm for a non­
proliferation agreement, Delhi emerged as one of the world's 
harshest critics of the N,P,T, and has indicated its intention 
not to sign the treaty as it presently stands. It will be 
useful therefore to examine India's objections to the N„P.T,
Delhi objected to the N.P.T, on four counts. In the 
first place, it was argued that the treaty did not provide 
for balanced and mutual obligations and responsibilities for 
both the nuclear and the non-nuclear states,"^ While "hori­
zontal proliferation", or the spread of nuclear weapons to 
additional countries was to be prohibited, no specific limi­
tations were to be placed on "vertical proliferation", or the
1, See, statement by Mr, A, Husain, the leader of India's 
delegation to the E,N.D,C», to the First Committee of the 
General Assembly, on 14 May 1968, Reproduced in Foreign 
Affairs Record, May 1968 (hereafter referred to as Husain 
Statement), p,113.
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continued development of nuclear weapons by the e x is t in g  nuclear
powers.'*' To remedy t h i s ,  India urged , the N ,P J ,  should in clu d e
a p ro h ib itio n  on any fu rth er production  of nuclear weapons- The
reduction  or d es tr u c tio n  of e x is t in g  nuclear stock s should, be
2
d e a lt  w ith  subsequently  and in  stages»  D e lh i's  a n x ie ty  that 
something should be done to l im it  " v e r t ic a l p r o life r a t io n "  ju s t  
as much as " horizon ta l p r o life r a t io n " , was c o n s is te n t  w ith  
In d ia 's  lon g-stan d in g  and v igorous advocacy o f disarmament»
But th ere was an a d d itio n a l reason for  In d ia 's  in s is te n c e  that 
the nuclear powers should disarm , Indian observers appear to  
have been p a r t ic u la r ly  con sciou s of th e  p r e s t ig e  and in f lu en ce  
which has accrued to th ose s ta t e s  which p o ssess  nuclear weapons. 
As Mr, T rived i w rote in  1966:
, 0 , many peop le and th e ir  Governments, p a r t ic u la r ly  
the Big Powers, con tinue to  a c t in  the con text of 
what they c a l l  r e a l i t i e s ,  ta lk  in  terms of acceptance  
of f a i t s  accom plis and propagate the id eas of ex c lu ­
s iv e  five-pow er c o n fa b u la tio n  to  so lv e  the problems 
of the w orld. There are some who even th ink  of 
equating p o sse ss io n  of th ese  e v i l  [nuclear] weapons 
w ith  permanent membership of the S ecu r ity  C ouncil of 
the United N a tio n s, as i f  th e  nuclear bomb were a 
s p e c ia l  symbol of the r ig h t  to en force th e veto»^
4
Im p lic it  in  th is  and other Indian o b se r v a tio n s , i s  a b e l ie f  in  
the e x is te n c e  of a s tru c tu re  o f world order which i s  based on 
a c lea r  d is t in c t io n  between nuclear and non-nuclear powers.
What seems to have troubled  D elh i about the N „P,T ., was the
1» The terms "horizontal"  and " v er tica l"  p r o li f e r a t io n  were 
popularized by Mr, V.C» T r iv e d i, In d ia 's  spokesman in  the  
E»N»D,C. in  1966» For an e x c e lle n t  account by Mr, T rived i 
of In d ia 's  o b je c tio n s  to the N»P,T, ,  se e  h is  a r t i c l e ,  
" V ertica l Versus H orizon ta l P r o life r a t io n :  An Indian View", 
in  James E. Dougherty and J . F.  Lehman, J r , ,  Arms Control 
For the Late S i x t i e s , N. York: Van N ostrand, 1967, 
pp »195-203,
2» Husain Statem ent, p ,1 1 3 ,
3» T r iv e d i, lo c ,  c i t , ,  pp»199-200,
4, See e s p e c ia l ly ,  S i s ir  Gupta, "Asian S ecu r ity : S tru ctu re of 
S ta b il i ty " ,  in  S u r v iv a l, Vol ,  10 , No, 2,  February 1968, 
p p ,56-57 o
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belief that it would serve to reinforce the present structure of 
world order by making it difficult (in theory, impossible) for 
additional states to enter the great-power "club", As an 
aspiring great-power itself, this was something about which India 
was especially sensitive,
India’s second objection to the N.P.T. concerned the question 
of the security of the non-nuclear states* In this context too, 
Delhi emphasised that the real threat to the security of these 
countries came from the "possession, the continued stockpiling 
and the further sophistication of nuclear weapons and the means 
of their delivery»" It followed, that "any real and credible 
guarantee of security to non-nuclear-weapon ^tates ,. » could be 
provided only through nuclear disarmament."^ However, in his 
statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly in 
May 1968, Mr. Husain conceded that progress towards nuclear 
disarmament, even if agreed upon by the nuclear powers, would 
take time. As an interim measure, he added, the nuclear states 
should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against the non-nuclear states.^
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of security 
considerations in the determination of India's attitude to the 
N.P.T. At early meetings of the E.N.D.C., Indian delegates
had often chided their colleagues for hesitating to discuss
3measures to prevent proliferation. In their anxiety to see 
some halt to the spread of nuclear weapons, Indian spokesmen 
seemed prepared to accept an agreement which made few demands
on the nuclear powers, other than undertakings not to dissem-
4inate nuclear weapons or know-how. As late as March 1964,
1» Husain Statement, p,117, The demand for nuclear power dis­
armament actually predated India’s brief pursuit of a nuclear 
guarantee (see Chapter |X# )• Thus, for a while at least, 
there seemed to be some inconsistency in Delhi’s policy: on 
the one hand it was asking the U.S. and Russia to disarm, 
while on the other it was seeking to engage them in a joint 
guarantee of India's security,
2» Husain Statement, p»117,
3. e.g, E.N.D.C./P.V. 34 (1962), p.33; E.N.D.C./P.V. 60 (1962), 
p,9; E.N.D.C./P.V. 156 (1963), p,16.
4» See, major speech on non-proliferation by Indian delegate, 
in E.N.D.C./P.V. 174, pp.12-20.
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the Indian representative reminded delegates to the E J UD ÜC 0 that 
the answer to the problem of nuclear spread was a non-acquisition, 
non-dissemination agreement and that what was really at issue was 
"not the question of dismantling the nuclear weapons apparatus of 
the present nuclear powers but that of preventing manufacture of
I
weapons by non-nuclear nations"» After China’s first nuclear 
test, however, it was possible to detect a change in Delhi’s 
approach to the question of nonproliferation,, Both at the 
EJoD.C, and in the General Assembly, Indian delegates began 
to stress the necessity for "an acceptable balance of mutual 
responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear 
Powers"in any nonproliferation agreement,, In the E UN„D„C„, 
the Indian delegate insisted that there should be "no enshrine­
ment or perpetuation of a privileged status of nuclear Powers" 
and that "a rational international treaty on non-proliferation 
should specifically embrace the essential requirements of 
cessation of production of nuclear weapons and delivery
vehicles and agreed arrangements for the reduction of existing
2stockpiles thereof»
There was a clear connection between these first 
indications of Delhi’s hesitation over measures to halt 
proliferation, and the anxiety in India stemming from China’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons„ The Indian Government was 
obviously looking to its future security requirements and had 
clearly decided that it would have to purchase and maintain 
a military nuclear option» During the early months of 1967,
Delhi sought from the U»S» and Russia a joint guarantee of
3protection against a nuclear attack by China„ However, as 
will be noted below, this endeavour had been abandoned by
1 o ibid„ , p o 20B
2» E „N „D «,C„ /PoV„ 232, p 015»
3o For the details of this development, see Chapter IX»
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the middle of 19670 Thereafter, it is unlikely that the Indian 
Government would have accepted as reliable any foreign guarantee 
despite Mr0 Husain's suggestion of May 1968, there is no reason 
to believe that a pledge by the nuclear powers not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, 
would have persuaded Delhi to look more favourably upon the 
N»P„T„ Nothing less than far-reaching disarmament by the 
nuclear powers, including China, is likely to have satisfied 
India in this regards, But nuclear power disarmament was, and 
indeed still is, only a very remote possibility0 In the mean­
time, Delhi has provided itself with an important reason for 
not signing the N»P»TU
India’s third objection to the N„PUT» concerned the 
issue of peaceful nuclear technology„ The restrictions in 
the treaty on the use of peaceful nuclear explosives, Delhi 
argued, represented an unwarranted extension of the detested 
(to India) distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states 
into the peaceful nuclear field» As India’s spokesman in the 
First Committee said:
Nations everywhere should be free not only to 
share in the benefits, but also to acquire the 
knowledge to extract such benefits by themselves 
and to have the freedom to use such knowledge«,
Since nuclear technology is the technology 
of the future and is likely to become the most 
crucial and potent instrument of economic devel­
opment and social progress, it would obviously 
be invidious for a greater part of the world to 
be wholly dependent on a few nuclear weapons 
States for the knowledge and application of this 
technology» e»„ And when it is proposed that this 
should be done for an initial period of twenty- 
five years regardless of any technological 
breakthrough during this period, would this not 
widen the economic and technical gap which already 
exists and which the developing countries are 
striving so hard to close?1
1» Husain Statement, ppoll6-117»
144
Here, Delhi was again giving expression to one of its fundamental 
contentions about the question of nonproliferation: that the
NoPoTo should not in any way discriminate against the non-nuclear 
states, and should not advance the division of the world into 
"have" and "have not" nations»
Finally, India objected to the safeguards provisions in the 
N,PJ, These, Delhi insisted, should be universally applicable, 
objective, and non-discriminatory» It was especially critical 
of the fact that the nuclear powers were not obliged to undergo 
inspection at all, and was concerned that the member nations 
of EURATOM might be subject to a less severe form of inspection 
than other non-nuclear states»^
The analysis in this chapter suggests that a great number 
of Indians now consider that the acquisition of a national 
nuclear force would be a tremendous boost to their country’s 
prestige and security. However, for a number of reasons (the 
great cost of a nuclear weapons programme, the realization 
that India is not yet in a position to manufacture a sizeable 
number of fairly sophisticated weapons, and uncertainties 
about the likely international response to such a move) , the 
Indian Government has resisted the pressures on it to go 
nuclear, At the same time, though, Delhi has sought to bring 
its nuclear industry to the point where any decision to develop 
nuclear weapons could be put into immediate effect, India’s 
determination to create and maintain an option on going nuclear 
has been a major influence in shaping its attitude to arms 
control. However, it has not been the only determinant of 
Delhi’s arms control policy. As a developing state, and a 
member of the "third world", India has joined with others like 
it in denouncing arms control measures which, it is alleged, 
discriminate in favour of the developed states. This factor
1» Husain Statement, p»117.
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was p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  i n  r e g a rd  to  I n d i a ’s p o s i t i o n  on I r A, E.- A - 
s a f e g u a rd s  and c e r t a i n  s e c t i o n s  of the  N,P.T„
I n d i a ’s s tand  on I , A , E tA„ s a fe g u a rd s  and th e  N ,P CT* has  been 
a sou rce  of f r i c t i o n  between D elh i  and Washington and has  c r e a t e d  
problems f o r  th e  United  S t a t e s  i n  the  p u r s u i t  of i t s  n o n p r o l i f e r a ­
t i o n  s t r a t e g y  i n  Asia-  Th is  w i l l  be a major s u b j e c t  f o r  a n a l y s i s  
i n  P a r t  I I I  of the  t h e s i s .
CHAPTER V
THE POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS OF ASIA : JAPAN
Of the nations in Asia capable of building nuclear weapons, 
it is Japan which probably has the greatest potential- Already 
an industrial giant, Japan shows promise of joining the front 
rank of world powers before the end of the century- During the 
last fourteen years Japan has laid the foundations of a vast 
nuclear industry and undoubtedly has the capacity to develop 
a nuclear weapons capability which, at least in the short run, 
would be superior to that of China’s,
A, Japan’s Nuclear Weapons Potential
Nuclear research was commenced in Japan during 1955-56 
and in 1957 the country acquired a small research reactor from 
the United States, After a hesitant start, interest in the 
use of nuclear energy grew and in 1961 a Long-range Program 
on Development and Utilization of Atomic Energy ushered in a 
new era in the development of Japan’s nuclear industry. The 
strategy of the 1961 plan and its subsequent modifications 
was in line with Japan’s traditional approach to the problem 
of overcoming a modernisation lag* Provision was made for 
heavy dependence on foreign technology in the short run while 
domestic research and development prepared the way for long 
run self-sufficiency,'*'
1, Victor Gilinsky and Paul Langer, The Japanese Civilian 
Nuclear Program, Rand RM-5366 - PR, Santa Monica: The 
Rand Corporation, 1967, p-3.
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Rapid advances in  J a p a n ’ s n u c le a r  in d u s t r y  d u r in g  th e  next 
few y e a rs  q u ic k ly  made th e  1961 p la n  obso le te , ,  In  1967 a new 
Long Range Program was drawn up, This  p la n  was a more a c c u ra te  
r e f l e c t i o n  of th e  improved p ro s p e c ts  f o r  c i v i l i a n  n u c le a r  power 
in  Japan  and s e t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h ig h e r  g o a ls  in  th e  development 
of r e a c to r  and f u e l  p ro c e ss in g  f a c i l i t i e s .  E v en tu a l  autonomy 
in  th e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of atomic energy was a g a in  s t r e s s e d  and 
p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis was p laced  on th e  development of advanced 
r e a c t o r s  of Jap an ese  d e s ig n ,
Japan  has had l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  j u s t i f y i n g  i t s  n u c le a r  
programme on economic grounds. Throughout most of th e  p o s t ­
war p e r io d  th e  co un try  has been faced  w ith  a r a p id l y  in c re a s in g  
demand fo r  e l e c t r i c  power,^ More r e c e n t l y ,  t h i s  has been 
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  an in c r e a s in g  dependence on im ported o i l ,  I t  
was hoped t h a t  th e  development of a tom ic energy would lower 
th e  c o s t  of e l e c t r i c  power and , by red u c in g  th e  c o u n t ry ’ s 
o v e r a l l  o i l  r e q u i r e m e n ts ,  in c r e a s e  th e  s e c u r i t y  of energy 
s u p p l i e s .  I t  has a l s o  been argued t h a t  th e  w idespread  u t i l i ­
z a t io n  of n u c le a r  power would e a se  th e  d r a in  on J a p a n ’s 
f o r e ig n  exchange and have a b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t  on th e  c o u n t r y 's  
te c h n o lo g ic a l  s t r u c t u r e , ^
J a p a n 's  r e a c t o r  and f u e l  programme i s  th e  b a s i s  of th e
c o u n t r y 's  n u c le a r  in d u s t r y  and would be an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  of
any p la n  to  produce n u c le a r  weapons. The f i r s t  r e a c t o r  in
Japan  to  g e n e ra te  e l e c t r i c a l  power was e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  T okai-
Mura in  1963. This was th e  Japan  Power D em onstra t ion  R eac tor
3
(J .P .D .R ,)  and had an o u tp u t  of 12 M.W. The f i r s t  commercial 
r e a c t o r  was a l s o  b u i l t  a t  Tokai-Mura and commenced o p e ra t io n s
1. Jap an ese  e l e c t r i c i t y  re q u ire m e n ts  a r e  r e p o r te d  to  have 
t r e b l e d  in  th e  y e a rs  1955-1966. See , Aldo C assu to ,  
"H iro sh im a 's  Japan  Goes N u c le a r" ,  i n  The World Today,
Vol. 26, No. 8, August 1970, p .314 .
2. G i l in sk y  and L anger,  op. c i t . ,  p p .5 -9 ,
3. i b i d . , p , 3.
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i n  1966. I t  was a B r i t i s h  b u i l t ,  n a t u r a l  u r a n iu m - f u e l l e d  f a c i l i t y ,  
w i th  an o u tp u t  of 160 M.W,^ By June 1971, t h e r e  were f i v e
2
r e a c t o r s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  Japan w i th  a t o t a l  o u tp u t  of  1,269 M,W.
3
Ten more were under c o n s t r u c t i o n  and s i x  on o rde r  . The n u c l e a r  
power u n i t s  c u r r e n t l y  in  o p e r a t i o n ,  under c o n s t r u c t i o n  or  on 
o r d e r  i n  Japan  a r e  expec ted  to  account  f o r  a t o t a l  o u tp u t  of
4
12 ,062 MoW8 In  th e  longer  r u n ,  J a p a n ’s u t i l i z a t i o n  of  n u c l e a r
power promises  to  be very  g r e a t  in deed .  The C e n t r a l  Power
Counci l  of Japan  announced r e c e n t l y  t h a t  32 n u c l e a r  power u n i t s
would be commissioned i n  th e  pe r io d  1970-79 and th a t  i n s t a l l e d
n u c l e a r  c a p a c i t y  i s  expected to  t o t a l  60,000 M,W, by 1985.^
I n  May 1971,  a committee e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  Japan  Atomic
I n d u s t r i a l  Forum es t im a te d  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  n u c l e a r  power
g e n e r a t i n g  c a p a c i t y  would be 110,000 M,W. i n  1990 and 220,000
M.W. by t h e  year  2000, The magnitude of t h e s e  f i g u r e s
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  p lu tonium o u tp u t  from J a p a n ’s r e a c t o r s
p romises  to  be q u i t e  enormous : o f f i c i a l  e s t i m a t e s  sugges t
7
t h a t  i t  could be a lmos t  two tons  an n u a l ly  by 1975 a l o n e .
I n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n ,  th e  J apanese  r e a c t o r  programme w i l l  
r e l y  ma in ly  on t h e  u se  of "proven"  or  L igh t  Water R eac to rs  
(L W.Ro) w i th  th e  p o s s i b l e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  Advanced Thermal 
R e a c to r s  (AoT.R.) d u r in g  th e  l a t e  1970s, But t h e  main aim of 
J a p a n ' s  r e a c t o r  r e s e a r c h  and development programme i s  th e  
development of  a F as t  Breeder  Reac to r  ( F .B . R , ) ,  These r e ­
a c t o r s ,  which a r e  f u e l l e d  w i th  plu tonium and a c t u a l l y  produce
1. i b i d  e
2, A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission, N in e t e e n th  Annual 
R e p o r t , June 1971, p ,36 ,
3 o i b i d .
4. i b i d ,
5, i b i d o, p , 32.
6, Atoms i n  Japan  ( o f f i c i a l  organ  of th e  Japan  Atomic 
I n d u s t r i a l  Forum),  Vol,  15,  No, 5, May 1971 (Supplement) ,  
p,  5,
7. New S c i e n t i s t :  J ap an ese  Supplement, 16 November 1967, 
p p . 3 ,  4,  Quoted in  Ian  B e l l a n y ,  A u s t r a l i a  in  t h e  Nuclear  
Age, Sydney: Sydney U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1972,  p p . 53-54„
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more p lu ton ium  th an  they  consume, w i l l  reduce  th e  need f o r  n a t u r a l  
uranium  and U235* C urren t p la n s  p rov ide  fo r  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  
of a 1000 M.W. f a s t  b reed e r  d em o n s tra to r  r e a c to r  i n  th e  e a r ly  
1980s o1
However, d e s p i t e  th e s e  r a t h e r  am b it io u s  p la n s ,  Japan  i s
s t i l l  f a r  from s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  in  th e  n u c le a r  f i e l d .  I t s  own
s u p p l i e s  of n a t u r a l  uranium a r e  q u i t e  meagre and c o n s e q u e n t ly ,
2
i t  w i l l  have to  depend h e a v i ly  on f o r e ig n  s o u rc e s ,  S ince  1967
Japan  has  c o n t ra c te d  w ith  Canada fo r  s u p p l ie s  of uranium ; a t  th e
same t im e ,  Jap an ese  mining en g in e e rs  have begun p ro s p e c t in g  fo r
3
uranium  in  N orth  America and on th e  A fr ic a n  c o n t in e n t .  U nlike 
I n d ia ,  Japan  does no t y e t  p o sse ss  a p lu tonium  s e p a r a t io n  p la n t  
l a r g e  enough fo r  commercial p u rp o se s .  However, c o n s id e r a t io n  
i s  be ing  g iv en  to  th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  of a F rench  d es igned  p la n t  
ca p a b le  of han d lin g  about 200 to n s  of sp en t  r e a c t o r  f u e l  per 
y e a r .  F i n a l l y ,  th e  r e a c t o r s  p r e s e n t l y  under c o n s t r u c t io n  in  
Japan  w i l l  be f u e l l e d  by e n r ic h ed  uranium , w hich , f o r  th e  f o r e ­
s e e a b le  f u t u r e ,  a t  l e a s t ,  w i l l  have to  come from f o r e ig n  
s u p p l i e r s  : i n  1968, Tokyo e n te re d  in t o  a 30 y ea r  agreement 
w ith  th e  U nited  S ta t e s  f o r  th e  supp ly  of t h i s  m a t e r i a l , ^  These 
s u p p l i e s ,  and alm ost c e r t a i n l y ,  any o th e r s  as w e l l ,  w i l l  be 
accompanied by r e s t r i c t i o n s  l i m i t i n g  th e  u se  of th e  e n r ic h ed  
uranium to  p e a c e fu l  purposes* However, th e  development of
1* G i l in s k y  and Langer , op* c i t * , p*33. For a break-down of
th e  r e a c t o r  ty p es  c u r r e n t ly  in  o p e r a t io n ,  under c o n s t r u c t io n ,  
or on o rder  i n  Jap an ,  s e e ,  A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Comm­
i s s i o n ,  N in e te e n th  Annual R e p o r t , June 1971, pp*37-38*
2* As of A p r i l  1965 J a p a n 's  t o t a l  r e s e r v e s ,  a s s u re d ,  p ro b ab le  
and p o s s i b l e  of uranium o x ide  (o re  g rade  0 ,05  to  0*06 per  
c e n t  uranium oxide) were on ly  2,100 to n s .  See, Reviews of 
N a t io n a l  S c ience  P o l ic y  : J a p a n , O .E ,C ,D .,  1967, p*107*
Quoted in  B e l la n y ,  op* c i t . ,  p*54, f n ,1 9 ,
3 * C a s s u to ,  l o c » c i t  *, p*314*
4* G i l in s k y  and L anger,  op* c i t  *, p ,25  and B e l la n y ,  op* c i t *, 
p * 54 *
5, For th e  d e t a i l s ,  s ee  th e  t e x t  of th e  agreem ent between Japan  
and th e  U*S* Reproduced i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Agreements fo r  Co­
o p e r a t io n ,  1967-68 , h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  Subcommittee on 
Agreements fo r  C o -o p e ra t io n  of th e  J o i n t  Committee on Atomic
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domestic enrichment facilities has long been a goal of the Japanese
nuclear programme., Work on the centrifuge technique was commenced 
1as early as 1959o In March 1968, a Nuclear Fuel Committee led
by the Acting Chairman of the Japan A,E„C. recommended a fairly
substantial centrifuge research and development programme (as well
2as a gaseous diffusion programme), It is generally agreed that 
Japan has the capacity to develop its own enrichment facilities.
One report on the Japanese nuclear programme has predicted that 
an enrichment plant of some sort should probably be in operation 
by 1980,* 123 4
Should it ever decide to go nuclear, Japan, like any other
would-be nuclear power, would face the problem of developing
an effective delivery system, At the moment, Japan possesses
4a number of F-86F and F-104J aircraft which could, if necessary, 
be made to play a nuclear role. However, these are essentially 
strike aircraft of a relatively short range and it is unlikely 
that a serious nuclear weapons system would be built around 
delivery vehicles of this type. Because of constitutional 
restrictions, no bomber aircraft have been built in Japan 
since the end of World War 11, It seems reasonable to assume, 
however, that Japan would be capable of building a wide range 
of military aircraft, including bombers, should it ever decide 
to do so, (It is expected that 130 of the 164 new F-4 
aircraft which Japan’s Air Self-Defence Force is tc receive
5, cont’d. Energy, 90th Cong-, 1st and 2nd Sess,, March 20, 
1967 and June 25, 1968, Washington, 1969, pp,104-106,
1, Gilinsky and Langer, op, cit,, pp,23-24,
2, Victor Gilinsky and Bruce L,R, Smith, "Civilian Nuclear 
Power and Foreign Policy," in Orbis, Vol, 12, No, 3, Fall 
1968, p,824,
3, Gilinsky and Langer, op, cit, , p,45. Recent changes in 
American policy on uranium enrichment have placed the whole 
question of the availability of U235 in a state of flux,
The details of these policy changes and their significance 
for American efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons 
in Asia (and elsewhere) will be discussed in Chapter JJJ of 
this thesis,
4, The Military BaLance, 1971-1972, London: The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, p,47.
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under the Fourth Defence Build-Up Plan, will be built in Japan,^ 
Anti-aircraft missiles of American design - Hawk and Nike
2Hercules - have been manufactured in Japan for some years now,) 
But despite this undoubted capacity to develop an aircraft 
delivery system, it is Japan’s expertise in rocketry which is 
perhaps more important in any assessment of the country’s 
nuclear potential. Since about 1954 Japanese scientists have 
been developing rockets for the country’s space programme and 
there can be little doubt that the experience gained could be 
put to a military use.
The Japanese space programme was initiated by a group of
scientists at Tokyo University, In April 1955, the first
fruits of their labours were unveiled - a tiny sounding rocket
measuring nine inches in length and weighing less than half 
3an ounce. Since that time substantial improvements have
been made in both the size and sophistication of Japanese
rockets. In 1964, Japan successfully tested a three stage,
solid-fuelled rocket called the Lambda. It was an improved
version of the Lambda, which in February 1970, launched into
earth orbit a satellite weighing 51 lbs. Another rocket
which has been successfully tested is the Mu, One version
of this series, the Mu-1, which was successfully tested in
October 1966, has four stages and an over-all weight of 
442,5 tons. But other launchers are already being developed. 
Spokesmen for Japan's Space and Technology Agency have announced 
plans to launch a 187 lb observation satellite in 1972 with
1, Strategic Survey, 1970, London: The Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1971, p,35,
2, Bellany, op, ctt,, p,56,
3, Paul F, Langer, The Japanese Space Program: Political 
and Social Implications, Rand P-3917, Santa Monica: The 
Rand Corporation, 1968, p,l,
4, Kishida Junnosuke, "Japan’s Rocketry," in Japan Quarterly, 
Vol, 14, No, 1, January-March 1967, p,87.
152
a "Q" r o c k e t  and a 264 lb  communications s a t e l l i t e  w i th  a l a r g e r  
"N" ro c k e t  i n  1 9 74 ,1 2345
The r o l e  of J a p a n 's  space r o c k e t s  i n  any f u t u r e  n u c le a r
weapons programme could  be v e ry  g r e a t , T heir  s o l i d  f u e l  systems
would make c o n v e rs io n  to  m i l i t a r y  pu rp o ses  r e l a t i v e l y  easy  and
th e  l a r g e s t  of th e s e  r o c k e t s  could  presum ably re a c h  i n t e r -
2
c o n t i n e n t a l  d i s t a n c e s  by f l y i n g  a b a l l i s t i c  t r a j e c t o r y ,
Jap an ese  s c i e n t i s t s  c u r r e n t l y  l a c k  e x p e r ie n c e  in  th e  u s e  of
th e  s o r t  of gu idance  system  which would be n e c e s s a ry  f o r
m i s s i l e s :  i n  o rd e r  to  a l l a y  concern  abou t th e  p o t e n t i a l  use
of th e  sp ace  programme fo r  m i l i t a r y  p u rposes  Jap an ese  r o c k e t s
have g e n e r a l ly  no t been f i t t e d  w i th  c o n v e n t io n a l  gu idance
mechanisms. But i t  i s  g e n e r a l ly  r e c o g n ise d  th a t  J a p a n 's
e l e c t r o n i c s  in d u s t r y  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  advanced to  p ro v id e  th e
n e c e ss a ry  gu idance  system s f o r  th e  c o u n t r y ' s  r o c k e t s  should
4
t h e i r  c o n v e rs io n  to  m i l i t a r y  purposes  be d e s i r e d ,
P a u l  Langer has noted th a t  Ja p a n e se  p u b l i c  o p in io n  i s  
f a v o u ra b ly  d isp o sed  tow ards b o o s t in g  th e  n a t i o n ' s  r o l e  i n  
space r e s e a r c h .  Some Jap an ese  v iew  t h e i r  c o u n t r y 's  e f f o r t s  
in  t h i s  f i e l d  as  a way of keep ing  a b r e a s t  of th e  l a t e s t  
developm ents  in  s c ie n c e  and te ch n o lo g y ,  O thers  see  th e  space 
programme a s  a means of g a in in g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r e s t i g e .
1, The A u s t r a l i a n , 13 F eb ruary  1970,
2, I t  has been claim ed t h a t ,  i f  co n v e r ted  to  m i l i t a r y  p u r ­
p o s e s ,  th e  f u l l y  developed  v e r s io n  of th e  Mu ro c k e t  could  
lau n ch  a 300 lb  warhead 5,000 m i l e s .  See, B e l la n y ,
£2i__cit^ ,, p , 55o
3, L anger ,  op, c i t . ,  p ,2 3 ,
4, Leonard B eaton , " C a p a b i l i t i e s  of N on-Nuclear Powers" in  
A l a a t a i r  Buchan ( e d , ) ,  A World of N uclear Pow ers? , E ngle­
wood C l i f f s ,  N , J U: P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  1966, p ,2 8 ,  The U,S, 
has r e c e n t l y  agreed  to  s e l l  to  Ja p a n ,  under c e r t a i n  c o n d i­
t i o n s ,  com plete  r o c k e t  g u idance  sy s tem s , See, The B u l l e t i n  
(Sydney), 9 August 1969, p ,4 1 ,  B e l la n y  has p o in ted  to  th e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  fo r  any f u t u r e  e f f o r t  by Japan  to  b u i ld  lo n g -  
ran g e  gu ided  m i s s i l e s ,  of th e  l o c a l  m an u fac tu re  in  th e  p a s t  
of American des igned  Hawk and N ik e -H ercu le s  a n t i - a i r c r a f t  
m i s s i l e s .  See, B e l la n y ,  op, c i t », p ,5 6 ,
5, L anger ,  op, c i t , ,  p ,2 4 .
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Whatever the  r e a s o n ,  i t  seems c e r t a i n  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  i n  space
r e s e a r c h  w i l l  c o n t in u e  to  grow in  Japan» M oreover, r e c e n t  changes
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  Japanese  space programme w i l l  be more e f f i c i e n t l y
o rg a n is e d ,  b e t t e r  funded and more open to  f o r e ig n  know-how than
in  th e  past»'*' This  prom ises to  g u a ra n te e  Japan  a p la c e  amongst
th e  w o r ld 's  l e a d e r s  in  space re se a rc h »  I t  w i l l  a l s o  mean th a t
J a p a n 's  p o t e n t i a l  to  b u i ld  m i s s i l e s  f o r  m i l i t a r y  purposes  w i l l  
2c o n t in u e  to  grow-
B» A t t i tu d e s  i n  Japan  Towards The Development of 
N uclear Weapons»
U nlike  t h e i r  In d ian  c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  s u c c e s s iv e  Jap an ese
Governments have experienced  l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  ad h e r in g  to
a p o l ic y  of s t r i c t  o p p o s i t io n  to  n u c le a r  weapons» S ince  th e
end of th e  w ar, th e  governm en t 's  s tan d  a g a i n s t  n u c le a r  weapons
has been s t r o n g ly  supported  by th e  o p p o s i t io n  p a r t i e s  i n  th e
Japanese  P a r l iam en t  and by th e  overwhelming m a jo r i t y  of th e
Japanese  people» S ince th e  commencement of n u c le a r  t e s t i n g
by China th e r e  has been some s l i g h t  su p p o r t  f o r  a Jap an ese
c a p a b i l i ty »  At th e  same tim e th e r e  has been  some le s s e n in g
of l e f t - w in g  o p p o s i t io n  to  n u c le a r  weapons» However, g e n e r a l ly
sp eak in g ,  th e  Chinese t e s t s  caused c o n s id e ra b ly  l e s s  concern  in
Japan  than  they  d id  in  In d ia  and , to  t h i s  day , o p p o s i t io n  to
th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons rem ains overwhelming,
A b s te n t io n  from th e  development of n u c le a r  weapons was
im plied  i n  A r t i c l e  9 ( th e  "peace  c l a u s e " )  of th e  Japanese
C o n s t i tu t io n »  This  was c l e a r l y  re a f f i rm e d  in  1961 under th e
1» i b i d », pp»29-30» See a l s o ,  B e l la n y ,  op« c i t », p»56»
2» B e llany  has drawn a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  developm ent i n  Japan  of 
n u c le a r  p ro p u ls io n  r e a c t o r s  f o r ,  amongst o th e r  u s e s ,  a sub­
m e rs ib le  o i l  tanker»  As he s u g g e s t s ,  developm ents such as 
t h i s  could  p la c e  Japan  in  a p o s i t i o n  to  be a b le  to  b u i ld  
n u c le a r  powered subm arines fo r  m i l i t a r y  pu rposes  a t  s h o r t  
n o tice»  See, i b i d »
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te rms of  th e  Second Defence Build-Up P lan  (1962-66) .  Among o th e r
t h i n g s ,  t h e  p la n  s t a t e d  t h a t  Japanese  m i l i t a r y  p r e p a r a t i o n s  were
to  be based  on "defence  a g a i n s t  l o c a l i z e d  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  us ing
only  c o n v e n t io n a l  weapons"., In  1968,  Mr, S a t o ’s Government s e t
f o r t h  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  " t h r e e  n o n -n u c le a r  p r i n c i p l e s " ,  v i z . ,  t h a t
Japan  would no t  p roduce ,  or own, n u c lea r  weapons or permi t  t h e i r
2
e n t r y  i n t o  the  country, , These s e n t im e n t s  were r e a f f i rm e d  i n
J a p a n ' s  f i r s t  White Paper on Defence which was p u b l i sh e d  in  
3
October  1970» In  1966,  one a u t h o r i t y  on Japanese  defence  
q u e s t i o n s  observed t h a t  th e  p o l i c y  of  nuc lea r  a b s t e n t i o n  had 
th e  " s u p p o r t  of the  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  and of  p u b l i c  o p in io n  as
Zj.
a whole"» That same y e a r ,  when Akio Doi,  a former b r i g a d i e r ,  
c a l l e d  f o r  " d e fe n s iv e "  n u c l e a r  weapons» The Times (London) 
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  he was "about  t h e  only  man i n  Japan  to  have put 
such views publicly"»"* In  a r e c e n t  and d e t a i l e d  p ie c e  of 
r e s e a r c h ,  John W el f ie ld  has examined c u r r e n t  Japanese  th in k in g  
on n u c l e a r  weapons.  He found ,  t h a t  even amongst members of 
th e  extreme r i g h t  wing of  the  r u l i n g  L i b e r a l  Democrat ic  P a r t y ,  
t h e r e  has  been no open suppor t  fo r  a Japanese  n u c l e a r  
c a p a b i l i t y » ^  Moreover,  though J a p a n ' s  p r e s s  has  tended  to  
c r i t i c i s e  C h in a ' s  d e c i s i o n  to  become a n u c l e a r  power, t h e r e  
have been  only  a few s u g g e s t io n s  i n  t h e  newspapers t h a t  t h i sg
w i l l  make a g r e a t e r  J apanese  de fen c e  e f f o r t  i n e v i t a b l e o
Amongst d e fence  and f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  s p e c i a l i s t s  and m i l i t a r y
and p o l i t i c a l  commenta tors ,  W e l f i e ld  a g a i n  found th a t  s u p p o r t e r s
9
of a J ap an ese  n u c lea r  c a p a b i l i t y  were a r a r e  phenomenon indeed .
lo Quoted in  Kei Wakaizumi, "The Problem For J a p a n , "  i n  Buchan 
( e d o ) ,  op» e i t . , p,76»
2o The Canberra Times, 22 March 1968.
3» See,  Notes on the  White Paper (some n o te s  i s s u e d  s h o r t l y  
a f t e r  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  Defence White Paper)»
Reproduced i n  S u r v i v a l , Vol» 13,  No» 1, January  1971, p . 5 ,
4» See,  Kei Wakaizumi, i n  Buchan ( e d „ ) ,  op» c i t », p»76,
5» The Times , 26 J u ly  1966»
6» John W e l f i e l d ,  Japan  and Nuclear  C h ina , Canberra Papers  on 
S t r a t e g y  and Defence ,  No» 9, Canber ra :  A»N»U» P r e s s ,  1970.
7« i b i d  . ,  pp .7 -1 1 ,  8» i b i d » , p.,20» 9» ib i d  », p»29.
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So f a r  as  th e  Japanese  p u b l i c  g e n e r a l ly  i s  co nce rned ,  "on ly  a 
m in o r i ty  »»0 advoca tes  in c re a s e d  d e fe n c e  e x p e n d i tu re  and a u to ­
nomous n u c le a r  weapons"»
There would seem to  be two b a s ic  re a so n s  why the  non­
n u c le a r  p o l i c i e s  of s u c c e s s iv e  Japanese  governments have 
r e c e iv e d  such w idespread su p p o r ts  The f i r s t  of th e s e  concerns  
what has sometimes been r e f e r r e d  to  as  th e  " in h e r e n t "  d i s t a s t e  
f o r  n u c le a r  weapons amongst th e  Jap an ese  p e o p le » More th a n  one 
o b se rv e r  has t e s t i f i e d  to  th e  overwhelming s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h i s  
phenomenon., Kei Wakaizumi has  argued t h a t  as  a r e s u l t  of t h e i r  
wartime e x p e r ie n c e s ,  th e  Jap an ese  have come to  h a t e  n u c le a r  
weapons "even  to  th e  p o in t  of n e u ro s is " »  T his  f e e l i n g ,  he has 
added, " i s  s t r o n g e r  and more d eep ly  ro o te d  among th e  Japanese
th a n  i n  any o th e r  n a t io n " ,  and " i s  a pow erfu l d e t e r r e n t  to  any
2
c o n s id e r a t io n  of n a t io n a l  n u c le a r  weapons"» Evidence abounds
3
to  su p p o r t  t h i s  claim» In  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  many of th e  a n t i -
1» ib id » ,  p»36» W e l f i e l d ' s  f i n d in g s  a r e  based on an a n a l y s i s  
of p u b l ic  o p in io n  p o l l s  which have been conducted by th e  
major Tokyo new spapers , th e  Prime M i n i s t e r ' s  O f f i c e ,  and 
s e v e r a l  p r i v a t e  o rg a n iz a t io n s »  For th e  d e t a i l s  of h i s  
a n a l y s i s ,  see I b i d », pp»35-44» W e lf ie ld  has o f f e r e d  a 
word of c a u t io n  about th e s e  p o l l s»  He has p o in te d  to  th e  
" c u r io u s  d i s c r e p a n c ie s "  and th e  " q u i t e  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
r e s u l t s "  which a r e  sometimes ob ta ined»  N e v e r th e le s s ,  he 
has added t h a t  " th e r e  seems to  be enough co rrespondence  
between th e  r e s u l t s  of v a r io u s  p o l l s  to  su g g es t  a c e r t a i n  
deg ree  of r e l i a b i l i t y » "  See i b i d », p»35»
2» Wakaizumi, in  Buchan ( e d » ) ,  op» c i t » ,  p»78»
3» Numerous p u b l i c  o p in io n  p o l l s  have a t t e s t e d  to  th e  s t r e n g t h  
of f e e l in g  a g a i n s t  n u c le a r  weapons in  Japan» For an a n a ly ­
s i s  based on th e  r e s u l t s  of some of th e s e  p o l l s ,  see  
W e l f ie ld ,  op» c i t », pp»40-44» A survey  i n  1958 r e v e a le d  
t h a t  21 per c e n t  of th e  members of J a p a n 's  D ie t  r a t e d  th e  
" f e a r  of n u c le a r  war and d e v a s ta t io n "  as  t h e i r  "p rim ary  
f e a r " .  By c o n t r a s t ,  i n  a s im i l a r  su rv ey ,  no In d ia n  
P a r l i a m e n ta r ia n s  m entioned th e  f e a r  of n u c le a r  war» See 
Lloyd A» F re e ,  O pin ions  of P a r l i a m e n ta r ia n s  in  I n d ia  and 
J a p a n , P r in c e to n :  I n s t i t u t e  For I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S o c ia l  
R esearch ,  1958, pp»15-16» Quoted in  D.H» Mendel, The 
Japanese  P eop le  and F o re ig n  P o l i c y , B erk e ley :  U n iv e r s i ty  
of C a l i f o r n ia  P r e s s ,  1961, p»152, fn»2,
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n u c le a r  movements have begun to  f ragm e n t ,  but the  se n t im e n t s
which gave r i s e  to them co n t in u e  to  f in d  e x p re s s io n  i n  a v a r i e t y
of ways, One has only to  r e c a l l  th e  tu rm o i l  l e a d in g  to the
c a n c e l l a t i o n ,  i n  1968, of v i s i t s  to  Japanese  p o r t s  by American
1
nuc lea r  powered v e s s e l s .  More r e c e n t l y ,  t h e r e  was widespread 
d e n u n c i a t i o n  of s u g g es t io n s  by a sm a l l  group in  the  r i g h t  wing 
of  th e  L i b e r a l  Democratic P a r t y  t h a t  the  U S ,  should be al lowed 
to  r e t a i n  nuc lear  weapons in  Okinawa a f t e r  i t s  r e v e r s i o n  to  
Japan ,  Moreover p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  of every p e r s u a s i o n  remain 
c o n s t a n t l y  aware of  th e  need to  acknowledge t h e  w idespread  
f e a r  and d i s t r u s t  of nu c l e a r  weapons th roughout Japan ,  I t  
seems r e a s o n a b l e  to  assume t h a t ,  w i th  t h e  p as s in g  of t h e  p r e s e n t  
g e n e r a t i o n  of J ap an es e ,  t h i s  somewhat un ique  d i s t a s t e  for  
nuc lea r  weapons may d im in i s h .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to  ex a g g e ra te  i t s  im por tance  i n  t h e  shap ing of  p a s t  and c u r r e n t  
Japanese  a t t i t u d e s  to  n u c l e a r  weapons.
Second, a m a j o r i t y  of  Japanese  do not c o n s id e r  t h a t  t h e i r  
s e c u r i t y  p o s i t i o n  w a r ra n t s  t h e  development of an independen t  
n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n t .  There would seem to  be two re a s o n s  fo r  
t h i s .  F i r s t ,  a r e l u c t a n c e  on th e  p a r t  of many Japanese  to 
see  China as a p a r t i c u l a r l y  g rave  t h r e a t  to  t h e i r  s e c u r i t y ;  
and second,  a b e l i e f  t h a t  any t h r e a t  t h a t  China (or  th e  
Sovie t  Union) does pose ,  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  accounted  f o r  by 
J a p a n ' s  a l l i a n c e  w i th  the  United S t a t e s ,  S cep t ic i sm  about  
the  a l l e g e d  t h r e a t  from China has  been ap p a re n t  i n  a number 
of g u i s e s :  i n  a p p ea ls  to  th e  r a c i a l  and c u l t u r a l  a f f i n i t y
of t h e  Chinese and Japanese  p e o p l e s ,  i n  r e a c t i o n s  of "under ­
s t a n d i n g " ,  though r a r e l y  of  sympathy towards Chinese  nuc lear  
2
t e s t s ;  i n  th e  widespread a c c ep tan c e  i n  Japan  of t h e  p o s s i b i l -
1, For a more le ng thy  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h i s  i s s u e ,  s ee  below, 
Chapter  IX,
2, This  r e a c t i o n  i s  most n o t i c e a b l e  i n  s t a t e m e n t s  by th e  Japan  
S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y  ( JeS .P«)  and t h e  Japan  Communist P a r ty
( J  C - P )  Both p a r t i e s  " r e g r e t t e d "  C h in a ' s  hydrogen bomb
t e s t  but  added t h a t  i t  was " u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  i n  view of the  
world nuc lea r  s i t u a t i o n " .  See,  D a i ly  Summary of  the  
Japanese  P re s s  ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as P S  0 J -P , ) ,
A s a h i , 6 J u ly  1967,
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i t y  of p e a c e fu l  c o - e x i s t e n c e  w ith  C h i n a i n  c la im s  t h a t  C h in a 's
n u c le a r  p o s tu r e  i s  no more th r e a t e n i n g  th a n  R u s s i a ' s ,  and i s
2
th u s  no more d e se rv in g  of n u c le a r  coun te rm easu res  by Japan ; and 
f i n a l l y ,  i n  c r i t i c i s m  of A m erica 's  con ta inm ent p o l i c y  towards 
China,
A tendency  to  s o f t  pedal in  i t s  d e a l in g s  w ith  Peking has 
been c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of Jap an ese  Government p o l ic y  f o r  some time» 
Evidence of t h i s  was apparen t in  o f f i c i a l  Jap an ese  s ta te m e n ts  
a s  e a r l y  as  1952« That y e a r ,  th e  Y oshida C a b in e t ,  having been 
v i r t u a l l y  fo rc e d  by th e  U,S, in to  r e c o g n is in g  Taiwan, n ev e r­
t h e l e s s  adv ised  Washington t h a t :
o6o th e  Jap an ese  Government d e s i r e s  u l t i m a t e l y  to  
have a f u l l  m easure of p o l i t i c a l  peace and commer­
c i a l  i n t e r c o u r s e  w ith  China [P ,R ,C ,]  which i s  
J a p a n 's  c lo s e  n e ig h b o u r ,^
That Tokyo was in  e a rn e s t  abou t i t s  d e s i r e  to  have commercial 
d e a l in g s  w i th  Peking has been borne o u t  by th e  f a c t s :  s in c e
1955, excep t f o r  a b reak  between 1958 and 1962, Japan  has
1, P ro f e s s o r  Masamichi of Kyoto U n iv e r s i t y  has  argued t h a t  the  
absence of t e r r i t o r i a l  d i s p u te s  and th e  l i m i t l e s s  p o s s i ­
b i l i t i e s  f o r  t r a d e  a r e  a f i rm  b a s i s  f o r  p e a c e fu l  co­
e x i s t e n c e  between China and Jap an ,  See , D ,S , 0 , J ,P . ,
Tokyo Shimbun, 13 J u ly  1967,
2, Follow ing  th e  ex p lo s io n  of C h in a 's  f i r s t  atomic bomb in  
October 1964, a L„D,P, com mittee r e p o r te d  on i t s  im p l i ­
c a t io n s  f o r  Japanese  p o l i c y ,  The r e p o r t  sugges ted  t h a t :
" i f  th e  new t h r e a t  t h a t  i s  posed by th e  n u c le a r  c a p a b i l i t y  
of th e  Communist Chinese can be t r e a t e d  b a s i c a l l y  w i th  the  
same a t t i t u d e  as was a p p l ie d  to  th e  S o v ie t  t h r e a t ,  th e n  we 
need only  be concerned w ith  th e  f u r t h e r  development of our 
c u r r e n t  p o s i t i o n " .  Quoted in  Wakaizumi, in  Buchan,
op, c i t , ,  p ,7 9 .  S im i la r  views were exp ressed  by L ,D ,P , 
d ie tm an Ezaki fo l lo w in g  C h in a 's  n u c le a r  m i s s i l e  t e s t  in  
October 1966, See, D. S , 0 , J , P , » M a in ic h i , 28 October 1966,
3, Reproduced in  Sh igeharu  Matsumoto, "Japan  and C h in a ,"  in  
A,M. H a lp e rn ,  P o l i c i e s  Toward C h ina , N. York: McGraw- 
H i l l ,  1965, p ,130 .
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traded extensively with China according to the principle of the 
"separation of politics from economics"» The reticence charac­
teristic of Japan's official attitude towards Peking in these 
early years has clearly survived China's acquisition of nuclear 
weapons» In January 1964, the Foreign Minister, Mr» Ohira, 
commenting on the prospect of China acquiring nuclear weapons, 
noted that Japan was already within range of Russian missiles 
and that the new threat was consequently not too alarming»^- 
In the first Sato-Johnson joint communique which was released 
just three months after China's initial nuclear test, President 
Johnson loudly condemned Peking's "bellicose policies" and 
"expansionist pressure"; by way of contrast, Mr-. Sato merely 
referred to Japan's intention to maintain normal diplomatic
relations with Taiwan and to continue its traditional trade
2policy towards Peking» In March 1967 the Foreign Minister,
Mr» Miki, drew attention to Japan's "deep historical relation­
ship with the Chinese mainland" and emphasised the need to 
"always leave a path open for contact between Japan and
3Communist China » Later that year, despite the detonation 
in June of Peking's first thermo-nuclear device, Defence Agency 
head Masuda went so far as to declare that. China’s nuclear 
weapons were "primitive" and dismissed the proposition that 
they might be used, as "ridiculous"» The Great Cultural 
Revolution in China seems to have had some effect on Japan­
ese attitudes towards Peking: in a speech in Canberra, in
July 1968, Mr» Miki intimated that the turbulent events on the
1» See, Shunsaku Katoo, "Postwar Japanese Security and Re­
armament.: With Special Reference to Japanese-American 
Relations," inD»C»S» Sissons (ed»), Papers on Modern 
Japan, 1968, Canberra: A.N»U» Press, 1968, p»62»
2» Welfield, op» clt», p»5»
3* The Japan Times, 15 March 1967»
4» Welfield, op» eit», pp»5-6»
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m ainland has  induced a "vague sen se  of u n e a s in e s s "  amongst th e  
Japanese  p e o p l e d  N e v e r th e le s s ,  he s t i l l  s t r e s s e d  th e  
" a f f i n i t y "  many Japanese  f e l t  towards China and i t s  p eo p le  and 
no ted  th e  "very  s t ro n g "  f e e l in g  i n  Japan  t h a t  Tokyo "shou ld  
p la y  an in te rm e d ia ry  r o l e  toward im proving U,So-China r e l a t i o n s . "  
Far from denouncing China, Mr. Miki m ere ly  observed t h a t ,  "w h ile  
r e c o g n i t io n  of th e  Peking Government [was] s t i l l  too  p rem a tu re ,  
economic, c u l t u r a l  and p e rs o n a l  exchange and c o n ta c t  should  be 
expanded".
The Japanese  Government’s p o l i c y  towards China has
re c e iv e d  g e n e ra l  support from th e  s t ro n g  r ig h t -w in g  f a c t i o n
2
i n  th e  r u l i n g  L .D .P . However, th e  r e l a t i v e l y  sm all  l e f t - w in g  
f a c t i o n  has tended to  favour a d i f f e r e n t  l i n e .  W hile r a r e l y  
ad v o ca tin g  th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  of th e  s e c u r i t y  agreem ent w ith  th e  
U .S . ,  i t  has n e v e r th e le s s  been c r i t i c a l  of th e  p u re ly  m i l i t a r y  
approach  to  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i t y  e v id e n t  i n  some of th e  s t a t e ­
ments and p u b l i c a t i o n s  of r ig h t -w in g  e le m e n ts .  In  r e g a rd  to  
China , th e  l e f t - w in g  f a c t i o n  has s t r e s s e d  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  
c h a r a c te r  of th e  Chinese r e v o lu t io n  ( i n  c o n t r a s t  to  th e  heavy 
emphasis on th e  i d e o lo g ic a l  f a c t o r  i n  many of th e  r ig h t -w in g  
f a c t i o n ' s  p ronouncem ents) ,  th e  e s s e n t i a l l y  d e f e n s iv e  n a tu re  
of C h ina’s m i l i t a r y  p r e p a r a t io n s  and th e  im portance  of t r a d e  
and c u l t u r a l  c o n ta c t s  in  b r in g in g  abou t p e a c e fu l  c o - e x i s t e n c e  
between China and Jap an .  The l e f t - w i n g  f a c t i o n ' s  lo n g -h e ld  
view  t h a t  Japan  should  a c t  as a b r id g e  between China and the
U.S. has been s t r e s s e d  w ith  even g r e a t e r  f i rm n ess  s in c e  China
3
commenced d eve lop ing  n u c le a r  weapons. N e i th e r  th e  r i g h t  
nor th e  l e f t  wing f a c t i o n s  of th e  L .D .P . seem to  b e l ie v e  th a t
1. " J a p a n 's  F o re ig n  P o l i c y ,"  speech by F o re ig n  M in is te r  Takeo 
Miki a t  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  N a tio n a l  U n iv e r s i t y ,  29 J u ly  1968,
p H 10 9
2. For a d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  of views w i th i n  th e  r i g h t  wing 
f a c t i o n  of the  L. DP»  on China and th e  Japan -U .S .  s e c u r i t y  
ag reem en t,  see  W e l f ie ld ,  op. c l t 0 , p p .7 -1 1 .
3. i b i d . , p p .11-12 .
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China  c o n s t i t u t e s  an im m edia te  t h r e a t  t o  J a p a n ,  However , t h e y  
do so f o r  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n s :  t h e  f o r m e r ,  p r i m a r i l y  b e c a u s e  of
J a p a n ’ s a l l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  U , S , ;  t h e  l a t t e r ,  b e c a u s e  China 
a l l e g e d l y  h a s  no a g g r e s s i v e  d e s i g n s  on J a p a n ,  As W e l f i e l d  
h a s  s u g g e s t e d ,  t h e  " p r e c i s e  s t r e n g t h s  o f  t h e  two c o n t e n d i n g  
g roups  and t h e  c h a r a c t e r  and i n c l i n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  mass 
a t  any g i v e n  t ime  a r e  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e r m i n e " i t  i s  
c l e a r  t h o u g h ,  t h a t  t h e  l e f t - w i n g  f a c t i o n  r e p r e s e n t s  a m i n o r i t y ?  
What i s  r e a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a b o u t  t h e s e  d i v i s i o n s ,  i s  t h a t  even 
w i t h i n  J a p a n ' s  r u l i n g  p a r t y ,  t h e r e  i s  some l e f t - w i n g  c r i t i c i s m  
of  what  i s  i n  any c a s e  a r e l a t i v e l y  m o d e r a t e  p o l i c y  to wards  
Ch ina ,
Though t h e  J a p a n e s e  Government  has  ad o p te d  a f a i r l y  
low-keyed  a p p ro a c h  i n  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  P e k i n g ,  i t s  r e l u c t a n c e  
t o  s e v e r  t h e  l i n k s  be tw een  Tokyo and Ta iwan,  and i n s t e a d ,  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  m a i n l a n d ,  h a s  b rough t  
i t  i n  f o r  s t r o n g  c r i t i c i s m  from e l e m e n t s  w i t h i n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
P a r l i a m e n t ,  P r e e m i n e n t  amongst  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c r i t i c s  
of  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t ’ s China  p o l i c y  has  been  t h e  J a p a n  S o c i a l i s t  
P a r t y  ( J oS 0P . ) ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  of  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s ,  The 
JoSoP,  h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  a d v o c a t e d  t h e  a d m i s s i o n  of  P e k ing  t o  
t h e  UoNo, t h e  s e v e r a n c e  o f  t i e s  w i t h  Ta iwan,  and t h e  e s t a b ­
l i s h m e n t  of  normal d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  J a p a n  and t h e  
2
PoRoC,  Though i t  h a s  condemned C h i n a ’ s n u c l e a r  t e s t s ,  t h e  
J , S  P,  has  be e n  c a r e f u l  t o  em phas i se  t h a t  i t  i s  opposed t o  
t e s t s  by a l l  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  a s  w e l l .  M oreove r ,  i t  h a s  con­
s i s t e n t l y  a l l e g e d  t h a t  China  has  been  d r i v e n  to  d e v e lo p  
n u c l e a r  weapons b e c a u s e  of  A m e r i c a ' s  m i l i t a r y  p r e s e n c e  i n  A s i a ,
1 ,  i b i d , ,  p , 1 3 ,
2, Sh ige ha ru  Matsumoto i n  H a l p e r n ,  op ,  c i t , ,  p p , 140 -141 ,
3,  See e s p e c i a l l y ,  s t a t e m e n t  by t h e  C e n t r a l  E x e c u t i v e  of  t h e  
J c S , P , Reproduced i n  D, S »0 , J , P , ,  A s a h i , 29 October  196^,
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Finally, it is interesting to note that in 1968 some elements in 
the JoSoPo were critical of the Tripartite Proposal on Security 
Assurances partly because they believed the measure was too 
obviously directed at containing C h i n a I n  addition to the 
JoSoPo, all the other opposition parties, as well as the 
country’s major newspapers, have been pressing for some time
2for the normalization of relations between Tokyo and Peking»
Public opinion polls also show a majority in favour of closer 
3ties with China» The disagreement on the matter, between
these elements on the one hand, and the government on the other,
has made the question of policy towards China one of the most
important issues in Japanese politics» President Nixon’s
announcement, in July 1971, that he intended to visit Peking
acutely embarrassed the Japanese Government; the situation
was aggravated by the fact that Tokyo was advised of the
American decision only minutes before President Nixon’s 4announcement» The whole affair seemed to indicate that 
Washington was either insensitive or indifferent to the 
significance of the debate in Japan over policy towards China»
In summary, though there has been some disagreement in 
Japan about Tokyo’s relations with Peking, there is little 
evidence to suggest that Japanese people as a whole have
1» D »S»0»J»P », Mainichi, 9 March 1968» The reference to the 
Tripartite Proposal on Security Assurances is to the 
resolution on security assurances sponsored by the U»S», 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and which was adopted 
by the Security Council in June 1968» For the text of 
the tripartite resolution, see Appendix V.
2» Morton H» Halperin, "America and Asia: The Impact of 
Nixon’s China Policy," in Roderick MacFarquhar (edc), 
Sino-American Relations, 1949-71, New York: Praeger, 1972, 
p»ll»
3» Welfield, op» cit», p„38»
4» Halperin, in MacFarquhar (ed»),op0 cit., p»12»
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regarded China as a particularly serious threat to their country's 
security« This factor has undoubtedly contributed towards the 
disinclination in Japan towards the development of nuclear 
weapons«
Evidence suggests that the Japan-U.S, Security Treaty is 
another important factor in the opposition to nuclear weapons 
in Japan« It has been commonly argued that it is unnecessary 
for Japan to arm itself with atomic and hydrogen weapons as the 
country is already covered by the nuclear guarantee implicit 
in the American alliance« This particular justification for 
a non-nuclear Japan appears to have had the support of 
substantial majorities in the government, the L.DnP, and the 
Self-Defence Agency- Moreover, China's development of nuclear 
weapons seems to have done little to alter this attitude.
Three months after Peking’s first nuclear test, Mr, Sato made 
clear his views on the value of the American alliance« The 
Prime Minister said:
The existing Security Treaty takes all possible 
contingencies into consideration, I think it 
is because this Security Treaty exists that Japan 
has not become nervous about China's nuclear 
test. There are views in some quarters that the 
Security Treaty should be abrogated or that some 
special relationship should be established with 
Communist China, Yet those who put forward their 
views should reflect that it is because of the 
present. Security Treaty system that Japanese are 
not in a state of apprehension,1
Since then, Tokyo has reaffirmed its faith in the alliance
with Washington on a number of occasions, In August 1966,
the Director of the Self-Defence Agency claimed that any
2attack on Japan would amount to an attack upon the U«S,
1« See, statement by Mr, Sato during a press conference 
in January 1965, Quoted in Welfield, op, cit,, p,3, 
2, The Japan Times, 31 August 1966,
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Following C h in a 's  t e s t  of  a hydrogen bomb in  June 1967,  Tokyo
1
a g a in  s t r o n g l y  r e a f f i r m e d  i t s  f a i t h  in  th e  American a l l i a n c e ,
In  August of t h a t  y e a r ,  J a p a n ' s  F o re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  Mr, Miki ,
observed t h a t  though the  d r a f t  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  under
2
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  Geneva made no p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  of 
n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s ,  t h e r e  was no cause  f o r  J apanese  a n x i e ty
3
on t h e  m a t t e r  because  of th e  c o u n t r y ' s  a l l i a n c e  w i th  t h e  U,S.
During th e  Upper House e l e c t i o n  campaign i n  June 1968, Mr,
4Sato s t r o n g l y  suppor ted  th e  S e c u r i t y  T r e a t y ,  and th e  govern­
m e n t ' s  s uccess  i n  t h a t  p o l l  was widely  i n t e r p r e t e d  as a vo te  
of con f ide nce  i n  t h e  a l l i a n c e  w i th  th e  U.S ,^  Tokyo 's  a t t i t u d e  
to  t h e  T r i p a r t i t e  P ro p o sa l  on S e c u r i t y  Assurances  i s  f u r t h e r  
t e s t im ony  of i t s  co n f id e n ce  i n  t h e  American a l l i a n c e .  The 
th ree -power  i n i t i a t i v e ,  of March 1968, was welcomed by Japan 
as encouraging  ev idence  of S o v ie t -U .S ,  p e a c e fu l  c o - e x i s t e n c e  
and as a u s e f u l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  towards  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  of a 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreement.  However, government spokesmen 
emphasised t h a t  because  Japan  was a l r e a d y  covered  by th e  
American n u c l e a r  u m b re l l a ,  t h e  th ree -pow er  s e c u r i t y  a r r a n g e -
ß
ment r e p r e s e n t e d  no r e a l  a d d i t i o n  to  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  s e c u r i t y .
During 1969 and 1970, t h e r e  appea rs  to  have been no 
l e s s e n i n g  of  s u p p o r t  i n  Tokyo f o r  the  a l l i a n c e  w i th  t h e  U S ,  
When agreement was re a c h e d ,  i n  November 1969,  on terms fo r
1. D . S . O . J . P . , S a n k e i ,  28 June 1967.
2, This  was a r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  i d e n t i c a l  bu t  s e p a r a t e  d r a f t s  
subm it ted  by R uss ia  and t h e  U.S.  i n  August ,  1967,
3» The Japan  Times , 30 August 1967,
4. The A u s t r a l i a n , 16 June 1968,
5. The Sydney Morning H era ld ,  9 J u ly  1968,
6. D .S , 0 . J , P », M a i n i c h i , 9 March 1968; S a n k e i , 8 March 1968; 
and Y om iur i , 8 March 1968,
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th e  r e v e r s io n  of Okinawa to  Japan,'*' Tokyo emphasised t h a t  " th e
p resen ce  of U nited  S ta te s  f o r c e s  in  th e  Far E as t c o n s t i t u t e d  a
2
m ains tay  fo r  th e  s t a b i l i t y  of th e  a r e a , "  Both governments 
r e a f f i rm e d  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  to  m a in ta in  th e  e x i s t i n g  1960 
s e c u r i t y  t r e a t y  "on th e  b a s i s  of m utual t r u s t  and common
3
e v a lu a t io n  of th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n " .  About a month
a f t e r  th e  Okinawa s e t t l e m e n t ,  Mr, S a to ' s  L ib e r a l  Democratic
P a r ty  (L D0P ,)  won a conv inc ing  v i c t o r y  in  J a p a n 's  11 th  p o s t -
4
war g e n e ra l  e l e c t i o n .  The L,DoP, fo u g h t th e  e l e c t i o n  p r im a r i ly  
on th e  b a s i s  of th e  governm ent 's  s u c c e s s f u l  n e g o t i a t i o n  of th e  
Okinawa i s s u e  and on th e  m ain tenance  of th e  Japan-U .S . s e c u r i t y  
a rrangem ent.  I t s  v i c to r y  was w idely  i n t e r p r e t e d  as  a h a rb in g e r
1, For th e  t e x t  of th e  U nited  S ta t e s - J a p a n  J o i n t  Communique 
on Okinawa, see  C urren t Notes on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s , 
C anberra : Department of F o re ig n  A f f a i r s  ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to  as C, N, I ,A, ) ,  Vol, 40, No, 11, November 1969, p p ,664-667, 
The term s of th e  Okinawa s e t t l e m e n t  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  
i n  the  c o n te x t  of American n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y  in  A s ia ,  
See below, Chapter X« *
2, CcNoI, A, , Vol, 40, No. 11, November 1969, p ,665 ,
3, i b i d , ,  p ,665 ,
4, The r e s u l t s  of th e  e l e c t i o n  to  th e  Lower House of th e  
Japanese  P a r l ia m e n t  were as  fo l lo w s :
S ea ts  held S ea ts  held
a f t e r  1967 a f t e r  1969
e l e c t i o n e l e c t i o n
L ib e r a l  D emocratic P a r ty 277 288
Japan  S o c i a l i s t  P a r ty 140 90
Komeito P a r ty 25 47
Japan  Communist P a r ty 5 14
D emocratic S o c i a l i s t  P a r ty ao 31
S ix te e n  Independen ts  were e l e c te d  in  1969, bu t 12 of th e s e  
have s in c e  been fo rm a l ly  accep ted  as  L ,D ,P , members, 
g iv in g  th e  L ,D .P , a t o t a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  in  th e  Lower House 
of 300 s e a t s .
Source: C,N, I A , ,  Vol, 40, No, 12, December 1969, p ,703 .
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of close co-operation between Tokyo and Washington in the 1970s0 
In June 1970, the Japan-U,S. security agreement was renewed» A 
cabinet communique issued at the time faithfully reflected the 
Japanese Government's thinking on the significance of the 
alliance for Japan's security. The communique said:
,,, no nation in today's world can expect to 
maintain its security by itself. The best 
conceivable way to secure national existence 
and development, ,,, is to build up our self- 
defence power in consonance with national 
capabilities, and to ensure the peace and 
security of the Far East including Japan by 
the Japanese-American security system,^
In the White Paper on Defence published in October 1970, Tokyo
reaffirmed that, so far as nuclear threats or large scale
conventional attacks were concerned, Japan would continue to
rely upon the deterrent power of its alliance with the 
3United States,
Though the government and the L,D»P. seems to have strongly
supported the American alliance, there appears to have been
much less enthusiasm for the treaty amongst the Japanese people
as a whole. The JoS.P, has urged immediate abrogation of the
security treaty with the U.S» and the adoption by Japan of a
policy of neutralism, (The idea of a four-power-U,S», Russia,
China, Japan - treaty to guarantee Japanese neutrality has
4been official J.S.P, policy ever since 1955. ) The Komeito
Party ("Clean Government" Party), the second largest of the 
opposition groups, has, in recent years, also called for the
1, The Australian, 29 December 1969,
2» As reported in The Australian, 23 June 1970,
3, See, Notes on the White Paper (some notes issued shortly 
after the publication of the White Paper on Defence), 
Reproduced in, Survival, Vol, 13, No. 1, January 1971, p»5,
4, See, JoAoA. Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and 
Neutralism, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1968, 
p»132.
166
dissolution of the pact with the U,S.^ The Democratic Socialist 
Party (D„S,P.)seems to have fewer reservations about the American
alliance but nevertheless favours the gradual withdrawal from
2Japan of all U.,S» bases» The Japan Communist Party (J C.P ),
the smallest of the opposition groups, favours immediate
abrogation of the Japan-UoS» security agreement» But this lack
of enthusiasm for the alliance does not seem to have been
confined to the opposition parties in the Japanese Parliament»
Public opinion polls have indicated that, amongst people
generally, there has been considerable anxiety about the security
treaty system and especially about the presence in Japan of
American bases; there has been widespread support, in these
polls, for a policy of neutrality for Japan in the confront-
3ation between the U,S* and the Communist powers»
In view of this evidence of antagonism towards the
security treaty it seems conceivable that some future Japanese
government formed by the J»S»P» or a coalition of left-wing
4parties might renounce the alliance with the U„S» However,
1« See, The Australian, 16 June 1968; Young C» Kim, "Okinawa 
Reversion as an Issue in Japanese Politics," in Orbis,
Voir. 12, No» 4, Winter 1969, p»1159; and Goto Motoo, 
"Crisis in Japan-U-S, Relations," in Japan Quarterly,
Vol» 15, No» 4, October-December, 1968, p»424»
2* The Australian, 16 June 1968,
3= Welfield, op» cit„, pp,35-38, and 46»
4o The political fortunes of the J»S»P» have actually slumped 
in the last two or three years, In elections to the Upper 
House of the Japanese Parliament in July 1968 the party 
lost eight seats» Later, in elections to the Lower House 
in December 1969, the Js^.Po lost considerable ground in 
securing only 90 seats in comparison with 140 seats at 
the previous election» See, "Trends and Topics: The 
House of Councillors Election," in Japan Quarterly, Vol» 
15, No» 4, October-December 1968, p»415; and, C »N 1 ,A,, 
Vol» 40, No» 12, December 1969, p»703»
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regardless of the fact that the existence of the Japan-U.S. 
security treaty has been put forward as a reason for Japan’s 
non-nuclear stance, its abrogation by the socialists (rather 
than, say, by a right-wing group) would probably not, of itself, 
increase very much the likelihood that Japan would acquire 
nuclear weapons. There is an acute sensitivity, amongst the 
socialists, towards the anti-nuclear feelings of the Japanese 
people. Moreover, pacifist and neutralist sentiment is 
strong in socialist circles in Japan. Other things being 
equal, it seems unlikely that a left-wing government, 
especially one dominated by the J.S.P., would opt for nuclear 
weapons. It is worth noting, however, that the abrogation of 
the Japan-U.S. security treaty, to the extent that such action 
removed the nuclear cover over Japan implicit in that treaty, 
would make it easier for those elements in Japan who do 
support the acquisition of an independent deterrent to say 
as much openly.
The question about what direction future thinking in 
Japan about nuclear weapons might take, is one, of course, 
which deserves closer examination than that which has so far 
been accorded it. However, before attempting this, it will 
be useful to look at Japanese policy towards arms control.
C. Japan and Arms Control
For about five years after the end of World War II, 
discussion of nuclear weapons in Japan was dominated by 
spokesmen of pacifist-internationalist or "humanist" 
orientation.1 There were two main reasons for this:
1. A.M. Halpern,, Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Atomic 
Weapons, RM-1331, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 
1954, p.l.
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th e  c o u n t r y 's  r e c e n t  m i l i t a r y  d e f e a t  and th e  subsequen t d e c l in e  
in  th e  p r e s t i g e  and in f lu e n c e  of th e  Jap an ese  m i l i t a r y  c l a s s ;  
and, th e  n u c le a r  a t t a c k s  on H iroshim a and N agasaki which had 
r a i s e d  in  th e  Japanese  p eo p le  a un ique  and profound f e a r  of th e  
atomic bomb. Thinking about n u c le a r  weapons in  Japan  a t  t h i s  
time was c h a r a c te r i s e d  by th e  fo l lo w in g  a s s e r t i o n s :  t h a t  the
atom ic bomb was an e s p e c i a l l y  d r e a d f u l  weapqn; t h a t  f u t u r e  wars 
would most l i k e l y  be n u c le a r ;  t h a t  c o n s e q u e n t ly ,  t h e r e  was an 
u rg e n t  need f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c t i o n  to  p re v e n t  war; and t h a t  
th e  Jap an ese  peop le  had a s p e c i a l  r i g h t  to  a say in  m a t te r s  
r e l a t i n g  to  n u c le a r  w e a p o n s I t  has a l r e a d y  been no ted  t h a t  
some of th e s e  a s s e r t i o n s  c o n t in u e  to  c h a r a c t e r i s e  Japanese  
th in k in g  about n u c le a r  weapons to  t h i s  day. I t  i s  th e  purpose  
of t h i s  p a r t  of th e  a n a l y s i s  to  examine th e  impact of th e s e  
and s im i la r  a t t i t u d e s  on Jap an ese  p o l i c y  tow ards arms c o n t r o l .
J a p a n 's  e a r l i e s t  i n i t i a t i v e s  in  th e  f i e l d  of n u c le a r  arms
c o n t ro l  were aimed a t  s e c u r in g  world  wide su sp e n s io n  of atom ic
and hydrogen bomb t e s t s .  The t e s t  e x p lo s io n  i s s u e  was of
s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  to  th e  J a p a n e s e .  S ince  as  e a r ly  as 1946,
th e  U.S. had been conduc ting  n u c le a r  t e s t s  in  th e  former
Japanese-m andated  M arsh a ll  I s l a n d s .  For a w h i le ,  t h e r e  was
l i t t l e  c r i t i c i s m  in  Japan  of th e s e  t e s t s  bu t t h i s  a l t e r e d
a f t e r  th e  c o n c lu s io n  of th e  Peace T re a ty  in  1951, an event
which had th e  e f f e c t  of r e l e a s i n g  many Jap an ese  from t h e i r
r e lu c t a n c e  to  c r i t i c i s e  American a c t i o n s .  Then came th e
2
Fukuryu Maru ("Lucky Dragon") i n c i d e n t .  T h is  provoked 
w idespread  d e n u n c ia t io n s  of American t e s t s ,  and t h e r e a f t e r  
th e  Jap an ese  p re s s  h e a d l in e d  every  t e s t  s e r i e s  and a l l
1. i b i d . , p p .1 -4 .
2. This  occu rred  when th e  U.S. conducted  a hydrogen bomb t e s t  
i n  th e  P a c i f i c  in  March 1954. The tuna  b o a t  Fukuryu Maru, 
which was c r u i s i n g  w e l l  o u t s id e  th e  e s t a b l i s h e d  danger 
zone was showered by r a d i o a c t i v e  v o lc a n ic  ash  from the  
u n ex p ec ted ly  wide f a l l o u t .  See , D.H» Mendel, op. c i t . ,  
p .1 5 5 .
169
s c i e n t i f i c  warnings about f a l l o u t  damage to  crops  and f is h » ^
In  1956 th e re  were a number of R uss ian  and American t e s t s  in
S o v ie t  A sia  and th e  W estern  P a c i f i c  r e s p e c t iv e ly «  M oreover,
B r i t i s h  t e s t s ,  in c lu d in g  t h a t  of a hydrogen bomb were scheduled
f o r  th e  summer of 1957 in  th e  P a c i f ic »  These developm ents
sparked  o f f  a new round of Japanese  p r o t e s t s  in  W ashington,
London and Moscow« In  1961, when R uss ia  resumed t e s t i n g  a f t e r
a t h r e e  y ea r  u n i l a t e r a l  m ora to rium , Japan  b i t t e r l y  condemned
th e  S o v ie t  d e c i s i o n ,  adding  t h a t  i t  "n o t  on ly  b e t r a y  Led] th e
e a r n e s t  p ray e r  of a l l  th e  p eo p le  of Jap an ,  b u t  m e r c i l e s s l y
tram p le [d ]  on th e  p r a y e r f u l  hopes f o r  peace of a l l  p eo p le  who
2
f e a r  war and love  peace«" Throughout t h i s  p e r io d ,  th e  two 
m ajor p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  in  Japan  ( th e  L„D.P. and J .S o P .)  
u s u a l ly  c lo sed  ranks to  oppose n u c le a r  t e s t s ,  a l th o u g h  S o c ia l ­
i s t  spokesmen sometimes grumbled t h a t  th e  government was
3
l e t h a r g i c  and in s in c e r e  on th e  m a tte r»
In  1957, Japan  was ad m itted  to  th e  U.N» and i t  was
obvious from th e  s t a r t  t h a t  Tokyo was determ ined  to  u se  i t s
v o ic e  i n  th e  world body to  draw a t t e n t i o n  to  n u c le a r  weapons
t e s t s ,  to  encourage th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o n t r o l  over them, and i f  p o s s i b l e ,  to  h e lp  b r in g  about th e
4
su sp e n s io n  of a tm ospheric  t e s t s  a l t o g e t h e r .  In  i t s  f i r s t  
y ear  as  a member of th e  world  body Japan  jo in e d  Norway and 
Canada in  sponso ring  a r e s o l u t i o n  aimed a t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  "a 
system f o r  advance r e g i s t r a t i o n  w ith  th e  U nited  N a tio n s  of 
n u c le a r  t e s t  explosions»" '*  In  1958, i n  th e  F i r s t  Committee
1. i b i d . , p»156»
2» Quoted i n ,  Robert V» E d in g to n ,  "Japan  in  th e  U nited  N ations  
on th e  I s s u e  of N uc lea r  Weapons," unpub lished  Ph.D, t h e s i s ,  
U n iv e r s i ty  of W ashington ( S e a t t l e ) ,  1968, p,130»
3» Mendel, op« c i t . ,  p .157 .
4. E d ing ton , op« c i t », p .4 7 .
5. i b i d . , pp«49-52„
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of the General Assembly, Japan submitted a resolution on disarma­
ment which implored the Disarmament Commission to direct itself 
to the problem of supervision and inspection; another clause in 
this resolution amounted to an appeal for a one year moratorium 
on nuclear weapons tests»^ The following year, Japan joined in
co-sponsoring a resolution condemning the projected French 
2nuclear tests» Two years later, in 1961, it participated in
sponsoring another resolution which stressed the urgency of
halting nuclear tests and which especially appealed to Russia
to refrain from carrying out its projected test of a 50 megaton 
3weapon»
Sometimes during this period, Japan’s desire for an end to 
nuclear testing brought it into conflict with the U»S, As 
Tokyo was reluctant to antagonise its powerful ally, Japan 
often had to compromise on disarmament matters: the registra­
tion proposal of 1957 was a compromise between a Soviet demand 
for a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests and Western 
insistence that any such moratorium should be part of a larger 
disarmament plan;^ Japan's own moratorium proposal of 1958, 
which included inspection and supervision provisions, was also 
a compromise between the Soviet and Western positions»^ This 
tension between policy objectives was something with which 
Japan had to often cope prior to the conclusion of the test 
ban treaty in 1963»
The latter agreement was thus doubly welcome to Japan»
In the first it helped resolve the conflict between policy 
objectives mentioned above; but more importantly, it ended 
the struggle for the single most important aspect of Japan's 
foreign policy in regard to nuclear weapons» Russia, Britain
1 » ibid», pp»83-84» 2» ibid», pp,119-120»
3»
5»
ibid», 
ibid»,
p»131» 
pp »87-88»
4» ibid», pp »47-49»
1.71
and th e  U0S. had a t  l a s t  made form al a s s u ra n c e s  t h a t  a tm o sp h e r ic  
t e s t s  in  A sia and th e  P a c i f i c  would cease« Tokyo was c o n s e q u e n t ly  
an e n t h u s i a s t i c  su p p o r te r  of th e  t e s t  ban and v ig o ro u s ly  advoca ted  
th e  e a r ly  c o n c lu s io n  of a com prehensive agreem ent s u b s c r ib e d  to
Though i t  tended to  c o n c e n t r a te  on th e  t e s t  s u sp e n s io n  
i s s u e ,  Japan  n e v e r th e le s s  ag reed  t h a t  th e  u l t im a te  g o a l  should  
be a com prehensive agreement to  c o n t r o l  th e  use  and p ro d u c t io n  
of n u c le a r  weapons« I t  was fo r  t h i s  re a s o n  th a t  Tokyo empha­
s i s e d  th e  n e c e s s i t y  of a com prehensive t e s t  ban« M oreover, 
in  1957 and 1958, w h ile  su g g e s t in g  v a r io u s  schemes f o r  th e  
r e g i s t r a t i o n  of n u c le a r  t e s t s ,  Japan  v ig o ro u s ly  su p p o r ted
W estern p ro p o s a ls  fo r  a " c u t - o f f "  in  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of
2f i s s i o n a b l e  m a te r i a l  f o r  weapons purposes« In  re g a rd  to
n u c l e a r - f r e e  zones, Japan  was somewhat more cau t io u s«  A s ia ,
3
i t  tended  to  em phasise, could  no t q u a l i f y  as  such an area«
I t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  to  a rgue  t h a t  on t h i s  i s s u e  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
Japan  was in f lu e n c e d  by i t s  dependence on th e  U nited  S t a t e s :  
th e  d e s ig n a t io n  of th e  A sian  and P a c i f i c  r e g io n  as  a n u c le a r  
f r e e  zone could l i m i t  A m erica’s s t r a t e g i c  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  th e  
a re a  and co n seq u en tly  red u ce  i t s  c a p a c i ty  to  defend  Ja p a n ,  
Tokyo’s i n t e r e s t  i n  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  as  d i s t i n c t  from 
th e  t e s t  ban or w ider disarm ament i s s u e s ,  p robab ly  d a t e s  
from about 1960, That year  Japan  jo in e d  fo u r  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  
in  sponso ring  a G eneral Assembly r e s o l u t i o n  c a l l i n g  upon a l l  
governments to  make every  e f f o r t  to  ach iev e  permanent a g r e e ­
ment on th e  p r e v e n t io n  of th e  w ider d i s s e m in a t io n  of n u c le a r  
4
weapons. E a r ly  in  1965 Tokyo in d ic a te d  t h a t  i t s  su p p o r t  f o r  
a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreem ent would be c o n d i t io n a l  upon th e
by a l l 1
1, i b i d , ,  p , 143.
3, i b i d , , p p , 147-8
2, i b i d ,
4, i b i d « ,  p ,148
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p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  a l l  th e  n u c l e a r  powers,  in c lu d in g  F rance  and
China,  and on th e  c o n c lu s io n  of a comprehensive t e s t  ban,'*'
Sometime l a t e r ,  i n  October 1966,  J a p a n ’s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  the
UoN, General  Assembly 's  F i r s t  Committee expressed  th e  hope t h a t
t h e  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreement t h e n  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  would
2
p la c e  some o b l i g a t i o n  on t h e  n u c lea r  powers to  disarm»
During t h i s  e a r l y  pe r io d  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  about  a non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y ,  Tokyo 's  say on t h e  m a t t e r  was l i m i t e d  
because  i t  was not  a member of th e  EoN,D,C, However, th rough  
v igo rous  d ip lo m a t ic  a c t i v i t y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  1967,  Japan  
acqua in ted  i t s e l f  w i th  c u r r e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  on a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
agreement and drew i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a t t e n t i o n  to  i t s  own views on
th e  proposed t r e a t y ,  S p e c i a l  envoys were d i s p a t c h e d  to  d i s c u s s
3
th e  i s s u e  w i th  the  governments of  seven  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s
4
and w i th  disarmament n e g o t i a t o r s  a t  Geneva, Apar t  from the  
d i s c u s s i o n s  between Japan  and th e  U . S , t h e  most im por tan t  
of t h e s e  c o n t a c t s  were th o se  w i th  Bonn, Japan  and West 
Germany had much i n  common in  r e g a rd  to  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of non- 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  Both c o u n t r i e s  p lanned  to  be major u s e r s  of 
nuc lea r  energy f o r  p e a c e fu l  pu rposes  and co n s eq u en t ly  had more 
than  a p a s s in g  i n t e r e s t  in  the  c h a r a c t e r  of  th e  i n s p e c t i o n  
and p e a c e fu l  u se s  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  proposed n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
agreement .  Moreover,  West Germany, l i k e  Japan ,  was not  a 
member of th e  E I n  a s t a t e m e n t  i s sued  a f t e r  a v i s i t  
t o  Tokyo by the  West German Vice C hance l lo r  Wi l ly  Brandt i n  
May 1967, s t r e s s  was l a i d  on th e  v a l u e  of  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  between
1, The Japan  Times,  5 January  1967,
2, i b i d ,
3, The UoS0, R u s s ia ,  Sweden, S w i t z e r l a n d ,  I n d i a ,  I t a l y ,  West 
Germany,
4, In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w i th  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of Roumania, B r a z i l  
and Canada,
5, The l e v e l  and n a t u r e  of  th e  c o n t a c t s  between the  U,S,  and 
Japan  on the  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  i s  a q u e s t i o n  of some 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of American e f f o r t s  to  l i m i t  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n  A s i a ,  The m a t t e r  w i l l  be taken  up l a t e r  
i n  t h e  th e s i s »  See Chapter  XI,
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Tokyo and Bonn over the nonproliferation agreement« Moreover, it 
was emphasised that the proposed treaty should in no way hinder 
the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and 
should place some obligation on the nuclear powers to disarm«^
It was reported that an important objective of Japanese diplomatic 
activity in 1967, was to prevent the EaN^D.C« from drafting a 
treaty which would only serve the interests of the nuclear powers« 
The draft N,P»T« which was agreed upon by Russia and the 
U,So in March 1968 was considered at a special meeting of the 
General Assembly in May of that year« At this gathering, Tokyo 
welcomed some of the changes which had been written into the 
latest version of the treaty and reaffirmed its wholehearted 
support for the spirit of the agreement« However, Japan was 
in no hurry to sign the N»P,T« At the General Assembly 
meeting, the Japanese delegate indicated thac his government 
was still troubled by aspects of the treaty relating to 
security guarantees, nuclear power disarmament, review 
conferences, inspection procedures, and provisions for the 
peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy« At the end of the 
General Assembly debate in May 1968, Japan supported the 
resolution endorsing the draft nonproliferation agreement« 
However, Tokyo did not sign the NoP«T« until February 1970 
and has still not ratified it»
Tokyo's procrastination over the N„P»T» needs to be 
explained» After all, Japan had been a keen supporter of 
many nuclear arms control measures in the past and its res­
ponse to the test ban treaty in particular had been swift 
and positive» Amongst the more obvious explanations for 
Tokyo's behaviour was the general lack of enthusiasm for the 
1» The Japan Times, 13 May 1967«
2» Kyodo News Agency, 23 February 1967, Quoted in Elizabeth 
Young, The Control of Proliferation: The 1968 Treaty in 
Hindsight and Forecast, London: The Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1969, p«9.
174
NoPoTo in  Japan* With one e x c e p t io n ,^  a l l  of th e  o p p o s i t io n
2p a r t i e s  were opposed to  th e  ag reem en t,  as were l a r g e  segments
of th e  n a t i o n ’ s p ress*  In  view  of t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  s t ro n g
a n t i - n u c l e a r  s ta n c e ,  the  a t t i t u d e s  of th e  o p p o s i t io n  p a r t i e s
3
seemed d e c id e d ly  ou t of c h a ra c te r*  There seem to  be two 
e x p la n a t io n s  f o r  t h e i r  behaviour* In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  th e  
o p p o s i t io n  p a r t i e s  d id  not view th e  N*P*T* as  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  disarmament m easure and co n seq u en t ly  a n t i - n u c l e a r  
sen tim en t was not a major d e te rm in a n t  of t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  to  
th e  agreement* As f a r  as  th e y  were concerned i t  was th e  n u c le a r  
weapons i n  the  hands of th e  superpow ers which c o n s t i t u t e d  th e  
g r a v e s t  t h r e a t  to  peace , and th e  N*P*T*, they  com plained , d id  
n o th ing  to  red u ce  th e se  s t o c k p i l e s .  Second, th e  o p p o s i t io n  
p a r t i e s  f e l t ,  t h a t  to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e  N*P*T* had any 
impact a t  a l l ,  i t  would r e i n f o r c e  th e  predominance of th e  
n u c le a r  powers over th e  n o n -n u c le a r  powers* The t r e a t y  would 
not p rev en t  th e  n u c le a r  powers from dep loy ing  n u c le a r  weapons 
abroad (such as in  Japan) o r ,  from u s in g  or t h r e a te n i n g  to  use  
them a g a in s t  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s *  M oreover, th e  o p e r a t io n  of 
th e  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  would, i t  was a l l e g e d ,  be accom­
panied  by th e  i n c lu s io n  of more and more n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s  
under th e  s o - c a l l e d  " n u c le a r  u m b re l la s"  of the  two s u p e r ­
powers* This  i t  was f e a re d  would h e ig h te n  th e  su b se rv ie n c e  
of th e  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s *  Even th e  p e a c e fu l  u t i l i z a t i o n  of 
n u c le a r  energy , i t  was a rg u ed ,  would be c o n t r o l l e d  by th e  su p e r -
1* The Democratic S o c i a l i s t  P a r ty  (D .S*P*), though no t e n t i r e l y  
s a t i s f i e d ,  suppo rted  th e  N*P*T* See, D. S ,0*J P » , Nihon 
K e i z a i , 12 June 1968, p ,2 8 ,
2* For a sample of o p p o s i t io n  views on th e  N*P.T, see  
D*S„0*J * P *, A sa h i , 26 A p r i l  1968, pp*19-20; Y om iuri,
13 June 1968, p*15; M a in ic h i , 22 J u ly  1968, p*4;  M a in ic h i ,
16 September 1969, p p * 8 - l0 ;  M a in ic h i , 6 November 1969, 
pp*13, 18-19, 23-24 and 33-34*
3* With the  e x c e p t io n  of the  Communist P a r ty  which s p l i t  over 
th e  i s s u e ,  a l l  Jap an ese  o p p o s i t io n  p a r t i e s  w h o le h e a r te d ly  
supported  th e  Test Ban Treaty*
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powers* To support  th e  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  th e n ,  was to
a c q u ie s c e  i n  th e  c o n s o l id a t io n  of superpower p redom inan te .
This was anathema to  th e  o p p o s i t io n  p a r t i e s ,  which s in c e  the
l a t e  1940s, had pursued p o l i c i e s  which were s t r o n g ly  n a t i o n a l i s t ,
1
and e s p e c i a l l y ,  an ti-A m erican*  In  th e  p a s t ,  th e  o p p o s i t io n
p a r t i e s  had found th a t  su p p o r t  f o r  disarmament was c o n s i s t e n t
w ith  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l i s t  and an t i -A m e r ic a n  v iew s ,  In  r e s p e c t
of th e  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y ,  however, t h i s  was n o t  th e  
2
c a s e .  The perform ance of th e s e  J a p an ese  p a r t i e s  h i g h l i g h t s
an im p o rtan t  f e a t u r e  of a t t i t u d e s  to  th e  N,.P,T, g e n e r a l l y ,
v i z , ,  t h a t  l e f t  wing groups th e  world over have n o t  supported
th e  agreem ent anywhere near a s  e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  as  th ey  have
many o th e r  arms c o n t ro l  m easu re s .  In d eed ,  many l e f t i s t
g roups  have fo llow ed  Peking i n  denouncing the  NoP,T, as a
means by which th e  superpowers hope to  a t t a i n  c o n t r o l  over
world p o l i t i c s .  Many o t h e r s ,  w h ile  no t a c t u a l l y  say ing  so ,
have n e v e r th e le s s  been in f lu e n c e d  by th e s e  s e n t im e n ts .
Another re a so n  fo r  Tokyo’s p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n  over th e
N ,P ,T , was t h a t ,  l i k e  a number of o th e r  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s ,
Japan  was anx ious to  observe  how c o u n t r i e s  s i m i l a r l y  p laced
to  i t s e l f  in  r e s p e c t  of n u c le a r  p o t e n t i a l  a c t e d .  Of p a r t i -
3
c u la r  im portance  in  t h i s  re g a rd  was West Germany, and when 
Bonn e v e n tu a l ly  s igned  th e  t r e a t y  i n  November 1969, th e
4
p o l i t i c a l  v a lu e  of J a p a n 's  h e s i t a n c y  p a r t l y  d is a p p e a re d .
U ndoubtedly , one re a so n  why Jap an  d e layed  s ig n in g  th e
1, JoA,Ao Stoekw in, "Domestic P o l i t i c a l  R e s t r a i n t s  i n  Japan­
ese  F o re ig n  P o l i c y , "  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  O u tlo o k , V ol, 22,
No, 2, August 1968, p ,183 ,
2, i b i d , ,  p , 184,
3, The im portance  of West German v iew s i n  J a p a n 's  th in k in g  
abou t th e  N„P.T, has been noted above. See a l s o ,
D, S *0*J »P », Tokyo Shimbun, 2 J u ly  1968, p ,25  and M a in ic h i , 
3 J u ly  1968, p ,2 9 ,
4, Ian  B e l la n y ,  "Japan  and th e  N uclea r  N o n - P r o l i f e r a t io n  
T r e a ty ,"  in  A u s t r a l i a ' s  N e ig h b o u rs , Jan u a ry -F e b ru a ry  1970, 
p ,2 .  See a l s o ,  D, S 0 J -P , ,  A sa h i,  8 November 1968, p , 6 .
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N ,P,T , was i t s  v e ry  r e a l  conce rn  about i n s p e c t io n  p ro ced u re s  and 
th e  impact of th e  t r e a t y  on th e  p e a c e fu l  u s e s  of n u c le a r  energy .
At th e  G eneral Assembly meecing in  May 1968, Japan  made four 
s u g g e s t io n s  as  to  how th e  t r e a t y  could  be improved in  t h i s  r e g a r d .  
These were: th a t  th e  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  a c t i v i t i e s  of a l l  s t a t e s ,
n u c le a r  and n o n -n u c le a r  a l i k e ,  be s u b je c t  to  i d e n t i c a l  forms of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  in s p e c t io n ;  t h a t  i n s p e c t io n  te ch n iq u es  be s im p l i ­
f i e d  and mechanized as  much as p o s s i b l e ;  t h a t  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f low  of n u c le a r  m a t e r i a l s  be f u r t h e r  l i b e r a l i z e d ;  and ,  t h a t  
p r o v is io n  be made f o r  th e  un im paired  u t i l i z a t i o n ,  where p o s s i b l e ,  
of p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  explosives,"^" J a p a n ’ s o b je c t io n s  to  the  
N„P,T, on th e s e  grounds had much in  common w ith  a number of
n o n -n u c le a r ,  West European c o u n t r i e s  w ith  r a p i d l y  growing n u c lea r  
2
i n d u s t r i e s .  But J a p a n ’s o b je c t io n s  c o n ta in ed  o t h e r ,  more 
d i s t i n c t i v e  e lem en ts .  One s e m i - o f f i c i a l  o b se rv e r  sugges ted  
t h a t  Japan  would be u n iq u e ly  h u r t  by I ,A ,E ,A , i n s p e c t io n s ,  
s in c e  EURATOM c o u n t r i e s  seemed l i k e l y  to  g e t  s p e c i a l  t r e a tm e n t  
under A r t i c l e  I I I  of th e  N.PoT, In  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  was argued 
t h a t  th e  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  " s p i n - o f f "  from n u c le a r  weapons con­
s t r u c t i o n  would g iv e  th e  n u c le a r  powers a c o n s id e r a b le
3
commercial ad v an tag e ,  The changes i n  th e  f i n a l  d r a f t  of th e
1, See, speech of J a p a n ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  to  th e  U ,N ,, in  
O f f i c i a l  Records of th e  G enera l Assembly, F i r s t  Comm ittee, 
1968, A /C ,1 /P ,V , 1565, New York: U nited  N a t io n s ,  1968,
p p , 27-41,
2, B e l la n y ,  l o c , c i t , , p , l*
3, See, Ryukichi Im ai,  "The N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n  T re a ty  and 
J a p a n ,"  i n  B u l l e t i n  of th e  Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , Vol, 25,
No, 5, May 1969, p p ,2 -7 ,  (R yukich i Imai i s  a c o n s u l t a n t
on n u c le a r  energy a f f a i r s  to  th e  Jap an ese  F o re ig n  M in i s t r y , )  
The p r e f e r e n c e  accorded  EURATOM i n  U.S, p o l i c y  tow ards th e  
NoPcT, and tow ards c o -o p e r a t io n  in  th e  p e a c e fu l  u se s  of 
atomic energy g e n e r a l ly ,  was a so u rc e  of c o n s id e r a b le  
f r i c t i o n  between W ashington and some of th e  n o n -n u c le a r  
s t a t e s  of A s ia ,  This  m a t te r  w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  in  g r e a t e r  
d e t a i l  l a t e r  in  th e  t h e s i s ,  See Chtßtftf XI.
N»P„T» went p a r t  of the  way tow ards  m eeting  Japanese  coneerne^  
However, in s p e c t io n  i s  s t i l i  an i s s u e  in  Jap an ,  and Tokyo i s  
u n l i k e ly  to  r a t i f y  th e  N .P J »  t i l l  i t  i s  accorded what i t  r e g a rd s  
as  e q u a l i t y  w ith  the  EURATOM c o u n t r i e s  in  the  m a t te r  of s a f e ­
guards» Tokyo’s concern  abou t the  in s p e c t io n  and p e a c e fu l  
u se s  p ro v is io n s  of th e  N»P„T, i s  more th an  j u s t  a mask fo r  o th e r  
u n s ta t e d  o b je c t io n s  to  th e  t r e a ty »  Jap an ,  i t  has been n o te d ,  
i s  p lan n in g  q u i t e  a c o n s id e r a b le  n u c le a r  in d u s t ry  f o r  the  fu tu re»  
C onsequen tly ,  i t  i s  u n d e r s ta n d a b le  t h a t  i t  should  want to  
l i b e r a l i z e  as  much as p o s s i b l e  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f low  of n u c le a r  
in fo rm a t io n  and m a te r ia l»  M oreover, Japan  i s  a p o t e n t i a l  
c o m p e ti to r  w ith  both  th e  EURATOM s t a t e s  and th e  m ajor n u c le a r  
powers in  what prom ises to  be a v e ry  p r o f i t a b l e  bus iness»
C onsequen tly ,  i t  has pow erfu l r e a s o n s  f o r  not w anting  to  be
2p laced  a t  a d isa d v a n ta g e .
Amongst th e  most v o ca l  opponents  of th e  N»P»T» in  Japan  
were th e  Japan  Atomic Energy Commission (J»A»E»Ce) and s e c to r s  
of in d u s t r y  such as th e  Japan  Atomic I n d u s t r i a l  Forum (JcA»l»F )» 
These b o d ie s  were p reoccup ied  w ith  th e  N»P„T»' s impact on the  
p e a c e fu l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of n u c le a r  energy and c o n t in u a l l y  
c o u n se l le d  th e  government to  i n s i s t  on a number of changes in
1» In  the  r e v i s e d  d r a f t  of 31 May 1968, A r t i c l e  IV was changed 
to  s t r e s s  th e  r i g h t  of p a r t i e s  to  a c q u i r e  n u c le a r  m a t e r i a l s  
and equipment» A r t i c l e  V was r e v i s e d  to  f u r t h e r  ensu re  t h a t  
n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s  would have a c c e s s ,  th rough  an appro ­
p r i a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  body, to  th e  p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s  from 
any p e a c e fu l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of n u c le a r  exp losions»
2» For a view which ten d s  to  m in im ise  J a p a n 's  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  
programme as  a f a c t o r  in  T okyo 's  a t t i t u d e  to  th e  NoP»To,  
see  B e l la n y ,  l o c » c i t » , pp»1-3»
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th e  agreements In c o n t r a s t  t o  t h i s  a n t i - t r e a t y  a d v ic e  from
depar tm en ts  concerned w i th  commerce and t e chno logy ,  th e  Japanese
Government tended to  r e c e i v e  p r o - t r e a t y  a d v ice  from i t s  p o l i t i c a l
2
d e p a r tm en t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the  F o re ig n  O f f i c e ,
So f a r ,  d i s c u s s i o n  has c e n t r e d  on some of th e  more obvious  
r ea s o n s  why Japan  h e s i t a t e d  to s ig n  th e  N„Pc,T0 But t h e r e  a r e  
grounds f o r  b e l i e v in g  t h a t  t h e  d e lay  i t s e l f  was a consc ious  a c t  
of  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  des igned  to  dem ons t ra te  t h a t  Japan  was no 
lo n g e r  t o t a l l y  devoted to  a low p o s t u r e  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s ,  
and more p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  to  improve Tokyo’ s b a rg a i n in g  p o s i t i o n  
i n  r e s p e c t  of two p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s ,  membership of  the  EJ„DoCo 
and r e v e r s i o n  of Okinawa,
1, The JoAoEoC, wanted i n s p e c t i o n  under the  t r e a t y  to  be
l i m i t e d  to  i n q u i r i e s  i n t o  t h e  purposes  f o r  which nuc lea r  
f u e l  was u sed .  Also ,  i t  was adamant t h a t  t h e r e  should be 
no r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of p e a c e fu l  nuc lea r  
exp lo s ions  i f  and when they  became a p r a c t i c a l  p r o p o s i t i o n .  
The Atomic Power I n d u s t r i e s  Council  was i n s i s t e n t  t h a t  
du r ing  i n s p e c t i o n s ,  th e  r e a c t o r s  should not  have to  cease  
o p e r a t i n g ,  and th a t  measures  should be evolved to  ensu re  
t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of commercial  s e c r e t s ,  See,  D, S - 0, J  ,P , 
Tokyo Shimbun, 29 August 1967,  p p , 18-19,  The Japan  Atomic 
I n d u s t r i a l  Forum l i s t e d  t h r e e  b as ic  o b j e c t i o n s  to  th e  s a f e ­
guards  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  N ,P ,T , :  s a f e g u a rd s  would f o s t e r
i n e q u a l i t i e s  between t h e  n u c l e a r  and th e  non -nuc lea r  s t a t e s  
i n  i n d u s t r i a l  r e s e a r c h  and development on the  p eac e fu l  
u ses  of atomic  energy;  they  could be used as  a cover fo r  
i n d u s t r i a l  esp ionage ;  and t h e i r  im plem enta t ion  could 
s e r i o u s l y  inconven ience  r e a c t o r  o p e r a t o r s .  See,  Atoms
i n  J a p a n , Vol,  12, No, 2, February  1968, p , 4 ,  For a 
c r i t i c i s m  by the  J . A . L F o  of the  N ,P0T0 as a whole,  see  
Atoms i n  J a p a n , Vol,  14, No, 3,  March 1970, p p ,3 -6 ,
2, For a sample of F o re ig n  O f f i c e  views on the  N.PoTo s e e ,
D , S 0 , J  P o, Nihon K e i z a i , 12 June 1968, p ,2 8 ;  S ä n k e t ,
29 June 1968, p ,27 ;  and,  M a i n i c h i , 3 J u ly  1968,  p s1 2 0
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Tokyo’s d e s i r e  fo r  membership of th e  E.N»D,C, stemmed l a r g e l y  
from i t s  b e l i e f  t h a t  Japan had a s p e c i a l  r o l e  to  p la y  in  th e  f i e l d  
of d isarm am ent, I t  should a l s o  be seen  as a r e f l e c t i o n  of Tokyo's 
d e s i r e  f o r  a say in  world a f f a i r s  commensurate w ith  i t s  r a p id ly  
growing i n d u s t r i a l  and economic power« The emergence of th e  non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i s s u e  only added to  th e s e  p re s su re s«  There was much 
re sen tm en t in  Tokyo th a t  J ap an ,  one of th e  most im p o rtan t  of th e  
n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s ,  was being  p r e v a i l e d  upon to  a c c e p t  an agreement 
which was n e g o t ia te d  by a forum in  which i t s  spokesman had no say»'*' 
In  May 1967, Japan  r a i s e d  th e  q u e s t io n  of membership of th e  E,NrD.C, 
w ith  A0CoD,Ao D i r e c t o r ,  Mr« W. C. F o s t e r ,  On t h i s  o c c a s io n ,
W ashington promised to  su p p o r t  J a p a n 's  r e q u e s t  bu t warned t h a t  th e
2
S o v ie t  Union was c u r r e n t ly  opposed to  th e  move« L a t e r ,  when Moscow
p ressed  Japan  to  s ig n  th e  N«P«T0, Tokyo asked R u ss ia  to  su p p o r t  i t s
3
membership of th e  E„NoD,Co By J u ly  1968, L ,D ,P . d ie tm en were
su g g e s t in g  q u i t e  openly t h a t  membership of th e  E,N,D,C, should be
4
demanded by Japan  as a c o n d i t io n  of i t s  s i g n a t u r e  of th e  N.P.T*
J u s t  how l a r g e ly  the  q u e s t io n  of E.N.D.C, membership f ig u re d  in  
Tokyo’ s d e l i b e r a t i o n s  over s ig n a t u r e  of th e  N«P,T. i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to  say« R eports  i n d i c a t e ,  however, t h a t  R u ss ia  and th e  U«S, came 
to  view Tokyo 's  membership of th e  E.N«D.C, as  an im p o r ta n t  p a r t  
of t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  have Japan  accede to  th e  N .P .T ,^  When Japan  
was e v e n tu a l ly  i n v i t e d  to  j o i n  th e  E.NoD.C, i n  May 1969, s e c t io n s  
of th e  Japanese  p re s s  were q u ick  to  n o te  t h a t  Tokyo was now much 
more l i k e l y  to  s ig n  th e  N.P.T«
S ince  th e  S a to -Johnson  t a l k s  of November 1967, th e  r e t u r n  of
Okinawa to  Japan  had been a c c ep ted  as  a fo regone  c o n c lu s io n ,
1« See, The M ain ich i  D a ily  News (Monthly I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E d i t i o n ) ,
1 J u ly  1969, p ,9 ,
2« The Japan  Tim es, 9 May 1967« In  September 1967, J a p a n 's  
F o re ig n  M in is te r  Mr, Miki a l s o  r a i s e d  th e  m a t te r  w i th  th e  
American ambassador to  th e  U«N., Mr. Goldberg« See,
The Japan  T im es, 24 September 1967,
3« D .S .O .J .P , , Tokyo Shimbun, 2 J u ly  1968, p ,2 5 .
4, D .S .O .J .P , , M a in ic h i , 22 J u ly  1968, p ,4 .
5« The M ain ich i D a ily  News (Monthly I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E d i t i o n ) ,
1 J u ly  1969, p ,9 ,
180
However Tokyo was anxious to secure as favourable a settlement as
possible, particularly in respect of the status of U.S. bases in
Okinawa after reversion. In November 1969, shortly before the
commencement of talks between Mr. Sato and President Nixon, there
was speculation in the Japanese press that the Prime Minister
would attempt to trade signature of the N.P.T. for concessions
on the Okinawa question.'*" Three of the opposition parties (the
D.S.P., the J.S.P., and the Komeito Party) believed that this was
the case, and they were appalled that the government should try
2to "curry favour" with Washington in such a way. It would be
unwise to be too dogmatic about this matter. However, it is
reasonable to speculate that by holding out on the N.P.T. ,
Tokyo strengthened its bargaining position in the negotiations
over Okinawa. A settlement, which was fairly favourable to
Japan, at least on the question of the status of U.S. bases after
3reversion, was reached late in November, 1969. Three months 
later, Tokyo signed the N.P.T.
Probably the most important conclusion to be drawn from 
this analysis of Japan's opposition to the N.P.T., is that 
the desire to preserve an option on building nuclear weapons 
does not seem to have been a particularly important motivating 
factor. As indicated earlier, support for nuclear weapons 
in Japan was, and indeed still is, virtually non-existent.
1. e.g., D.S.OJrP., Asahi, 8 November 1969, p.6.
2. D.S.O.J.P., Mainichi, 6 November 1969, pp.13, 23-24, 33.
3. The United States agreed to remove all of its nuclear weapons 
from Okinawa by the date of reversion. It also agreed that 
after reversion, U.S. bases in Okinawa would become subject 
to the same restrictions which applied to American bases 
elsewhere in Japan. However, the gains from the Okinawa 
agreement did not flow all one way. Washington seems to 
have wrung certain concessions from Japan. For a more 
extended discussion of this matter, see below, Chapter X%
«!
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C onsequen tly ,  one must look  to  o th e r  f a c t o r s  to  e x p la in  Tokyo's 
a t t i t u d e .  P robab ly  th e  most im p o rtan t  and c r e d i b l e  of th e s e  
was i t s  concern  abou t th e  in s p e c t io n  and p e a c e fu l  uses  p ro v is io n s  
of th e  N .P.T . But t h e r e  i s  ev idence  to o ,  t h a t  Japan  used  i t s  
s ig n a t u r e  of th e  N .P .T , as  a means of s e c u r in g  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  
o b je c t iv e s  of i t s  own. Thus, Tokyo’ s r e a c t i o n  to  th e  N .P J o  
r e f l e c t e d  a s u r p r i s i n g l y  ( fo r  Japan) h igh  d eg ree  of d ip lo m a t ic  
a s s e r t i v e n e s s  and must be seen  as an i n d i c a t i o n  of i t s  d e s i r e  
f o r  a louder  v o ic e  i n  world  a f f a i r s .
I t  has been argued so f a r  i n  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  t h a t  o p p o s i t io n  
to  n u c le a r  weapons has been an im p o rtan t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
J a p an ese  th in k in g  ever s in c e  th e  end of World War I I .  S u ccess iv e  
governments in  Tokyo have adhered to  a p o l i c y  of no t a c q u i r in g  
n u c le a r  weapons and have been s u p p o r te d ,  on t h i s  i s s u e  a t  l e a s t ,  
by th e  o p p o s i t io n  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and th e  overwhelming mass 
of th e  Jap an ese  p e o p le .  But what of th e  fu tu r e ?  W il l  Japan  
always rem ain  n o n -n u c le a r?  T h is ,  of c o u r s e ,  i s  a q u e s t io n  
which cannot be answered a t  p r e s e n t  w ith  c e r t a i n t y .  N everthe­
l e s s ,  i t  i s  one which would seem to  d e se rv e  c a r e f u l  c o n s id e r a ­
t i o n ,  A f te r  a l l ,  t h e r e  i s  every  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  a n u c l e a r ­
armed Japan  would be a power of immense m i l i t a r y  s i g n i f i c a n c e ;  
g r e a t e r  th an  s a y ,  B r i t a i n ,  F ra n c e ,  o r ,  i n  th e  s h o r t - r u n  a t  
l e a s t ,  China. I t s  emergence would c l e a r l y  mark an im p o rtan t  
s h i f t  i n  th e  world b a la n c e  of power.
In  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  t h e r e  have been some developm ents  which 
could  be i n t e r p r e t e d  as  in d i c a t i n g  t h a t  Japan  might e v e n tu a l ly  
abandon i t s  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a n c e .  In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  J a p a n 's  
n o n -n u c le a r  p o l i c y  has been p a r t  of a w ider r e j e c t i o n ,  i n  t h a t  
c o u n t ry ,  of m i l i t a r i s m  in  g e n e r a l .  Ever s in c e  1945, th e  s i z e  
and in f lu e n c e  of J a p a n 's  d e fen c e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  has been kep t 
to  a minimum. But t h e r e  a r e  s ig n s  a l re a d y  t h a t  t h i s  could  change, 
J a p a n 's  de fen ce  f o r c e s  prom ise  to  grow f a i r l y  r a p i d l y  in  th e  
f u t u r e .  Even i f  e x p e n d i tu re  on de fen ce  were n o t  to  exceed th e
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f i g u r e  of a b o u t  1 p e r  c e n t  o f  G .N .P . as  e n v is a g e d  i n  t h e  F o u r th
D efence  B u ild -U p  P la n  f o r  1 9 7 2 -7 6 ,  J a p a n ’s l i k e l y  r a t e  o f  g row th
w i l l  e n s u r e  v e r y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a b s o l u t e  i n c r e a s e s .  M o re o v e r ,
t h i s  g row th  i n  e x p e n d i tu r e  seems l i k e l y  to  be  accom panied  by an
i n c r e a s i n g l y  im p o r ta n t  r o l e  f o r  J a p a n ’s d e fe n c e  f o r c e s .  A f t e r
t h e  r e v e r s i o n  of Okinawa, J a p a n e s e  f o r c e s  w i l l  t a k e  o v e r  from  t h e
A m ericans t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  d e fe n c e  o f  t h e  Ryuku I s l a n d s
a n d ,  a s  U .S , s e rv ic e m e n ,  i n  c o n fo r m i ty  w i th  t h e  Nixon d o c t r i n e ,
a r e  w ithd raw n  from Ja p a n  p r o p e r ,  l o c a l  f o r c e s  w i l l  have  t o  t a k e
2
t h e i r  p l a c e  t h e r e  a s  w e l l .  T h is  e n la rg e m e n t  of  J a p a n ’ s d e f e n c e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  seems l i k e l y  to  be made e a s i e r  by a g row ing  s e n s e  
o f  n a t i o n a l i s m  amongst t h e  J a p a n e s e  p e o p le ,  (The W hite  P a p e r  on 
D efence  p u b l i s h e d  i n  O c tober  1970 n o ted  t h a t  d u r in g  t h e  p o s t - w a r  
p e r io d  t h e r e  had been  a te n d e n c y  f o r  t h e  J a p a n e s e  p e o p le  to  
s u p p re s s  t h e i r  f e e l i n g s  of a t t a c h m e n t  to  t h e  c o u n t r y .  I t  was 
now t im e ,  t h e  paper  e m p h a s ise d ,  to  r e - e x a m in e  t h i s  p o s t - w a r  
t e n d e n c y , ) ^
Second , though  t h e r e  a r e  s t i l l  v e r y  few p e o p le  i n  J a p a n  who
seem p r e p a r e d  to  a d v o c a te  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  a n a t i o n a l  n u c l e a r
f o r c e ,  t h e r e  h a s ,  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  been  much more d i s c u s s i o n  a b o u t
4
n u c le a r  weapons and r e l a t e d  i s s u e s .  Such comment h a s  b e e n  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  o b v io u s  i n  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  p r e s s  and i n  t h e  w r i t i n g s
1, On t h i s  p o i n t ,  s e e  H edley  B u l l ,  "The New B a la n c e  of Power i n  
A s ia  and t h e  P a c i f i c , "  i n  F o r e ig n  A f f a i r s , V o l,  49 ,  No, 4 ,
J u l y  1971, p ,6 7 5 ,
2, Under an  ag reem en t  r e a c h e d  i n  December 1970, m ost o f  t h e  
A m erican combat u n i t s  i n  J a p a n  w ere  s c h e d u le d  to  be w ith d ra w n  
by m id -1971 , T h is  was e x p e c te d  to  r e d u c e  t h e  number o f  U ,S ,  
m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l  i n  J a p a n  from  4 0 ,0 0 0  t o  2 8 ,0 0 0 ,  S e e ,  
S t r a t e g i c  S u rv e y ,  1 9 7 0 , p ,3 7 ,
3 , S ee ,  G i s t  o f  t h e  W hite  P a p e r  on D e fe n c e ,  Reproduced  i n  
S u r v i v a l , V ol, 1 3 ,  No, 1 ,  J a n u a r y  1971 , p . 2 ,
4 , For a s u rv e y  o f  some of t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n ,  s e e  W e l f i e l d ,  
op , c i t , ,  p p , 20 -35 ,
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of  s p e c i a l i s t  commentators  on d e f e n c e  and f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s , ,  U s u a l l y ,
i t  h a s  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  d i s c u s s i o n  a b o u t  t h e  N ,P .T „ ,
b u t  some of  i t  seems to  have been  s t i m u l a t e d  by t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  i n
t h e  UoS, a b o u t  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n c e , ^  I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n
t h i s  r e g a r d  t h a t  t h e  r e c e n t  White  P a p e r  on Defence  n o t  o n ly  l e f t
open t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  J a p a n  m ig h t  a c q u i r e  n u c l e a r  weapons i n  
2
t h e  f u t u r e ,  bu t  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  r e i t e r a t e d  an  e a r l i e r  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e
d e v e lo p m e n t  of  " d e f e n s i v e "  n u c l e a r  weapons would n o t  i n f r i n g e  t h e
3
J a p a n e s e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  Th is  i n c r e a s e d  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  d i s c u s s
1, The q u e s t i o n  of  m i s s i l e  d e f e n c e  was t h e  s u b j e c t  of  much a n a l y s i s  
and comment i n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  p r e s s  d u r i n g  1967,  For  a sample  of  
t h i s  comment, s e e  D , S , 0 - J , P , ,  A s a h i , 24 August  1967 , p p , 22-25 
and 25-28 ;  The J a p a n  T im es , 28 May 1967 and i b i d , , 20 and 21 
Sep tem ber  1967,  The re  have been  r e p o r t s  t h a t  J a p a n e s e  o f f i c i a l s  
have  s o u g h t  i n f o r m a t i o n  about  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n c e  from t h e  
UoSo Government ,  See ,  D, S , 0 , J , P , ,  A s a h i , 24 August  1967 , p ,2 4  
and The New York T im e s , 7 J u l y  1967,  I n  J u l y  1967,  a d e b a t e  was 
h e l d  i n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  P a r l i a m e n t  on t h e  deve lopm en t  of  a non­
n u c l e a r  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n c e  s y s te m .  S e e ,  D. S , 0 - J  , P , , 
A s a h i , 24 August  1967,  p . 2 4 .  Dur ing  1967,  t h e r e  were  a number 
of  r e p o r t s  t h a t  "key  e le m e n t s "  i n  t h e  S e l f  D efence  Agency 
(S .DoA,)  and t h e  r u l i n g  L .D .P ,  f a v o u r e d  a b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  
d e f e n c e  sys tem  f o r  J a p a n ,  These  " k ey  e l e m e n t s "  were  s a i d  t o  
i n c l u d e  G e n e ra l  Matsumo, a fo rm er  d i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  S,D,A,
T h i n k in g  amongst t h i s  group seems t o  have c e n t r e d  l a r g e l y  on 
some s o r t  of  s e a b o r n e  sys te m ,  p o s s i b l y  o p e r a t e d  i n  c o - o p e r a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  See ,  A u s t r a l i a n  F i n a n c i a l  Review,
10 Augus t  1967;  D , S , 0 , J , P », Nihon K e i z a i  ( e v e n i n g ) ,  13 J u l y  
1967;  i b i d , ,  A s a h i , 24 August  1967;  The A u s t r a l i a n , 31 J a n u a r y  
1967,
2, The W hi te  Pa pe r  s t a t e d  t h a t  J a p a n  would n o t  a c q u i r e  n u c l e a r  
weapons " a t  p r e s e n t , "  See ,  G i s t  o f  t h e  White  Pa pe r  on D efence ,  
Reproduced  i n  S u r v i v a l , Vol .  13 ,  No, 1 ,  J a n u a r y  1971,  p , 3 ,
3 ,  i b i d , The J a p a n e s e  Government  h a s  long  h e l d  t h a t  " d e f e n s i v e "  
n u c l e a r  weapons would i n  no way c o n t r a v e n e  A r t i c l e  9 of  t h e  
J a p a n e s e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  See ,  t h e  v i e w s  of  P r im e  M i n i s t e r s  K i s h i  
and S a t o ,  r e p o r t e d  i n  The Times (London) ,  27 J u l y  1966, See 
a l s o ,  s t a t e m e n t  by Mr, S a t o ,  r e p o r t e d  i n  The J a p a n  T i m e s ,
28 May 1967,
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i s s u e s  r e l a t i n g  to  de fen c e  and n u c le a r  weapons would seem to
i n d i c a t e ,  among o th e r  t h i n g s ,  a d e c l in e  in  th e  s t r e n g t h  of J a p a n ’s
" n u c le a r  a l l e r g y / '  But even i f  t h a t  u n iq u e ly  Jap an ese  d i s t a s t e
fo r  n u c le a r  weapons has n o t  y e t  d i s s i p a t e d  v e ry  much, i t  seems
l i k e l y  to  do so in  th e  f u t u r e .  Those Japanese  who remember
H iroshima and Nagasaki a r e  a l re a d y  g iv in g  way to  a g e n e r a t io n  who
have no memories of World War I I ,  M oreover, as  Ian  B e l la n y  has
s u g g e s te d ,  th e  growth of com m ercial,  b en ev o len t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of
n u c le a r  energy w i th in  th e  co un try  w i l l  p robab ly  a l s o  h e lp  th e
Jap an ese  to  f o r g e t  t h e i r  " n u c le a r  a l l e r g y / ’'*'
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  more g e n e ra l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  which seem to
p o in t  Japan  in  th e  d i r e c t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons, Japan  i s  a l re a d y
a g r e a t  economic and i n d u s t r i a l  power ( i t  i s  p r e s e n t l y  th e  w o r ld ’s
t h i r d  g r e a t e s t  economic power) and i t s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  f u r t h e r
2
growth seems enormous. This  r a i s e s  th e  q u e s t io n  of w hether  or 
no t Japan  w i l l  e v e n tu a l ly  want to  a c q u i r e  th e  m i l i t a r y  a c c o u t r e ­
ments of a g r e a t  power, which a t  th e  p re s e n t  tim e in c lu d e  a 
s t r a t e g i c  n u c le a r  f o r c e .  Mr. Sato  has s a id  t h a t  h i s  c o u n t ry  has 
no i n t e n t i o n  of dev e lo p in g  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  commensurate w i th  i t s  
economic power. Indeed ,  he has spoken of J a p a n ’s in te n d e d  pa th
3
i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  as  "a com ple te ly  new experim ent in  world  h i s t o r y , "  
N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  seems re a s o n a b le  to  ag ree  w ith  Hedley B u l l  t h a t
1, B e l la n y ,  op, c i t . ,  p ,5 7 ,
2, Herman Kahn of th e  Hudson I n s t i t u t e  and James Abegglen of th e  
Boston C onsu lt ing  Group have p r e d ic te d  t h a t  J a p a n 's  economy 
w i l l  grow t h r e e  to  f i v e  tim es d u r in g  th e  1970s. Quoted in  
Ralph No Clough, "E as t  A sia  i n  th e  1970s" in  Bruce Brown ( e d , ) , 
A sia  and th e  P a c i f i c  in  th e  1970s , C anberra : A u s t r a l i a n  
N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  1971, p ,1 3 .  Some o b s e rv e rs  
q u e s t io n  w hether so h igh  a r a t e  of growth can be co n t in u ed
f o r  an o th e r  10 y e a r s .  See views of P ro fe s s o r  James Morley 
of Columbia U n iv e r s i t y ,  Quoted in  i b i d ,
3, Quoted in  Hedley B u l l ,  lo c ,  c i t , , p ,675 .
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" th e r e  i s  no rea so n  to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  J ap an ,  or any o th e r  c o u n t ry ,  can 
a t t a i n  th e  s t a t u s  of a g r e a t  power w ith o u t  p ro v id in g  i t s e l f  w ith  th e  
m i l i t a r y  means th a t  have been a n e c e s s a ry  c o n d i t io n  of such a s t a t u s  
in  th e  p as t» "^
The above c o n s id e r a t io n s  n o tw i th s ta n d in g ,  i t  seems u n l i k e ly  
t h a t  Japan  w i l l  d e c id e  to  deve lop  n u c le a r  weapons in  th e  near  fu tu re . ,  
In  th e  absence of any u rg e n t  n e c e s s i t y  to  do so ,  th e  c o s t s  of going 
n u c le a r  would s t i l l  seem to  be too g rea t»  Such a move would 
p ro b ab ly ,  even now, f r a c t u r e  th e  co u n try  p o l i t i c a l l y  and , a lm ost 
c e r t a i n l y ,  cause  immeasurable damage to  J a p a n ’ s image abroad» The 
consequences of o ffen d in g  th e  U»S»,  R u ss ia  and China could  be so 
g r e a t  as  to  make any d e c i s io n  to  a c q u i re  n u c le a r  weapons a v e ry  
r i s k y  one indeed» M oreover, though Japan i s  t e c h n i c a l l y  and 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  competent i t  has y e t  to  develop  one or two of th e  
f a c i l i t i e s  norm ally  rega rded  as  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  an independen t 
weapons programme» (These would in c lu d e ,  of c o u r s e ,  a p lutonium  
s e p a r a t io n  p la n t  and, i f  a f o r c e  in c lu d in g  th e rm o -n u c le a r  weapons 
were en v isag e d ,  a uranium enrichm ent complex as w ell» )  Even 
th e n ,  J a p a n ’s s c i e n t i s t s  would s t i l l  f a c e  fo rm id ab le  problems 
in  re g a rd  to  warhead developm ent, no t th e  l e a s t  of w hich , would 
be t h a t  of t e s t i n g ,  F i n a l l y ,  amongst th e  c o s t s  of going n u c l e a r ,  
Japan  would p robab ly  have to  a c c e p t  a lower r a t e  of economic 
growth th an  i t  has enjoyed in  th e  p a s t ,  as  w e l l  as  reduced 
e x p e n d i tu re  i n  a number of in c r e a s in g ly  im p o rtan t  problem a r e a s  
such as  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  and u rban  renewal»
There a r e  a number of p o s s i b l e  developm ents which could  make 
i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  f u t u r e  J ap an ese  Governments to  adhere  to  a non­
n u c le a r  s tance»  One of th e s e  would be th e  emergence in  th e  
co u n try  of extreme n a t i o n a l i s t  s e n t im e n t  s im i l a r  to  t h a t  which 
e x i s t e d  b e fo re  th e  war» Another would be a r a p id  e s c a l a t i o n  
in  th e  n u c le a r  arms r a c e  between th e  two superpowers» A lso ,
1» ib id»
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Japan's present path will be made more difficult if, while remaining 
non-nuclear, it is not able to realise some of its great power 
aspirations such as permanent membership of the Security Council <> 
(The fact that the five powers designated permanent members of the 
Security Council also happen to be the world's only nuclear powers, 
must serve as an incentive to proliferation amongst states with 
great power aspirations such as India and Japan^) But the thing 
most likely to put Tokyo's non-nuclear policy at risk would be 
the adoption by China (or Russia) of a more aggressive policy 
towards Japan, especially, if such a development were accompanied 
by a diminished sense of confidence in Japan in the credibility 
of its alliance with the United States.
CHAPTER VI
THE POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS OF ASIA: AUSTRALIA
Any analysis of nuclear capabilities in Asia must take account
of Australia's potential in this field. It is true of course that
Australia is not nearly so advanced as India and Japan in the
exploitation of atomic energy. At the present time Australia
possesses only two small research reactors and the contract has
yet to be let for the construction of the country's first power
reactor. But nevertheless, Australia has long been recognised as
a potential nuclear power. The report,in 1960, by the National
Planning Association in Washington, concluded that Australia was
one of a group of nations which, though relatively limited in
scientific manpower were economically capable, fairly competent
technically, and thus able to produce nuclear weapons in the
near future.'*' In 1969, the United States Atomic Energy
Commission claimed that Australia was one of eight nations
which had the ability to produce "a substantial number of
2nuclear weapons with a delivery system in five years".
A. Australia's Nuclear Weapons Potential.
The first important moves in the development of nuclear
research in Australia were taken by the Commonwealth Government
in 1946. The budget for that year provided specifically for
3expenditure on research in the nuclear field. In addition,
1. The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control. Quoted in Hedley 
Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, New York: Praeger,
(2nd edition), 1965,p.151.
2. The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1969.
3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives 
(hereafter referred to as C,P,D. , H of R.), Vol. 189,
29 November 1946, p.832.
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an atom ic energy  la b o ra to r y  was e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  Melbourne U n iv e r s i ty
and p la n s  were announced fo r  a tom ic energy r e s e a r c h  to  be c a r r i e d
2
out a t  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i t y .  During th e  l a t e  1940s 
a d d i t i o n a l  e f f o r t s  were made to  in c r e a s e  th e  number of s c i e n t i s t s  
in  A u s t r a l i a ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  a r e a s  r e l a t e d  to  d e fe n c e .  A Defence 
R esearch  and Development P o l ic y  Committee was s e t  up under the  
cha irm ansh ip  of a Defence S c i e n t i f i c  A d v ise r .  T h is  com mittee was 
i n s t r u c t e d  to  g iv e  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  need f o r  in c r e a s in g  
th e  number of peop le  t r a i n e d  in  s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e a r c h  m ethods. On 
i t s  recom mendation, th e  government approved th e  appoin tm ent of a 
Chief S c i e n t i s t  i n  th e  Department of Supply and Development, 
whose f i r s t  t a s k  was to  s t im u la t e  th e  r e c r u i tm e n t  of d e fen c e  
s c i e n t i s t s ,  and to  o rg a n is e  th e  s e t t i n g  up of f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  
de fen c e  r e s e a r c h .^
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of th e  e a r l y  y e a rs  of n u c le a r  r e s e a r c h  in
A u s t r a l i a  was th e  h igh  l e v e l  of c o l l a b o r a t io n  w ith  B r i t a i n ,  and
o th e r  members of th e  Commonwealth. There were some d i s c u s s io n s
on atom ic energy m a t te r s  between B r i t i s h  and A u s t r a l i a n  r e p r e s -
4
e n t a t i v e s  b e fo re  th e  end of World War I I  and , i n  1944, th e  two 
governments ag reed  to  p ro s p e c t  f o r  uranium o re  i n  A u s t r a l i a .
I t  was env isaged  t h a t  uranium from A u s t r a l i a  could  be used to  
f u e l  B r i t a i n ’s r e a c t o r s . ^  A f te r  th e  war c o o p e ra t io n  w ith  
B r i t a i n  con t in u ed  and s c i e n t i s t s  r e c r u i t e d  in  A u s t r a l i a  f o r  
d efence  work were s e n t  to  th e  U nited  Kingdom f o r  p o s t - g r a d u a te  
t r a i n i n g .  In  a d d i t i o n  to  i t s  b i - l a t e r a l  c o n ta c t s  w i th  B r i t a i n  
on m a t t e r s  r e l a t e d  to  atom ic r e s e a r c h ,  A u s t r a l i a  was a l s o
1. i b i d . , p .8 0 5 .  2» i b i d . , Vol. 187, 12 J u ly  1946, p .2477 .
3. C u rren t  Notes on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s , C anberra : Department 
of E x te rn a l  A f f a i r s  ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  C .N .I .A . ) ,
Vol. 20, No. 5, May 1949, p .645 .
4. For r e f e r e n c e s  to  th e s e  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  s e e  C .P .D . , H of R . ,
Vol. 187, 12 J u ly  1946, p .2477 .
5. C .N .I .A . , Vol. 26, No. 10, O ctober 1955, p .721 .
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r e p re s e n te d  on the  B r i t i s h  Commonwealth A dvisory  Committee on Defence 
Science« This  com m ittee, whose o th e r  members were th e  U nited King­
dom, Canada, New Zealand and South  A f r i c a ,  was formed in  1947 to 
c o n s id e r  and rev iew  de fen ce  r e s e a r c h  a c t i v i t i e s « ^  There a l s o  appears
to  have been a s e p a r a te  arrangem ent f o r  c o - o p e ra t io n  in  atom ic energy
2
r e s e a r c h  between Canada and A u s t r a l ia «
During t h i s  e a r ly  phase  in  th e  development of a tom ic  energy 
r e s e a r c h  in  A u s t r a l i a  no a s s i s t a n c e  was r e c e iv e d  from th e  United 
S ta te s«  During 1948 and 1949, th e  o p p o s i t io n  i n  th e  F ed era l  
P a r l ia m e n t  a s s e r t e d  th a t  t h i s  r e lu c t a n c e  on A m erica’s p a r t  to  
s h a re  i t s  n u c le a r  s e c r e t s  w ith  A u s t r a l i a  was due to  th e  governm ent’ s
3
" f a i l u r e  to  stamp out th e  Communist meance"« But charges  of t h i s  
s o r t  ignored  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  American Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
p r o h ib i te d  any exchange of n u c le a r  in fo rm a t io n  or m a te r i a l  
between th e  U.S« and o th e r  powers«
Probab ly  th e  most im p o rtan t  a r e a  of c o l l a b o r a t i o n  between 
B r i t a i n  and A u s t r a l i a  was i n  th e  a re a  of m i s s i l e  and warhead 
te s t in g «  The f i r s t  approaches  by th e  U«K. Government on th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of u s ing  a re a s  in  C e n t ra l  A u s t r a l i a  f o r  t e s t i n g  
guided  m i s s i l e s  were made in  1946« In  November of t h a t  y e a r ,  
th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Government announced p ro p o s a ls  to  e s t a b l i s h  an 
e x p e r im e n ta l  range  f o r  r o c k e t s  and guided p r o j e c t i l e s  based on 
Woomera, Though no t d i r e c t l y  concerned w ith  atom ic energy as 
such , th e  work a t  Woomera was n e v e r th e le s s  r e l a t e d  to  th e  
development of n u c le a r  weapons, and as w e l l ,  was ev idence  of 
A u s t r a l i a ’ s e a r l y  involvem ent i n  advanced weapons re sea rch «
Symbolic of A n g lo -A u s t ra l ia n  c o l l a b o r a t io n  in  n u c le a r  
m a t te r s  was th e  t e s t i n g  in  A u s t r a l i a  of B r i t i s h  n u c le a r  weapons«
1« For d e t a i l s  of th e  work of t h i s  com m ittee, s e e  C«P»D«, H of 
R«, Vol« 196, 29 A p r i l  1948, p«1245,
2« ib id « ,  Vol, 188, 31 J u ly  1946, p ,3421 ,
3, e » g , ,  i b i d 0, Vol« 204, 4 October 1949, p ,796  and Vol, 198,
30 September 1948, p p »1029-1030, 1038»
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Britain’s first atomic test took place at the Monte Bello Islands 
off the coast of Western Australia in October 1952,'*' The test was 
carried out under conditions simulating an explosion in a port and 
was designed, amongst other things, to provide information on the 
measures necessary to protect British and Australian facilities 
in this type of situation. Three Australian scientists were 
present at the test and had also assisted in its preparation, as 
had units of the Australian armed forces and officers of the 
Department of Supply. In October of the following year, Britain 
tested another nuclear weapon - this time at Emu Field, west of 
the Woomera rocket range in South Australia, Following this 
second test, the Commonwealth Government agreed to permit a series 
of atomic tests to take place "over the years" in Australia,
This agreement was subject to the proviso that no tests were to 
take place without the approval of a specially appointed safety 
committee consisting of five Australian scientists, Altogether, 
twelve nuclear devices, all of low yield, were detonated in 
Australia between 1952 and 1957, Later, when Britain commenced 
testing at Christmas Island, Australia was represented by a 
number of observers, It seems reasonable to assume, that as a 
result of Britain’s nuclear test programme, Australia learned 
something about the production, use and effects of nuclear 
weapons; Australian scientists, government officials and service 
personnel were involved, in various ways, in the preparation 
and analysis of all of the tests carried out in Australia,
By the early 1950s a start had been made on nuclear research 
in Australia, The Federal Government had given a lead in the 
recruitment and training of nuclear scientists and in the estab­
lishment of research facilities. These efforts had been supple­
mented through collaboration with Britain and other members of 
the Commonwealth, Indeed, it is worth noting that Australia,
1, C.N,I,A,, Vol, 23, No, 10, October 1952, p,589,
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mainly  because of i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  B r i t a i n ,  had an e a r l i e r  
i n s i g h t  than  most c o u n t r i e s  i n t o  developments i n  th e  f i e l d  of atomic 
energy» At a t ime when th e  United  S t a t e s  was r e l u c t a n t  to  a s s i s t  
any s t a t e  i n  the  p e a c e fu l  or m i l i t a r y  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of atomic 
ene rgy ,  B r i t a i n  was a l low ing  A u s t r a l i a n  s c i e n t i s t s  l i m i t e d  access  
to  some of i t s  own atomic s e c r e t s »
In  1953, th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission (A»AoE»C») 
was e s t a b l i s h e d »  This move seems to  have been p r e c i p i t a t e d ,  
amongst o th e r  t h i n g s ,  by th e  d i s c o v e ry  of  uranium» The f i r s t  
s i z e a b l e  d e p o s i t s  of th e  m in e ra l  so f a r  found i n  A u s t r a l i a  were 
un ea r th ed  i n  1951» T h e r e a f t e r ,  A u s t r a l i a  e n t e r e d  i n t o  agreements 
to  expo r t  uranium ore  to  th e  United S t a t e s  and B r i t a in »  But the  
major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  th e  AoA,E»C» was to  o r g a n i s e  r e s e a r c h  and 
development l e a d in g  to t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  u se  of atomic energy» The 
Research Programme of t h e  Commission s t a t e d :
The Programme i s  d i r e c t l y  aimed a t  deve lop ing  th e  
b e s t  methods f o r  producing  i n d u s t r i a l  atomic power 
from uranium and thor ium f o r  u l t i m a t e  use  in  
A u s t r a l i a n  indus t ry»
»»» Based on th e  a d v ice  i t  has r e c e i v e d ,  i t  [ th e  
Government] b e l i e v e s  t h a t  th e  p ro d u c t i o n  of  e l e c t r i c  
power from n u c l e a r  s ou rces  w i l l  become an economic 
p r o p o s i t i o n  in  p a r t s  of A u s t r a l i a  remote from th e  
source  of conv en t io n a l  f u e l s  w i t h i n ,  p ro b a b ly ,  t h e  
next  decade»^
I n  October 1958 work commenced on A u s t r a l i a ’s f i r s t  r e s e a r c h
r e a c to r »  This  was a 10 M.W» i n s t a l l a t i o n  c a l l e d  HIFAR and was
b u i l t  a t  t h e  A»A»E»C»’s r e s e a r c h  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  a t  Lucas Heights
near  Sydney. HIFAR has been i n  o p e r a t i o n  s in c e  January  1958 and
u s e s  f u e l  manufac tu red  in  B r i t a i n  from en r ic hed  uranium s u p p l ie d
2
by t h e  United S t a t e s .  I t  i s  no t  c ap a b le  of producing q u a n t i t i e s
L  C.N»I,A. , V o l» 25, No. 10,  October 1954, pp,  733-34»
2» Ho G e lbe r ,  The A u s t r a l i a n  American A l l i a n c e , Ringwood:
Penguin,  1968,  p»48»
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of f i s s i o n a b l e  m a te r i a l  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  th e  m anufac tu re  of n u c le a r
weapons» In  any c a s e ,  p r i o r  to  1966, th e  f u e l  s u p p l ie d  f o r  HIFAR
was s u b je c t  to  c o n t ro l  by th e  U ,S. and B r i ta in »  S ince  th e n ,  HIFAR
has been s u b je c t  to  I.A.E.A» safeguards»"^" MOATA, th e  on ly  o th e r
r e s e a r c h  r e a c t o r  b u i l t  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  i s  a l s o  f u e l l e d  w i th  e n r ic h ed
uranium» T his  r e a c t o r  which i s  a l s o  a t  Lucas H e ig h ts ,  has an
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  power o u tp u t  (10 k i l o w a t t s )  and was d es ig n ed  prim -
2
a r i l y  f o r  r e a c to r  p h y s ic s  r e s e a r c h .
The e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of th e  AoA»EoC. was fo llow ed  by s u g g e s t io n s
in  p a r l i a m e n t  and e lsew here  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  im m ediately  proceed
w ith  th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  of n u c le a r  power s t a t i o n s  to  a s s i s t  th e
n a t i o n ' s  development» S u g g es tio n s  such as  th e s e  were i n  l i n e
w ith  c u r r e n t  th in k in g  in  many p a r t s  of th e  world and r e f l e c t e d
th e  hopes th en  he ld  f o r  th e  s u c c e s s f u l  use  of atom ic energy  in
th e  p ro d u c t io n  of e l e c t r i c  power» In  1955, th e  A u s t r a l i a n
Government in d i c a te d  t h a t ,  f o r  th e  tim e b e in g ,  i t  was n o t
p repa red  to  encourage th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of an a tom ic power
s t a t i o n .  I t  emphasised th a t  much remained to  be le a rn e d  about
th e  p ro d u c t io n  of power from n u c le a r  s o u rc e s  and t h a t  in  some
p a r t s  of A u s t r a l i a ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th o se  r i c h  in  c o a l  d e p o s i t s ,  i t
would be many y e a rs  b e fo r e  a tom ic f a c i l i t i e s  could  compete w ith
3
c o n v e n t io n a l  f u e l  p l a n t s .
The c o l l a b o r a t i o n  between B r i t i s h  and A u s t r a l i a n  s c i e n t i s t s  
which was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of th e  e a r l y  y e a r s  of atom ic energy 
r e s e a r c h  in  A u s t r a l i a  remained a f e a t u r e  of developm ents  in  
t h i s  f i e l d  a f t e r  the  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of th e  A.A.E.C, In  announ­
c ing  d e t a i l s  of th e  A»A»E»C» R esearch  Programme, C anberra  
emphasised t h a t  work u n d e r ta k e n  in  A u s t r a l i a :
1. The Age (M elbourne), 28 September 1966.
2. See, A.L. B urns , "N uclear Forces  i n  A u s t r a l i a , "  in  Nina 
H ea th c o te ,  A.L. Burns and G»P. King ( e d s . ) ,  N uclear  D is p e r s a l  
i n  A sia  and th e  I n d o - P a c i f i c  R eg ion , C anberra : A.N.U» P r e s s ,  
1965, p p .40-41.
3 » C .P .D . , H of R . , V o l» 7, 1955, p»545.
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w h i le  be ing  a complete and s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  programme,
[would] be r e l a t e d  to  th e  work c u r r e n t l y  i n  p ro g re s s  
i n  th e  Uni ted Kingdom i n  o rder  to  avoid d u p l i c a t i o n  
of e f f o r t  and to p rov ide  fo r  c o o p e r a t i o n  and mutual  
a s s i s t a n c e  between the  two coun t r i e s ,^ -
To a s s i s t  i n  the  work of th e  A .A .E .C , ,  B r i t a i n  agreed to  make
a v a i l a b l e  to  A u s t r a l i a  in fo rm a t io n  on r e c e n t  developments i n
atomic energy r e s e a r c h  i n  th e  U„K, and to o f f e r  f a c i l i t i e s  to
A u s t r a l i a n  s c i e n t i s t s  to  enab le  them to  g a i n  f i r s t  hand know-
2
le d g e  of r e a c t o r  d e s ig n  and o p e r a t i o n .  As f a c i l i t i e s  were 
completed i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  s t a f f  t r a i n e d  i n  England were brought 
back to form the  nucleus  of r e s e a r c h  groups a t  Lucas H e ig h t s ,  
A u s t r a l i a  a l s o  b e n e f i t e d  from agreements  reached  w i th  th e  
United S t a t e s  and Canada, In  June 1956, Canberra  e n t e re d  i n t o  
an agreement w i th  the  United S t a t e s  f o r  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  the  
p e a c e fu l  u s e s  of  atomic energy .  Under the  terms of th e  a g r e e ­
ment,  A u s t r a l i a  was to r e c e i v e  in fo rm a t io n  on the  d e s i g n ,  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  and o p e r a t i o n  of r e s e a r c h  r e a c t o r s  t o g e th e r  w i th  
s u p p l i e s  of en r iched  uranium and in fo rm a t io n  on th e  p ro d u c t io n  
and r e f i n i n g  of  uranium and thor ium. P r o v i s i o n  was a l s o  made
f o r  A u s t r a l i a n  s c i e n t i s t s  to  v i s i t  " s p e c i a l i s e d  r e s e a r c h
3
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  i n  th e  United S t a t e s " ,  Th is  i n i t i a l  i n t e r ­
governmental  agreement was amended and extended i n  September
4
1960 and a g a i n  i n  A p r i l  1967, C o -o p e ra t io n  w i th  the  U,S, 
in  t h e  p e a c e fu l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of atomic energy was a l s o  provided  
f o r  i n  an agreement between the  American and A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic 
Energy Agencies i n  1964,^  In  August 1959, A u s t r a l i a  s igned  an 
agreement w i th  Canada f o r  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  the  p eac e fu l  u ses  of 
atomic energy .  The agreement prov ided  f o r  an exchange of
1, C .N . I .A . ,  V o l , 25, No, 10,  October 1957, p p , 733-734,
2, i b i d .
3,  i b i d . ,  Vol.  27, No, 6, June 1956, p ,374 ,
4, G e lbe r ,  op,  c i t . ,  p ,4 7 ,
5, i b i d .
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i n f o r m a t io n ,  m a t e r i a l  and equipment between the  two c o u n t r i e s  and 
f o r  t h e  use  of each o t h e r ' s  f a c i l i t i e s * ^  There can be l i t t l e  
doubt  t h a t  atomic energy r e s e a r c h  i n  A u s t r a l i a  has  b e n e f i t e d  
g r e a t l y  from t h i s  c o o p e ra t io n  w i th  f r i e n d l y  powers.
I n  the  mid-1960s t h e r e  was a r e v i v a l  of i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  
p r o s p e c t s  f o r  n u c l e a r  power p r o d u c t io n  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  In 1965, 
th e  A»A»E*C* p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  nuc lea r  power would have "a s i g n i ­
f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  t h i s  count ry  [ A u s t r a l i a ]  w i t h i n  the  f o r e s e e a b l e  
f u t u r e " .  In  South A u s t r a l i a ,  the  A»A»E,C* a l l e g e d ,  nuc lea r  
power would prove co m p e t i t iv e  w i th  t h a t  produced from c o n v e n t io n a l  
s o u rces  by th e  e a r l y  1970s,  In  a d d i t i o n ,  by the  m i d - t o - l a t e  
1970s,  i t  would be p o s s i b l e  to  j u s t i f y  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of
n u c l e a r  power producing f a c i l i t i e s  i n  Tasmania,  New Sputh Wales
2and V i c t o r i a  a l s o .  In 1966 t h e  A,A,E*C* r e p e a te d  t h e s e  con­
c l u s i o n s  and emphasised th e  need f o r  A u s t r a l i a  to beg in  t h e
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of advanced c o n v e r t e r  s t a t i o n s  as  soon as  econo-
3m i c a l l y  j u s t i f i a b l e .  S p e c u l a t io n  about  th e  f u t u r e  of n u c lea r  
power i n  A u s t r a l i a  was no t  conf ined  to  t h e  A.A»E,C„ In  
p a r l i a m e n t ,  d u r ing  1965 and 1966, a number of members p re s s ed  
th e  government to  e s t a b l i s h  n u c l e a r  power s t a t i o n s  bo th  f o r  
t h e  p ro d u c t i o n  of e l e c t r i c i t y  and the  d e s a l i n a t i o n  of water*
The government was not  a t  a l l  sym pathe t ic  to s u g g e s t io n s  
about  t h e  u s e  of nuc lea r  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  d e s a l i n a t i o n  of  
w a te r .  However, i t  ag reed  w i th  the  A»A.E»C», t h a t  in  the  
" f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e " ,  the  p ro d u c t i o n  of  e l e c t r i c  power from
n u c l e a r  s ou rces  was l i k e l y  to  become an economic p r o p o s i t i o n
4 , . .i n  some a r e a s  of  A u s t r a l i a *  The d e c i s i o n  to  b u i ld  A u s t r a l i a  s
1* C .N . I .A . , Vol* 30,  No* 10, August 1959, p*22*
2, A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission, T h i r t e e n t h  Annual R e p o r t , 
June  1965, p p , 22-24*
3. A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission, F o u r t e e n t h  Annual R e p o r t , 
June  1966,  pp*23-25» The A*A»E»C* i n s i s t e d  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  
needed c o n v e r t e r  s t a t i o n s  i n  o rd e r  to  accumula te  a s to c k
of plu tonium f o r  use  in  any f u t u r e  f a s t  b re e d e r  r e a c t o r  
programme.
4* C .P . D. , H of R», Vol* 50, p»553*
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f i r s t  n u c le a r  power s t a t i o n  was announced in  October 1969»^ The p la n t
i s  schedu led  to  be b u i l t  a t  J e r v i s  Bay in  N,S,W. and i s  expec ted  to
2
have a c a p a c i ty  of 500 M.W. Tenders f o r  th e  p r o j e c t  c lo se d  on 
15 June  1970; b id s  were r e c e iv e d  from a t o t a l  of seven  d i f f e r e n t
3
o r g a n i s a t io n s  in  B r i t a i n ,  Canada, West Germany and the  U nited  S t a t e s ,
A f te r  d e t a i l e d  e v a lu a t io n ,  a s h o r t - l i s t  of fo u r  system s was drawn up
4
f o r  f u r t h e r  c o n s id e r a t io n .  In June 1971, the  A u s t r a l i a n  Government 
announced t h a t ,  i n  view of the  c o u n t ry ’ s c u r r e n t  economic circum ­
s t a n c e s ,  a f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  on the  proposed power s t a t i o n  a t  J e r v i s  
Bay would be d e f e r r e d  f o r  12 months,"* No d e c i s io n  to  proceed  
w ith  th e  p r o j e c t  has y e t  been made. From th e  b e g in n in g ,  govern­
ment spokesmen den ied  t h a t  d e fence  c o n s id e r a t io n s  had e n te re d  in to  
C a n b e r ra ’ s d e c i s io n  to  e s t a b l i s h  a n u c le a r  power s t a t i o n .
N e v e r th e le s s ,  the  government i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  p la n t  to  be b u i l t  
a t  J e r v i s  Bay shou ld  be cap a b le  of becoming " f u l l y  independen t 
of o v e rs e a s  f u e l  s u p p l ie s  and s e r v ic e s » "  A ccording to  th e  A»A.E»C.,
1. A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission, E ig h te e n th  Annual R e p o r t , 
June  1970, p .1 3 ,
2. i b i d .
3. A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission, N in e te e n th  Annual R e p o r t , 
June 1971, p .1 3 .
4 . i b i d .  These w ere:
(a) N a tu r a l  Uranium P r e s s u r i s e d  Heavy Water Moderated and Cooled 
R e a c to r ,  p r e s s u r e  tube  type  (PHWR-CANDU) -  Atomic Energy
of Canada L td ,
(b) Steam G en era t in g  Heavy Water R eac to r  (SGHWR) -  The N uclear  
Power Group, U.K»
(c) P r e s s u r i s e d  Water R eac to r  (PWR) -  K raf tw erk  Union A„G»,
West Germany.
(d) P r e s s u r i s e d  Water R eac to r  (PWR) -  W estinghouse, U.S.A»
For a d i s c u s s io n  of some of th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the
v a r io u s  ty p es  of r e a c t o r s  i n  common u s e ,  see  Ia n  B e l la n y ,  
A u s t r a l i a  in  th e  N uclear  Age, Sydney: Sydney U n iv e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  
1972, p p ,13-17.
5. A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission, N in e te e n th  Annual R e p o r t , 
June 1971, p .2 0 .
6. T h is  req u ire m en t re g a rd in g  f u e l  s u p p l i e s  was s t i p u l a t e d  in  th e  
A .A .E .C .’ s I n v i t a t i o n  to  Tender» The r e l e v a n t  c la u s e  i s  
reproduced  in  i b i d », p,15»
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a l l  fo u r  of th e  s h o r t - l i s t e d  t e n d e r e r s ,  In  c o n c e r t  w i th  t h e i r
governm ents , were a b l e ,  i n  one way or a n o th e r ,  to  meet t h i s
c o n d i t io n  reg a rd in g  ind igenous  f u e l  r e q u ire m e n ts .^ - As B e llany
has  s u g g e s te d ,  by seek ing  to  a c q u i r e  a r e a c to r  which would be
independen t of f o r e ig n  f u e l  s u p p l i e s ,  A u s t r a l i a  has g iv en  th e
im p ress io n  th a t  i t  wants to  be in  a p o s i t i o n  where i t  would be
a b le  to  u se  t h a t  r e a c to r  fo r  m i l i t a r y  p u rp o s e s ,  should  i t  ever 
2d e c id e  to  do s o 0
The p ro s p e c t  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  w i l l  e v e n tu a l ly  a c q u i r e  a tom ic
power f a c i l i t i e s  r a i s e s  i n e v i t a b l e  q u e s t io n s  about th e  n a t i o n ’ s
n u c le a r  weapons p o te n t ia l - ,  I t  seems g e n e r a l ly  agreed  th a t
A u s t r a l i a  could meet th e  c o s t  of going n u c le a r  w ith o u t  too  much
d i f f i c u l t y .  The c o u n t ry ’s p r e s e n t  G.N.P. of abou t 33 b i l l i o n  
3
d o l l a r s  i s  w e l l  above th e  e s t im a te d  minimum l e v e l s  of G.N.P.
1, i b i d , ,  p .1 6 .  The Canadian b id  was f o r  a r e a c t o r  which uses  
n a t u r a l  uranium f u e l ,  hence no u n d e r ta k in g  on enrichm ent 
was r e q u i r e d .  The B r i t i s h  and German subm iss ions  were 
accompanied by o f f e r s  of en richm ent te ch n o lo g y .  The U.S. 
b id  i s  s a id  to  have inc luded  an  o f f e r  of "en r ichm ent s e r ­
v i c e s " .  Whether t h i s  meant t h a t  the  American Government was 
w i l l i n g  to  a s s i s t  A u s t r a l i a  i n  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of an 
enrichm ent p la n t  was not made c l e a r  i n  th e  A ,A oE,C .' s  r e p o r t .  
However, on 20 J u ly  1971, C anberra  announced t h a t  " th e  U nited  
S t a t e s  Government had o f f e r e d  to  d i s c u s s  w ith  A u s t r a l i a  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of making U.S. enrichm ent techno logy  a v a i l a b l e  
o u t s id e  of the  U nited  S t a t e s  fo r  th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  of a 
uranium enrichm ent p la n t  on a m u l t i - n a t i o n a l  b a s i s . ” See, 
C .N .L A . ,  Vol. 42, No. 7, J u ly  1971, p .383 .  The whole 
m a t te r  of r e c e n t  changes in  American p o l i c y  on uranium 
enrichm ent and the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of th e s e  changes f o r  U.S, 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l ic y  w i l l  be ta k e n  up a g a in  l a t e r  in  th e  
t h e s i s .  See, Chapter XI*
2, B e l la n y ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p . 109-110,
3, The f i g u r e  i s  fo r  th e  1969-1970 f i n a n c i a l  y e a r .  See, 
Yearbook of th e  Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , No. 57, 1971, 
C anberra : Bureau of Census and S t a t i s t i c s ,  1971, p ,4 6 1 .
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which, in the past, have been considered necessary to support a
nuclear weapons programme. Moreover, it seems that the "dollar”
cost would not be high in relation to Australia’s GcN.P, and 
2defence budget. However, there appear to be deficiencies in 
Australia's technological resource base which could threaten any 
future plan to acquire nuclear weapons, Bellany has argued that,
1, According to Ian Bellany, the highest level at which this 
minimum seems to have been put is about ten billion dollars, 
(Amounts mentioned in this chapter are expressed in U,S, 
dollars,) See, Bellany, op, cite, p,65,
2. Harry Gelber has estimated that the annual cost to Australia 
of producing 100 twenty kiloton bombs and fifty 3000 kilo­
metre surface-to-surface missiles in soft emplacements would 
be about 118,5 million dollars for ten years. See Gelber, 
op. cit,, pp.44-45, Bellany has estimated that the annual 
cost to Australia of producing 100 plutonium warheads (prob­
ably no greater than 60 kilotons) and 100 short-range (less 
than 500 nm) ship-borne missiles would be about 95 million 
dollars for ten years. See, Ian Bellany, An Australian Nuclear 
Force, Canberra: A.N.U. Press, 1969, p.16. By way of 
comparison, expenditure on defence in Australia has been 
estimated at 1,270 million dollars for 1969 and 1,261 million 
for 1970, See, The Military Balance, 1970-1971, London:
The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970, p.lll and The 
Military Balance, 1971-1972, London: The Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1971, p,61 respectively, Ian Bellany 
has also costed a somewhat more sophisticated force than the 
last mentioned one. This would include "eight specially 
constructed ships or submarines designed to carry between 
them one hundred ballistic or cruise missiles with a range 
of up to 1,000 miles and nuclear warheads up to 100 kt, 
with VFL [very low frequency] navigation and communication 
equipment, and a protected national command centre," Bellany 
has estimated that over a ten year period,the annual cost 
of such a force would be equal to less than twenty per cent 
of Australia’s 1968-69 defence budget, See, Bellany, 
Australia in the Nuclear Age, pp,79-80,
198
using the "Kramish" R and D criterion,'*" Australia is "scarcely
sufficiently technologically mature to undertake a programme for
2the manufacture of nuclear weapons." It seems that if Australia
wants to be able to produce nuclear weapons in the future, it will
probably have to spend much more on R and D than it presently does,
and as well, to expand the size of the country’s technically
3qualified manpower force.
Australia will begin to acquire a stockpile of plutonium
some time after its first power reactor commences operations.
(Just when this might be is impossible to say, pending a decision
to go ahead with the project at Jervis Bay. It has been calcu-
4lated that it will take about five years to build the reactor. ) 
However, Australia’s first reactor will be foreign built (most 
probably by one of the short-listed tenderers mentioned above) 
and the plutonium derived from it will, almost certainly, be 
subject to restrictions limiting its use to peaceful purposes. 
Australia could circumvent these difficulties by building its own 
reactor and ancillary facilities from national resources. How­
ever, it has been estimated that Australia’s engineers and 
scientists would first need at least three years experience 
running a foreign built facility.^ Assuming it would take about 
five years to construct a locally built reactor, Australia could 
not begin to produce plutonium weapons within about eight or 
nine years of the start-up of the first reactor bought from
1. It has been suggested by Arnold Kramish, among others, that 
in addition to having a G.N.P. of about ten billion dollars, 
a country must be spending at least 0.8 per cent of its 
G.N.P. on scientific research and development (R and D) in
order to be able to manufacture nuclear weapons from its own 
resources. See, ibid., p,65.
2. Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, p.66. According to
Bellany, expenditure in Australia on R and D during 1967 and 
1968 was probably somewhere between 0.7 and 1 per cent of 
G.N.P. ibid., pp.65-66.
3. ibid., p .67.
4. Bellany, An Australian Nuclear Force, p.16.
5. Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, pp.70-71.
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overseas, (In sum, this could amount to a gap of up to 14 years
between the letting of the contract for the first foreign built
reactor and the construction of Australia’s first plutonium weapons,)
Recent developments in centrifuge technology have raised the
possibility that Australia might be able to choose to base any
future nuclear weapons programme on enriched uranium manufactured
2in a centrifuge plant rather than on plutonium from a reactor.
As Bellany has pointed out, such an alternative route to weapons
production could have certain advantages: it would allow for
simpler weapon design, at least in the initial stages of bomb
construction; and would make for an easier transition to the
3manufacture of thermo-nuclear weapons« However, centrifuge
technology has yet to prove itself in practical operation. In
any case, Australia would need years of experience running a foreign
built centrifuge plant before it could build one of its own;
it has been estimated that Australia could not hope to have a
4locally built centrifuge plant in operation before 1985.
Should Australia ever decide to develop nuclear weapons it 
would, like any other aspiring nuclear state, be faced with the 
problem of developing a delivery system. Providing it was
1. ibid., p «71«
2, For a discussion of some of these recent developments in 
centrifuge technology, see below, Chapter XI. The A.A.E.C, 
has been conducting work on a centrifuge programme for 
some years* See, Australian Atomic Energy Commission, 
Seventeenth Annual Report, June 1969, p,10.
3, Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, p.71. In the 
manufacture of thermo-nuclear weapons a reactor would prob­
ably still be required for the production of tritium.
See, ibid*
4. ibid., pp.71-72» As mentioned above, the British and West 
German tenders for the proposed power station at Jervis Bay 
were accompanied by offers of enrichment (possibly centri­
fuge?) technology. However, it is almost certain that any 
enrichment facility built with British or West German 
assistance would be accompanied by restrictions limiting 
its use to peaceful purposes,
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satisfied with a fairly unsophisticated means of delivering its
nuclear bombs, Australia could make use of the Canberra jet
bombers already in service with the Royal Australian Air Force 
1(RoAcAnFo) These aircraft are certainly capable of carrying 
nuclear bombs but nevertheless they suffer from a number of 
important disadvantages- In particular, they are limited in the 
number of foreign targets they would be capable of striking from 
bases in Australia and are vulnerable both to pre-emptive attack 
and modern air defencesr Australia presently has twenty-four 
F111C aircraft on order for the RoA„AoF„ This is a multi­
purpose aircraft which couid certainly be used in a nuclear 
role. It can fly at supersonic speeds and, according to Ian 
Bellany, Mhas the greatest operational radius of any modern 
bomber one country has ever undertaken to supply to another»"
Even so, it would be limited in the number of important foreign
2targets it could strike from bases in Australia. Moreover,
though in many ways a very sophisticated aircraft, the FlllCs
would still be vulnerable to modern air defences and to pre-
3emptive attack by an adversary armed with nuclear missiles»
1, Australia has one bomber squadron equipped with Canberra 
B-20 aircraftn See, The Military Balance, 1971-1972, p.44, 
2-, The maximum published un-refuelled range of the F111C is 
3,800 miles» See, The Military Balance, 1969-1970, London: 
The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969, p.56. Bellany 
has pointed out that with in-flight re-fuelling, the F111C 
would probably have sufficient range to reach Chinese and 
Japanese targets, but not to return to Australia, Without 
re-fuelling, it would be stretched to the limit to fly from 
Darwin (Australia) to Djakarta (Indonesia) and back. See, 
Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age , p,63 (including fn, 
1).
3» ibid ,, po 63 o
A lso ,  as  long as th e  U .S . ,  th e  s u p p l i e r  of th e  F111C, rem ains
opposed to  n u c le a r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  A u s t r a l i a  could  expec t  to  be
d isco u rag e d  from u s in g  th e  F111C as a n u c le a r  d e l iv e r y  v e h i c l e .
These and o th e r  c o n s id e r a t io n s  have prompted th e  exam ination
of A u s t r a l i a ' s  p o t e n t i a l  to  develop  a m i s s i l e  d e l iv e r y  f o r c e  of
some k in d .  Because of A u s t r a l i a ’s a s s o c i a t i o n  w ith  B r i t a i n  in
th e  development and t e s t i n g  of guided  m i s s i l e s ,  and more
r e c e n t l y ,  w i th  th e  U.S. i n  th e  m a in tenance  in  A u s t r a l i a  of
American space  t r a c k in g  and communication s t a t i o n s ,  A u s t r a l i a n
s c i e n t i s t s  have no doubt a c q u i re d  v a lu a b le  knowledge about
e l e c t r o n i c s ,  p ro p u ls io n  and o th e r  a s p e c t s  of m i s s i l e  te c h n o lo g y .^
In  t im e ,  A u s t r a l i a  could develop  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  b ase  and th e
s p e c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of m i s s i l e
components and f u e l s .  The p ro d u c t io n  of I .C .B .M .s  l i k e  th e
Minuteman, or S .L .B .M .s l i k e  th e  P o l a r i s ,  would seem to  be w e l l
2beyond A u s t r a l i a ’s p r e s e n t  c a p a c i ty .  However, Ia n  B e l lan y  has 
c o s te d  a more modest d e l iv e r y  system  w hich , he c la im s ,
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1. The development of th e  J i n d i v i k  t a r g e t - d r o n e  has p rov ided  
some e x p e r ien ce  w ith  th e  problems o f  un-manned f l i g h t .
T h is  ex p e r ien ce  could  be v a lu a b le  i f  A u s t r a l i a  ever  dec ided  
to  develop  a s t a n d - o f f  m i s s i l e  or a s h o r t - r a n g e  s e a -b o rn e  
m i s s i l e .  See, i b i d . , p .6 7 .
2. B e l lany  has e s t im a te d  t h a t  th e  p ro d u c t io n  of m i s s i l e  d e l iv e r y  
system s of th e  P o l a r i s  or Minuteman ty p e  w i l l  rem ain  beyond 
A u s t r a l i a ' s  f i n a n c i a l  and t e c h n i c a l  c a p a c i ty  t i l l  1990 a t  
th e  e a r l i e s t .  See, B e l la n y ,  A u s t r a l i a  in  th e  N uclear Age, 
p .6 7 .  H arry  Gelber seems more o p t i m i s t i c  as  r e g a rd s  
A u s t r a l i a ’ s c a p a c i ty  to  a f f o r d  a s o p h i s t i c a t e d  m i s s i l e  
d e l iv e r y  system ; he has c o s ted  a f o r c e  of 50 Minuteman I -  
ty p e  m i s s i l e s ,  w ith  a ran g e  of 10,000 km. and i n  hard  
emplacements a t  around 130 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  a n n u a l ly  fo r
10 y e a r s .  See, G e lb e r ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p . 44-45. He has conceded, 
though , t h a t  th e  t e c h n ic a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  manpower r e q u i r e ­
ments f o r  th e  development of a s o p h i s t i c a t e d  m i s s i l e  system , 
even i f  c ap a b le  of be ing  m e t,  would d e t r a c t  g r e a t l y  from 
o th e r  a re a s  of development in  A u s t r a l i a .  See , i b i d . , p ,4 6 .
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Australia could be in a position to produce by the late 1970s, 
Such a force would be made up of one hundred 1000-mile range 
ballistic or cruise missiles capable of being surface-launched 
from ships or submarines.^"
Bo The Nature and Extent of Support for Nuclear 
Weapons in Australia
The Australian public has never displayed much vocal
opposition to their nation’s involvement in the nuclear affairs
of either of its major allies, Britain and the United States.
However, this does not mean that Australians have been anxious
to see their country acquire nuclear weapons of its own.
Indeed, over the years, support for an Australian nuclear force
has remained low and constant. Successive governments in
Canberra have displayed little enthusiasm for an Australian
nuclear force though they have vigorously sought the protection
of the American and British deterrents. At the same time,
Australia has not undertaken never to produce nuclear weapons.
In this and other ways Canberra has, at least diplomatically,
preserved an option on going nuclear.
During the whole post-war period no more than about ten
or twelve members of the Federal Parliament have openly
suggested that Australia should acquire nuclear weapons.
Most of these have been members of the Liberal-Country Party
coalition, though there have been some advocates in the
2Australian Labor Party (A,L,P.). In recent years there has been
1. Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, pp.79-80.
2, Members of the Australian Federal Parliament who, at one time 
or another, have supported the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, include Senator Gorton, in C.P.D., Senate, Vol.S.10, 
8 May 1957, pp.608 and 609; Senator Wordsworth, in ibid. , 
p,615; Senator Branson, in ibid., Vol.S.26, 2 September 1964, 
p,367, See also, Mr. Bruce, in C.P.D., H of R., Vol. 6,
28 April 1955, pp,287-8; Mr. Stewart, in ibid. , Vol. 15,
7 May 1957, p,1102; Mr. Bostock, in ibid., pp.1105-6; Mr, 
Wentworth, in ibid», 8 May 1957 , p,1155 and ibid. , Vol. 25,
6 October 1959, p,1817; Mr, Beasley, in ibid., p.1810;
Mr. Killen, in ibid., Vol. 28, 11 October 1960, pp.1872-3.
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strong support for an Australian nuclear force from the Democratic
Labor Party (D»L»P.).^ Outside of Parliament, support for nuclear
weapons has been similarly slight and, generally speaking has been
2limited to the Returned Services League of Australia (R.S.L.)#
3certain publicists, and some members of the Australian scientific 
4community»
There has been very little agreement amongst the supporters 
of an Australian nuclear capability about the proposed purpose and 
characteristics of such a force»
lo In July 1963, the Federal Conference of the D»L»P» called for 
the establishment of U»S» nuclear bases in Australia, See, 
The Mercury (Hobart), 29 July 1963= Since then, demands for 
an Australian nuclear force of one sort or another have been 
a regular feature of D»L»P, statements on defence» See,
The Sydney Morning Herald^ 7 November 1967; statements by 
Senator F» McManus in C ,P , Senate, 26 March 1969, pp,634-5 
and in "Defence and the D.L.P»", unpublished seminar paper, 
A»N»U», 28 August 1969, p,4», and The Australian, 15 November 
1967.
2o In 1962, the National Congress of the RoS.L, resolved that 
Australia should acquire a supply of nuclear weapons and 
aircraft for their delivery» See, Henry S. Albinski, 
"Australia and Nuclear Affairs" in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 38, 
No, 1, Spring 1965, p,44» The 1966 National Congress 
resolved chat Australian troops should be equipped with 
tactical nuclear weapons, and that the R,A,A»F, should be 
provided with strategic nuclear weapons "at an appropriate 
time"» More recently, the R»S»L. has modified its position, 
and in its 1969 Defence Statement, urged that it was in 
Australia's interests to sign the N,P»T» Material supplied 
by courtesy of Mr, A,G,W. Keys, National Secretary, R.S.L. 
Canberra»
3» See especially, B*A, Santamaria, President of the National 
Civic Council, in The Bulletin, 19 June 1965, pp»25-27,
4» In 1968, Sir Philip Baxter, Chairman of the Australian Atomic 
Energy Commission declared that Australia must equip itself 
with the most "sophisticated and effective weapons that man 
can devise - with no type excluded"» See, The Australian,
20 March 196.8»
5» This section has been constructed from material drawn from 
the sources cited above» See p, 202»
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Some have been anxious that Australia should acquire a minimum 
deterrent against China and even Russia» Consequently, weapons 
capable of delivery onto targets in these countries have been 
proposed» More usually, it has been suggested that Australia 
should acquire tactical nuclear weapons for use against invading 
land or naval forces»^ Implicit in proposals of the latter 
sort was the idea that nuclear weapons could compensate for the 
relative insignificance of Australia’s conventional forces»
That the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia would be 
interpreted by the Americans as a challenge to their policy of 
nonproliferation has gone virtually unacknowledged by many 
supporters of an Australian bomb» Indeed some have argued that 
Australia could expect either the U,S» or the U,K, to provide 
it with warheads, nuclear delivery vehicles and staging facili­
ties» It is indicative of the uninformed nature of much of 
the nuclear debate in Australia that some people should have 
seriously suggested that nuclear weapons could be obtained 
from abroad» Like the other nuclear weapons states, the 
United States and Britain have never supplied nuclear warheads 
to anyone and there is no reason to believe that they have 
ever considered making an exception in Australia’s case» Nor 
is it at all likely that either power would be prepared to do 
so in the future» In addition to suggestions that such a
capability could be obtained from overseas, it has been variously 
proposed that Australia should manufacture its own, build one 
in collaboration with neighbouring non-nuclear nations, or 
induce allied nations to station nuclear weapons on Australian 
territory,
It is hardly surprising that some uncertainty has existed
1» For a view which questions the military value of tactical 
nuclear weapons in situations such as these, see Bellany, 
Australia in the Nuclear Age, pp,96-97»
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about how A u s t r a l i a  might a c q u i re  a n u c le a r  f o r c e .  U n lik e  In d ia  and
J a p a n ,  A u s t r a l i a  does no t y e t  p o s se s s  an e x te n s iv e  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r
e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  and c o n se q u e n t ly ,  i s  i n  no p o s i t i o n  to  m an u fac tu re
i t s  own n u c le a r  weapons w i th in  a r e a s o n a b ly  s h o r t  p e r io d  of t im e .
The f a c t  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  la c k s  th e  w herew itha l  to  im m ediate ly  proceed
w i th  th e  m anufac tu re  of n u c le a r  weapons has c e r t a i n l y  n o t  gone
u n n o t ic e d .  Many A u s t r a l i a n s ,  bo th  th o se  keen to  see  t h e  coun try
go n u c le a r  and th o s e  simply anx ious to  see  i t  pu rchase  a m i l i t a r y
n u c le a r  o p t io n ,  have urged  th e  government to  a t  l e a s t  e s t a b l i s h
th e  r e a c t o r s  which would be n e c e s s a ry  fo r  any f u tu r e  weapons 
1programme,
Three f e a t u r e s  of th e  su p p o r t  f o r  n u c le a r  weapons i n  A u s t r a l i a  
a r e  worthy of s p e c i a l  m en tion , In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e ,  th e  i n i t i a l  
a g i t a t i o n  fo r  an A u s t r a l i a n  n u c le a r  f o r c e  p r e d a te d ,  by many y e a r s ,  
th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c lea r  weapons by China, I t  was as  long ago 
as 1955-57 t h a t  c e r t a i n  members of th e  F e d e ra l  P a r l ia m e n t  f i r s t  
recommended t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  should  a c q u i re  a n u c le a r  f o r c e .  The 
t h r e a t s ,  a g a in s t  which i t  was a l l e g e d  A u s t r a l i a  needed n u c le a r  
weapons, u s u a l ly  went u n s p e c i f i e d  though o c c a s io n a l ly  R u ss ia  was 
mentioned as a d i s t i n c t  menace. I t  was argued th e n ,  a s  indeed 
i t  was l a t e r ,  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  could  not depend in  a l l  c i rc u m s tan c es  
on a s s i s t a n c e  from i t s  a l l i e s .  The development of n u c le a r  weapons 
by China c e r t a i n l y  p rov ided  more g r i s t  f o r  th e  m i l l  of th o s e  who 
have campaigned f o r  an A u s t r a l i a n  n u c le a r  f o r c e .  But th e  a c t u a l  
d im ensions of su p p o r t  f o r  n u c le a r  weapons in  A u s t r a l i a  were 
v i r t u a l l y  u n a f fe c te d  by th e  Chinese ach ievem ent,
A second im p o rtan t  f e a t u r e  of th e  su p p o r t  f o r  n u c le a r  weapons 
in  A u s t r a l i a  has been th e  a lm ost t o t a l  p re o c c u p a t io n  w ith  th e  
s e c u r i t y  i s s u e ;  t h e r e  has been v i r t u a l l y  no su p p o r t  f o r  an Aus­
t r a l i a n  n u c le a r  f o r c e  on th e  grounds of p r e s t i g e . That t h i s
1, e , g ,  Mr, G a lv in ,  C-P „D. ,  H of R , , Vol. 48, 28 O ctober 1965, 
p p , 2355-7; Dr, Mackay, C. P, D. , H of R , , Vol, 45, 25 March 
1965, p .390 .
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is so is hardly surprising in a country which harbours few, if any, 
aspirations to great power status. Moreover, there is little 
need in Australia, as there is in some countries, for some spec­
tacular demonstration of national self-assertion, such as the 
development and testing of nuclear weapons, to unite and reassure 
the country.
Finally, it is important to note that there has been vir­
tually no support for an Australian nuclear force either as a 
means to enable Canberra to break free of the American alliance 
altogether, or even, as a way of securing for Australia a 
greater say in American policy, especially nuclear policy, in 
Asia.^ Indeed, the most vocal advocates of an Australian nuclear 
capability - the D,L»P., certain right wing members of the Federal 
Parliament and, the R,S„L, - have all been strong supporters of 
the country's alliance with the United States and, generally 
speaking, have viewed the costs to Australia of this alliance 
as small in comparison with the benefits. However, many of 
these elements have nevertheless alleged that, in certain 
circumstances, the alliance could break down, and that conse­
quently Australia should acquire its own nuclear force» Ideally, 
they would like to have the bomb and the American alliance too» 
What they appear to have overlooked, however, is that in view 
of the priority America has traditionally accorded the goal of 
nonproliferation, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
Australia would almost certainly damage its relationship with 
the U.S*
I. It has been argued by some Australians that their country's 
alliance with the U.S», and in particular, the presence on 
Australian soil of American electronic and radar defence 
installations, (these will be described later in the chap­
ter) serves to expose Australia to Soviet, and eventually, 
Chinese, nuclear attack. But though these people would 
like to see the alliance with the U,S. abandoned, they do 
not advocate that Australia should then acquire its own 
nuclear weapons.
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But what of the Australian Government's attitude to nuclear 
weapons? It has already been noted that the post-war Labor 
government was responsible for launching Australia on the path 
of nuclear collaboration with Great Britain« These early efforts 
were climaxed by the establishment, in 1946, of the joint 
Australian-British guided missile range at Woomera, The new 
Liberal-Country Party coalition government under Mr, Menzies, 
which took office in 1949, was eager to continue this collabor­
ation, and in 1952, agreed to allow Britain to carry out a series 
of atomic tests on Australian territory« From the start, the 
Menzies government seemed quite reluctant to denounce nuclear 
weapons outright. Indeed, there was a tendency for Canberra to 
eulogize what it saw as the special advantages of the atomic 
bomb as an aid in combating Communism, That nuclear weapons 
enabled the West to counter the overwhelming conventional 
forces of Russia and its allies, was a recurring theme in 
Australian statements on disarmament at this time,^
However, despite Canberra's views about the value of nuclear 
weapons in combating Communism, especially Chinese Communism, 
the Australian Government was not anxious to develop a nuclear 
arsenal of its own; it seemed sufficient to rely upon the 
strength of Australia's powerful allies. The country's ties 
with London stretched back into Australia's past and, though 
shaken somewhat by Britain's inability to help defend Australia 
during World War II, were still strong, It was especially 
appreciated in Canberra that, after the war, the U.K» had re­
established a strong military presence in the Malaya-Singapore 
2area. But Australia's security links with the United States
1, The Australian Government's attitude to disarmament and arms 
control will be discussed at greater length later in the 
chapter,
2, In 1955, Australian troops were sent to Malaya as part of 
the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve,
208
were to prove  much more im por tan t  tha n  th o se  w i th  B r i t a i n ,  In 
September 1951, A u s t r a l i a  jo i n e d  New Zealand and th e  U S ,  i n  the  
AcNoZoUoS, p a c t , *  Under A r t i c l e  V of t h i s  ag reement,  each p a r ty  
under took  to  reg a rd  an armed a t t a c k  in  th e  P a c i f i c  a r e a  on any of 
t h e  o the r  p a r t i e s  as  dangerous to  i t s  own s e c u r i t y  and d e c l a r e d  
t h a t  i t  would a c t  to meet the  common danger i n  accordance  w i th  
i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  Th is  r e p r e s e n t e d  about  as  f i rm  an 
u n d e r ta k in g  of armed suppor t  as  A u s t r a l i a  could expec t  to  g e t  
from th e  w o r ld ’ s most powerful  n a t i o n .  In  1954, A u s t r a l i a  
ex tended i t s  a l l i a n c e  t i e s  w i th  Washington when i t  j o i n e d  
B r i t a i n ,  F rance ,  New Zea land ,  T h a i l a n d ,  P a k i s t a n ,  the  P h i l i p p i n e s  
and t h e  U, S , i n  t h e  fo rm a t io n  of the South Eas t  A s ia  T re a ty  
O rg a n iz a t io n  (S,E A, T O ) ,
For about  t e n  y ea r s  a f t e r  the  end of th e  war,  C a n b e r r a ’ s 
tw in -edged p o l i c y  of n u c lea r  a b s t e n t i o n  and dependence upon 
th e  n u c l e a r  power of i t s  a l l i e s  v i r t u a l l y  went u n c h a l l e n g e d .
By th e  mid-1950s ,  however,  t h e r e  were some s t i r r i n g s  of  suppor t  
i n  A u s t r a l i a  f o r  a n a t i o n a l  n u c l e a r  f o r c e  and,  in  1957,  main ly  
i n  r e s p o n s e  to  t h i s  p r e s s u r e ,  th e  Federa l  Government f e l t  
c o n s t r a i n e d  to  o u t l i n e  in some d e t a i l  i t s  r ea sons  f o r  r e s t r i c t ­
ing  A u s t r a l i a ' s  de fence  e f f o r t  to  c o n v en t io n a l  f o r c e s  on ly ,
2
In  a speech in  September of t h a t  year  the  Prime M i n i s t e r  noted 
t h a t  i t  was " q u i t e  im poss ib le  from th e  p o i n t  of view of the  
n a t i o n a l  economy to  p r e p a r e  s im u l ta n e o u s ly  f o r  every c o n ce iv ab le  
k ind  of warn" Any a t tem p t  by A u s t r a l i a  to  b u i l d  n u c l e a r
1, For comment on the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and purpose  of  the  AoN,Z,U0S,
p a c t  and S E , A J , 0 » ,  see  Trevor  R, Reese ,  A u s t r a l i a ,  New 
Zealand and th e  United S t a t e s , London: 0 , U , P , ,  1969;
JoGc S ta r k e ,  The ANZUS T re a ty  A l l i a n c e , Melbourne: Melbourne 
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1965; Alan Wat t ,  "The ANZUS T re a ty :  P a s t ,  
P r e s e n t  and F u t u r e " ,  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  O u t look , Vol,  24, No, 1, 
A p r i l  1970, pp ,17 -36 ;  Alan Wat t ,  The E v o lu t io n  of A u s t r a l i a n  
Fore ign  P o l i c y , Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1968,
2, For the  t e x t  of  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r ' s  speech ,  see  C, P , D, ,
H of R , ,  19 September 1957, p p , 795-798,
209
weapons, he added, would commit the country to "such prodigious 
expenditures as to involve either an intolerable total defence vote 
or a heavy degree of abandonment of non-nuclear elements"» There 
were two reasons, the Prime Minister added, why Australia should 
not make this effort. In the first place, nuclear arms were 
unnecessary» In South East Asia, the area of greatest concern 
to Australia from a defence point of view, only limited wars were 
likely» Australia could best prepare fcr this type of conflict 
by strengthening its conventional forces» Secondly, it was in 
the interests of everyone that the possession of nuclear weapons 
should be limited to Britain, the United States and Russia»
These countries, the Prime Minister argued, were "sufficiently 
informed about the deadly character of these weapons" and could 
be expected to act responsibly in matters of war and peace»
Indeed, the possession of nuclear weapons by these powers was 
a deterrent "not only to prospective enemies but [also] to 
themselves"» But were nuclear weapons to be acquired by a 
"number of other powers", he added, "the chances of irresponsible 
action with calamitous repercussions in the world would be 
materially increased," The strategic and tactical consider­
ations then exercising the minds of Australia's policymakers 
were apparent in this speech by the Prime Minister» Because 
the three great powers were deterred from using nuclear weapons 
against each other, global war was considered most unlikely,^- 
Moreover, as an ally of two of the great powers, Australia 
could feel confident of being protected from conventional or 
nuclear attacks of less than global dimensions» There was no 
need then for an Australian nuclear force» This reliance upon 
the nuclear power of its allies, especially that of the U»S», 
was clearly a major determinant of the Australian Government s
1» This was made more explicit in a major speech by the Prime 
Minister in April 1957» See, C»N,I,A„, Vol» 28, No» 4,
April 1957, pp»319-322.
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n o n -n u c le a r  p o l i c y .
C h in a 's  f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t  ap p ea rs  to  have done l i t t l e  to
d im in is h  C a n b e r r a 's  f a i t h  in  th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of i t s  a l l i a n c e  w ith
th e  U nited  S t a t e s .  The M in is te r  fo r  E x te rn a l  A f f a i r s ,  Mr.
H asluck , d id  adm it t h a t  th e  Chinese ex p lo s io n  was a " d e p re s s in g "
ev en t and "m ight cause  some d i s q u i e t . "  However, he s t r e s s e d
th a t  what had been t e s t e d  "was a lm os t c e r t a i n l y  a p r im i t i v e
n u c le a r  d e v ic e  o n ly ,  no t an o p e r a t io n a l  weapon." W estern
m i l i t a r y  c a p a c i t y ,  Mr. Hasluck em phasised, would c o n t in u e  to  be
g r e a t l y  in  excess  of th a t  of Communist China. Indeed ,  i t  was
h i s  v iew  t h a t  "d e fen ce  commitments g iven  to  Communist C h in a 's
ne ighbours  would no t be a l t e r e d  by an y th in g  Communist China had
ach iev ed  or was l i k e l y  to  ac h ie v e  in  th e  n u c le a r  f ie ld ." '* '
A f e a t u r e  of th e  L ib e ra l -C o u n try  P a r ty  governm ent 's
a t t i t u d e  to  n u c le a r  weapons has been i t s  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  a s s i s t ,
where p o s s i b l e ,  i n  th e  development and m ain tenance  of th e
W estern n u c le a r  d e t e r r e n t .  There was ev idence  of t h i s  i n  th e
c o o p e ra t io n  extended to  B r i t a i n  in  the  1950s d u r in g  t h a t
c o u n t r y ' s  n u c le a r  t e s t  programme. But i t  has a l s o  been
r e f l e c t e d  in  C a n b e r ra 's  w i l l in g n e s s  to  pe rm it  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t ,
on A u s t r a l i a n  s o i l ,  of American e l e c t r o n i c  and r a d a r  d e fen c e
i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  In  May 1963, th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Government announced
t h a t  th e  U .S , would e s t a b l i s h  a n av a l  communications s t a t i o n
a t  N orth  West Cape in  W estern A u s t r a l i a .
2
The North  West Cape i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  which i s  under t o t a l  
3
U.S. c o n t r o l ,  was designed  to  improve communications w ith
1. See, r e p o r t  of Mr. H a s lu c k 's  speech . Reproduced in  C .N .I .A . ,  
Vol. 35, No. 10, October 1964, p p ,33-34.
2. The base  a t  N orth  West Cape was o f f i c i a l l y  opened in  
September 1967 by th e  l a t e  Prime M in i s t e r ,  Mr. H arold  H o l t .  
L a te r  i t  was renamed th e  H arold  E. H o lt  Communications 
S t a t i o n  in  h i s  memory.
3. These were th e  term s of a memorandum accompanying th e  
agreement which e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  base . See, C .N .I .A . ,
Vol, 34, No, 5, May 1963, p .7 .  For th e  t e x t  of th e  
agreement s e e ,  i b i d . ,  p p ,17-32,
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American  v e s s e l s  c r u i s i n g  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  Ocean and t h e  Sou th  West 
P a c i f i c ,  I t  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  u s e f u l  f o r  t r a n s m i t t i n g  t a r g e t
i n f o r m a t i o n  and a t t a c k  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  submerged P o l a r i s  
s u b m a r i n e s .  V e s s e l s  of  t h i s  t y p e  have been  de p lo y e d  i n  t h e  
P a c i f i c  s i n c e  1964 and t h e  m i s s i l e s  t h e y  c a r r y  a r e  p resum ab ly  
a s s i g n e d  t o  t a r g e t s  i n  China and t h e  e a s t e r n  p a r t  of t h e  
U,S„ScRo The i n s t a l l a t i o n  a t  N o r t h  West Cape i s  t h u s  one of  
a  number of f a c i l i t i e s  a round  t h e  w or ld  which  h e l p  m a i n t a i n  
A m e r i c a ' s  g l o b a l  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n t I n  December 1966,  t h e
U,S ,  was g r a n t e d  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a n o t h e r  i n s t a l l a t i o n
i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  t h i s  t im e  a t  P i n e  Gap nea r  A l i c e  S p r i n g s  i n  t h e
2
N o r t h e r n  T e r r i t o r y ,  C a n b e r r a  h a s  r e f u s e d  to  e l a b o r a t e  on 
t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  a t  P i n e  Gap, o t h e r  t h a n  t o  r e v e a l
3
t h a t  i t  i s  i n v o lv e d  i n  " d e f e n c e  s p a c e  r e s e a r c h " .  I t  ha s  been
s u g g e s t e d  by some o b s e r v e r s ,  however ,  t h a t  c u r r e n t  and p l an n e d
a c t i v i t y  a t  P i n e  Gap i n c l u d e s  m o n i t o r i n g ,  d e t e c t i o n  and
g u i d a n c e  o p e r a t i o n s  i n t i m a t e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  A m e r i c a ' s
4
d e f e n s i v e  and o f f e n s i v e  m i s s i l e  s y s t e m s .  F i n a l l y ,  i n  A p r i l
1,  O the r  American  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  of  t h i s  t y p e  a r e  a t  C u t l e r  i n  
Maine ( U .S .A . )  and i n  E t h i o p i a ,  I a n  B e l l a n y  h a s  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  t h e  N o r t h  West Cape b a s e  i s  now r e d u n d a n t  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  
a r e  o t h e r  methods a l r e a d y  i n  u s e  by t h e  Americans  t o  do t h e  
same j o b .  See ,  "American Bases  May Be Good For You ,"  i n  
The B u l l e t i n  (S ydne y ) ,  22 November 1969 ,  p . 5 3 ,
2, The Age , 12 December 1966, T h i s  i n s t a l l a t i o n  became 
o p e r a t i o n a l  e a r l y  i n  1969,
3,  See s t a t e m e n t  by Mr, F a i r h a l l ,  M i n i s t e r  f o r  D e fe n ce ,  Quoted 
i n  The Sydney Morning H e r a l d , 30 A p r i l  1969,
4, R o b e r t  Cooksey has  s u g g e s t e d  t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  u s e s  of  t h e  
i n s t a l l a t i o n  a t  P i n e  Gap, These  a r e :  1) The m o n i t o r i n g  of  
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  s a t e l l i t e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  e a r l y  w arn ing  s a t e l l ­
i t e s ,  2) The c o n t r o l  of  s a t e l l i t e  A,B,M, s y s t e m s ,  3) The 
command and c o n t r o l  of  American  f r a c t i o n a l  o r b i t i n g  b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e s  ( F . O . B . S . )  on to  t a r g e t s  i n  C h ina .  See ,  h i s  " P i n e  
Gap" ,  i n  The A u s t r a l i a n  Q u a r t e r l y , V o l ,  40 ,  No. 4 ,  December 
1968 ,  p p . 12-20 ;  a l s o ,  h i s  " F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  Review: J u l y -  
December,  1968" ,  i n  i b i d , ,  V o l ,  41 ,  No, 1 ,  March 1969,  pp ,
80 -84  and i n  The Sydney Morning H e r a l d , 6 May 1969,  See 
a l s o ,  a r t i c l e s  by R o b e r t  Cooksey and Des B a l l ,  i n  The Sydney 
Morning H e r a l d , 2 and 3 J u l y ,  1969,  I a n  B e l l a n y  h a s  q u e s t i o n e d
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1969, i t  was announced th a t  A u s t r a l i a  had agreed  to  th e  e s t a b ­
l i sh m e n t  by th e  U.S, of a "d efence  space com munications" f a c i l i t y  
a t  Woomera in  South A u s t r a l i a ,  The i n s t a l l a t i o n s  a t  N orth  West 
Cape and P ine  Gap, to g e th e r  w ith  th e  one planned fo r  Woomera, a r e  
th e  most im p o rtan t  American f a c i l i t i e s  of t h e i r  ty p e  in  A u s t r a l ia «
In  a d d i t i o n  to  t h e s e ,  however, t h e r e  a re  a number of o th e r  U.S.
2
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  A u s t r a l i a .  Some of th e s e  a r e  th e  r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y  of a c i v i l i a n  body, th e  N a t io n a l  A e ro n au t ic s  and Space 
A d m in is t r a t io n  (N .A .S .A ,) .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e y  a r e  capab le  of 
perfo rm ing  m i l i t a r y  t a s k s .  The Im portance of A u s t r a l i a  in  
A m erica’s " d e fe n c e -sp a c e "  a c t i v i t y  has been summed up by one 
A u s t r a l i a n  commentator i n  th e  fo l lo w in g  way:
4 contdo some of th e s e  assum ptions  about th e  u se  of P in e  Gap 
and su g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  seems more ex p e r im en ta l  
th an  o p e r a t io n a l .  Amongst th e  r o l e s  which he th in k s  P in e  
Gap may have a r e  th e  fo l lo w in g :
1) The p ro v is io n  of c o n t in u o u s  c o n ta c t  between th e  U.S. and 
any o b je c t  of m i l i t a r y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  s t a t i o n e d  more th an  
22,000 m i le s  ou t in to  sp ace .  2) The m o n i to r in g  and p o s s ib ly  
th e  manoeuvring of c e r t a i n  ty p e s  of "spy" s a t e l l i t e s .
3) Perform ance as a ground s t a t i o n  fo r  th e  e a r ly -w a rn in g  
s a t e l l i t e  system th e  U.S. hopes to  have o p e r a t io n a l  by 1975.
4) An a d ju n c t  to  American experim en ts  des igned  to  t e s t  th e
f e a s i b i l i t y  of p la c in g  A.B.M.s in  o r b i t .  S e e ,B e l la n y ,  ."American
Bases May be Good f o r  You," p p . 53-55«
1. The Canberra T im es, 24 A p r i l  1969. S p e c u la t io n  has i t  t h a t  
th e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  to  be b u i l t  a t  Woomera w i l l  most l i k e l y  
s e rv e  as  a ground s t a t i o n  fo r  a new U.S. communications 
s a t e l l i t e  which w i l l  be used fo r  communications between th e  
U.S. and American and a l l i e d  f o r c e s  on land  or a t  sea  in  
th e  A sian  a r e a .  See, R obert Cooksey, in  The Sydney Morning 
H e ra ld , 6 May 1969; Jo n a th an  Gaul in  The Canberra  T im es,
29 A p r i l  1969; P e te r  Robinson in  The A u s t r a l i a n  F in a n c ia l  
Review, 24 A p r i l  1969; and , B e l la n y ,  "American Bases May be 
Good fo r  You," p .5 4 ,
2, For a l i s t  of de fen ce  and s c i e n t i f i c  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  
A u s t r a l i a  ( c u r r e n t  to  Septem ber, 1969),  e i t h e r  under j o i n t  
c o n t r o l  or under th e  s o le  c o n t r o l  of an o th e r  power, s e e ,
HoG. G e lb e r ,  Problems of A u s t r a l i a n  D efence , M elbourne:
Oxford U n iv e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1970, Appendix I ,  p p . 287-292.
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O u t s i d e  t h e  U.S.  A u s t r a l i a  i s  t h e  l a r g e s t  c e n t r e  
f o r  American  a e r o - s p a c e  o p e r a t i o n s  * Because  of  
i t s  t e c h n i c a l  and l o g i s t i c  f a c i l i t i e s ,  i t s  p o l i ­
t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  and e x t e r n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  t h i s  
c o u n t r y  p r o v i d e s  t h e  most  s u i t a b l e  p i e c e  of  r e a l  
e s t a t e  f o r  such  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s o u t h e r n -  
h e m i s p h e r e , !
I n  u r g i n g  a c c e p t a n c e  of  t h e  b a s e  a t  N o r t h  West  Cape,  t h e
A u s t r a l i a n  Government  a rgued  t h a t  t h e  new f a c i l i t y  would improve
A m e r i c a ’ s g l o b a l  d e t e r r e n t  c a p a b i l i t y  a n d ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t s
c a p a c i t y  t o  d e t e r  a g g r e s s i o n  i n  t h e  W e s te rn  P a c i f i c  r e g i o n  and
S ou th  E a s t  A s i a ,  T h i s ,  i t  was u r g e d ,  was u n d o u b t e d l y  i n
A u s t r a l i a ' s  i n t e r e s t s .  M oreove r ,  i t  was a d d e d ,  t h r o u g h  i t s
membership o f  A, NoZ. U»S„,  A u s t r a l i a  was o b l i g e d  to  do w h a te v e r
2
i t  co u ld  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  common d e f e n c e  e f f o r t .  T h i s  l i n e  of
a rgum en t  was r e p e a t e d  ad nauseam i n  government  s t a t e m e n t s  on
3
t h e  m a t t e r  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  whole o f  1963,
I n  March o f  t h a t  y e a r  a new element; was i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o
t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  when t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Labor  P a r t y  (A„L,P ,)  u rg ed
t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  a n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone  i n  t h e  S o u t h e rn  
4
H em isphe re ,  T h i s  p r o p o s a l  was l o u d l y  denounced  by t h e  
government  p r i m a r i l y  on t h e  g r ounds  t h a t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  
such  a zone c o u ld  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  m i l i t a r y  p l a n s  of  A u s t r a l i a ' s  
two m ajo r  a l l i e s  a n d ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them 
t o  d e p lo y  n u c l e a r  weapons i n  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  d e f e n c e .  Much of  t h e  
e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  government  p o s i t i o n ,  b o t h  on t h e  n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone
1,  R o b e r t  Cooksey,  i n  The Sydney Morning H e r a l d , 6 May 1969.
2, S ee ,  s t a t e m e n t  by t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s ,  S i r  
G a r f i e l d  Ba rw ick ,  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  b i l l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
b a s e  a t  N o r t h  West Cape, Reproduced  i n  C,N. I , A , , V o l ,  34 ,
No. 5 , May 1963,  p p . 10 -13 ,
3,  S ee ,  P e a c e  Through S e c u r i t y , C a n b e r r a :  F e d e r a l  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  
L i b e r a l  P a r t y  of  A u s t r a l i a ,  1963;  S i r  G a r f i e l d  B a rw ick ,  i n
C,PoD, , H of  R , , 9 May 1963,  p p , 1 2 2 4 f f , ;  and W i l l i a m  McMahon, 
i b i d . ,  16 May 1963,  p ,1 5 0 6 .
4,  For  a u s e f u l  a n a l y s i s  of  t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  s e e ,  A l b i n s k i ,  
l o c .  c i t . , p p , 32-46»
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issue in particular and nuclear weapons in general, is well illus­
trated in this extract from the Prime Minister's Federal Election 
Policy Speech of November, 1963:
Labour [the A„L,P0] proposes to negotiate a nuclear- 
free zone South of the Equator, with a prohibition 
of the storing or deployment of nuclear weapons in 
that area. This is a suicidal proposal, If adopted 
in the absence of a general world disarmament [sic*] 
which effectively included the Communist powers, it 
would certainly imperil the existence of both SoE.A.T.O. 
and A 0N 0Z 0U 0 S 0 Great Britain and the U,S,A, are our 
allies in S,E.A.T.O», and the U,S,A. in A.N.Z-U»S.
Each is a nuclear power« The capacity of the United 
States, in particular, to use nuclear weapons has 
successfully deterred the Communist aggressors in 
the past, and has thereby saved the free world, The 
Soviet Union has great nuclear power: we may be sure
that Communist China will have it before long, Both 
are North of the Equator; but nowadays nuclear weapons 
could be delivered anywhere in the vforld. It follows 
that Labour’s proposals, if successful, would seek to 
prevent our two nuclear-powered allies from firing 
nuclear weapons from any point South of the Equator, 
while leaving the Communists free to fire into this 
zone without resistance,1
Throughout the debate over the AoL,P,’s proposal the Australian 
Government made much of America’s opposition to the idea of a 
nuclear-free zone in the Asian and Pacific area: in June 1963,
1, The Prime Minister’s Policy Speech, Federal Election, 1963, 
Canberra: Federal Secretariat, Liberal Party of Australia, 
1963, pp,7-80 For further examples of the government's 
reaction to the A,L0P, proposal see, statements by the 
Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies in C,P,D» , H of R., 16 May 
1963, p,1519 and 22 May 1963, p,1704, See also, Dangerous 
and Frustrating - A,L,P, Decisions on Defence and Foreign 
Relations, Canberra: Federal Secretariat, Liberal Party of 
Australia, 1963, p,9; Peace Through Security, Canberra: 
Federal Secretariat, Liberal Party of Australia, pp,3-4,
For a more recent statement of government opinion see speech 
by Prime Minister, Mr, Gorton, in C ,.P -D. , H of R„, No, 14,
12 September 1969, p-1272.
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an A„N,Z,U.S>communique claimed t h a t  t h e  d e s i g n a t i o n  of  t h e  a r e a
as  a n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone would "not on ly  be i l l u s o r y  bu t  be p o s i t i v e l y
d angerous ,  would d i s t u r b  th e  e x i s t i n g  s t r a t e g i c  b a lan ce  and would
1
i n c r e a s e  the  r i s k s  of a g g r e s s i o n , "
The d e b a t e  about  American de fenc e  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  A u s t r a l i a
f l a r e d  up a g a i n  in  1969 fo l low ing  a l l e g a t i o n s  about  th e  purpose
of t h e  base  i n  P in e  Gap and news of t h e  d e c i s i o n  to  e s t a b l i s h
th e  f a c i l i t y  a t  Woomera, Once a g a i n ,  the  government defended
i t s  a c t i o n s  on th e  grounds t h a t  c o - o p e r a t i o n  of  t h i s  s o r t  was
a " v a l u a b l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  t h e  defence  of  A u s t r a l i a ,  t h e  UcS,,
2
and a l l  f r e e  n a t i o n s " , Moreover,  i t  was s t r e s s e d ,  to  he lp  t h e  
U,S.  i n  th e  m a t t e r  of ba se s  was to  s t o r e  up c r e d i t  f o r  the  
fu tu r e «  As th e  M in i s t e r  f o r  Defence,  Mr, F a i r h a l l ,  s a id  i n  
A p r i l  1969:
I f  we i n  t h i s  coun t ry  f i n d  o u r s e l v e s  i n  th e  
p o s i t i o n  of being  a b l e  to  make some c o n t r i b u t i o n  
to  ease  A m er ica ' s  burden  i n  de fend ing  the  f r e e  
world and defend ing  A u s t r a l i a  under Anzus,  and 
r e f u s e  to  do so ,  where do we s tand  in  t h e  f u t u r e  
i f ,  having r e f u s e d  t h i s  f a c i l i t y ,  we seek  some 
g u a r a n t e e  from th e  United  S t a t e s , ^
Th is  was an obvious appea l  to  th e  " L a f a y e t t e  syndrome" which
Harry  Gelber c la ims  has  been a marked f e a t u r e  of th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p
4
between American p u b l i c  o p in io n  and f o r e i g n  policy« That  the
1. Communique reproduced  i n  C , N , I ,A , , V o l0 34 , No« 6, June 
1963, p p , 5 - 7 o
2« See s t a t e m e n t s  by government spokesmen i n  The A u s t r a l i a n ,
30 A p r i l  1969; The Sydney Morning H e r a l d , 30 A p r i l  1969 
and The Canberra T imes , 24 A p r i l  1969; a l s o ,  P r e s s  R e le a s e ,  
P„M, No,37 /1969,  23 A p r i l  1969, For d e t a i l s  of the  d e b a t e  
i n  P a r l i a m e n t  on J o i n t  Defence I n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  
s ee  C. PnD. , H of R„ , 23 A p r i l  1969,  pp ,1413-1469 .
3. C. P. D. , H of R, ,  23 A p r i l  1969,  p .1417.
4, See H.G. G e lbe r ,  The A u s t r a l i a n  American A l l i a n c e , p«121. 
According to  Dr, G e lb e r ,  "Americans never f o r g o t  t h e  h e lp  
g iven  to George Washington by th e  French  under  young 
L a f a y e t t e , "  S i m i l a r l y ,  A m er ica ' s  modern a l l i e s  would do 
w e l l  to  d i s p l a y  s i m i l a r  l o y a l t y  in  o rd e r  to  s e c u re  Ameri­
can m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  a t  some t ime i n  t h e  f u t u r e .
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Australian Government had every intention of continuing this co­
operation with the U,S, was made abundantly clear in the Prime 
Minister's Federal Election Policy Speech of October, 1969,^
It should be noted in passing, that it is not only In 
respect of bases and other such facilities that Canberra has 
been willing to assist the U»S, One of the most significant 
developments in post-war Australian foreign policy was the 
decision to deploy troops in Vietnam, There were a number of 
reasons for this decision, but undoubtedly, a major one, was 
the desire on Canberra's part to enhance Australia's standing 
as an ally in the eyes of the United States, The decision to 
commit Australian combat forces to Vietnam was announced in 
April, 1965, On that occasion, the Prime Minister Mr, Menzies 
noted, that:
The takeover of South Viet Nam would be a direct 
military threat to Australia and all the countries 
of South and South East Asia, It must be seen as 
part of a thrust by Communist China between the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans,^
There is evidence here of one important reason for Australia's 
commitment to Vietnam, viz,, the belief that what was happen­
ing in Indo-China constituted an indirect threat to Australia's 
security, But it seems reasonable to assume that Washington 
brought some pressure to bear upon Canberra as well and that
Australia, as T,B, Millar has suggested, "did not resist for
3reasons of international security insurance," That Australia 
had responsibilities under A,N,Z,U,S, and S»E,A,T,0,, and that 
in any case it was prudent to assist the U,S., were arguments 
which characterised the Australian Government's defence of its
1, See, Policy Speech, Federal Election, 1969, Canberra:
Federal Secretariat, Liberal Party of Australia, 1969, p,7,
2, QUoted in T„B, Millar, "Problems of Australian Foreign 
Policy, January-June, 1965," in The Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, Vol, 11, No, 3, December 1965, p,273,
3, ibid.
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position in Vietnam from the very start.^
The analysis so far suggests that the A.N.Z.U.S, pact has 
long been the cornerstone of Australia’s defence policy. The 
alliance between the U.S. and Australia reflects the large degree 
of understanding between the two countries about developments in 
the world in general and Asia in particular. Canberra has been 
especially conscious of its dependence on the U.S, and has been 
anxious to display its worth as an ally. It has been especially 
concerned that the U.S. should maintain an effective presence in 
Asia. But it is also apparent that Canberra’s alliance with 
the U.S. has been a major determinant of Australia's non-nuclear 
status, Australia has never exhibited that distaste for 
involvement in nuclear affairs which has been so typical of say, 
Japan. Rather, Canberra has tended to emphasise what it sees 
as the unique virtue of nuclear weapons in preserving world peace 
and safeguarding Australian security. But at the same time, the 
Australian Government has been unwilling to develop nuclear 
weapons of its own. Instead, it has chosen to depend on the 
American nuclear deterrent, the might and significance of which 
it readily acknowledges, and has willingly co-operated in the 
maintenance and extension of this capability.
But how have recent developments in United States policy
towards Asia affected the Australian Government’s thinking about
relations with Washington? Canberra was slow to react to the
2announcement of the Nixon doctrine, (As recently as April 1971, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bury, chose to stress the 
alleged continuity of U.S. policy in Asia; he emphasised that 
America continued to regard itself as a ’’Pacific Power” with 
"deep permanent interests in the future of Asia” and that it
1, See especially, Mr, Harold Holt, Policy Speech, Federal 
Election, 1966, Canberra: Federal Secretariat, Liberal 
Party of Australia, 1966, pp,14-15,
2. The Nixon doctrine and its significance for American non­
proliferation policy in Asia will be discussed later in 
the thesis. See Chapter X.
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would "con tin u e  to  support the e f f o r t s  of th e  n a t io n s  o f  South-East  
A sia  to m a in ta in  t h e i r  freedom and security"o'*-) N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  to  d e t e c t  in  the a c t i o n s  and s ta te m e n ts  o f  th e  A u stra­
l i a n  Government during the  l a s t  two or th r e e  years  at l e a s t  some 
e lem ent of concern  and u n c e r ta in t y  about fu tu r e  American p o l i c y  in
A s ia ,  About two months a f t e r  P r e s id e n t  Johnson’ s h i s t o r i c  speech  
2
of 31 March 1968, th e  A u s tr a l ia n  Prime M in is ter  v i s i t e d  the  U0S. 
w ith  the  d ec la r e d  i n t e n t i o n  of a s s e s s i n g  "the f e a r s ,  sometimes  
exp er ien ced  and expressed  in  t h i s  and other c o u n t r ie s ,  th a t  th e
3
United S t a t e s  might l o s e  i n t e r e s t  in  the area  o f  South East A s ia ."
One year l a t e r ,  Mr, Gorton a g a in  v i s i t e d  Washington; c l a r i f i c a t i o n
of th e  new R epublican A d m in is t r a t io n 's  v iew s about Am erica’s
a l l i a n c e  w ith  A u s t r a l ia  seems to  have been a major purpose of  
A
th e  v i s i t ,  On 10 March 1970, th e  M in is ter  fo r  D e fe n c e ,  Mr,
1, S ee ,  s ta tem en t  by Mr, Bury in  the House o f  R e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  on 
6 A p r i l  1971. Reproduced in  C N-.l A , V o l .  42 ,  No, 4 ,  A p r i l  
1971 , p ,1 5 9 ,  Hedley B u ll  has observed that th e  A u s tr a l ia n  
Government was s i m i l a r l y  r e lu c t a n t  to  r e c o g n is e  the  tr u th  
about B r i t i s h  w ithdrawal from the  Far E a s t .  In r e s p e c t  of  
Canberra's  understanding  of  American p o l i c y  in  A s ia ,  B u l l  has 
argued th a t  the  A u s tr a l ia n  Government "has g iv e n  th e  appear­
ance of r e ly in g  on what i s  t o ld  to  them by t h e ir  United S t a te s  
m i n i s t e r i a l  o f f i c i a l  and m i l i t a r y  c o n t a c t s  r a th er  than making 
t h e i r  own assessm en t o f  the  d r i f t  o f  American o p in io n ,"  See  
H edley B u l l ,  "Review Comments: S t r a t e g i c  A spects"  in  Bruce 
Brown ( e d , ) ,  A sia  and the  P a c i f i c  in  the 1 9 7 0 s , Canberra: 
A u s tr a l ia n  N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1971, p ,2 3 2 ,
2, In  h i s  sp e e ch ,  P r e s id e n t  Johnson ordered an alm ost com plete  
h a l t  to  th e  bombing of  North Vietnam; announced th a t  the U. S,  
was prepared to  commence n e g o t ia t io n s  in  P a r is  w ith  r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e s  of  the North Vietnam ese Government; and in d ic a te d  
th at  he would not be a c a n d id a te  a t  the  forthcom ing p r e s i ­
d e n t ia l  e l e c t i o n s ,
3, See , r e p o r t  by th e  Prime M in is ter  on h i s  v i s i t  to  the  U S ,  
in  CoP.D. , H of  R, ,  No, 9,  4 June 1968 , p ,1 9 2 0 ,
4 , See , report  by the  Prime M in is ter  on h i s  v i s i t  to  th e  U . S , ,  
i n  CcP.D. , H of R, ,  No. 8 ,  15 May 1969, p p ,1887-1892 , On 
th e  b a s is  o f  v iew s  exchanged during th e  v i s i t ,  Mr, Gorron was 
a b le  to  r e p o r t  t h a t ,  in  h i s  o p in io n ,  th e r e  were no lon ger  any 
grounds fo r  doubting  th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of A m erica 's  a l l i a n c e  
w ith  A u s t r a l ia ,
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F r a s e r ,  made what i s  p r o b a b l y  t h e  most  c o n s i d e r e d  s t a t e m e n t  y e t  
by an  A u s t r a l i a n  Government  spokesman,  a b o u t  f u t u r e  U,S» p o l i c y  
i n  Asia»  I n  h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  Mr» F r a s e r  s a i d :
For t w e n t y - f i v e  y e a r s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  c a r r i e d  
t h e  m ain  bu rd en  of  d e f e n c e  of  t h e  f r e e  w o r l d ,  To­
day i t  i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p u b l i c  r e c o r d  t h a t  a r e - a p p r a i s a l  
i s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  of  t h e  manner  i n  which  American  
commitments  m ig h t  be d i s c h a r g e d  i n  t h e  f u t u r e »  Tha t  
r e - a p p r a i s a l  f o c u s s e s  l a r g e l y  on Asia» The Nixon 
d o c t r i n e ,  f i r s t  e n u n c i a t e d  a t  Guam, i s  f u l l  of  meaning 
f o r  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  to  our  n o r t h  and to  us» American  
h e l p  w i l l  be more r e a d i l y  f o r t h c o m i n g  t o  t h o s e  coun­
t r i e s  t h a t  h e l p  t h e m s e l v e s ;  i n s u r g e n c y  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  
e x p e c t e d  t o  be c o n t a i n e d  -  b e t t e r  s t i l l ,  p r e v e n t e d  from 
d e v e l o p i n g  -  w i t h o u t  U .S .  combat manpower.  I t  i s  t o  be 
e x p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be  some c o n t r a c t i o n  of  t o t a l  
U,S ,  f o r c e s  and i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  However ,  t h e  Americans 
ha v e  p r o c l a im e d  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  s t a n d  by t h e i r  T r e a t y  
o b l i g a t i o n s »  Two of  t h e s e  a r e  o f  m a jo r  c o n c e r n  t o  u s  
-  ANZUS and SEATO»1
D e s p i t e  t h e  r i t u a l i s t i c  o b s e r v a n c e  of  c o n t i n u e d  U.S ,  s u p p o r t  f o r  
A.N.ZoUoS, and S oE»A,T ,0»,  i t  i s  no t  h a rd  t o  d e t e c t  i n  t h i s  s t a t e ­
ment  of  Mr. F r a s e r ’ s a v e r y  r e a l  n o t e  of  c o n c e r n  and u n c e r t a i n t y  
a bou t  f u t u r e  U»S, p o l i c y  i n  A s i a ,
These  comments a b o u t  f u t u r e  U„S. p o l i c y  i n  A s i a  were 
a ccom pan ied ,  i n  Mr„ F r a s e r ' s  s t a t e m e n t ,  by r e f e r e n c e s  t o  S o v i e t  
n a v a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  Ocean,  Mr, F r a s e r  n o t e d  how 
S o v i e t  c a p a b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  a r e a  had i n c r e a s e d  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  
and how t h i s  was som e th ing  C a n b e r r a  c o u ld  n o t  a f f o r d  t o  be d i s ­
i n t e r e s t e d  i n ;  A u s t r a l i a ,  he e m p h a s i se d ,  must  t a k e  a c c o u n t  of  
S o v i e t  n a v a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  Ocean i n  p l a n n i n g  i t s  own
1, See ,  s t a t e m e n t  by Mr, Malcolm F r a s e r ,  M i n i s t e r  f o r  D e f e n c e ,  
House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  10 March 1970» Reproduced  i n  
G e l b e r ,  P rob lem s  of  A u s t r a l i a ’ s D e f e n c e , pp®297-298,
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de fen c e  p o l i c i e s *  This concern  abou t  S ov ie t  nava l  a c t i v i t y
i n  th e  I n d i a n  Ocean has con t inued  to  grow and amongst some
government backbenchers  has  reached  p r o p o r t i o n s  of  near  h y s t e r i a *
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  about  R u s s i a ’ s movement i n t o  the  I n d i a n
Ocean must  be seen  as r e i n f o r c i n g  th e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  about  the
f u t u r e  s e c u r i t y  of  th e  r e g i o n  which were a l r e a d y  p r e s e n t  i n
A u s t r a l i a n  minds as a r e s u l t  of  the  Nixon d o c t r i n e *  F u r the r
compounding t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  has  been th e  B r i t i s h  Government’s
d e c i s i o n  to  withdraw most of  i t s  f o r c e s  from the M a lays ia -
2Singapore  a re a  by the  end of 197 l e Th is  l a t t e r  development
1, i b i d  *, p*298, For s t a t e m e n t s  on th e  q u e s t i o n  of S o v ie t  
n a v a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  the  I n d i a n  Ocean by o th e r  government 
spokesmen, see  remarks by t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r ,  Mr McMahon, 
i n  C*P*Do, H of R . , No* 3,  19 March 1970,  p*677; by the  
Navy M i n i s t e r ,  Mr* K i l l e n ,  i n  C*Pc D *, H of R*, No* 8,
14 May 1970, p*2145; and by th e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s ,  
Mr, Bury, reproduced i n  C J * I*A *, Vol* 42, No» 5, pp*279- 
280* E a r l i e r ,  i n  August 1969,  th e  the n  M i n i s t e r  f o r  E x t e r ­
n a l  A f f a i r s ,  Mr* F r e e t h ,  i n  a s t a t e m e n t  i n  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  
P a r l i a m e n t ,  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  th e  S ov ie t  p r e s e n c e  i n  the  I n d ia n  
Ocean was not n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n t r a r y  t o  A u s t r a l i a ’s i n t e r e s t s *  
He a l s o  noted R u s s i a ’s p r o p o s a l  f o r  a system of c o l l e c t i v e  
s e c u r i t y  i n  A sia  and r e v e a l e d  t h a t  c o n t a c t s  had been made 
between Canberra and Moscow "on m a t t e r s  of b i l a t e r a l  
i n t e r e s t  *** and wider i s s u e s " * See,  C*P *D*, H of R*,
No* 11, 14 August 1969,  p p , 312-313* Mr* F r e e t h ’s speech 
was lo u d ly  condemned in  some c i r c l e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  by the  
Democrat ic  Labor P a r ty  (D*L*P*)* I n  the  e l e c t i o n s  h e ld  i n  
November 1969, Mr* F re e th  l o s t  h i s  s e a t  i n  Par l iament*
S ince  th en  the  government has  t a k e n  a n o t i c e a b l y  tougher  
l i n e  on S o v ie t  a c t i v i t y  i n  th e  I n d i a n  Ocean*
2, B r i t a i n ' s  i n t e n t i o n  to  withdraw from th e  M alays ia-Sxngapore  
a r e a  was f i r s t  announced i n  J u ly  1967* I t  was the n  expec ted  
t h a t  th e  w i thdraw al  would be completed by th e  mid-1970’s ,  
and t h a t  t h e r e a f t e r ,  B r i t a i n  would m a i n t a i n  what was c a l l e d  
a " s p e c i a l  c a p a b i l i t y "  i n  the  area* I n  January  1968, 
however,  the  Wilson Labour government announced t h a t  the  
d a t e  of w ithdrawal would be advanced to  th e  end of  1971,
and t h a t  t h e r e a f t e r ,  only  a few hundred t ro o p s  under t r a i n i n g  
i n  M alays ia  would remain  i n  the  area* B r i t i s h  t ro o p s  were 
a l s o  to  be withdrawn from the  P e r s i a n  Gulf  a r e a  by th e  end 
of  1971« The B r i t i s h  C o n s e rv a t iv e  government,  which was 
e l e c t e d  to  o f f i c e  i n  1970, has  dec ided  to m a i n t a i n  a smal l  
permanent B r i t i s h  ground f o r c e  (1000 men) i n  the M alays ian
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promises to further erode the Western military presence in Asia 
and has contributed to official and unofficial concern in 
Australia about the future security of the region.
Discussion about present and future American policy in 
Asia has figured prominently in the writings of academic and 
other unofficial observers in Australia during the last three 
or four years« The general conclusion seems to be that the 
Nixon doctrine and concomitant developments herald a signifi­
cant change in American policy and one which has important 
implications for Australia, So far as the more systematic 
analyses are concerned, the writer who has drawn the most far-
reaching conclusions from current developments in U,S9 policy
1has probably been Hedley Bull, He has argued that the Nixon
doctrine amounts to "a policy of global retreat and with- 
2drawal" and that what is involved is a change, not just in
3the means of American foreign policy, but in the ends as well. 
According to Bull:
It now seems likely that the United States, 
unconvinced that the global balance of power 
is at stake, will be prepared to allow 
aggression to succeed, and communism to expand,
2 (conto) peninsula and to station a small naval force in the 
east of Suez area. However, these moves do not really 
amount to a reversal of the policy of military dis­
engagement from the area. For a note on these develop­
ments, see Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age, p.82,
L  Hedley Bull's major contributiors to this discussion have 
been: "Asia in the Seventies : An Australian View" in
New Guinea, Vol, 5, No, 2, June-July 1970, ppe51-63; "Review 
Comments : Strategic Aspects" in Bruce Brown (ed0), op, cite, 
pp,230-237; and, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the 
Pacific" in Foreign Affairs, Vol, 49, No, 4, July 1971, 
pp„669-6819
2, See, "Review Comments : Strategic Aspects" in Bruce Brown 
(ed„), op, cito, p,232,
3, See, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and ehe Pacific" in 
Foreign Affairs, Vol, 49, No, 4, July 1971, pp,671-2.
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i n  Indoch ina  and p o s s ib ly  i n  o th e r  a r e a s  of A sia  
and th e  P a c i f i c ,  r a t h e r  th a n  in t e r v e n e  d i r e c t l y  
to  p re v e n t  i t , l
S im i la r ,  though somewhat l e s s  ex trem e, v iews have been s t a t e d  
by o th e r  A u s t r a l i a n  w r i te r s n  J .L ,  R icha rdson  has c h a ra c ­
t e r i s e d  th e  problem as more a m idd le  term  r a t h e r  th an  a long 
term  one. He has warned th a t  "dom estic  c o n s t r a i n t s  [ i n  th e  
UcS-] could  make f o r  K orea-type  m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s  of American 
i n t e n t i o n s *" The i n e v i t a b l e  c r i s e s  (assuming America were 
to  in t e r v e n e  in  any f u t u r e  c o n f l i c t  i n  A s i a ) ,  he has added, 
could  w e l l  b r in g  about an  e s c a l a t i o n  of American d isengagem ent 
from A sia  a s  a whole. P u b l ic  p r e s s u r e  i n  th e  U ,S , ,  he has
u rg e d ,  could  a l s o  lead  to  American " d ip lo m a t ic  i n e f f e c t i v e -  
2
n e s s , "  F i n a l l y ,  of a l l  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  w r i t e r s ,  R ichardson
has emphasised m ost,  what he c l a im s ,  i s  th e  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y
between th e  Nixon d o c t r in e  and A u s t r a l i a ’s commitment to
M alays ia  and S ingapo re ,  or more p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  C a n b e r ra ’s
b e l i e f  t h a t  in  th e  even t of any emergency a r i s i n g  o u t  of t h i s
3
commitment, i t  could  depend on American m i l i t a r y  s u p p o r t .
1, i b i d , ,  p ,6 7 2 .  Another A u s t r a l i a n  w r i t e r  who i n t e r p r e t s  
c u r r e n t  U ,S, p o l i c i e s  in  f a r - r e a c h in g  term s i s  B,A, S a n ta ­
m a r ia ,  See h i s  " I n to  th e  S e v e n t ie s " ,  in  A u s t r a l i a n  O u tlo o k , 
Vol, 25, No, 2, August 1971, p p , 115-131, San tam aria  has 
argued t h a t  " th e  USA has f a l l e n  behind  th e  USSR i n  the  
n u c le a r  r a c e " .  Should t h i s  d i s p a r i t y  grow, he has added, 
th e  U.S, and i t s  a l l i e s  w i l l  be i n  no p o s i t i o n  to  w i th s ta n d  
S o v ie t  p r e s s u r e ;  th e  p o s i t i o n  has  been  ag g rav a ted  by th e  
growth of S o v ie t  n av a l  power and in f lu e n c e  in  th e  In d ia n  
Ocean, "The U ,S , , "  acc o rd in g  to  S an ta m aria ,  " i s  on the  
r e t r e a t  everywhere i n  A sia  -  from Indo-C hina to  South Korea, 
N ix o n 's  V ie tn a m is a t io n  programme may u l t i m a t e l y  r e s u l t  i n  
s h e e r  ’s c u t t l e ' , "  See, i b i d , ,  p p , 120-121,
2, J ,L ,  R ich a rd so n ,  " P o l i t i c a l  and S t r a t e g i c  R e la t io n s  : A View 
From C anberra" i n  Bruce Brown ( e d , ) ,  o p , c i t , ,  p ,1 4 7 ,
3, i b i d , ,  p p ,151-153, C anberra  dec ided  to  r e t a i n  A u s t r a l i a n  
fo r c e s  in  M alays ia  and S ingapore  a f t e r  th e  B r i t i s h  w i th ­
draw al from th e  a re a  a t  th e  end of 1971, For th e  announce­
ment of t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  see  s ta te m e n t  on de fen ce  by th e  Prime 
M in i s t e r ,  Mr, John G orton , on 25 F ebruary  1969, Reproduced 
i n  C,No1 ,A, , Vol, 40, No, 2, F eb rua ry  1969, p p ,4 1 -4 4 .  For
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Harry Gelber,'*' a l s o ,  has p o in te d  to  what he see s  a s  im p o rtan t
changes i n  American p o l i c y  in  A sia :  a r e v e r s io n  to  an o f f s h o re
p o l i c y ;  s m a l le r  U.S, r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  in  th e  a r e a ;  and g r e a t e r
s e l f - r e l i a n c e  by lo c a l  powers^ However, Gelber has i n s i s t e d
t h a t  th e  Nixon D o c tr in e  " i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  an e x e r c i s e  in
am b ig u i ty ,  des ig n ed  to  r e f l e c t  a mood w ith o u t  n e e d le s s ly
2
narrow ing o p e r a t io n a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s „" I t  rem ains u n c l e a r ,
he has con c lu d ed ,  j u s t  how f a r  th e  U,S, w ithd raw al i n  1967-70
"was a tem porary  phenomenon, a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  Vietnam w ar-
w e a r in e ss  or how f a r  i t  r e f l e c t e d ,  o r  would come to  r e f l e c t ,
3
a permanent change in  th e  U .S. view of th e  w o r ld ,"
I t  seems c l e a r ,  th e n ,  t h a t  th e  changes in  American 
f o r e ig n  and d e fe n c e  p o l i c i e s  of th e  l a s t  few y e a rs  have a l re a d y  
had an im pact on o f f i c i a l  and u n o f f i c i a l  A u s t r a l i a n  th in k in g .
I t  has been g e n e r a l ly  acknowledged, t h a t  to  a g r e a t e r  or 
l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  A m erica 's  p re s e n c e  i n  A sia  i n  th e  f u t u r e  w i l l  
be l e s s  consp icuous th a n  i t  has  been i n  th e  p a s t .  This  has 
h e lp e d ,  however m a rg in a l ly ,  to  undermine A u s t r a l i a n  c o n f i ­
dence in  th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of U„S. commitments. I t  would seem 
p ro p er  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  to  comment on th e  l i k e l y  im p l ic a t io n s  
of th e s e  developm ents fo r  A u s t r a l i a ' s  n u c le a r  weapons p o l i c y .  
But b e fo r e  doing  s o ,  i t  w i l l  be u s e f u l  to  look  b r i e f l y  a t  
C a n b e r ra 's  re c o rd  i n  th e  arms c o n t r o l  f i e l d .
3 ( c o n t , )  a more d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s io n  of th e  A u s t r a l i a n  
commitment, see  Robert Howard, "F o re ig n  P o l ic y  Review; 
Jan u a ry -Ju n e  1969," i n  The A u s t r a l i a n  Q u a r t e r l y , V ol. 41, 
No, 3, September 1969, p p , 99-103.
1. See, H,G. G e lb e r ,  "The U.S.A. and A u s t r a l i a "  i n  Gelber 
( e d . ) ,  Problems of A u s t r a l i a n  F o re ig n  P o l i c y , p p , 77-93.
2. i b i d „ , p ,8 0 .
3. ib  i d , ,  p , 84 c
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C. A u s t r a l i a  and Arms C o n tro l
I t  was noted  e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  ever s in c e  th e  Second World
War, s u c c e s s iv e  A u s t r a l i a n  Governments have been r e l u c t a n t  to
condemn n u c le a r  weapons o u t r i g h t ,  b u t  i n s t e a d ,  have tended  to
e u lo g i s e  t h e i r  r o l e  in  p r e s e rv in g  the  s e c u r i t y  of A u s t r a l i a
and i t s  a l l i e s »  This  tendency  has been e v id e n t  i n  C a n b e r ra ’s
arms c o n t r o l  p o l i c y  th roughou t most of th e  po s t-w ar  e r a .
In  th e  e a r l y  1950’s ,  A u s t r a l i a  was anx ious to  em phasise
t h a t  i t  reg a rd ed  disarmament a s  a s i n g l e  problem and though t
i t  p ro p e r  t h a t  b o th  a s p e c t s ,  c o n v e n t io n a l  and n u c l e a r ,  should
be d e a l t  w ith  toge ther .^"  C anberra  was e s p e c i a l l y  concerned
t h a t  th e  W estern  powers should  no t be dece ived  by disarm ament
p ro p o s a ls  "pu t  forward fo r  th e  purpose  of g a in in g  a s t r a t e g i c  
2
a d v a n ta g e ."  I t  r e p e a te d ly  denounced th e  S ov ie t  Union fo r
i t s  i n s i s t e n c e  on banning n u c le a r  weapons b e fo re  a programme
3
of c o n v e n t io n a l  disarmament had been p u t  in t o  e f f e c t .  At
m e e tin g s  of the  Disarmament Commission in  1957, A u s t r a l i a
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  p r o h i b i t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons under
e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  shou ld  go hand in  hand w ith
4
m ajor r e d u c t io n s  i n  c o n v e n t io n a l  weapons and f o r c e s .  I t  
seems c l e a r ,  t h a t  a major r e a s o n  fo r  C a n b e r ra ’s i n s i s t e n c e  
on ba lanced  disarm ament (n u c le a r  and n o n -n u c le a r )  was i t s  
concern  about C h in a ’s c o n v e n t io n a l  s t r e n g t h .  I n  an a d d re s s  
to  th e  F i r s t  Committee of the  U.N. G enera l Assembly in  
October 1957, the  A u s t r a l i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s a id :
1. See, s ta te m e n t  by A u s t r a l i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  in  th e  F i r s t  
Committee of th e  U.N. G enera l Assembly, December 1951. 
Reproduced in  C .NoI.A . , V ol, 22, No. 12, December 1951, 
p »709.
2. i b i d . ,  Vol. 25, No. 11, November 1954, p .7 9 8 .
3. i b i d . , Vol. 26, No. 5, May 1955, p .3 4 7 ,
4. As r e p o r te d  in  s ta te m e n t  i n  October 1957 by A u s t r a l i a ’ s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  th e  U.N. G enera l Assembly. Reproduced 
in  i b i d „, Vol. 28, No. 10, O ctober 1957, p ,8 0 4 .
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o o » A u s t r a l i a  i s  a co u n try  s i t u a t e d  on th e  v e ry  
edge of A s ia ,  a p a r t  of th e  world where many 
c o u n t r i e s '  problems of n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  a r e  o v e r ­
shadowed by th e  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  w eigh t of Communist 
Chinese manpower„ #. ,  We have never co n s id e re d  i t  
r e a l i s t i c  i n  any disarmament p la n s  to  draw a sharp  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between c o n v e n t io n a l  f o r c e s  and weapons 
on th e  one hand and n u c le a r  weapons on the  o th e r ,
,oo In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we in  A u s t r a l i a  f e e l  t h a t  a d i s ­
armament agreement th a t  d id  not impose s u i t a b l e  
o b l i g a t i o n s  upon Communist China would no t be much 
use  in  our p a r t  of the  w o r l d , e ,n^
In  A p r i l  1959, China proposed th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of an
" a re a  f r e e  of a tom ic  weapons, o s . th ro u g h o u t  th e  whole of
2
E a s t  A sia  and th e  P a c i f i c  r e g io n " .  N u c le a r - f r e e  zones had
been d is c u s s e d  b e f o r e ,  bo th  i n  th e  U J ,  and e lsew h ere .
U su a l ly ,  however, th e  id e a  had been c o n s id e re d  in  a European 
3
c o n te x t ,  C h in a 's  s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  such a zone should  be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  in  th e  E as t A sian  and P a c i f i c  r e g io n  seems to  
have s t im u la te d  C a n b e r ra 's  th in k in g  on th e  m a t te r  and, d u r in g  
th e  nex t  few y e a r s ,  A u s t r a l i a  c l a r i f i e d  i t s  p o s i t i o n  on th e  
whole q u e s t io n  of n u c l e a r - f r e e  zones , C a n b e r ra 's  perform ance 
on t h i s  i s s u e  p ro v id e s  an o th e r  i n s i g h t  i n t o  th e  e v o lu t io n  of 
th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Governm ent's  a t t i t u d e  to  n u c le a r  weapons 
in  g e n e r a l .
1, i b i d , ,  p p ,803-4,
2, Quoted i n ,  Morton H a lp e r in  and Dwight P e r k in s ,  Communist 
China and Arms C o n t r o l , New York: P r a e g e r ,  1965, p ,1 0 0 ,  
C h in a 's  o r i g i n a l  s u g g e s t io n  f o r  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of a 
n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone in  E as t  A sia  and th e  P a c i f i c  r e g io n  was 
widened in  subsequen t p ro p o s a ls  so as  to  in c lu d e  a l l  of 
China, th e  U .S . ,  R u ss ia  and Japan ,  See, i b i d , ,  pp,1Q0-101,
3, e«go,  W alter U l b r i c h t ' s  p ro p o s a l  f o r  a B a l t i c  " se a  of 
peace" (1955); th e  p ro p o s a l  f o r  a n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone in  
C e n t r a l  Europe f i r s t  p u t  forw ard by P o la n d 's  F o re ig n  Min­
i s t e r  Mr, Rapacki in  1957; and ,  a j o i n t  S o v ie t -A lb a n ia n  
p ro p o s a l  f o r  a n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone i n  th e  a r e a  of th e  Balkans 
and th e  A d r ia t i c  (1959) ,  In  1958, a p ro p o s a l  to  e s t a b l i s h  
a n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone in  A sia  was advanced r a t h e r  t e n t a t i v e l y  
by Mr, N ehru .
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From th e  s t a r t ,  C anberra  reg a rd ed  most n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone
p ro p o s a ls  w i th  a g r e a t  d e a l  of s u s p i c io n ,  In  1961, A u s t r a l i a
d e c l in e d  to  su p p o r t  a r e s o l u t i o n  in  th e  U.N, G enera l Assembly
seek in g  to  e s t a b l i s h  such a zone in  Africa,"^ and in  1962, in
a l e t t e r  to  the  U.N, S e c r e t a r y  G en e ra l ,  C anberra  made i t  c l e a r
t h a t  i t  " s e r io u s ly  d oub t[ed ]  the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of r e g io n a l
a rrangem ents  f o r  th e  l i m i t a t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons in  any
2
a re a  of th e  w o rld " .  In  1963, and a g a in  i n  1965, A u s t r a l i a
m od if ied  i t s  s tan d  a l i t t l e  and a c t u a l l y  supported  U.N.
r e s o l u t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  to  n u c l e a r - f r e e  zones in  L a t in  America
and A f r ic a  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  However, C anberra  a c te d  on t h i s
o c c a s io n  on the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  t h a t  no p re c e d e n t  had been
e s t a b l i s h e d  fo r  th e  c r e a t i o n  of s i m i l a r  zones e lsew here  and
only  a f t e r  A u s t r a l i a ’s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  had reminded th e  U.N.
t h a t  " th e  c o n d i t io n s  which must e x i s t  b e f o r e  n u c l e a r - f r e e
zones can be c o n s id e re d ,  do no t y e t  e x i s t  i n  th e  a r e a  i n  which
3
A u s t r a l i a  i s  s i t u a t e d , "
1 . In  speak ing  to  th e  r e s o l u t i o n ,  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
expressed  a number of r e s e r v a t i o n s  about th e  p ro p o s a l .
In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t s  f a i l u r e  to  p ro v id e  f o r  s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  among th e  s t a r e s  i n  th e  r e g io n  and th e  
absence of any m achinery  f o r  d e a l in g  w ith  th e  problem of 
n u c le a r  t h r e a t s  to  A f r ic a n  n a t io n s  posed by s t a t e s  o u t ­
s id e  th e  a r e a .  See , C.N. I ,A. ,  V ol. 32, No, 11, November 
1961, p p ,37-39,
2. See, t e x t  of th e  A u s t r a l i a n  l e t t e r  in  O f f i c i a l  Records of 
th e  Disarmament Commission, Supplement f o r  January  1961
to  December 1962, New York: U nited  N a t io n s ,  1963 ( h e r e a f t e r  
r e f e r r e d  to  as Reply to  S e c r e ta r y - G e n e r a l ) ,  p .5 4 .  For th e  
c i rc u m stan c es  of th e  A u s t r a l i a n  l e t t e r ,  see  above, p .4 3 ,  
f  n, 3.
3. See, s ta te m e n t  by A u s t r a l i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  F i r s t  Comm­
i t t e e  of U.N. G enera l Assembly. Reproduced in  C .N ,I ,A . ,
Vol, 34, No. 11, November 1963, p p ,3 5 -6 .  A u s t r a l i a ’s 
re q u ire m e n ts  f o r  a n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone were s e t  o u t  in  the  
F i r s t  Committee of th e  U.N. G eneral Assembly in  O ctober,  
1963. They were: 1) Unanimity (o f  th e  s t a t e s  in c lu d ed  in  
th e  z o n e ) , 2) B a lance  (between n u c le a r  and c o n v e n t io n a l
disarmament in  th e  zo n e ) .  3) V e r i f i c a t i o n ,  4) Absence 
w i th in  th e  zone of n u c le a r  t a r g e t s .  See, i b i d . ,  Vol. 34,
No, 10, October 1963, p p ,57-60,
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There seem to  be two main re a so n s  why C anberra  has  been 
so s u s p ic io u s  of p ro p o s a ls  to  e s t a b l i s h  n u c l e a r - f r e e  zones in  
th e  A sian  and P a c i f i c  r e g io n ,  In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  a s  was 
in d i c a te d  above, A u s t r a l i a  has never been e n t i r e l y  happy w ith  
m easures  des igned  to  reduce  th e  l e v e l  of n u c le a r  f o r c e s  on ly :  
such  an approach , i t  has  been a rg u ed ,  te n d s  to  g iv e  th e  
Communist powers a m i l i t a r y  advan tage .  Canberra  has tended 
to  re g a rd  t h i s  l i n e  of re a so n in g  as e s p e c i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  when 
speak ing  of t h a t  p a r t  of th e  world  in  which A u s t r a l i a  i s  
s i t u a t e d .  During th e  1963 s e s s io n  of th e  U.N, G enera l Assembly, 
A u s t r a l i a ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s a id :
. . .  We b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  p r o h i b i t i o n  of n u c le a r  
weapons i n  t h i s  [Asian and P a c i f i c ]  a r e a  would 
c r e a t e  a s e r io u s  im balance on accoun t of the  
enormous manpower r e s o u rc e s  and th e  c a p a c i ty  of 
[ s i c ]  c o n v e n t io n a l  w a r fa re  of a t  l e a s t  one power 
[presum ably China] in  t h i s  r e g i o n . 1
In  th e  second p la c e ,  Canberra  has  been e s p e c i a l l y  concerned
t h a t  th e  d e s ig n a t io n  of th e  A sian  and P a c i f i c  r e g io n  as a
n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone could  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  th e  m i l i t a r y  p la n s  of
i t s  two major a l l i e s  and , in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  could  make i t
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them to  dep loy  n u c le a r  weapons in  A u s t r a l i a ' s
d e fe n c e .  ( I t  was noted  above, t h a t  t h i s  was th e  argument used
by th e  F e d e ra l  Government to  a t t a c k  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Labor
P a r t y ' s  p ro p o s a l  i n  1963 f o r  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of a n u c l e a r -
f r e e  zone in  th e  S ou thern  H em isphere .)  That A u s t r a l i a
re c o g n ise d  th e  " r i g h t  of th e  n u c le a r  Powers to  conclude
agreem ents  f o r  th e  s t a t i o n i n g  of t h e i r  n u c le a r  weapons w herever
m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i t y  r e q u i r e [ d ] ,"  was made c l e a r  i n  1962, in
2
C a n b e r r a 's  n o te  to  th e  U.N. S e c re ta ry  G enera l ,
1. See, s ta te m e n t  by A u s t r a l i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  Reproduced 
in  i b i d . ,  p . 59.
2. See, Reply to  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , p .5 5 .
228
In  c o n t r a s t  to  the  s c e p t i c is m  w ith  which i t  reg a rd ed  
most n u c l e a r - f r e e  zone p r o p o s a l s ,  C anberra  e x h ib i te d  whole­
h e a r t e d  en thusiasm  f o r  th e  n u c le a r  t e s t  ban t r e a t y .  Indeed ,  
A u s t r a l i a  was one of the  f i r s t  n a t io n s  to  accede  to  th e  
agreem ent when i t  was opened f o r  s i g n a t u r e  i n  August 1963,
The A u s t r a l i a n  Government advanced fo u r  main re a s o n s  f o r  s ig n ­
ing th e  t e s t  ban t r e a t y ,  v i z . ,  t h a t  th e  agreem ent would reduce  
c o n ta m in a t io n  of th e  atm osphere; impose a r e s t r a i n t  on. th e  
armaments r a c e ;  open up th e  way fo r  a d d i t i o n a l  disarmament 
m easures; and , c r e a t e  an atm osphere amenable to  b e t t e r  E a s t -  
West r e la t io n s . '* '  There seems to  be no r e a s o n  to  doubt th e  
s i n c e r i t y  of C a n b e r ra 's  p u b l i c ly  s t a t e d  e x p la n a t io n  of i t s  
s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  t e s t  ban. At th e  same t im e ,  i t  i s  u s e f u l  to  
remember t h a t  s ig n a tu r e  of the  agreem ent was no t d i f f i c u l t  
to  r e c o n c i l e  w ith  many of A u s t r a l i a ' s  long s ta n d in g  a t t i t u d e s  
to  arms c o n t r o l  and n u c le a r  weapons in  g e n e r a l .  For one 
th i n g ,  the  t e s t  ban promised to  l i m i t  th e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of 
n u c le a r  weapons, an o b je c t iv e  which C anberra  had long 
su p p o r te d .  A lso ,  i t  i n  no way h in d e re d  th e  c a p a c i ty  of 
A u s t r a l i a ' s  two major a l l i e s  to  deploy  n u c le a r  weapons in  
th e  c o u n t r y 's  d e fen c e .
One of th e  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  f e a t u r e s  of A u s t r a l i a n  
p o l i c y  in  the  arms c o n t r o l  f i e l d  has been i t s  c lo s e  i d e n t i ­
f i c a t i o n  w ith  B r i t i s h  and American v iew s .  U n t i l  v e ry  
r e c e n t l y ,  t h i s  was e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  in  r e s p e c t  of th e  q u e s t io n  
of n u c le a r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  S ince th e  mid- 1 9 5 0 's ,  by which 
tim e B r i t a i n ,  R u ss ia  and America had a l l  a c q u i re d  n u c le a r  
weapons of t h e i r  own, C anberra  has  r e g i s t e r e d  s t ro n g  o p p o s i t io n
1. See, s ta te m e n t  by th e  M in is te r  f o r  E x te rn a l  A f f a i r s  on 
15 August 1963, on A u s t r a l i a ' s  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of the  N uclear  
T es t Ban T re a ty ,  Reproduced in  N uclea r  T e s t i n g , S e le c t  
Documents on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s ,  No, 2 of 1963,
C anberra : Departm ent of E x te rn a l  A f f a i r s ,  1963, p .3 6 .
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to  f u r t h e r  n u c le a r  spread«, In d eed ,  i t  was t h i s  r e lu c ta n c e  to
see  n u c le a r  weapons a c q u ire d  by a d d i t i o n a l  s t a t e s  w hich , in
1957, th e  Prime M in is te r  c i t e d  as  a major re a s o n  f o r  A u s t r a l i a
r e s t r i c t i n g  i t s  d e fen c e  e f f o r t  to  c o n v e n t io n a l  f o r c e s , ^
G e n e ra l ly ,  th e  rea so n s  advanced by A u s t r a l i a  f o r  opposing
th e  spread  of n u c le a r  weapons have c l o s e l y  resem bled th o se
en u n c ia ted  by i t s  two n u c le a r  a l l i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  U.S.
In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  A u s t r a l i a n  spokesmen have argued t h a t  th e  sp read
of n u c le a r  weapons to  a d d i t i o n a l  c o u n t r i e s  would in c r e a s e
th e  chances of i r r e s p o n s i b l e  a c t i o n  and hence th e  l i k e l i h o o d
of war. A lso ,  arms c o n t r o l  m easures would be made more
d i f f i c u l t ,  bo th  to  d e v i s e  and to  implement* F i n a l l y ,  Canberra
has argued t h a t  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons would
e n t a i l  th e  d iv e r s i o n  of r e s o u rc e s  from deve lopm enta l work,
something which i s  to  be r e g r e t t e d  everyw here, but e s p e c i a l l y ,
2
i n  underdeveloped  c o u n t r ie s *  N e v e r th e le s s ,  in  re g a rd  to  
th e  N .P .T . ,  which in  r e c e n t  y e a rs  has been the  most im p o rtan t  
m a n i f e s t a t io n  of B r i t i s h ,  American and S o v ie t  conce rn  about 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  A u s t r a l i a  adopted  a somewhat u n c o -o p e ra t iv e  
stance«, In  th e  U.N. and e lse w h e re ,  C anberra  r a i s e d  a number 
of o b je c t io n s  to  th e  N.P.T«, M oreover, i t  de layed  s ig n in g  
the  agreement and has g iv e n  no i n d i c a t i o n  as  to  when i t  might 
r a t i f y  i t *  I t  w i l l  be u s e f u l  to  examine j u s t  why A u s t r a l i a  
ac te d  in  t h i s  manner.
The A u s t r a l i a n  Government harboured  fo u r  main r e s e r ­
v a t io n s  abou t th e  N ,P ,T . F i r s t ,  i t  q u es t io n e d  th e  e f f e c ­
t i v e n e s s  of th e  t r e a t y  a s  a means of p re v e n t in g  p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,
1, See above, p.209«,
2, See, s ta te m e n t  by th e  Prime M in i s t e r ,  Mr. M enzies, i n  
C .P .D . , H of R . ,  Vol. 16, 19 September 1957, p ,7 9 8 .  See 
a l s o ,  s ta te m e n ts  by A u s t r a l i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to  s e s s io n s  
of the  U.N. G enera l Assembly, Reproduced in  CaN. 1 „A. ,
Vol. 29, No. 9 , September 1958, p ,5 7 9 ; i b i d . ,  V ol. 36,
No. 10, October 1965, p .634 ; and ib id  , Vol. 37, No. 11, 
November 1966, p .6 8 5 .
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In  a s ta te m e n t  to  th e  F i r s t  Committee of th e  U.N. G enera l
Assembly in  May 1968, A u s t r a l i a  d e c la r e d  t h a t  i n  o rd e r  to  be
e f f e c t i v e  th e  t r e a t y  would r e q u i r e  th e  su p p o r t  of "w e ll  beyond"
40 s t a t e s ,  and t h a t  th e s e  would need to  in c lu d e  th e  w o r ld 's
many n e a r - n u c l e a r  powers»^- In  J u ly  of th e  fo l lo w in g  y ea r  a
government m i n i s t e r  drew a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  two n u c le a r
2
and many n e a r - n u c l e a r  s t a t e s  had s t i l l  no t signed» The 
governm ent, he added, " r e a l l y  [ d i d n ' t ]  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s
3
t r e a t y  [was] l i k e l y  to  be e f f e c t i v e . "
Second, Canberra  was u ndoub ted ly  concerned abou t th e
im p l ic a t io n s  of the  N .P .T . f o r  th e  c o u n t r y 's  long term s e c u r i t y ,
There were t r a c e s  of t h i s  concern  in  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  d e l e g a t e ' s
speech  to  th e  U.N* in  May 1968, and th e  i s s u e  became more
4
prom inen t i n  subsequen t government s ta t e m e n t s ,  Mr. F a i r -  
b a i r n ,  th e  M in is te r  f o r  N a t io n a l  Development, appea rs  to  have 
been e s p e c i a l l y  p reoccup ied  w ith  t h i s  m a t t e r ;  i n  Ju ly  1969 he 
com plained t h a t  s ig n a t u r e  of th e  N,P»T. would commit f u t u r e
1, See, t e x t  of speech by Mr. P a t r i c k  Shaw, A u s t r a l i a n  
Ambassador to  th e  U.N. ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  A u s t r a l i a ' s  
N .P .T .  S ta te m e n t) .  Reproduced in  C„N. I .A, ,  V ol. 39, No. 5, 
May 1968, p p , 206-210.
2. In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  F ran ce ,  China , Ja p a n ,  West Germany, I n d ia ,  
A rg e n t in a ,  I s r a e l  and P a k is ta n .  See, speech by Mr, D. 
F a i r b a i r n ,  M in is te r  f o r  N a t io n a l  Development, b e f o r e  a 
L i b e r a l  P a r ty  m eeting  in  Melbourne on 13 J u ly  1969 (h e re ­
a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  F a i r b a i r n  S ta te m e n t) , p .9 .  Text of 
Mr, F a i r b a i r n ' s  speech s u p p l ie d  by c o u r te s y  of D r . I .  
B e l la n y ,  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i t y ,  C anberra ,
3, i b i d ,
4. e » g . ,  see  s ta te m e n ts  by th e  Prime M in i s t e r ,  Mr. G orton , in  
C .P .D . , H o f  R ,,  No. 4 ,  26 March 1969, p p ,903-4; i b i d . ,
No. 14, 12 September 1969, p„1272; and, P o l ic y  Speech , 
F e d e ra l  E l e c t i o n ,  1969, C anberra : F e d e ra l  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  
L i b e r a l  P a r ty  of A u s t r a l i a ,  1969, p . 7 .  See a l s o ,  s t a t e ­
ment by Mr, Gordon F r e e th ,  M in is te r  f o r  E x te rn a l  A f f a i r s ,  
i n  C .P .D , , H of R . ,  No. 11, 14 August 1969, p p »316-317.
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A u s t r a l i a n  Governments " f o r  a l l  tim e" to  r e f r a i n  from producing
n u c le a r  weapons.^ I t  must be em phasised, however, t h a t  nobody
i n  th e  government seems to  have though t A u s t r a l i a  needed to
2
produce  n u c le a r  weapons in  th e  near  f u t u r e .  The la c k  of 
en th u s iasm  f o r  th e  N .P .T . ,  a t  t h i s  t im e , seems to  have been 
more a r e f l e c t i o n  of th e  u n e a s in e s s  in  the  c a b in e t  and e l s e ­
where about A u s t r a l i a ’s f u t u r e  s e c u r i t y :  a f t e r  a l l ,  th e
e n u n c ia t io n  of the Nixon d o c t r i n e  and B r i t a i n ’s "E as t  of Suez" 
d e c i s i o n  w ere , f o r  re a s o n s  in d ic a te d  e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  
developm ents  of th e  g r e a t e s t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  to  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  
Government and were bound to  have some impact on C a n b e r ra ’s 
a t t i t u d e  to  th e  N .P,T , As Hedley B u ll  has su g g es ted :
I n  a p e r io d  in  which A u s t r a l i a ’s co n f id e n c e  in  
h e r  U nited  S ta te s  and B r i t i s h  a l l i e s  had r e c e iv e d  
some s e tb a c k s ,  th e  r e n u n c i a t i o n  of an independen t 
n u c le a r  c a p a b i l i t y  d id  no t seem an a t t r a c t i v e  
c o u rs e ,  and ap p e a ls  by h e r  a l l i e s  to  su p p o r t  the 
t r e a t y  they  had sponsored  found a l e s s  ready  
re sp o n se  th a n  they  m ight have done in  e a r l i e r  
y e a r s , ^
T h ird ,  A u s t r a l i a  was unhappy w ith  the  in s p e c t io n  p ro ­
v i s i o n s  of th e  N.PoTo I t  complained i n  p a r t i c u l a r  abou t
th e  vagueness  of the  s a fe g u a rd s  agreem ents  which s i g n a t o r i e s
4
were o b l ig e d  to  n e g o t i a t e  w i th  th e  I .A ,E .A , and even 
a l l e g e d  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n s p e c t io n  would expose A u s t r a l i a  
to  th e  danger of communist e s p io n a g e ,^  C anberra  was
1, F a i r b a i r n  S ta te m e n t , p ,1 0 ,  The s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  A u s t r a ­
l i a n  Governments would be committed " f o r  a l l  t im e" i s  
q u i t e  m is le a d in g .  The " e scap e  c la u s e "  ( A r t i c l e  X) in  
th e  NcP.T.  a u t h o r i s e s  s t a t e s  to  w ithdraw  a t  t h e i r  own 
d i s c r e t i o n  i f  they  ju d g e  t h a t  t h e i r  "supreme i n t e r e s t s "  
r e q u i r e  i t .
2, In  1957, Mr, Gorton favou red  th e  development of an 
A u s t r a l i a n  n u c le a r  f o r c e  b u t  i t  i s  no t c l e a r  t h a t  he 
s t i l l  d oes ,
3, Hedley B u l l ,  "Problems of A u s t r a l i a n  F o re ig n  P o l i c y ,  
Jan u a ry -Ju n e  1968", i n  The A u s t r a l i a n  J o u rn a l  of P o l i t i c s  
and H i s t o r y ,Vol. 14, No, 3 , December 1968, p ,3 1 8 ,
4, A u s t r a l i a ’s N .P .T , S ta t e m e n t , p ,2 0 9 ,
5, F a i r b a i r n  S ta te m e n t , p p ,9 -1 0 .
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e s p e c i a l l y  concerned t h a t  th e  in s p e c t io n  system should  not 
"impede or burden n u c le a r  r e s e a r c h ,  developm ent, p ro d u c t io n  
or use  f o r  p e a c e fu l  p u rp o s e s ."  I t  ob jec  ted  e s p e c i a l l y  to  
th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of s a fe g u a rd s  to  l e g i t i m a t e  bona f id e  
a c t i v i t i e s  in  the  mining and e a r l y  p ro c e s s in g  s ta g e s  of 
n u c le a r  raw m a te r i a l  p ro d u c t io n  and i n s i s t e d  on th e  l e g i t i ­
macy, under th e  t r e a t y ,  of th e  u se  of n u c le a r  energy  f o r  
n o n -e x p lo s iv e  m i l i t a r y  p u rp o se s ,  such as n av a l  propulsion»'*'
F o u r th ,  A u s t r a l i a  was d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  p e a c e fu l  
u se s  p r o v is io n s  of the  N.P»T, In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  was 
s c e p t i c a l  abou t how p a r t i e s  to  th e  t r e a t y  i n  a p o s i t i o n  to  
do so in tended  to  meet t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n s  to  a s s i s t  o th e r  s t a t e s  
i n  f u r t h e r i n g  th e  developm ent of n u c le a r  energy f o r  p e a c e fu l  
p u rp o s e s .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a ,  a 
c o u n try  w ith  "a low r a i n f a l l ,  a p o o r ly  in d e n ted  c o a s t l i n e  
and l i t t l e  to p o g ra p h ic a l  r e l i e f "  had a s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  in  
th e  p o s s i b le  u se  of n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n s  f o r  major e n g in e e r ­
ing p r o j e c t s .  C onsequen tly ,  C anberra  b e l ie v e d  t h a t  a l l  p a r t i e s  
to  th e  t r e a t y  should  have a c c e s s  to  n u c le a r  e x p lo s iv e s  fo r  
p e a c e fu l  purposes  and t h a t  any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a rrangem ents  
n e c e ssa ry  f o r  th e  im plem en ta t ion  of the  p e a c e fu l  e x p lo s iv e s  
c l a u s e  of th e  t r e a t y  should  "go no f u r t h e r  th a n  to  p ro v id e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  a s s u ra n c e s  on s a f e t y  and an adequa te  demon­
s t r a t i o n  t h a t  th e  e x p lo s io n s  [would] no t be used f o r  n u c le a r
2
weapons developm ent."
The l a t t e r  two r e s e r v a t i o n s  about th e  i n s p e c t io n  and 
p e a c e fu l  u ses  p ro v i s io n s  of the  N»P0T 0 f ig u re d  most o f t e n  in  
o f f i c i a l  A u s t r a l i a n  s ta te m e n ts  on th e  ag reem en t.  But th e se  
o b je c t io n s ,  which were l a r g e l y  of a commercial n a tu r e ,  
h a rd ly  seem s u b s t a n t i a l  enough i n  A u s t r a l i a ’s case  to  accoun t
1. A u s t r a l i a ’ s N .P .T . S ta te m e n t , p .2 0 9 .
2. i b i d . ,  p ,210.
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f o r  i t s  d e la y  in  s ig n in g  th e  t r e a t y ,  U nlike  o th e r  n e a r -
n u c le a r  s t a t e s  such as West Germany and Jap an ,  A u s t r a l i a  i s ,
and indeed prom ises to  remain fo r  some t im e ,  a r e l a t i v e l y
un im p o rtan t  c o m p e ti to r  in  th e  c i v i l i a n  n u c le a r  f i e l d , ^  In  any
c a s e ,  Canberra  appea rs  to  have been  unduly  s u s p ic io u s  about
th e  impact of the  N .P .T , on th e  n a t i o n ’s c i v i l i a n  n u c le a r  
2
programme, A u s t r a l i a  i s  no t n e c e s s a r i l y  o b l ig e d  to  a cc ep t
IoA.EsA* in s p e c to r s  from Communist c o u n t r i e s ;  th e  t r e a t y  i s
u n l i k e ly  to  r e s t r i c t  the  use  of power and d e s a l i n a t i o n
r e a c t o r s  or l i m i t  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  and development p r o j e c t s ;
and, t h e r e  i s  ample p ro v i s io n  in  th e  N ,P 6T. f o r  a c c e s s  to  any
3
p o s s i b l e  b e n e f i t s  from p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n s ,  I t  
seems re a s o n a b le  to  conclude th e n ,  t h a t  th e s e  commercial 
r e s e r v a t io n s  d id  no t r e f l e c t  C a n b e rra ’ s r e a l  r e a s o n  fo r  
opposing th e  N.PoT. A u s t r a l i a  was p ro b ab ly  most concerned 
about th e  N .P .T . f o r  s e c u r i t y  r e a s o n s ,  b u t  so as  no t to  
d e t r a c t  from i t s  a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  U„S0, i t  chose to  a t t a c k  
th e  t r e a t y  on commercial g rounds,
C an b e rra ’s p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n  over th e  N .P ,T . was a ided  by 
the  la c k  of w idespread  en thusiasm  fo r  th e  agreement w i th in  
A u s t r a l i a .  A d m it ted ly ,  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Labor P a r ty  (AoL.P,)» 
th e  m ajor o p p o s i t io n  p a r ty  i n  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  P a r l i a m e n t ,
1» I t  now seems u n l i k e ly  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a ’s f i r s t  n u c le a r  power 
s t a t i o n  could  be o p e ra t in g  b e fo re  1975, By th e n ,  West 
Germany i s  expected  to  have 16 r e a c t o r s  and Japan  17,
See, A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission, S even teen th  
Annual R e p o r t ,  1968-69 , p o l5 .
2, On t h i s  p o in t  s e e ,  J .L ,  R ich a rd so n ,  A u s t r a l i a  and the  
N o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n  T r e a ty , C anberra : A,N,U0 P r e s s ,  1968, 
p p , 13-18» See a l s o ,  "On th e  N uclea r  T h re s h o ld " [a u th o r  
anonymous], C u rren t  A f f a i r s  B u l l e t i n , ( U n iv e r s i ty  o f ,  
Sydney), Vol„ 45,*No, 2, December 13, 1969, p ,2 6 .
3. Under A r t i c l e  V of the  N.P.T«,, p a r t i e s  to  th e  t r e a t y  u n d e r ­
ta k e  " to  in s u r e  t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s  from any p e a c e fu l  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  of n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n s  w i l l  be made a v a i l a b l e  
th rough  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p ro c e d u re s"  to  non­
n u c le a r  s i g n a t o r i e s .
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gave the  t r e a t y  i t s  b l e s s i n g .  The N T .T .  , Labor a rg u ed ,
was a n e c e s s a ry  f i r s t  s te p  tow ards n u c le a r  disarmament and
a c a r d i n a l  o b j e c t iv e  of American p o l i c y .  C onsequen tly ,  in
th e  i n t e r e s t s  of bo th  world peace  and con t inued  good r e l a t i o n s
w ith  th e  U .S . ,  A u s t r a l i a  shou ld  s ig n  th e  t r e a t y  and encourage
o th e r  s t a t e s  i n  th e  A sian  and P a c i f i c  a r e a  to  do l i k e w is e ,^
A lso ,  i t  seems th a t  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  p eo p le  g e n e r a l ly  were
fa v o u ra b ly  d isp o sed  tow ards th e  N .P .T . ;  a G allup P o l l
p u b l ish e d  in  October 1969 in d ic a te d  a s u b s t a n t i a l  m a jo r i t y
2
i n  favou r  of s ig n in g .  But t h i s  i s  h a r d ly  ev idence  of a
g roundsw ell  of su p p o r t  f o r  th e  t r e a t y .  Indeed , t h e r e  were
few s ig n s  of r e a l  en thusiasm  f o r  th e  N .P .T , in  A u s t r a l i a ,  and
th e  A .L .P . ’s e f f o r t  to  make s i g n a t u r e  of the  agreem ent an
i s s u e  in  th e  1969 F e d e ra l  E l e c t i o n  campaign f e l l  r a t h e r  f l a t .
Though th e r e  were few r e a l  champions of th e  N .P .T . in
A u s t r a l i a ,  t h e r e  were many s t ro n g  opponents  of th e  ag reem en t.
At l e a s t  one government m i n i s t e r  was r e l u c t a n t  to  see  
3
A u s t r a l i a  s ig n ;  so too  were some L ib e ra l -C o u n t ry  P a r ty
1. See, s ta te m e n ts  by Mr. Gough W hitlam, Leader of th e  A .L .P . ,  
i n  C .P .D . » H of R . ,  No. 3 , 26 March 1968, p ,4 5 7 ; i b i d . ,
No. 11, 14 August 1969, p p , 322-3; In to  the  S e v e n t ie s  w ith  
Labor, P o l ic y  Speech, F e d e ra l  E l e c t i o n  1969, C anberra : 
F e d e ra l  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  A u s t r a l i a n  Labor P a r ty ,  1969, p .2 6 ;  
and, The C anberra  T im es, 24 O ctober 1969.
2. The q u e s t io n  asked in  th e  p o l l  and th e  r e s u l t s  a r e  as 
fo l lo w s :
"We should  s ig n  th e  N uclear  N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n  T re a ty ,  
or we should  make our own n u c le a r  weapons?"
Aug. 1969 O ct, 1969
% %
Sign  t r e a t y  54 53 
Make weapons 39 29 
Undecided 7 18
S o u rce : "On th e  N uclea r  T h re s h o ld ,"  p .2 5 .  The w r i t e r  of 
t h i s  t r a c t  has emphasised t h a t  th e  above q u e s t io n  i s  open 
to  th e  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  i t  does no t a l lo w  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l ­
i t y  of doing n e i t h e r ,  or of fo rm u la t in g  c o n d i t io n s  fo r  
s i g n a t u r e .
3. Mr. F a i r b a i r n ,  M in is te r  f o r  N a t io n a l  Development.
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backbenchers»  M oreover, the  Dem ocratic Labor P a r ty  (D .L ,P „) ,
one of th e  n a t i o n ' s  m in o r i ty  p a r t i e s ,  was a p a r t i c u l a r l y
ou tspoken  c r i t i c  of th e  N .P .T . as was one prom inent and
i n f l u e n t i a l  member of th e  A u s t r a l i a n  s c i e n t i f i c  community»^
But fo rem ost amongst th e  N .P .T » 's  d e t r a c t o r s  was th e
A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission (A«A.E,Co), This  body
seems to  have s t r o n g ly  in f lu e n c e d  C a n b e r ra 's  s ta n d  on the  
2
N.P.T , I t  c o n t in u a l l y  q u e s t io n e d  a s p e c t s  of th e  s a f e g u a rd s ,  
p e a c e fu l  u se s  and amendments p r o v is io n s  o f  the  t r e a t y  and 
e x h ib i te d  a b rusque  d i s r e g a r d  f o r  th e  b ro ad e r  p o l i t i c a l  
i s s u e s »
3
In  February  1970, C anberra  s igned  th e  N.P»T, However, 
i t  i n d i c a te d  t h a t  b e fo r e  r a t i f y i n g  th e  agreem ent i t  would 
seek  f u r t h e r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of th e  I .A .E .A . s a fe g u a rd s  system
and would want a s s u ra n c e s  t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  had r e c e iv e d  a
4
s u f f i c i e n t  deg ree  of s u p p o r t  from o th e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  I t  i s  
r e a s o n a b le  to  assume, though , th a c  A u s t r a l i a ' s  r e lu c ta n c e  
to  r a t i f y  th e  N .P .T . had l e s s  to  do w ith  th e s e  m a t t e r s ,  and 
more, w ith  l i n g e r in g  doub ts  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  Government c i r c l e s  
abou t th e  im p l ic a t io n s  of the  t r e a t y  f o r  th e  n a t i o n ' s  lo n g -  
ru n  s e c u r i t y .  The d e c i s i o n  to  s ig n  th e  N .P .T . was somewhat
1. P ro f e s s o r  E.W. T i t t e r t o n  ( D i r e c to r ,  R esearch  School of 
P h y s ic a l  S c ie n c e s ,  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i t y ) ,  
denounced th e  N .P .T . a s  "a w o r th le s s  b i t  of p a p e r" .  See 
h i s  a r t i c l e  in  The Sydney Morning H e ra ld , 25 J u ly  1969,
2. This  seems to  have been th e  consensus  of j o u r n a l i s t s  who 
have commented on th e  q u e s t io n ,  See, "On the  N uclear  
T h re s h o ld ,"  p ,2 8 .  For d e t a i l s  of th e  A .A .E .C . 's  o b je c ­
t i o n s  to  th e  N .P .T , ,  s e e ,  A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy 
Commission, S ix te e n th  Annual R e p o r t , June 1968, p p ,84-90 , 
From a re a d in g  of th e s e  o b je c t io n s  i t  i s  hard  to  avoid  
th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  C a n b e r r a 's  s ta n d  on the  N .P .T . has 
been s t r o n g ly  in f lu e n c e d  by th e  A .A .E .C . 's  a t t i t u d e ,
3. On 27 F ebruary  1970, For th e  A u s t r a l i a n  G overnm ent's  
s ta te m e n t  on th e  o c c a s io n  of th e  s ig n in g  of the  N .P .T . ,  
see  C .N .I .A . , Vol, 41, No. 2, Feb ruary  1970, p p ,70-71,
4. i b i d , ,  p ,71 .
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of a d e p a r t u r e  from th e  t r e n d  of p re v io u s  government p o l i c y  on 
th e  i s s u e  and r e q u i r e s  some exp lan a tio n »
T here  seem to  be t h r e e  obvious e x p la n a t io n s  f o r  
A u s t r a l i a ’s d e c i s i o n  to  s ig n .  F i r s t ,  Canberra  was undoubted ly  
in f lu e n c e d  by th e  s i m i l a r  and e a r l i e r  d e c i s io n s  o f  West 
Germany, S w i tz e r l a n d ,  I t a l y ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  J a p a n .^  A u s t r a l i a  
had always i n s i s t e d  t h a t ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  to o th e r  a s s u r a n c e s ,  i t  
would r e q u i r e  ev id en ce  of w idespread  su p p o r t  f o r  th e  t r e a t y  
b e fo re  s ig n in g .  When th e s e  im p o rtan t  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s ,  
some of which had p r e v io u s ly  r a i s e d  o b je c t io n s  to  th e  N .P .T , 
s i m i l a r  to  A u s t r a l i a ’ s ,  dec id ed  to  s ig n ,  C a n b e rra ’s p o s i t i o n  
was somewhat underm ined . T hat A u s t r a l i a  c o n t in u e s  to  i n s i s t  
t h a t  th e  t r e a t y  has  a t t r a c t e d  i n s u f f i c i e n t  su p p o r t  i s  a 
r e f l e c t i o n  o f  i t s  d e s i r e  to  p re s e rv e  a r e a s o n  f o r  not 
r a t i f y i n g .
Second, i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  to  suppose t h a t  A u s t r a l i a ’ s 
d e c i s i o n  was a l s o  m o t iv a te d  by a r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  i t s  dependence 
on f o r e i g n  n u c le a r  te c h n o lo g y ,  a t  l e a s t  in  th e  s h o r t  ru n .  I t  
has a l r e a d y  been  no ted  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a ' s  f i r s t  n u c le a r  power 
s t a t i o n  w i l l  be f o r e i g n  b u i l t .  The s h o r t - l i s t e d  te n d e r e r s  
f o r  th e  p r o j e c t  in c lu d e  f i rm s  from Canada, B r i t a i n ,  West 
Germany and th e  U n ited  S ta t e s  -  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  which have 
s igned  th e  N .P .T . There i s ,  of c o u rs e ,  n o th in g  in  th e  t r e a t y  
which f o r b id s  a s ig n a t o r y  from a s s i s t i n g  th e  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  
e f f o r t s  of a n o n - s ig n a to ry .  However, Canberra must s u r e ly  
have r e a l i s e d  t h a t  th e  c o u n t r i e s  concerned would have been  
under c o n s id e r a b le  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  not. to  a s s i s t  A u s t r a l i a  
i f  i t  rem ained a n o n - s ig n a to ry  of th e  N .P .T . Indeed th e r e  
had a l r e a d y  been  c r i t i c i s m  in  th e  U.S. of p ro p o s a ls  to  p ro v id e  
A u s t r a l i a  w i th  p e a c e f u l  n u c le a r  e x p lo s iv e  s e r v i c e s  w h ile  i t
1. A l l  of th e s e  c o u n t r i e s  s ig n ed  th e  N .P .T . between November 
1969 and F eb ru a ry  1970. I n d o n e s ia 's  s i g n a t u r e  on 3 March, 
j u s t  fo u r  days a f t e r  A u s t r a l i a ’s ,  seems more th a n  j u s t  a 
c o in c id e n c e .
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rem ained o u t s id e  th e  NoP.T.'1'
But p ro b a b ly  th e  most im p o rtan t  r e a s o n  fo r  A u s t r a l i a ’ s 
s i g n a t u r e  had to  do w ith  th e  fundam ental s t r a t e g i c  and 
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  i m p l i c i t  in  th e  t r e a ty *  The N .P .T . ,  a f t e r  
a l l ,  prom ised to  r e i n f o r c e  a s t r u c t u r e  of world  o rd e r  in  which 
th e  U .S. (and R u s s ia )  enjoyed a p o s i t i o n  of r e l a t i v e  predom­
in a n ce  and a c a p a c i ty  to  r e g u l a t e  c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s *  In  view 
of i t s  p ro f e s s e d  s t a k e  i n  the  m ain tenance  of th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
s t a t u s  quo ( u n l ik e  s a y ,  I n d i a ,  A u s t r a l i a  has  no t ev inced  any 
r e a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  a r e - o r d e r in g  of th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
system ) and , i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t s  c lo s e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w ith  th e  
U.S,., A u s t r a l i a ,  i n  th e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  would have found i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  adop t a w holly a n t a g o n i s t i c  a t t i t u d e  to  th e  
N .P .T .
To c o n c lu d e .  Throughout most of th e  p o s t-w ar  p e r io d ,  
s u c c e s s iv e  A u s t r a l i a n  Governments have tended  to  re g a rd  
n u c le a r  weapons as  a u n iq u e ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  
W estern  s e c u r i ty *  At th e  same tim e C anberra  has not 
m anufac tu red  n u c le a r  weapons of i t s  own, b u t  has chosen 
in s t e a d  to  r e l y  on th e  n u c le a r  might of i t s  a l l i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
th e  U .S . Whether A u s t r a l i a  w i l l  c o n t in u e  to  eschew th e  
p ro d u c t io n  of n u c le a r  weapons would seem to  depend p r im a r i ly  
on th e  n a tu r e  of i t s  f u t u r e  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  W ashington.
A lre a d y ,  th e  p o l i c i e s  of th e  Nixon A d m in i s t r a t io n  have 
p r e c i p i t a t e d  some u n e a s in e s s  i n  C anberra  ab o u t th e  f u t u r e  
American p o s i t i o n  in  A sia ;  t h i s  development seems to  have 
been a f a c t o r  in  A u s t r a l i a ’ s h e s i t a t i o n  to  s ig n  th e  N„P0T* 
and ,  p ro b ab ly  a l s o ,  i n  i t s  co n t in u ed  r e l u c t a n c e  to  r a t i f y
1. See e s p e c i a l l y ,  th e  o b je c t io n s  r a i s e d  by S ena to r  J.W. 
F u l b r i g h t ,  Chairman, Senate  F o re ig n  R e la t io n s  Committee, 
i n  N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  T r e a t y , h e a r in g s  b e f o r e  th e  Sena te  
Committee on F o re ig n  R e l a t i o n s ,  P a r t  2, 90 th  Cong», 2nd 
S e s s . ,  F eb ruary  18 and 20, 1969, W ashington, 1969, 
p p .316-317 and 328-329.
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t h a t  agreem ent.  C le a r ly ,  th e  c r e a t i o n  of an  A u s t r a l i a n  
n u c le a r  f o r c e  i s  a l e s s  u n th in k a b le  p ro s p e c t  now th a n  i t  
was in  the  p a s t .  Should c o n f id e n c e ,  in  A u s t r a l i a ,  in  
th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of th e  n a t io r i ' s  a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  U„S, 
be f u r t h e r  and s u b s t a n t i a l l y  e ro d ed ,  th e  p r e s s u r e  on C anberra  
to  abandon i t s  n o n -n u c le a r  s ta n c e  would become v e ry  g r e a t  
in d e e d ,
PART III
AMERICAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 
IN ASIA
1964-1971
CHAPTER VII
NONPROLIFERATION AND SOME ASPECTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE 
NUCLEAR FORCE, 1964 - 1967
China exploded its first atomic device in October 1964»
Between then, and December 1967, Peking conducted six
additional nuclear test explosions; these included the
successful test of a nuclear armed missile, and that of
a thermo-nuclear device in the megaton range.^ China’s
entry into the nuclear club was, without doubt, a highly
significant development so far as Washington was concerned.
For one thing, Peking's achievement was regarded as a serious
challenge to America’s long-standing opposition to the spread
of nuclear weapons; it was widely believed in the U.S., that
China's possession of nuclear weapons would significantly
increase the possibility of further proliferation, especially 
2in Asia. In a major statement, just two days after Peking's
1. For a more detailed discussion of the Chinese nuclear 
programme, see above, Chapter III.
2. See, Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H» Perkins, Communist 
China and Arms Control, New York: Praeger, 1965, p»72. 
This book, which was prepared as a report to A.C.D.A., 
was based on the proceedings of a conference of top 
scholars and specialists in Chinese affairs and arms 
control which was held in Virginia in 1964 under the 
auspices of the East Asian Research Center and the Center 
for International Affairs at Harvard. Earlier, Henry 
Kissinger also, had expressed the view that China's 
acquisition of nuclear weapons might push other states
in Asia in the same direction. See, Henry A, Kissinger, 
The Necessity for Choice, Garden City, New York: Double­
day, 1962, p.262.
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th e  tim e in  th e  U.S. C o n g r e s s ^  A lso ,  i t  i s  w orth  n o t in g  in  
t h i s  c o n te x t ,  t h a t  th e  G i l p a t r i c  Committee, one fu n c t io n  of which 
was to  e v a lu a te  th e  r e l a t i v e  im portance  of American n o n p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n  p o l i c i e s ,  was convened by P r e s id e n t  Johnson on ly  weeks
2
a f t e r  C h ina’s f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t .
B u t,  of c o u rs e ,  th e  s t im u lu s  t h a t  C h ina ’s e n t ry  in t o  th e  
n u c le a r  c lub  was expec ted  to  g iv e  to  f u r t h e r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  
A sia  was no t th e  o n ly  cause  f o r  concern  about th e  m a t te r  in  
Washington« The U.S. and China w ere , a f t e r  a l l ,  th e  b i t t e r e s t  
of opponen ts .  In  th e  p a s t ,  th e  U.S. had r e g r e t t e d  d e c i s io n s  
by F rance and th e  U„K. to  a c q u i r e  n u c le a r  weapons. R egre t 
t h a t  China was about to  fo l lo w  s u i t  must have been so much 
g r e a t e r .  M oreover, P e k in g ’s i n i t i a l  ach ievem ents  in  th e  
n u c le a r  f i e l d  were r e g i s t e r e d  d u r in g  a p e r io d  of p a r t i c u l a r l y  
g rav e  concern  in  th e  West abou t C h ina ’s f u t u r e  p o l i c i e s  in  
A sia  and in  th e  world in  g e n e r a l .  In  September 1965, C h in a 's  
Defence M in i s t e r ,  L in  P ia o ,  p u b l i sh e d  h i s  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  
t r e a t i s e  on " p e o p le ’s w a r s ."  T h is  was reg a rd ed  by many 
s e n io r  o f f i c i a l s  i n  W ashington as  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  c l e a r  
i n d i c a t i o n  of P e k in g ’ s p l a n s ,  n o t  only  to  dominate th e  un d er­
developed  world ( th e  " c o u n t r y s id e " )  , bu t to  s u b v e r t  th e
3
developed n a t io n s  ( th e  " c i t i e s " )  as  w e l l .  M oreover, th e
4 ( c o n t . )  27-28, 30 and J u ly  13 and 22, 1966, W ashington, 
1966, p .243 .  See a l s o ,  h i s  s ta te m e n t  a t  E.N.D.C. i n  March 
1966, in  Verbatim Record of th e  Conference of th e  E ig h te e n -  
N ation  Committee on D isarm am ent, Geneva ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to  as E .N .D .C ./P .V . , 253, p .1 6 .
1. For a p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t r o n g  s ta te m e n t  a long  th e s e  l i n e s ,  see  
speech in  th e  U.S. S en a te  by S ena to r  R obert Kennedy.
Reproduced i n The New York Tim es, 24 June 1965.
2. For a n o te  on th e  G i l p a t r i c  Committee and some of th e  c i r ­
cum stances su r ro u n d in g  i t s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  see  above, p p .33-34.
3. That th e  U,S. A d m in is t r a t io n  a t ta c h e d  p a r t i c u l a r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
to  L in  P i a o ’s t r e a t i s e  was a p p a re n t  i n  1966 in  an a n a l y s i s  of 
th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n  by Defence S e c re ta ry  McNamara.
He s a id :  "This  s ta te m e n t  [by L in  P iao ]  should  be read  by 
every  American concerned w ith  th e  p o l i t i c a l  aims of Communist 
China. I t  i s ,  to  quo te  S e c r e t a r y  Rusk, ’as  candid  a s  H i t l e r ' s
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y e a r s  1965-67 w itn e ssed  a g ra d u a l  deepening  of th e  c r i s i s  in  
Vietnam and , in  th e  e a r ly  s ta g e s  of t h a t  c o n f l i c t  a t  l e a s t ,  
W ashington tended to  reg a rd  China as  th e  i n s p i r a t i o n ,  even 
th e  g u id ing  hand, behind North  Vietnam and th e  Vietcong.'*" A lso , 
C h in a ’s e a r l y  achievem ents  i n  th e  n u c le a r  weapons f i e l d  co­
in c id e d  w ith  th e  deepening r i f t  between Moscow and P ek ing .
What im pressed  (and d i s tu r b e d )  many U .S. o b se rv e rs  about th e  
S in o -S o v ie t  d ia lo g u e  a t  t h i s  t im e ,  was P e k in g ’s v i t r i o l i c  
d e n u n c ia t io n  of R u s s ia 's  a l l e g e d  sympathy f o r  d e t e n te  w ith  
th e  West. To many A m ericans, t h i s  seemed l i k e  f u r t h e r  ev idence  
of Chinese in t r a n s ig e n c e  and a g g re s s iv e  i n t e n t .  F i n a l l y ,  
t h e s e  were a l s o  th e  y e a rs  of th e  "G rea t C u l tu r a l  R evo lu tion"  
which commenced l a t e  in  1965 and co n t in u ed  beyond 1967. 
Throughout much of t h i s  p e r io d  th e r e  were c i v i l  d i s tu r b a n c e s  
and armed c la s h e s  in  many p a r t s  of China and s e r io u s  damage 
was done to  th e  c o u n t ry ’s i n d u s t r i a l ,  e d u c a t io n a l  and 
governm ental s t r u c t u r e s .  These i n t e r n a l  d i s r u p t i o n s  were 
accompanied by a marked d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  C hina’s r e l a t i o n s  
w i th  th e  r e s t  of th e  w orld . To many f o r e ig n  o b s e r v e r s ,  th e  
whole ep iso d e  seemed to  b e t r a y  an e lem ent of r e c k le s s n e s s  
and i r r a t i o n a l i t y  w hich, in  view of C h in a ’s n u c le a r
2
a s p i r a t i o n s ,  was reg a rd ed  as  e s p e c i a l l y  d i s t u r b i n g .
3 ( c o n t . )  Mein Kempf’ ,"  See, Mr. McNamara's s ta t e m e n t ,  in  
Department of Defence A p p ro p r ia t io n s  f o r  1967, P a r t  1 , 
h e a r in g s  b e fo re  a Subcommittee of th e  House Committee on 
A p p ro p r ia t io n s ,  90 th  Cong., 2nd S e s s . ,  W ashington, 1966 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  Department of Defence Appro­
p r i a t i o n s  fo r  1967, P a r t  1) ,  p p . 12-13.
1. For some remarks on t h i s  by Defence S e c re ta ry  McNamara, 
see  i b i d . ,  pp .13 and 19.
2. Donald Brennan has drawn a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  f l u r r y  of concern  
in  th e  U.S. e a r ly  i n  1967 over u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d  r e p o r t s  t h a t  
th e  m i l i t a r y  commander of S ink iang  P ro v in ce  in  China had 
th r e a te n e d  to  s e i z e  th e  n u c le a r  b ase  t h e r e  i f  M ao is ts  
a t tem p ted  to  ta k e  over th e  p r o v in c i a l  government. See,
D.G. Brennan, "The R isks  of Spread ing  Weapons: A H i s t o r i c a l  
C ase ,"  i n  Arms C o n tro l  and Disarmam ent, Vol. 1 , 1968, p .6 0 .
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There was ample reason, then, why Peking's effort to acquire 
a nuclear force should have been regarded in Washington as a 
more than usually significant development« Earlier in this 
thesis, there was some discussion of the progress China has 
made in the development of its nuclear armoury and of the 
possible uses to which that force might be put« In the present 
chapter, an attempt will be made to examine a number of aspects 
of the United States response to the emergence of the Chinese 
nuclear force and the significance of these developments for 
American nonproliferation policy in Asia. Chronologically, 
this chapter covers the period from, roughly, October 1964 to 
September 1967. Thereafter, America's response, declaratory and 
otherwise, to the Chinese nuclear force, tended to be domin­
ated by the decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence 
system. This decision marked the commencement of a new 
stage in America's response to the Chinese nuclear force and 
must remain the subject of analysis in another chapter.
In considering its response to the emergence of the 
Chinese nuclear force, the United States was confronted with 
two basic choices: either it could adhere to its policy of
opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, or alternatively, 
it could abandon proliferation as an objective in Asia and 
encourage, or at least tolerate, the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by some of China's neighbours. So far as can be 
discovered, no prominent member of the U.S. Administration 
was prepared to openly support a policy of "selective 
proliferation" in Asia as an answer to the challenge posed
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by C h ina’ s e n t ry  in t o  th e  n u c le a r  c lu b .  I t  seems r e a s o n a b le  
to  co n c lu d e ,  though , t h a t  t h e r e  were n e v e r th e le s s  some American 
o f f i c i a l s  who were anx ious t h a t  th e  U.S. should  weigh c a r e f u l l y  
th e  c o s t s  of a p o l i c y  aimed a t  l i m i t i n g  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A sia .  
I t  was no ted  e a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  t h a t  so f a r  as  American
1. L a t e r ,  i n  1968, when th e  f i n a l  d r a f t  of th e  N .P .T . was being  
c o n s id e re d  by C ongress ,  some elem en ts  o u ts id e  of th e  admin­
i s t r a t i o n  ex p ressed  su p p o r t  f o r  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c le a r  
w eap o n s ,in  one form or a n o th e r ,  by some of th e  c o u n t r i e s  in  
A s ia .  The s t a t e s  m entioned in  t h i s  c o n te x t  in c lu d ed  I n d i a ,  
Ja p a n ,  P a k i s t a n ,  A u s t r a l i a  and T h a i la n d .  I t  was u s u a l l y  
sugges ted  t h a t  " d e fe n s iv e "  n u c le a r  weapons (A.B.M.s) r a t h e r  
th a n  o f f e n s iv e  system s be a c q u i re d .  I n v a r i a b ly ,  i t  was 
argued t h a t  such a development would improve th e  s e c u r i t y  
p o s i t i o n  of th e  c o u n t r i e s  conce rned , enhance s t a b i l i t y  in  
th e  r e g io n ,  and r e l i e v e  America of some of i t s  de fence  
commitments. For an account of th e s e  arguments see 
s ta te m e n ts  by Dr. Robert S trausz-H upe ,  Hon. C raig  Hosmer, 
and Dr. Edward T e l l e r  i n  N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  T re a ty ,  h e a r in g s  
b e fo re  th e  Senate  Committee on F o re ig n  R e la t io n s ,  90th  
Cong., 2nd S e s s . ,  J u ly  10-12 and 17, 1968, W ashington,
1968 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  Senate  H earings  on Non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  T re a ty ,  P a r t  1 ,  1968) ,  pp .1 3 3 ,  163 and 193 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  See a l s o ,  s ta te m e n ts  by Dr. James McBride, 
Hon. C raig  Hosmer, Hon. Pau l F in d le y ,  Congressman Donald 
F ra s e r  and Dr. Edward T e l l e r ,  i n  Arms C on tro l and Disarm­
ament Act Amendments, 1968, h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  House 
Committee on F o re ig n  A f f a i r s ,  90 th  Cong., 2nd S e s s . ,  
February  1 , 5 -8 ,  19, 20, 1968, W ashington, 1968 (h e re ­
a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as House H earings  on Arms C on tro l  and 
Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968) ,  p p .3 9 ,  99, (132, 119 ) ,
77 and 274-8 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  In  J u ly  1965, A.C.D.A.
D ir e c to r  F o s te r  s t r o n g ly  c r i t i c i s e d  th e  id e a  t h a t  s e l e c t e d  
c o u n t r i e s  in  A sia  should  a c q u i r e  n u c le a r  weapons to  o f f s e t  
p o t e n t i a l  Chinese t h r e a t s .  See h i s  "New D i r e c t io n s  i n  
Arms C o n tro l  and D isarm am ent," p p . 590-591. The a t t e n t i o n  
p a id  to  th e  q u e s t io n  by Mr. F o s te r  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  
concept of " s e l e c t i v e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n "  had more th an  a 
few s u p p o r te r s  in  th e  U.S. a t  t h a t  tim e.
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relations with Europe have been concerned, efforts to limit 
proliferation have often caused problems for Washington in 
respect of other aims of United States policy» For this 
and other reasons, the policy of nonproliferation has not always 
had the wholehearted support of all members of the U.S. Govern­
ment. Later in the thesis, it will be noted that similar 
problems have arisen in respect of American policy in Asia; 
despite the administration’s commitment to a policy of 
opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, it seems clear 
that some U.S. officials have been reluctant, in view of 
other U.S. policy objectives, to see the American Government 
take certain steps which might help limit proliferation in 
the Asian and Pacific region.
It is hardly surprising, of course, that the American 
Government chose to maintain, in respect of Asia, its strong 
opposition to proliferation. After all, the arguments the 
U.S. had used against the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe 
were just as valid in Asia. These were: that the countries 
in question had no need of nuclear weapons; that they could 
not afford them (this seemed particularly valid in respect 
of Asia); that the spread of nuclear weapons to one country 
would encourage further proliferation; and, that prolifera­
tion would complicate U.S. military action, and in particular, 
would hamper the central control of war»'*'
1. Some of these arguments were considered at the conference 
(see above, p»239 ) in 1964 on Chinese affairs and arms 
control. There was a consensus amongst the conferees, 
that proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia was no 
answer to the security problems posed by China's acquis­
ition of nuclear weapons. See, Halperin and Perkins, 
op. cit., pp.72-73. For a particularly strong statement 
of the case against "selective proliferation" in Asia, 
see testimony of Professor Mason Willrich, in Senate 
Hearings on Nonproliferation Treaty, Part 1, 1968, 
pp.213-219.
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From the moment of the first Chinese test, Washington 
seemed anxious to promote the idea that the U.S. would not 
regard as militarily significant any nuclear force that Peking 
was likely to develop in the foreseeable future. To this end, 
the U.S. Government reminded China (and the other states of 
Asia and the Pacific) that the development of nuclear weapons 
by Peking would in no way reduce America’s willingness or 
capacity to support its friends and allies in Asia against 
aggression. Alliance commitments were quickly reaffirmed 
and a unilateral undertaking of support against nuclear black­
mail was extended to countries in Asia (and elsewhere) which 
remained non-nuclear,^ In addition, there was considerable 
stress in U.S. pronouncements on America’s overwhelming 
strategic superiority in respect of China. In his statement 
on the day of Peking’s first nuclear test, President Johnson 
emphasised that the military significance of the Chinese 
achievement "should not be overestimated." He continued:
Many years and great efforts separate testing 
of a first nuclear device from having a stock­
pile of reliable weapons with effective 
delivery systems.
Still more basic is the fact that if and 
when the Chinese Communists develop nuclear 
weapons systems, free-world nuclear strength 
will continue to be enormously greater.2
The theme of overwhelming U.S. strategic preponderance was 
one which recurred again and again in official and unofficial
1. The question of American alliance commitments and other 
assurances to countries in Asia, and the significance 
of these measures for U.S. nonproliferation policy in
the region, will be examined in some detail in Chapter IX.
2. Quoted in Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, New 
York: Praeger, 1965, p.87.
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American pronouncements d u r in g  1964 and 1965,^  M oreover, i t
was one which P r e s id e n t  Johnson h im s e lf  r e tu rn e d  to  i n  October
1966 fo llo w in g  C h in a 's  s u c c e s s f u l  n u c le a r  m i s s i l e  t e s t ,  As th e
P r e s id e n t  s a id  on t h a t  o c c a s io n :  "The l e a d e r s  of China must
r e a l i z e  t h a t  any n u c le a r  c a p a b i l i t y  they  can develop  can -  and
2
w i l l  -  be d e t e r r e d , "
The q u e s t io n  of A m erica 's  s t r a t e g i c  s ta n d in g  v i z - a - v i z , ,
China r e c e iv e d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e x h a u s t iv e  t r e a tm e n t ,  i n  1967, in
3
S e c re ta ry  McNamara's 1968 d efence  p o s tu r e  s ta te m e n t ,  McNamara
noted  th a t  though China had s u c c e s s f u l ly  t e s t e d  a m i s s i l e  th e
p re v io u s  O ctober ,  i t  would s t i l l  r e q u i r e  much tim e and many
more t e s t s  b e fo re  Peking could  a c h ie v e  a t r u l y  o p e r a t io n a l
4
McRcB.M, or I,R ,B.M , c a p a b i l i t y ,  China , he added , was c l e a r l y  
g iv in g  "h igh  p r i o r i t y "  to  the  development of an I ,C ,B ,M ,,  
b u t  i t  was u n l i k e l y ,  he th o u g h t ,  t h a t  Peking would pose a 
n u c le a r  t h r e a t  to  th e  c o n t in e n ta l  U,S, b e fo r e  th e  m id -1 9 7 0 's ,^  
The emphasis th roughou t McNamara's s ta t e m e n t ,  was on th e  ease
1, See, W illiam  P, Bundy, "The U nited  S t a t e s  and A sia"  in  
A l a s t a i r  Buchan ( e d , ) ,  China and th e  Peace of A s i a , London: 
C hatto  and Windus, 1965, p ,1 8 ;  H a lp e r in ,  op, c i t . ,  p p .108 -  
109; C harle s  W olf, "The L im i t a t i o n s  of N uclear  D e te r re n c e  
in  A sia" in  Buchan ( e d , ) ,  op, c i t , , p p , 196-197, See a l s o ,  
T e le v is io n  I n te rv ie w  With S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e ,  Dean Rusk,
on October 18, 1964, Reproduced i n  Documents on Disarma­
m ent, 1964, W ashington: U nited S t a t e s  Arms C o n tro l  and 
Disarmament Agency, 1965 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  D on 
I), , 1964) , p ,464,
2, See, T oas t by th e  P r e s id e n t  a t  a S t a t e  Dinner in  Kuala 
Lumpa, M a lay s ia ,  O ctober 30, 1966, Reproduced in  American 
Fo re ign  P o l ic y  : C u rre n t  Documents, 1966, (Department of 
S t a t e  P u b l i c a t i o n  8423),  W ashington, 1969, p ,724 ,
3, See, S ta tem en t of S e c re ta ry  of D efence R obert S, McNamara 
Before  th e  House Armed S e rv ic e s  Committee on th e  F i s c a l  
Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 D efense Budget, 
W ashington, U,S. Government P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1967 ( h e r e ­
a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  1968 Defence P o s tu re  S ta te m e n t) ,
4, i b i d , ,  p ,4 2 ,
5, i b i d .
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with which the U.S» could deter China,, As the Defence Secretary 
said:
We estimate, ... that a relatively small number of 
warheads detonated over 50 Chinese urban centers 
would destroy half of the urban population (more 
than 50 million people) and more than half of the 
industrial capacity. Moreover, such an attack 
would also destroy most of the key governmental, 
technical, and managerial personnel and a large 
proportion of the skilled workers» Since Red 
China’s capacity to attack the U.S. with nuclear 
weapons will be very limited, even during the 
1970’s, the ability of even a small portion of 
our strategic offensive forces to inflict such 
heavy damage upon them should serve as an effective 
deterrent to the deliberate initiation of such an 
attack on their part»-*-
Indeed, such was the margin of superiority enjoyed by the U.S. 
that, according to McNamara:
"»»„ the [UoS.J strategic missile forces proposed 
for the FY 1968-72 period would, by themselves, 
give us an Assured Destruction capability against  ^
both the Soviet Union and Red China, simultaneously»
These efforts on the part of the U.S. to downgrade the
military significance of China's emergence as a nuclear power,
were reinforced by efforts to persuade Peking that danger and
insecurity for China would accompany its development of a
nuclear force; as President Johnson observed on the day of
China’s first nuclear test, Peking's "crude nuclear device
o o » could only increase the sense of insecurity of the 
3Chinese people»" This line of argument was used repeatedly 
by U.S. Government spokesmen during the next two or three 
years. In January 1965, just three months after the first
1. ibid., p»39,
2. ibido, p»44.
3. Quoted in Halperin, op. cit», p»88.
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C hinese t e s t ,  A„C„D,A, D i r e c t o r ,  WcC. F o s t e r ,  warned t h a t  s t a t e s
which chose  to  a c q u i re  n u c le a r  weapons pu t them selves  a t  g rave
r i s k ;  such c h o ic e s ,  he em phasised , " in c r e a s e d  th e  t h r e a t  . . .  of
n u c le a r  a t t a c k  by o th e r  n a t io n s  w i th  n u c le a r  c a p a b i l i t i e s .
That same y e a r ,  A s s i s t a n t  S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e ,  W illiam  Bundy,
warned t h a t  though China m ight a c q u i r e  a " token"  n u c le a r  f o r c e
i t  would "rem ain  h ig h ly  v u ln e r a b le  000 f o r  many y e a r s  to  
2
come»" In  O ctober 1966, i n  th e  wake of C h in a 's  s u c c e s s f u l  
n u c le a r  m i s s i l e  t e s t ,  P r e s id e n t  Johnson a g a in  warned t h a t  
P e k in g ’ s p u r s u i t  of a n a t io n a l  n u c le a r  c a p a b i l i t y  " i n v i t e [ d ]
3
danger to  China i t s e l f , "
These o f f i c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  were supplemented by a r a s h  
of u n o f f i c i a l  pronouncements which a l s o  sought to  promote th e  
id e a  of in c re a s e d  r i s k  and i n s e c u r i t y  f o r  China as  a r e s u l t  
of i t s  a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons. S h o r t ly  a f t e r  P e k in g ’s 
f i r s t  a tom ic  t e s t ,  Morton H a lp e r in  u rg e d ,  t h a t :
The Chinese must be made to  r e a l i s e  e0» th a t  t h e i r  
development of a n u c le a r  c a p a b i l i t y  w i l l  in c r e a s e  
r a t h e r  th an  d e c re a se  th e  l i k e l i h o o d  of th e  U nited  
S t a t e s  u s in g  n u c le a r  weapons a g a i n s t  them,^
The q u e s t io n  of w hether th e  U .S, shou ld  t r y  to  h a l t  
C h in a 's  n u c le a r  programme by m i l i t a r y  f o r c e ,  he added , was 
one which should  be g iv en  " c a r e f u l  d e t a i l e d  c o n s id e r a t io n  a t
1, See , s ta te m e n t  by WoC. F o s te r  i n  To Amend F u r th e r  th e  Arms 
C o n tro l  and Disarmament A c t , h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  House 
Committee on F o re ig n  A f f a i r s ,  89 th  C ong,, 1 s t  S e s s , ,
J a n u a ry  26 and 27, 1965, W ashington, 1965 ( h e r e a f t e r  
r e f e r r e d  to  as  House H earings  on Arms C on tro l  and D is ­
armament A ct,  1965) ,  p ,7 2,
2, S ee , W illiam  P. Bundy, "The U nited  S t a t e s  and A sia  " in  
A l a s t a i r  Buchan ( e d , ) ,  op, c i t , , p „186
3, See, T oas t by th e  P r e s id e n t  a t  a S t a t e  D inner in  Kuala 
Lumpur, M a lay s ia ,  October 30, 1966, Reproduced in  American 
F o re ig n  P o l ic y  : C u rren t  Documents, 1966, p ,724 ,
4, H a lp e r in ,  op, c i t e , p ,119 ,
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th e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l  of government»"^ The same y e a r ,  C h ar le s  Wolf
argued  t h a t  P e k in g ’s a c q u i s i t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons could  have
th e  e f f e c t  of " low ering  th e  th r e s h o ld  of p ro v o c a t io n  a t  which
u se  of n u c le a r  weapons a g a i n s t  China would be e f f e c t i v e  and 
2
c r e d i b l e » " There were t h r e e  r e a s o n s ,  he a l l e g e d ,  f o r  t h i s :
th e  s t im u lu s  C h in a 's  n u c le a r  s t a t u s  would g iv e  to  f u r t h e r
e r o s io n  of th e  S o v ie t  n u c le a r  u m b re l la ;  th e  p r o s p e c t ,  because
of C hinese  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  of reduced  an tagon ism , b o th  in s id e
and o u t s id e  A s ia ,  a t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a second u se  of n u c le a r
weapons a g a i n s t  t a r g e t s  in  A sia ;  and " th e  i n c e n t iv e  to  pre-em pt
a g a i n s t  a sm all  and v u ln e r a b le  f o r c e  t h a t  might o th e rw is e  be
3employed w ith  damaging l o c a l  m i l i t a r y  e f f e c t s " »  In  1966,
Klaus Knorr v e n tu re d  th e  o p in io n  th a t  " i t  [was] p o s s i b l e  ». « 
t h a t  Communist China in c re a s e d  i t s  m i l i t a r y  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  to
4
th e  U nited  S t a t e s  when i t  exploded i t s  f i r s t  [n u c le a r ]  bomb". 
S i m i l a r l y ,  George Q uester  argued  t h a t  China had "become more 
l o g i c a l l y  a t a r g e t  f o r  d i s a b l i n g  or ’c o u n t e r - f o r c e ’ o p e ra t io n s  
by th e  U nited  S ta te s " » ^  (The q u e s t io n  of " a s s e r t i v e  d isa rm a­
ment" or th e  f o r c i b l e  e l im i n a t io n  of C h ina’ s n u c le a r  f a c i l i t i e s  
was s t i l l  an i s s u e  in  1968, and t h a t  y e a r ,  was th e  s u b je c t  of 
a d e t a i l e d  p ie c e  of a n a l y s i s  by two members of th e  S tan fo rd  
R esearch  I n s t i t u t e »  )
1. i b i d o , p»127•
2» C h a r le s  W olf, "The L im i t a t i o n s  of N uclear  D e te r re n c e  in  
A s i a , "  in  Buchan ( e d , ) ,  op» c i t » , p»190,
3» I b id » ,  pp»190-191o
4» Klaus K norr, On th e  Uses of N uclear  Power in  th e  N uclear 
Age, P r in c e to n ,  New J e r s e y :  P r in c e to n  U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  
1966, p»126»
5» George H, Q ueste r  in  " S in o -S o v ie t  R e la t io n s  and Arms
C o n t r o l , "  C o l le c te d  P a p e r s ,  Volume I I ,  R eport to  th e  U.S. 
Arms C o n tro l  and Disarmament Agency, E a s t  A sian  R esearch  
C en te r  and C enter  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s ,  Harvard Uni­
v e r s i t y ,  1966, pp»42-43of C hapter V I I I ,
6, See , R obert M, Lawrence and W illiam  Van C leave , " A s s e r t iv e  
Disarmament: The Unexamined O ption  in  Regard to  C h in a ,"  
(unp u b lish ed  r e s e a r c h  p a p e r ) . Copy h e ld  in  th e  S t r a t e g i c  
and Defence S tu d ie s  C e n t re ,  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i t y ,  
Canberra»
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American attempts to encourage the feeling in Peking that 
danger and insecurity for China had accompanied its acquisition 
of nuclear weapons were reinforced by Washington’s verbal 
pronouncements about the state of relations between Moscow and 
Peking® From the time the Sino-Soviet rift became public, and 
especially, after China commenced nuclear testing, official 
UoS. statements highlighted the split between Russia and China 
and, in particular, sought to promote the idea that Peking's 
acquisition of nuclear weapons had exacerbated the rift and 
had reduced the likelihood of Soviet support for China in 
any conflict with the U®S®^
1® On this point, see remarks by Secretary of Defence, 
McNamara, in Department of Defence Appropriations for 
1966, Part 3, hearings before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 90rh Cong®, 1st Sess®, 
Washington, 1965 (hereafter referred to as Department 
of Defence Appropriations for 1966, Part 3), pp®9 and 
11; Department of Defence Appropriations for 1967, Part 
19 pp.13, 16, and 38; 1968 Defence Posture Statement, 
p®8, See also, William P, Bundy, "The United States 
and Asia" in Buchan (ed®), op® cit®, pp®18-19. See 
also, Statement made by Secretary of State Rusk Before 
the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 16, 1966® 
Reproduced in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 
1966, pp®655-656®
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There i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  ev idence  to  en ab le  one to  say
c o n c lu s iv e ly  t h a t  th e  U.S. ever  s e r i o u s l y  co n s id e re d  an
unprovoked a t t a c k  upon C h in a ’s n u c le a r  f a c i l i t i e s , I f  such
an id e a  ever was c o n s id e re d ,  t h e r e  must s u r e ly  have been many
re a s o n s  f o r  i t s  r e j e c t i o n :  th e  v i r t u a l  c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  such an
a t t a c k  could  n o t  perm anently  p re v e n t  China from becoming a
n u c le a r  power; u n c e r t a in t y  about R u s s i a ' s  r e sp o n se  (UrSo
pronouncements about th e  im p l i c a t io n s  of th e  S in o -S o v ie t
s p l i t  n o tw i th s ta n d in g ) ;  th e  e f f e c t  of such a c t io n  on A m erica’s
image as an advoca te  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law and th e  p e a c e fu l
s e t t l e m e n t  of d i s p u te s ;  and th e  awkward and u n p le a sa n t
2
p re c e d e n t  which such a move would c re a te «  In d eed ,  i t  seems 
h ig h ly  u n l i k e ly  t h a t  any American A d m in is t r a t io n  would 
c o n s id e r  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons, even to  a co u n try  
so a n t a g o n i s t i c  to  th e  U«S, as  C hina, as  s u f f i c i e n t  j u s t i f i ­
c a t i o n  f o r  so r a d i c a l  a d e p a r tu r e  from American t r a d i t i o n s ,
1« The co lu m n is t  S tew art Alsop has a l l e g e d  th a t  a t  th e  tim e 
of th e  com ple tion  of th e  t e s t  ban agreem ent,  i n  June 1963, 
P r e s id e n t  Kennedy co n s id e re d  i n v i t i n g  th e  S o v ie t  Union to  
c o -o p e ra te  w ith  th e  U.S« in  an e f f o r t  to  bar  C h in a 's  
development of n u c le a r  weapons« See S tew art A lsop ,
" A f f a i r s  of S t a t e :  The R eal Meaning of th e  T e s t  Ban",
in  S a tu rday  Evening P o s t , 28 September 1963, p«20.
Another so u rce  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  P r e s id e n t  Jo h n so n ,p ro b ab ly  
towards th e  end of 1964, p re s id e d  over t o p - s e c r e t  m ee tings  
t h a t  "war-gamed" th e  p ro b a b le  r e s u l t s  of a p re -em p tiv e  
s t r i k e  a g a i n s t  C h in a 's  n u c le a r  i n s t a l l a t i o n s «  " I n v a r i a b l y , "  
th e  r e p o r t  c o n t in u e d ,  "p reem ptive  a t t a c k  was d e c i s i v e l y  
r e j e c t e d , "  See, Rowland Evans and R obert Novak, Lyndon 
Bo Johnson: The E x e rc is e  of Power, London: A llen  and 
Unwin, 1967, p ,538 ,
2, Some of th e s e  o b je c t io n s  were c o n s id e re d  in  th e  r e p o r t  by 
Lawrence and Van C leave ,  See , op« c . i t , ,  p p ,1 3 -2 3 .  See 
a l s o ,  H a lp e r in ,  op» c i t , , pp«125-127« For a n o th e r  exam­
i n a t i o n  of th e  d is a d v a n ta g e s  of such a c t i o n ,  see  Morton A. 
K aplan, "Weaknesses of th e  N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  T rea ty "  in  
O r b is , V o l, 12, No, 4 ,  W inter 1969, pp«1043-1045«
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as an attack upon another state simply to stem the growth of
its power. Whether or not the U.S. did actually consider an
unprovoked attack upon China's nuclear facilities, its
pronouncements in this period certainly conveyed the impression
that Peking's pursuit of a nuclear force had reduced the
constraints on American recourse to nuclear weapons in the
event of any conflict between China and the United States.
It is not a purpose of this thesis to closely examine China's
reactions to U.S. policy. Nevertheless, it is reasonable
to assume that Peking was indeed impressed by the threats
implicit in these American pronouncements. That China clearly
acknowledged its high vulnerability to U.S. nuclear attack
was emphasised, in 1967, by one of America's leading experts
on Chinese military affairs."*" Furthermore, there would seem
to be some force in Halperin's argument, that China's
insistence that it will never be the first to use nuclear
weapons must be seen as part of its campaign to minimize
2the chances of an American pre-emptive attack.
The analysis so far in this chapter suggests that the 
American response to China's emerging nuclear capability 
was primarily one of attempting to downgrade the military 
significance of that force. Not only did Washington try 
to promote the idea that China's nuclear capability was a 
relatively insignificant one, and would in no way alter 
America's resolve to meet its security commitments in Asia,
1. See, testimony of Alice Langley Hsieh in Scope, Magnitude, 
and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile 
Program, hearings before the Subcommittee on Military 
Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., November 6 and 7, 1967, Washington, 
1968 (hereafter referred to as J.C.A.E. Hearings on Scope, 
Magnitude and Implications of United States Antiballistic 
Program, 1967), pp.78-81.
2, Halperin, op. cit., p.95. On this point, see also,
A. Doak Barnett, "A Nuclear China And U.S. Arms Policy", 
in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 3, April 1970, p.429.
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but in addition, an attempt was made to persuade Peking that 
the acquisition of a nuclear force attracted dangers to China. 
It will be argued that these efforts on the part of the United 
States to downgrade the military significance of the Chinese 
nuclear force were thoroughly consistent with the goal of 
nonproliferation in Asia. But before doing so, it will be 
useful to consider the American response to Peking's emerging 
nuclear capability from a somewhat different angle.
In hearings before the J.C.A.E. in 1966, Secretary of 
Defence McNamara discussed what he believed were the 
essential features of an effective nonproliferation policy. 
Such a policy, he said:
... must [among other things] not permit the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons or a nuclear 
test to increase the prestige, political 
influence and power of a nation above and 
beyond the influence it is due because of 
its political and economic position.
There is ample evidence to suggest that in the years immed­
iately following China's first test explosion, U.S. officials 
were indeed anxious to minimize the political, as well as the 
military, advantages which China might have hoped to gain 
from its achievements in the nuclear field.
In the first place, Peking's initial steps along the 
nuclear roted were accompanied by official U.S. statements 
which sought to detract from the magnitude of the Chinese 
accomplishment. A.C.D.A. Director W.C. Foster scoffed that 
the success of China's nuclear programme was "in large 
measure due to the very substantial assistance provided by
1, Quoted in JoC.A.E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1966, p.76. The same point had been made earlier 
in unofficial American sources. See, Halperin, op. cit., 
p.107 and Halperin and Perkins, op. cit., pp,69 and 71.
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the Soviet Union during the 1950's".^ This depreciation of the
Chinese achievement was usually accompanied by words of praise
for Indian and Japanese efforts in the nuclear field» India
in particular, it was stressed, was much more advanced than
China in peaceful nuclear technology, but had very wisely
2refrained from developing nuclear weapons» These tactics 
were clearly designed to rob China of some of the kudos it 
might otherwise have hoped to gain from its nuclear achieve­
ments and to help compensate for the inevitable loss of 
prestige in non-nuclear countries in Asia such as India and 
Japan, Second, U.S» spokesmen sought to emphasise that the 
development of nuclear weapons was a costly and cruel 
experience for the Chinese people. As President Jqhnson said 
on the day of Peking's first test:
The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program 
is a tragedy for the Chinese people Scarce 
economic resources that could have been used 
to improve the well-being of the Chinese people  ^
have been used to produce a crude nuclear device,,»
In March 1966, Secretary of Defence McNamara remarked that
1, Quoted in his "New Directions in Arms Control and Dis­
armament", p,588. For additional remarks along these 
lines by W.C. Foster, see his address before the 
Commonwealth Club at San Francisco, June 4, 1965. 
Reproduced in D on D ., 1965, p»238. See also, remarks
during press conference by Assistant Secretary of State 
William P. Bundy, Reproduced in D.O,S,B,, 2 November
1964, p,616,
2» See, remarks during press conference by Secretary of 
State, Dean Rusk, Reproduced in D on D,, 1964, p»441. 
See also, remarks by A.C.D»A. Director W.C, Foster in 
his address before the Commonwealth Club. Reproduced 
in D on D », 1965, p.238,
3» Quoted in Halperin, op. cit,, p«88. See also, remarks 
by President Johnson in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 
30, 1966» Reproduced in American Foreign Policy : 
Current Documents, 1966, pp.723-724.
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China was d eve lop ing  n u c le a r  weapons " a t  a time when m i l l i o n s  of 
h e r  p eo p le  [were] s ta rv in g " «  He added:
In  o rd e r  to  develop  th e s e  in s t ru m e n ts  of w ar, 
she [China] i s  skimming o f f  th e  top  of her  
income, removing t h i s  from th e  peop le  who need 
i t  to  l i v e  . »o she i s  doing i t  no t on ly  i n  term s 
of f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  b u t  i n  term s of human 
r e s o u rc e s  because  i t  i s  th e  same peop le  who a r e  
deve lop ing  th o s e  weapons th a t  could  be d ev e lo p ­
ing th e  fo u n d a t io n  f o r  an expanding food 
p ro d u c t io n  in  t h a t  n a t io n « ^
In  a d d i t i o n  to  d e t r a c t i n g  somewhat from P e k in g ’s ach ievem en t,  
t h i s  l i n e  of r e a s o n in g ,  to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  emphasised th e  
c o s t s  and s a c r i f i c e s  inv o lv ed  in  th e  Chinese n u c le a r  
programme, seemed to  be a l s o  aimed a t  d e t e r r i n g  o th e r  
s t a t e s  in  A sia  from d ev e lo p in g  n u c le a r  weapons«
Yet an o th e r  v a r i a t i o n  of W ash ing ton’s re sp o n se  to  th e  
emerging Chinese n u c le a r  f o r c e  was e v id e n t  i n  th e  pronounce­
ment by P r e s id e n t  Johnson on th e  day China conducted i t s  
f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t«  In  t h a t  s ta t e m e n t ,  th e  P r e s id e n t  d e c la re d  
t h a t  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  jo in e d  w ith  " a l l  humanity in  r e g r e t t i n g
th e  co n tam in a t io n  of th e  a tm osphere caused by th e  Chinese 
2
Communist t e s t " «  Three days l a t e r ,  A.C.D.A. D i r e c to r  W.C. 
F o s te r  in f e r r e d  t h a t  C h in a ’s t e s t  had i s o l a t e d  t h a t  co u n try
3
"from an overwhelming m a jo r i t y  of th e  n a t io n s  of th e  w o rld " .
In  May of th e  fo l lo w in g  y e a r ,  F o s te r  condemned China f o r  i t s
" t o t a l  d i s r e g a r d  of th e  t e s t - b a n  t r e a t y  to  which more th a n
4
100 c o u n t r i e s  [had] ad h e re d " .  A s ta te m e n t  is s u e d  by the
1. See, te s t im o n y  by McNamara in  J.C.AoEo H earings  on Non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of N uc lea r  Weapons, 1966, p .8 6 .
2» Quoted in  H a lp e r in ,  op. c i t . ,  p 088.
3. See, ad d re s s  by W.C. F o s te r  i n  D e t r o i t  on October 19, 1964. 
Reproduced in  D on D«, 1964, p .4 7 4 .  On t h i s  p o i n t ,  see  
a l s o ,  remarks d u r in g  p r e s s  co n fe ren c e  by A s s i s t a n t  S ec re ­
t a r y  of S t a t e  W illiam  Bundy. Reproduced in  DoO.S.B. ,
2 November 1964, p p . 616-617.
4. See, S ta tem en t by A.C.D.A. D i r e c to r  F o s te r  to  th e  Disarm­
ament Commission, May 17, 1965. Reproduced in  D on D. ,  
1965, p„174.
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Departm ent of S t a t e  a f t e r  C hina’ s t h i r d  n u c le a r  t e s t  i n  May 
1966, s a id :
The U nited  S ta t e s  Government con t inued  to  d e p lo re  
th e  d i s r e g a r d  of th e  Chinese Communist l e a d e r s  
f o r  th e  d e s i r e s  and w e l l -b e in g  of p eo p le  th rough­
ou t th e  world who may s u f f e r  from th e  i l l - e f f e c t s  
of a tm ospheric  n u c le a r  t e s t i n g ,  which most of the  
world has banned by adherence  to  th e  l im i t e d  t e s t  
ban t r e a t y , 1
The o b je c t  of th e s e  t a c t i c s  was c l e a r .  By th e  tim e China
commenced i t s  n u c le a r  t e s t  program, an overwhelming m a jo r i t y
of th e  w o r ld ’s n a t io n s  had r e g i s t e r e d  t h e i r  d is a p p ro v a l  of
a tm ospheric  n u c le a r  t e s t i n g  th rough  t h e i r  su p p o r t  of th e
2
n u c le a r  t e s t - b a n  t r e a t y ,  W ash ing ton’s aim was to  draw 
a t t e n t i o n  to  C h in a 's  contempt f o r  w o rld ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  A sian , 
o p in io n  and th u s  rob Peking of some of th e  p o l i t i c a l  advan­
ta g e s  i t  m ight have o th e rw is e  hoped to  have ga ined  from i t s  
n u c le a r  ach ievem ents .
I t  i s  no t c l e a r  t h a t  W ash ing ton 's  e f f o r t s  in  t h i s  r eg a rd  
were v e ry  f r u i t f u l .  In  much of th e  non-European w orld ,  
d i s g u s t  w ith  C h in a 's  c o n ta m in a t io n  of th e  a tm osphere may 
have been over-shadowed by a sen se  of s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  
th e  European n u c le a r  monopoly had a t  l a s t  been b roken . As 
A l i  Mazrui has p o in te d  o u t :
,o .  t h a t  e x p lo s io n  from China in  1964 had a 
proud h o p e fu ln e ss  f o r  many in  A sia and A f r ic a  -  
th e  s o r t  of h o p e fu ln e s s  and th e  s o r t  of p r id e  
no t v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from th o se  which accompanied 
J a p a n ’s v i c t o r y  over R u ss ia  more th a n  h a l f  a 
cen tu ry  e a r l i e r , ^
1, See, Department of S t a t e  announcement on  May 9 , 1966, 
Reproduced in  Documents .o n  -Disarmament, 196.6, U nited  S ta t e s  
Arms C o n tro l  and Disarmament Agency, W ashington, 1967 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  D on D, , 1966), p ,279 ,
2, The UoSc,  B r i t a i n ,  R u ss ia  and 104 o th e r  s t a t e s  had s igned  
th e  t e s t - b a n  t r e a t y .  The s i g n a t o r i e s  in c lu d ed  a l l  th e  
non-communist s t a t e s  of A sia  excep t Cambodia,
3, A li  M azrui, "Num erical S t r e n g th  and N uclear  S ta tu s  in  th e  
P o l i t i c s  of th e  T h ird  W orld ,"  i n  The J o u rn a l  of P o l i t i c s , 
Vol, 29, No, 4, November 1967, p ,8 2 0 ,
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M oreover, as  Ralph Powell has shown, C h in a 's  n u c le a r  su ccess  
r e s u l t e d  in  c o n s id e r a b le  s u p p o r t ,  no t on ly  in  A sia  and A f r i c a ,  
b u t  i n  Europe as w e l l ,  f o r  P e k in g 's  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  disarm ament 
d i s c u s s io n s  and i t s  adm iss ion  to  th e  U nited  N ations»^-
I t  would seem re a s o n a b le  in  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  of A m erica 's  
re sp o n se  to  th e  C hinese n u c le a r  f o r c e  to  ta k e  in t o  account 
W ash ing ton 's  a t t i t u d e ,  i n  th e  p e r io d  p r e s e n t l y  under rev ie w , 
tow ards P e k in g 's  membership of th e  U nited  N a t io n s » Less th a n  
one month a f t e r  C h in a 's  f i r s t  t e s t  e x p lo s io n ,  th e  U.S» Govern­
ment r e a f f i rm e d  i t s  o p p o s i t i o n  to  P e k in g 's  membership of th e  
2
world  body» The fo l lo w in g  y e a r ,  U»S. spokesmen i n  th e
G enera l Assembly e l a b o r a te d  a t  some le n g th  on W ash ing ton 's
re a so n s  fo r  i t s  s tan d  on th e  m a tte r»  To a l low  th e  Chinese
in ,  i t  was c la im e d , "would be seen  by P e ip in g  as a reward
3
f o r  i t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m isbehav iour"»  W ashington c l e a r l y  
im plied  t h a t  i t  reg a rd ed  C h in a 's  t a s t i n g  and development of 
n u c le a r  weapons as  an example of t h i s  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m is­
b e h a v io u r" ;  t h e r e  were r e p e a te d  r e f e r e n c e s  i n  th e  U»S» 
s ta t e m e n t s ,  b o th  to  C h in a 's  o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  t e s t - b a n  t r e a t y  
and th e  proposed n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y ,  and to  P e k in g 's
view th a t  th e  development of n u c le a r  weapons by s o c i a l i s t
4
s t a t e s  was something to  be d es ired »  Such a t t i t u d e s ,  U.S» 
spokesmen a l l e g e d ,  were c o n t r a r y  to  th e  v iew s of an o v e r -
1» See, Ralph L. P o w e ll ,  " C h in a 's  Bomb: E x p l o i t a t i o n  and 
R e a c t io n " ,  in  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , Vol» 43, No. 4 , J u ly  1965, 
pp»622-623» On t h i s  p o i n t ,  see  a l s o ,  H a lp e r in ,  o p » c i t », 
p» 94»
2» See, R e p l ie s  Made by th e  S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e  to  Q ues tions  
Asked on a CBS T e le v i s io n  Program, November 11, 1964» 
Reproduced in  American F o re ig n  P o l ic y  : C u rren t  Documents, 
1964 (Department of S t a t e  P u b l i c a t i o n  8253),  W ashington, 
1967, p »886»
3» See, s ta te m e n t  made i n  th e  U»N» G eneral Assembly by U.S» 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  A rth u r  J .  G oldberg , November 17, 1965» 
Reproduced in  D»0 »S . B. , 13 December 1965, p»944»
4» i b i d . ,  p»943»
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whelming majority of the world’s nations and ran counter to "the 
most important activities the United Nations undertakes»"'*' It 
is difficult to determine the precise significance of the nuclear 
factor in Washington’s opposition to Chinese membership of the 
U.N. Apart from the references mentioned above, U.S. state­
ments on the subject were far from explicit in suggesting that 
the development of nuclear weapons constituted grounds for 
China’s exclusion from the world body; but then clearly, it 
would have been extremely difficult for a power like the U»S. 
to have argued openly that such action did constitute grounds 
for exclusion» But regardless of the many and varied reasons 
for Washington’s attitude to Chinese membership of the U.N», 
the policy itself seems to have been consistent with the goal 
of nonproliferation in Asia (and elsewhere). Notwithstanding 
the support which existed in some capitals for Peking’s 
membership of the world body, to have admitted China at 
this time would have seemed like rewarding that country for 
its nuclear achievements and may have reinforced the suspicions
of states elsewhere that the means to great-power status lay
2in the acquisition of nuclear weapons»
It has been argued in this chapter, that in their 
comments during 1964-67 on China’s emerging nuclear force,
U.S» officials sought to minimize the military and political 
significance of that capability» Clearly, this declaratory 
policy was thoroughly consistent with the goal of nonprolif­
eration in Asia» Though there was virtually no reason to
1» ibid»
2, The whole question of Chinese membership of the U»N, at 
this time was, in many respects, a hypothetical one»
During 1964 and 1965 especially, Peking exhibited marked 
hostility to the world body and it is unlikely that it 
would have accepted any invitation to join»
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believe that China could be diverted in this way from its attempt 
to build nuclear weapons, it was nevertheless reasonable to hope 
that such a policy could perhaps reduce Peking's expectations 
about what it could hope to gain from the possession of a nuclear 
forceo This in turn, it might have been reasonably argued, 
could reduce the value Peking placed on such a capability and 
lessen the urgency to develop one« But the policy of promoting 
the idea that the Chinese nuclear force was a relatively 
insignificant one was just as important from the point of view 
of its impact on potential nuclear powers in Asia such as 
India, Japan and Australia. Were such a policy to be 
effective, it could be expected to reduce pressures for 
proliferation in these countries in two ways: by affecting
(downwards) perceptions about the threat posed by the Chinese 
force itself; and by reducing expectations about what they, 
like China, could hope to gain from the possession of inde­
pendent nuclear capabilities.
With the announcement, in September 1967, of the 
decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence system, U.S. 
pronouncements about the Chinese nuclear force assumed a 
somewhat different character from those examined in the present 
chapter. The new approach was of major significance from 
the point of view of American nonproliferation policy and 
will be examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND 
AMERICAN NONPROLIFERATION 
POLICY IN ASIA, 1967-1971
In September 1967, the American Secretary of Defence, 
Robert McNamara, announced that the United States intended 
to deploy a "light" antiballistic missile (A.B.M.) system 
called Sentinel. The programme announced by Mr. McNamara 
was designed to provide what was called "area" defence of 
the whole of the U.S. against the sort of missile attack 
that China was expected to be able to launch during the 
second half of the 1970's. Less than two years later, in 
March 1969, the new Nixon Administration announced details 
of a revised A.B.M. system called Safeguard. The new 
programme was designed primarily to protect America’s land 
based retaliatory forces against Soviet attack. However, 
it was also intended that Safeguard should eventually be 
able to protect U.S. cities from China, Both the Johnson 
and the Nixon Administrations argued that the deployment of 
an A.B.M. system in the United States would, among other 
things, help to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia; 
the knowledge that American cities would not be vulnerable 
to Chinese attack would, it was alleged, enhance the 
credibility of U.S. guarantees and assurances in Asia and 
hence discourage the development there of independent 
nuclear forces.
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to assess the 
Sentinel and Safeguard programmes from the point of view of 
American nonproliferation policy in Asia. It will be argued
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that America's movement into the A.B»M, field was not primarily 
motivated by concern about China or the problem of nuclear 
spread in Asia. Indeed, the whole exercise detracted from 
efforts to limit proliferation and seemed to indicate that 
the goal of nonproliferation in Asia, far from what was 
suggested in the previous chapter, enjoyed only a low priority 
relative to other U.S. policy objectives»
A. The Sentinel and Safeguard Programmes
Research and development on a weapon capable of inter­
cepting incoming I»C.B.MoS commenced in the U„S, in the mid- 
1950s, By 1966, a series of technological breakthroughs 
had opened up the possibility of an effective weapon and the 
Joint Chiefs, supported by a number of congressmen, were of 
the opinion that the time was right to d e p l o y L a t e r  that
year it was revealed that an A»B»M. system had been built 
2around Moscow, This disclosure, along with evidence of 
a continued build-up in Russia's I»C»B„M, force, greatly
1. See, Ralph E. Lapp, "A Biography of the ABM", in The New 
York Times Magazine, 4 May 1969, p»123. For a more 
lengthy account of these developments, see Ralph E» Lapp, 
Arms Beyond Doubt, New York: Cowles Book Co», 1970, 
pp,37-48. See also, the prepared statement of Dr. John 
S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defence Research and Engin­
eering, U.S. Department of Defence, in Scope, Magnitude, 
and Implications of the United States Antiballistic 
Missile Program, hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess,, November 6 and 7, 1967 
(hereafter referred to as J.C,A»E. Hearings on Scope, 
Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Anti­
ballistic Missile Program, 1967), pp»44-47.
2» Lapp, op, cit., pp,45-46.
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increased the pressure on the U.S. Administration to deploy an
A.B.M. system, But this it was reluctant to do. Members
of the government, especially Secretary of Defence McNamara,
were of the opinion that any response to the Soviet initiative
should be limited to moves aimed at maintaining America's
2assured destruction capability. A.CeDoA. Director Foster
was also of the opinion that continued reliance on deterrence
("associated with a cutback and a freeze") was the most appro-
3priate response to the Soviet challenge. There seemed to 
be a clear desire, if possible, to avoid a new round in the 
strategic arms race«^ Consequently Washington's initial 
reaction was to accelerate efforts to ensure the penetration 
capability of American I„C0BcM,s and to call for a halt in 
the deployment of the Soviet AoB.M. and the development of 
its American counterpart. But by mid-1967 opposition to the 
government's stand had increased. Congressmen and military 
spokesmen critical of the administration's reluctance to 
deploy an A.B,M, system had now been joined by Republican 
Party organizers anxious to make the missile controversy an 
issue in the following year's Presidential election,^
1, ibid,, p.46, See also, Benson D. Adams, "McNamara's A„B,M, 
Policy, 1961-67" in Orbis, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 1968,
p,220,
2, See, Statement of Secretary of Defence Robert So McNamara 
Before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal 
Year 1968-72 Defence Program and 1968 Defence Budget, 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967 (here­
after referred to as 1968 Defence Posture Statement), pp,
46 and 55,
3, See Foster's testimony in, United States Armament and Dis­
armament Problems, hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
90th Cong,, 1st Sess., February 3, 6, 7, 28 and March 1-3, 
1967, Washington, 1967 (hereafter referred to as Senate 
Hearings on U,S, Armament and Disarmament Problems, 1967) , 
p, 27 o
4, McNamara made it clear, that in his view, the Soviet Union 
would react to a U„S. antiballistic missile deployment by 
increasing its own offensive nuclear forces. See, 1968 
Defence Posture Statement, p,46,
5, Lapp, op, eit,, p,48,
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At long last, the administration bowed to this pressure and on
18 September 1967, Mr, McNamara announced America’s decision
to deploy a "light” A»B,M. system called Sentinel,'*'
The programme announced by Mr. NcManara called for the
immediate establishment throughout the U„S. of from 15-20
Spartan missile batteries. These batteries were to provide
what was called an "area" defence of the whole of the UeS,
Provision was also made for the eventual installation of
Sprint missiles to protect both the Sentinel system’s radars
and some of America’s Minuteman I.C.B.M.s, The whole system
was scheduled to cosc 5 billion dollars and was expected to
2be fully operational by 1972-3, The main reason advanced by 
Washington for the deployment of Sentinel was the alleged 
need to counter China’s potential missile threat, In addi­
tion to this, it was claimed that Sentinel would help 
protect both America’s Minuteman force from Soviet attack, 
and the nation’s cities from an accidental missile launching 
by any one of the nuclear powers. In emphasising that 
Sentinel was primarily China-oriented, the Administration 
reminded the American people that China was expected to have 
a "modest" I,,CoB.M. force by the mid-1970s. Such a force, 
it was alleged, would be capable of inflicting great damage 
on the American continent; but, by deploying Sentinel, the 
UoS, would have a good chance of reducing to zero the number
1, The text of Mr, McNamara's announcement (hereafter referred 
to as McNamara’s A.B.M, Statement) is reproduced in 
JoCrArEo Hearings on Scope, Magnitude, and Implications
of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program, 1967, 
pp.105-113.
2, See, statemenc on Sentinel A.B.M, system issued by the 
Department of the Army, November 15, 1967. Reproduced 
in ibid., pp,135-136, For an exhaustive description of 
the proposed Sentinel system, see testimony by Dr, John 
S, Foster, Jr,, in ibid., pp.8-44.
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of casualties it could expect from any attack by China during 
the 1970s «1 *56
The anti-China rationale came as a surprise to many
observers, and, according to one writer on the subject, was
2received with "down-right disbelief on Capitol Hill", There
had, of course, been some discussion in unofficial circles
about the usefulness of ballistic missile defence against 
3China, and McNamara himself had often considered such an
4option» (He had just as often rejected such a move as 
unnecessary,^) However, discussion in the U,S= about AJoM, 
deployment had more often been linked to calculations about 
the Soviet threat to America’s cities and retaliatory forces;
I» See, McNamara's A„B,M, Statement, in ibid,, pp.111-112,,
2» Lapp, op» cito, p,50,
3» See, Morton H, Halperin, China and the Bomb, New York: 
Praeger, 1965, p.154; Richard B, Foster, "The Impact of 
Ballistic Missile Defence on Arms Control Prospects" in 
James E. Dougherty and J„F„ Lehman, Jr« (eds«), Arms 
Control for the Late Sixties, New York: Van Nostrand, 1967, 
p«83; and, Edward Teller, "BMD in a Strategy for Peace," 
in ibid,, p«109»
4» See, testimony by Mr» McNamara, in Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, hearings before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 89th Cong», 2nd Sess«, February 23, and 
March 1 and 7, 1966, Washington, 1966 (hereafter referred 
to as J»C„A»E. Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1966), p»99« See also, his statement in Depart­
ment of Defence Appropriations for 1967, Part 1, hearings 
before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appro­
priations, 89th Cong,, 2nd Sess,, Washington, 1966 (here­
after referred to as House Hearings on Department of Defence 
Appropriations for 1967, Part 1) , pp,50-52, See also,
1968 Defence Posture Statement, p«540
5, Early in 1968, McNamara said:
It is not clear that we need an ABM defence against 
China, In any event, the lead time for deployment 
of a significant Chinese offensive force is longer 
than that required for U,S, ABM deployment; there­
fore, the decision for the latter need not be made 
now. Source: ibid.
6, For example, see W.W, Rostow, "The Great Transition : Tasks 
of the First and Second Postwar Generations", the Sir
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there can be little doubt that the Sentinel decision was
motivated by concern about the UoS.S»R, rather than about China»^
But why, then, did McNamara justify the decision in terms of
the alleged threat from China? It would be going beyond the
scope of the present thesis to examine this question in detail»
However, it is the view of most observers, that McNamara’s
espousal of the China rationale was simply an attempt to curb
domestic pressure for a "thick" anti-Soviet system and to
"give the Soviets an excuse against reaction if they would 
2take it»" But the fact remains that the decision to deploy
6 (conto) Montague Burton Lecture given at the University of 
Leeds in England on February 23, 1963» Reproduced in 
Department of State Bulletin, Washington: United States 
Department of State (hereaf ter referred to as D .0» S »B»),
27 March 1967, p»501» (Rostow was, at the time, Special 
Assistant to the President») Amongst the strongest 
supporters of an A„B0M„ system were the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, In a statement in March 1967 urging immediate 
deployment, General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
referred almost exclusively to the Soviet threat» China 
was not even mentioned» See, Statement of Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, on A»B„M» System, in Department of Defence 
Appropriations for 1968, Part 2, hearings before a Sub­
committee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 90th 
Cong», 1st Sesso, March 1967, Washington, 1967 (hereafter 
referred to as House Hearings on Department of Defence 
Appropriations for 1968, Part 2), pp»176-179»
1» The decision to deploy against China, was announced at the 
end of a long speech which was devoted primarily to 
Soviet-U»S, strategic relations, and in which McNamara 
argued persuasively against the deployment of any A»BoM, 
system at all» See McNamara’s A,B,M» Statement,
Reproduced in JoC.AoEo Hearings on Scope, Magnitude, and 
Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile 
Program, 1967, pp,105-113»
2» See, H»Lo Trewhitt, McNamara, New York: Harper and Row,
1971, p»131» See also, Lapp, op» cit», pp,49-50 and 
Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention, New York:
David McKay, 1969, pp,83-84» (Townsend Hoopes occupied 
the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs at the time of the Sentinel 
announcement»)
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Sentinel was publicly linked to the alleged Chinese threat, 
and it is this factor, among other things, which makes the 
move so important from the point of view of U.S. nonprolifer­
ation policy in Asia,
In January 1969, the Republicans under President Nixon
assumed office, and for a while, the new government seemed
prepared to continue work on the Sentinel programme. But by
now the latter had run into trouble. There had been
considerable opposition to the scheme from people living in
cities close to where Sentinel sites were to be installed,^
In addition, criticism of the programme on strategic and
political grounds had increased. All this stimulated debate
on the AoBoM, and produced demands in Congress for the
postponement of construction pending a full review of cost,
2safety and diplomatic factors. On 6 February 1969, the 
new Secretary of Defence, Mr, Laird, suspended work on the 
Sentinel sites. About a month later, on 14 March, Mr,
Nixon announced details of a revised A,BoM, programme. The 
new scheme was to be called Safeguard and would utilize 
components scheduled for the discarded Sentinel system. 
Deployment of the new system was to proceed according to a 
phased programme. During the first phase, Safeguard sites 
were to be installed to protect Minuteman fields in Montana 
and North Dakota, Depending upon the results of annual 
assessments of the Soviet and Chinese threats, additional 
Safeguard sites were to be established throughout the country 
to provide protection for other missile and bomber bases and 
for the national command centre in Washington, The full 
Safeguard system (12 batteries) would provide area defence 
of the whole of the U,S, against the sort of attack China
1, Lapp, op, cit,, p.53,
2, Lapp, loc, cit,, pp,125-6,
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was expected to be able to launch during the 19?0s>‘*‘ The
complete system was scheduled to be operational by 1976-7 and
2was expected to cost 6-7 billion dollars» Senate approval 
of President Nixon’s Safeguard programme was granted in August
31969 but by the slim majority of 51 to 49 and only after a
prolonged and acrimonious debate9 not just about the Safeguard
system, but about national security and strategic deterrence 
4generally»
Unlike its predecessor, the Nixon Administration made 
no effort to conceal the anti-Soviet aspects of its A uBoM» 
plan» Government spokesmen openly admitted that their major 
concern was Russia’s growing missile strength» This, it was 
alleged, had increased dramatically since the decision, 18 
months earlier, to deploy Sentinel»^ Indeed, Secretary of 
Defence Laird argued that the Soviets appeared bent on 
acquiring a first-strike capability vis-a-vis, the United 
States» Fear of an increasing Soviet threat to America’s 
retaliatory forces clearly dictated the structure of the 
Safeguard plan; thus, in its initial phases, the scheme
1» See, text of President Nixon’s statement, in D,0-S»B »,
14 April 1969, p»315,
2» See, testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defence, Mr» D» 
Packard, in Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications 
of A»B»Mo Systems, Part 1, hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Organisation and Disarmament Affairs of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong»,
1st Sess», March 6, 11, 13, 21, 26 and 28, 1969 (here­
after referred to as Senate Hearings on Strategic and 
Foreign Policy Implications of AoB»M» Systems, Part 1, 
1969), pp»294-295»
3» Lapp, op» cit», pp»57-58o
4» For a detailed account of this debate, see ibid», pp»57-89»
5» See, statements by President Nixon» Reproduced in 
Do SoOoBo, 31 March 1969, p»274 and ibid», 5 May 1969, 
p»379 o
6» See his testimony in Senate Hearings on Strategic and 
Foreign Policy Implications of A„BGM» Systems, Part 1,
1969, pp»203-4.
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provided for protection of America’s Minuteman missile sites 
and strategic bomber bases,
But though Safeguard was to be deployed primarily 
because of the alleged Soviet threat, the Nixon Administration 
also intended that the system should protect American cities 
from China»^ It seems, indeed, that the new government’s 
assessment of the Chinese "threat” differed little from that
of its predecessor, China, it was alleged, would have a
2"significant" nuclear capability by 1973 or 1974, According
to President Nixon, this development would render American
diplomacy in the Pacific "not credible", unless of course,
the U»S. could defend its cities against a Chinese attack,,
And that, he added, was precisely what Safeguard was expected 
3to do. That Safeguard would provide close to a damage
denial capability against China was reaffirmed by the Deputy
4Secretary of Defence, Mr» Packard» Indeed, it is apparent 
that the full Safeguard system was scheduled to provide 
virtually the same level of "area defence" of the U.S» as 
had been planned for in the discarded Sentinel system»"*
Early in 1970, the administration requested funds for 
the commencement, in the 1970-71 Fiscal Year, of the second 
phase of the Safeguard programme. This was to provide for
lo Mr, Nixon also noted that Safeguard would protect the
U»S» "against any irrational or accidental attack"» See, 
D»0cS»Bo, 31 March 1969, p»275»
2» See, statement by President Nixon, in D»0»SoBo, 5 May 
1969, p ,379«
3» See his statement in D »0 » S»B », 5 May 1969, p»379»
Earlier, President Nixon predicted that Safeguard would 
protect America from a Chinese attack for the next 10 
years» See, D „0 «, S»B , , 31 March 1969, p»275»
4» See his testimony in Senate Hearings on Strategic and 
Foreign Policy Implications of A»B,,M» Systems, Part 1,
1969, p » 262 o
5, See, testimony of Defence Secretary Laird, in ibid», p»181«
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th e  deployment of one a d d i t i o n a l  Safeguard  s i t e  a t  Whiteman
A ir Force  Base in  M isso u r i ;  th e  deployment of a d d i t i o n a l  S p r in t
m i s s i l e s  a t  th e  two Safeguard  s i t e s  p re v io u s ly  sch ed u le d ;  and
advanced p r e p a r a t io n  work f o r  f i v e  new Safeguard  s i t e s  In
u rg in g  acc ep tan c e  of th e  f i s c a l  y ea r  1971 programme, the
a d m in i s t r a t i o n  drew a t t e n t i o n ,  once a g a in ,  to  th e  need fo r
some co u n te r  to  th e  Soviet: t h r e a t  to  A m erica’ s la n d -b a se d  
2
s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s „ At th e  same t im e ,  th e  China r a t i o n a l e  
was s t r e s s e d  as v ig o r o u s ly ,  i f  no t more so ,  th a n  p r e v io u s ly  * 
Defence S e c re ta ry  L a ird  ag a in  r a i s e d  th e  s p e c t r e  of " th e
3p o t e n t i a l  C hinese t h r e a t  to  a p o r t i o n  of our p o p u la t io n "  
and emphasised t h a t  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s c u r r e n t  A.BcM« 
p ro p o s a ls  m a in ta in ed  th e  o p t io n  to  move towards a f u l l  12- 
s i t e  Safeguard  deployment which "would p ro v id e  s u b s t a n t i a l  
a r e a  d e fe n se  of th e  U,S« p o p u la t io n  fo r  a number of y e a rs
4
a g a in s t  Communist Chinese o r  n th  c o u n try  a t tack " , ,  P r e s id e n t  
Nixon, in  a s ta te m e n t  o u t l i n i n g  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s l a t e s t .  
AcBcMc p ro p o s a ls  d w elt  a lm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  on th e  Chinese 
f a c t o r T h e  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  encoun te red  s t ro n g  o p p o s i t io n  
in  Congress to  i t s  r e q u e s t  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  funds and the  
p lanned  expans ion  of the Safeguard  system  was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
c u r t a i l e d o  By J u ly  1971, th e  U,S, Government had commenced
lo See, te s t im o n y  of Defence S e c re ta ry  L a i rd ,  i n  Department 
of Defence A p p ro p r ia t io n s  f o r  1971, P a r t  1, h e a r in g s  
b e fo re  a Subcommittee o f  th e  House Committee on Appro­
p r i a t i o n s ,  9 1 s t  Congo, 2nd S e s s , ,  W ashington, 1970 (h e r e ­
a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  House H earings  on Department of 
Defence A p p ro p r ia t io n s  f o r  1.971, P a r t  1 ) ,  p p , 320-321 o 
2o See rem arks by Defence S e c re ta ry  L a i r d ,  in  i b i d , ,  pn319„
3 o i b i d o
4» i b i d o, p o320o
5o See, P r e s id e n t  N ixon’s News Conference of Jan u a ry  30,
1970o Reproduced in  L O X B . , 16 F ebruary  1970,  p p o l7 4 -1 7 7 0 
6o S t r a t e g i c  Survey, 1970, London: The I n s t i t u t e  fo r  S t r a t e g i c  
S tu d ie s ,  1971, p„4,  For a comment on o p p o s i t io n  in  th e  
Senate  Armed S e rv ic e s  Committee to  th e  proposed expansion  
of th e  S afeguard  system , see The A u s t r a l i a n , 20 June 1970.
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work on three Safeguard sites and had requested funds for a 
fourthe ^
Spokesmen for both the Johnson and the Nixon Adminis­
trations were insistent that the deployment of a ballistic 
missile defence system in the UoS, could be of tremendous 
assistance in helping to limit the spread of nuclear weapons
in Asia« This point was noted by McNamara in September 1967
2when he revealed plans for the deployment of Sentinel; it
was later elaborated upon in an address in Detroit by Mr« Paul
3Warnke, an Assistant Secretary of Defence« Mr« Warnke 
admitted that there had been some speculation in Asia as 
to whether, when Chinese I«CoB=M«s were targeted on American 
cities, the U0So would renegue on its commitments in Asia: 
whether, in other words, the "United States would really be4willing to risk Detroit to save a small Asian nation«"
The decision to deploy Sentinel, Mr« Warnke emphasised, 
would counter these doubts« As he put it:
In deploying this system, we seek to emphasise 
the present unique disparity in strategic nuclear 
capability and technology between the U = S = and 
China and to extend well into the future the 
credibility of our option for a nuclear response«
1, The Military Balance, 1971-1972, London: The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971, p«2»
2« See, McNamara's A,B«M« Statement« Reproduced in
JoC«A,E« Hearings on Scope, Magnitude, and Implications 
of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program, 1967,
p«112o
3« See, Remarks of Paul C« Warnke, Assistant Secretary of 
Defence, International Security Affairs, Before the 
Advocates Club, Detroit, Mich«, October 6, 1967«
Reproduced in ibid«, pp«118-124 =
4« ibid =, p,121«
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Our deployment will substantially reduce the 
Chinese Communist capability to threaten American 
cities and should leave, neither Asia in general 
nor the Chinese in particular, with any uncertain­
ty as to whether or not the United States would act 
to prevent the Chinese from gaining any political 
or military advantage from their nuclear forces, ^
The implications of this for nonproliferation in Asia were, 
according to Mr, Warnke, clear to see:
The increased credibility of the United States 
deterrent, which we expect to result from our 
deployment [of Sentinel], should make even clearer 
the lack of any need for independent national 
nuclear forces in Asia, If any country in the 
area has been tempted to develop a nuclear 
capability because of a fear that we would cease 
to deter China, our actions should have removed 
these uncertainties„^
Similar claims were made on behalf of the Nixon Adminis­
tration’s Safeguard system. In hearings before the House 
Committee on Appropriations in 1969, Defence Secretary 
Laird, said:
It [Safeguard] would provide an additional 
indication to the people of Asia that we 
intended to support them against nuclear 
blackmail from China, and thus help to con­
vince the nonnuclear countries that acquis­
ition of their own nuclear weapons is not 
required for their security,^
1. ibidn
2. ibid., p„122,
3» See his testimony in Safeguard Antiballistic Missile 
System, hearings before Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess,, 
May 22, 1969, Washington, 1969 (hereafter referred 
to as House Hearings on Safeguard Antiballistic 
Missile System, 1969), p,310 As Laird noted, the same 
words had been used the previous year by McNamara in 
support of the Sentinel programme.
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The following year, Laird told the House Appropriations 
Committee, that:
President Nixon has assured our Asian allies that 
our nuclear shield extends to them0 The credi­
bility of that shield would be greatly enhanced 
if our Asian allies knew that because of a SAFE­
GUARD defense the Chinese Communists had virtually 
no prospect of blackmailing the United States by 
threatening American cities
President Nixon emphasised that the U„S„ had to have some 
kind of defence against the sort of nuclear capability 
China was likely to have in ten years time. This way, 
he argued:
„c o nuclear blackmail could not be used against 
the United States or against those nations like 
the Philippines with which the United States is 
allied in the Pacific, not to mention Japan,2
It is not at all clear, however, that the decision 
to deploy a ballistic missile defence system in the U,S, 
was consistent with the goal of nonproliferation in Asia«, 
In the first place, it could be argued that America's 
interest in A,B,M, systems served to draw attention to 
yet another way in which nuclear weapons might be used, 
thus adding to their perceived value in the eyes of 
potential nuclear states in Asia (and elsewhere), More 
particularly, America's movement into the AoB,M, field 
seemed inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the
I, House Hearings on Department of Defence Appropriations 
for 1971, p„185, The reference in Mr, Laird's state­
ment to the "nuclear shield" refers to undertakings 
made in the context of the Nixon doctrine. The latter 
question will be examined in Chiptftr X«
2o See, President Nixon's News Conference, January 30, 
1970, Reproduced in D „0,S,B ,, 16 February 1970, 
pp,176-177,
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proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty and was consequently 
poorly calculated to persuade non-nuclear states to adopt a 
sympathetic attitude towards that agreement0 (The announce­
ment of the Sentinel decision on 18 September 1967, just 
three weeks after Russia and the U„S, had tabled their 
separate but identical drafts of a nonproliferation treaty, 
was a particularly poor piece of timing«) This was an 
especially important consideration in respect of Asia, where 
India in particular, but Japan also, had long insisted on the 
need for limitations to the build-up of super-power 
armouries ("vertical proliferation") as well as measures to 
counter the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional
lc A declaration of intention "to achieve at the earliest 
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race" 
was written into the Preamble to the Draft Treaty on 
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 24,
1967c The draft of January 18, 1968, which, with minor 
amendments, became the Treaty on the Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, contained Article VI, 
which read:
Each of the Parties to this Treaty under­
takes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures regarding cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.,
The full text of the January 18 draft is reproduced in 
International Negotiations on the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 
48, January 1969, pp,150-154,
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countries ("horizontal proflieration"),^  That the decision to 
deploy a ballistic missile defence system would make it more 
difficult for non-nuclear states to accept the proposed nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty, was a view which was quite openly
2voiced by WoW, Rostow, Special Assistant to President Johnson« 
But perhaps more important than the A,B,M, decision as 
such, was the manner of its justification« The decision to 
deploy Sentinel raised an important question about American 
strategic thinking, viz«, why the notion of deterrence, which 
had hitherto operated in the context of Soviet-U.S, strategic 
relations, was considered inappropriate in respect of China,
In answer, Secretary of Defence McNamara spelt out at some 
length the essence of the Johnson Administration's thinking 
on the matter. He said:
1, For a reference to the Indian and Japanese positions on 
this question, see above, pp,139-141, and 172-173 
respectively. The Indian Government denounced the A,B,M, 
decision as a further illustration of superpower indiff­
erence about the problem of "vertical proliferation" and 
warned that it would retard progress towards a nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty. See, statement by Mr, Husain, 
leader of India's delegation to the E,N,D,C,, before a 
meeting of that committee, on February 27, 1968« Repro­
duced in Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi: Ministry of 
External Affairs, Government of India, Vol, 15, No, 2, 
February 1968, p,35. See also, statement by Mr, Husain 
before the First Committee of the U,N, General Assembly 
on May 14, 1968, Reproduced in Foreign Affairs Record,
Vol, 15, No, 5, May 1968, p,115. Also, statement by
Mr, Husain before the Plenary Meeting of the Conference 
of Non-nuclear-weapon States, Geneva, September 12, 1968, 
Reproduced in ibid,, Vol. 15, No, 9, September 1968, p,200,
2, See his Sir Montague Burton Lecture given at the Univer­
sity of Leeds on February 23, 1967, Reproduced in
Do0oS,B., 27 March 1967, p,501.
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Why can we deter the Soviets and be confident 
of it, and not deter the Red Chinese who have a 
lesser force than the Soviets? The answer is that 
the Soviets, in effect, have an invulnerable or 
substantially invulnerable, force; whereas the 
Chinese in the mid-1970’s will have a vulnerable 
force« The reaction of a party with a small 
vulnerable force during a period of tension and 
crisis is likely to be quite different than the 
reaction [sic,] of a party with a strong invul­
nerable force [deleted]0
This is what we would fear of the Chinese, 
that in a period of tension - and we have had some 
recently, and we are likely to have more in the 
years ahead - they, seeing this huge U,S, force 
facing them and recognising that they have but a 
small highly vulnerable force subject to complete 
destruction if we were to use but a small part of 
ours, might be tempted to launch a preemptive 
strike
McNamara did not suggest that the Chinese leaders were
inherently reckless or irrational« Indeed, spokesmen
for the Johnson Administration were insistent that China’s
leaders were just as cautious as those of other nuclear 
2states, Instead, the emphasis was on what could have
1« See McNamara’s testimony in Authorization for Military 
Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 
1969 and Reserve Strength, hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services,90th Cong,, 2nd Sess«, 
February-March, 1968, Washington, 1968 (hereafter 
referred to as Senate Hearings on Authorization for 
Military Procurement, Research and Development, FY 1969), 
p,143, For further reasoning along these lines, see 
Interview with Secretary of Defence McNamara, Life 
Magazine, September 29, 1967, Reproduced in JrC.A.E, 
Hearings on Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the 
United States Antiballistic Missile Program, 1967, 
p,113. See also, Remarks of Paul C, Warn'ke, Assistant 
Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs, 
Before the Advocates Club, Detroit, Mich,, October 6,
1967 (hereafter referred to as Warnke Statement), 
Reproduced in ibid,, p,122,
2, See especially, ibid,, pp,120-121«
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been called "technical irresponsibility" - the idea that because 
China’s first generation of L C 0B,Mo's would be highly vulnerable, 
there would be a premium, in any period of crisis, on a pre­
emptive Chinese attack upon the U„So
By arguing in this manner, spokesmen for the Johnson 
Administration were calling into question the whole concept of 
deterrence, at least: in respect of China, They were clearly 
implying that China was an infinitely more dangerous opponent 
than Russia,, This, it seems reasonable to argue* was hardly 
calculated to inspire confidence in the minds of America's 
friends and allies in Asia; it was totally inconsistent with
UoS„ efforts since October 1964 to minimize the military
1significance of the Chinese nuclear force and, if anything,
stimulated, rather than weakened, the pressures for prolifer-
2ation in India and Japan, It seems reasonable to conclude that
it was considerations such as these that contributed to A uC,.DoA,’s
3opposition to the Sentinel programme. In February 1967,
1, Some of these efforts were discussed in the previous chapter,
2, It has already been noted that discussion in the U„S, about 
ballistic missile defence, even prior to the Sentinel 
decision of September 1967, appears to have stimulated 
interest in A„B„M.'s in Japan, See above, p,183. For more 
recent evidence of this, see Kawata Tadashi, "Economic 
Implications of Nuclear Armament," in Japan Quarterly,
Vol, 15, No, 2, April-June 1968, p,184, Tadashi argued, in 
effect, that if AoB,M,'s were as useful in an anti-China 
role as Washington claimed, then some of China's neighbours 
might want them too. In Delhi, the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses argued that if the United States, 
powerful and all as it was, still needed additional pro­
tection against China, then India was not likely to feel 
confident about foreign guarantees of protection. See,
Shelton L, Williams, The US,, India, and the Bomb, Baltimore, 
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, p,70,
3, That AoC,D,A, had opposed the Sentinel decision, was made 
clear in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in March 1968, See testimony by A„C,D,A, Director, 
Foster, in Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendment, 1968, 
hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
90th Cong,, 2nd Sess,, March 19, 1968, Washington, 1968, pp,7-8.
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AcC.D.A. Director Foster had warned that the deployment of a 
Chinese oriented A,B,M. system would encourage India to take 
a more serious view of China’s nuclear capability, ^  (Even 
Defence Secretary McNamara, the chief spokesman for the admin­
istration's A.B.M, programme, is reported to have said in 
May 1967, that the deployment in the U, S. of a Chinese
oriented ballistic missile system would encourage India to 
2want one too. ) The decision to deploy an A.B.M, system, it
seems, not only detracted, in many ways, from efforts to
limit proliferation in Asia, but in addition, was a source of
disagreement within the ranks of the U.S. Administration.
But if the Johnson Administration was guilty of
magnifying the military significance of the Chinese nuclear
force, and therefore, of hampering efforts to limit
proliferation in Asia, the Nixon Administration, and
especially its Defence Secretary, Mr. Laird, was even more so.
It has already been noted, that though the Nixon Administration’s
Safeguard system was primarily Soviet orientated, it was
nevertheless partially justified in terms of the alleged
Chinese threat. In arguing its usefulness in this regard,
Laird upgraded the Chinese threat much more than spokesmen
for the previous administration had done, Almost as soon as
he assumed office in February 1969, the new Defence Secretary
claimed that the Chinese nuclear threat was more serious
3than he had previously imagined. Laird now believed that
1. See, Foster’s testimony in Senate Hearings on United States 
Armament and Disarmament Problems, 1967, p,27, Given the
nature of this particular reservation, he is not likely to 
have changed his mind on the matter prior to the decision 
in September to deploy,
2. See, The New York Times, 19 May 1967.
3. See his remarks in Nonproliferation Treaty, Part 2, hearings 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th 
Cong,, 2nd Sess., February 18 and 20, 1969, Washington,
1969,
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China would "fire a test ICBM within the next 18 months" and
would "have the capability by 1975 of having from 20 to 30
ICBM launch missiles available that could hit the United States
of A m e r i c a " . I n  hearings later that year before the House
Committee on Appropriations, Laird claimed that "by the latter
part of the decade of the 1970’s, the Chinese [could] have the
capability of destroying tens of millions of people .0. in the
2United States with a force of less than 100 ICBM's", To meet
this Chinese threat, the Defence Secretary argued, the U.S.
had no alternative other than the deployment of an A.B.M,
system; to rely, as it did in respect of the Soviet threat,
on the deterrent power of U.S, strategic forces would, he
alleged, be highly dangerous.
To support his argument, Laird produced the following set 
3of figures:
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF
POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY IN 1970 
(number of Cities in Order of Population Rank)
United States Soviet Union Communist China
No. of 
Cities
Popula­
tion
Indus­
trial
Capacity
Popula­
tion
Indus­
trial
Capacity
Popula­
tion
Indus­
trial
Capacity
10 25.1 33,1 8,3 25,0 3,7 30-35
50 42.0 55.0 20,0 40,0 6,8 50-60
100 48.0 65,0 25.0 50,0 8.6 65-75
200 55,0 75.0 34.0 62,0 9,0 80-90
400 60.0 82.0 40,0 72.0 10,0 85-90
1000 63.0 86,0 47,0 82,0 11,0
1. ibid.
2. See his testimony in House Hearings on Safeguard Antiballistic 
Missile System, 1969, p,58.
3» ibid,, p,15.
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On the basis of these figures, the Defence Secretary arrived at 
two important conclusions concerning America’s strategic rela­
tionship with China. In the first place, he argued, it would 
be infinitely more difficult to deter China than Russia. As 
he put it:
.,», the thousand largest Chinese cities contain 
considerably less than the one-third, one-fourth, 
or one-fifth of the population Mr. McNamara has 
postulated at various times as the level required  ^
for "Assured Destruction" against the Soviet Union.
It followed, Laird later added, that:
We [the U.S.] can destroy the Soviet Union even 
in a second strike, ... The population and industry 
[of the UoSoS.R.] ... are concentrated in a 
relatively few urban areas. That is not the case 
in mainland China
This argument of Laird's ran counter to McNamara’s earlier
claim that China could be effectively deterred by virtue of
America’s capacity to detonate a relatively small number of
warheads over 50 Chinese urban centres (such an attack,
McNamara had argued, would destroy half of China's urban
population and more than half of its industry, as well as most
of the country’s key government officials and a large majority
3of its scientific, technical and skilled workers). In
answer to this, Laird pointed out that in a time of crisis,
China's key government officials and even its skilled workers4could be evacuated from the cities. Moreover, as he argued 
on another occasion:
1. ibid.
2. ibid., p,58.
3. See above, p. 248.
4. See his remarks in House Hearings on Department of Defence 
Appropriations for 1971, Part 1, p.187.
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.o, China is predominately a rural society where the 
great majority of the people live off the land and 
are dependent only to a limited extent on urban 
industry for their survival» Furthermore, as Mao 
Tse-tung is reported to have said, China with its high 
population (now estimated at 800 million) could 
survive (i,e,, as a people but not as a 20th century 
nation) even with a loss of hundreds of millions from 
a nuclear attack. And we know from past experience 
that the Asian Communists are tenacious opponents and 
are willing to take great losses of life in achieving 
their objectives. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that our ability to deter Communist China 
with our strategic offensive forces is considerably 
less certain than in the case of the Soviet Union
The picture Laird drew of the alleged Chinese threat was con­
siderably more menacing than that presented by his predecessor. 
The image of a reckless and irrational China willing to 
sacrifice millions of its citizens was frightening to say 
the least and, generally speaking, was one which had been 
avoided by McNamara and other senior spokesmen for the Johnson 
Administration, Moreover, by emphasising the demographic 
factor, Laird drew attention to something infinitely more 
basic in its connotation than the issue of "technical 
irresponsibility" alluded to by McNamara, After all, though 
China's first generation of I,C„B„M,'s might well be vulner­
able to a U»S, (or Soviet) first strike, later generations 
will probably not be, China, like Russia and the United 
States before it, should eventually acquire an effective 
second-strike capability, and this should reduce considerably 
the danger that its nuclear forces might be used in a pre­
emptive role. On the other hand, though, China seems likely 
to remain a country where "the great majority of people live
1. Quoted in House Hearings on Safeguard Antiballistic Missile 
System, 1969, pp,15-16, See also, the remarks of General 
Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in ibid,, 
p.58. Wheeler shared Laird’s view that China was a parti­
cularly difficult opponent to deter. According to Wheeler, 
"they [the Chinese] do not have as much to lose as the 
Soviets or as we [the U.S,] have to lose,"
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off the land" for a long while yet. Hence, to the extent that 
Secretary Laird has alleged that this fact constitutes a major 
difficulty in deterring China, he has drawn attention to an 
issue of very long-term significance.
The second conclusion Laird derived from his figures concerned 
the relative utility of the Chinese and U„S. forces viz-a-viz,, 
each other. The Defence Secretary argued that, in contrast to 
China, the American population was concentrated in a relatively 
few large cities. Consequently, he urged, "they [the Chinese] 
could inflict on us a proportionately greater number of 
fatalities in a small attack than we could inflict on them 
in a very large attack",^ Or, as he put it on another occasion:
They can do proportionately as much damage to us 
with a relatively few missiles as we can do to  ^
them with a relatively large number of missiles,
Effective deterrence of Peking, the Defence Secretary implied,
would require that the U.S. be prepared to unload "most or all
3of [its] Minuteman missiles against China", and this, he
warned, would leave the U,S. "relatively naked as far as the
4Soviet threat is concerned". Again, this served to undermine 
another impression that McNamara had sought to foster, viz,, 
that China could be deterred with a minimum of intetference 
to America’s anti-Soviet deterrent, (McNamara claimed in 1967 
that the strategic forces scheduled for FY 1968-72 would 
provide the U,S. with an "assured destruction"capability in 
respect of Russia and China simultaneously,)^
1. Quoted in House Hearings on Department of Defence Appro­
priations for 1971, Part 1, p,187,
2. Quoted in House Hearings on Safeguard Antiballistic Missile 
System, 1969, p,58.
3. ibid,, p,59. See also, p,16.
4. ibid,, p,59.
5. See above, p.248.
B . The Safeguard Programme, SoA.L.T,, and the Nixon 
Administration’s China Policy,
283
Since about late 1969, much of the discussion in the U.S, 
about ballistic missile defence, has taken place against the 
background of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) 
between the United States and the Soviet Union0 Agreement by 
the two superpowers to hold talks on limiting strategic 
armaments was arrived at in 1968, However, the talks were 
postponed following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August of that year. In June 1969, the new American Admin­
istration proposed to the Soviet Union that preliminary talks 
on strategic arms limitations should begin by the end of July« 
The first round of talks was eventually held in Helsinki from 
November 17 to December 22, 1969, Up until July 1971, four 
subsequent rounds had been held in Vienna and Helsinki 
alternatively. The initial session at S.A.LoT. was devoted 
to an exploration of general strategic concepts. In subsequent 
sessions, both sides set forth proposals to limit offensive and 
defensive forces. However, disagreement existed on two issues: 
on the question of what constituted ’'strategic" forces (the 
Soviet Union maintaining that such a term embraced all those 
weapons which could reach the other sides territory, a 
definition that would include America's tactical nuclear weapons 
in the European theatre); and on whether an initial agreement 
on A.B.M.'s alone would serve the goal of the talks (the U.S. 
insisting all along, that an agreement limiting defensive 
systems should be iCCORpiVlItd by one limiting offensive systems 
as well).
1. For the background to S.A.L.T. and for information on the 
negotiations so far, see Strategic Survey, 1969, London: The 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970, pp.25-30; Strategic 
Survey, 1970, pp,11-12; and Strategic Survey, 1971, London: 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972, 
pp.13-16, The material in this paragraph is drawn from these 
sources,
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Even before the formal commencement of S»AUL0T„ it was clear 
that Soviet-UoSo negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms 
would have a strong bearing on American planning in the A.BoM, 
field» There is much evidence to suggest, that up until about 
the early months of 1970, some members of the Nixon Administration 
contemplated an agreement with the U»SoS»R0 that would allow both 
countries to maintain A 0B,M, systems which would be effective 
against China, In March 1969, during a press conference follow­
ing the initial Safeguard announcement, President Nixon declared 
that Russia and the UoS. would be reluctant to totally abandon 
their A.B.M. systems so long as a threat from China existed»^
Later that year, Secretary of State Rogers also implied that
the Soviet and American negotiators at S»A»L»T, would take
2account of the threat posed to both countries by China, But 
it was Secretary of Defense, Laird, who most clearly shared 
these sentiments. In a statement before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs in 1969, he said:
».. I do not want to get the ABM argument completely 
tied to the Soviet threat because I believe that 
there is a very good possibility that in these 
[SoAcLoTo] discussions we will agree upon an ABM 
force for both countries, and that this ABM force 
will be agreed to on the basis of the potential 
threat from ,»» the Chinese in the decade of the 
late 1970's»* 3
1» As quoted by Secretary of Defence, Laird, in House Hearings 
on Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, 1969, p»88,
2» See, remarks during press conference by Secretary of State, 
Rogers, Reproduced in Documents of Disarmament, 1969, 
Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, 1970 (hereafter referred to as D on D », 1969), p»503,
3. See, Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, hearings before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong», 1st Sess,, 
June-August, 1969, Washington, 1969, p»546» See also, remarks 
by Laird in House Hearings on Safeguard Antiballistic Missile 
System, 1969, p»53.
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From about the middle of 1970, however, evidence began to 
emerge that Washington was now contemplating a ScAoLoT. agreement 
that would substantially limit A 0B„M» deployment in both Russia 
and the United States„ A report published by the Institute For 
Strategic Studies in London suggests that "on or about 24 July"
1970, Washington offered a package to the Soviet negotiators at 
Vienna which included, among other things, a proposal on "a 
limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment to small 
systems of perhaps 100-125 launchers around Moscow and Washing-
lton", Referring to that proposal, in February 1971, President
Nixon claimed that the American submission had "incorporated
alternative provisions for either limitation or a total ban of
2ABM" [my emphasis]„ The following month, Mr„ Laird revealed
that the Defence Department was examining alternative A,BoM,
plans in the event of an agreement at S,A„L„To which would
3preclude full deployment of the Safeguard system0 In May
1971, the American leader announced what he described as "a 
significant development in breaking the deadlock" at S0AoL«>Te, 
viz,, an agreement by the Soviet and American Governments "to 
concentrate ... on working out an agreement for the limitation4of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems", Two 
months later, in July 1971, Deputy Secretary of Defence, Packard, 
clearly indicated that the U„S, Government was no longer
I, See, Strategic Survey, 1970, p„120
20 See, Building For Peace : U„S. Foreign Policy for the 1970*8", 
A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the 
United States, Washington, 25 February, 1971, (hereafter 
referred to as Building For Peace), p061»
3, See, Statement of Secretary of Defence Melvin R, Laird 
Before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972- 
76 Defence Program and the 1972 Defence Budget, March 9,
1971, UoS. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1971 
(hereafter referred to as 1972 Defence Posture Statement:), 
p.74.
4, See, text of President Nixon’s announcement in D,0„S.B.,
7 June 1971, pp,741-742,
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contemplating any substantial expansion of its Safeguard programme« 
Noting that the administration had so far recommended a four-site 
deployment only, he added:
oo. we are not at this time talking about going 
ahead with the original 12-site program if we 
can achieve, as I think we can, and hope we can, 
some agreement in the SALT talks
Though the details of an agreement on A.B.Mo’s have yet to be 
worked out at SoA.LoT,, the Nixon Administration has made it 
clear that it is prepared to accept a level of deployment 
which falls well short of the full 12-site Safeguard system 
which was previously deemed necessary for "area defence" of 
the whole of the United States«
In view of the importance attached to ballistic missile 
defence by both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, this 
apparent volte-face in American policy requires some explan­
ation. One possible argument, which can be discounted at 
the outset, is that there has been a sudden and substantial 
downgrading of the perceived threat from China. Though, for 
reasons to be discussed shortly, there has recently been less 
stress on the Chinese threat, the prediction by Mr» Laird, 
in March 1971, that Peking could attain an initial operational 
capability (LOoC,) with I.C0B,M.'s by 1974-5, and could have
significant numbers of these weapons deployed late in the 
2decade, does not differ too much from earlier official 
3UoSo estimates. Clearly, the reasons for the apparent change 
in UoS, policy have to be sought elsewhere*
1. Quoted in, Arms Control Implications of Current Defense 
Budget, hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, 
International Law and Organization of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong,, 1st Sess*, June 16-17 
and July 13-14, 1971, Washington, 1971, pp.186-187„
2. See, 1972 Defence Posture Statement, pp047-48„
3o For a note on some of these earlier evaluations, see above, 
p, 94.
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In  look ing  f o r  th e  t r u t h  of th e  m a t t e r ,  one must acknow­
ledge  a g a in  a b a s ic  f a c t ,  w hich, because  of th e  emphasis in  t h i s  
c h a p te r  on th e  Chinese r a t i o n a l e ,  may have been i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  
s t r e s s e d ;  v i z » ,  t h a t  b o th  th e  S e n t in e l  and Safeguard  programmes 
were m o t iv a ted  p r im a r i ly  by c o n s id e r a t io n s  a r i s i n g  o u t  of 
A m erica 's  s t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  th e  U »S»S.R^ Moreover, 
j u s t  as  i t  was in  th e  c o n te x t  of Scv ie t-U oS , s t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s  
t h a t  A m erica 's  A,B,M, programme was launched ,  so ,  i t  was in  a 
s im i l a r  c o n te x t ,  t h a t  i t  seems to  have been s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
c u r t a i l e d »  Though in fo rm a t io n  on th e  m a t te r  i s  s t i l l  v e ry  
s c a r c e ,  i t  seems t h a t  R u ss ia  and th e  U»S, b o th  came to  S ,A ,L ,T ,
ready  to  f in d  a way to  h a l t  t h e i r  in c r e a s in g ly  dangerous and
2
c o s t l y  c o m p e ti t io n  in  s t r a t e g i c  arms. I t  i s  to  t h i s  end t h a t
Washington now seems p rep a red  to  a c c e p t  s u b s t a n t i a l  l i m i t s  on
th e  s c a le  of i t s  AoBoM, deployment»
I t  seems r e a s o n a b le  to  suppose t h a t  r e c e n t  t r e n d s  in
th e  Nixon A d m in i s t r a t i o n ’s r e l a t i o n s  w ith  Peking have a l s o
had something to  do w ith  W ash ing ton 's  ap p a re n t  w i l l in g n e s s
to  b a rg a in  away th e  o p t io n  of dep loy ing  a f u l l  1 2 - s i t e  
3
Safeguard  system» From abou t th e  e a r l y  months of 1971,
1» See above, p p , 262-263; 265-266; and 268-269»
2, For a n o te  on Moscow's approach  to  SoA0L»T0, se e  Lawrence 
T„ C a ld w e ll ,  S o v ie t  A t t i t u d e s  to  SALT, A delph i P ap e r ,
No» 75, London: The I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  S tu d ie s ,  1971,
See a l s o ,  Thomas W» W olfe, " S o v ie t  Approaches to  SALT", 
in  Problems of Communism, Vol, 19, No, 5, September- 
O ctober ,  1970, pp»1-10 ,
3» C oncre te  s ig n s  of an improvement i n  r e l a t i o n s  between th e  
U nited  S t a t e s  and China began to  emerge l a t e  i n  1969,
During th e  n ex t 18 months a number of ach ievem ents  were 
r e g i s t e r e d :  r e s t r i c t i o n s  were eased on t r a d e  and t r a v e l
between th e  U»S, and China; th e  U ,S»-Chinese am b a ssa d o r ia l  
t a l k s  in  Warsaw were resumed a f t e r  a tw o-year l a p s e ;  and, 
t h e r e  were th e  f i r s t  i n d i c a t i o n s  of a s o f te n in g  of th e  U,S, 
p o s i t i o n  on Chinese membership of the  U nited N a t io n s ,  On 
J u ly  15, 1971, P r e s id e n t  Nixon announced t h a t  he had 
accep ted  an i n v i t a t i o n  to  v i s i t  China, For t e x t  of P r e s i ­
d en t  N ix o n 's  announcement, see  D, 0 »S »B, ,  2 August 1971, p ,1 2 1 .  
For an a n a l y s i s  of th e  m o tives  f o r  th e  American move, i t s
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there seems to have been a conscious effort, in official U.S, 
statements, to play down the alleged threat from China• It 
seems reasonable to argue that Washington was, at about this 
time, coming to acknowledge some inconsistency in its desire for 
better relations with Peking and its portrayal of China as a 
potential and important military threat. This had important 
implications for American A.B.M, policy; continued stress on 
the need for an A.B.M, system against China, especially if such 
emphasis were accompanied, as it had been in the past, by 
suggestions of Chinese irrationality, recklessness and pre­
disposition towards miscalculation, could only serve to 
reinforce Peking's suspicions of U,S, hostility towards China 
and could hardly make for better relations between the two 
countries. For the same reason, it was no longer expedient 
for Washington to promote the idea of a possible agreement 
with the U.S.S.R. on mutual but exclusively anti-China A.B.M» 
deployments. Such action would only increase Peking's 
suspicions of collusion between Washington and Moscow.
(contd,) impact on Asian politics, and its significance 
for future relations between the U.S. and China and between 
the U.S. and other Asian states, see Morton H, Halperin, 
"America and Asia : The Impact of Nixon's China Policy" in 
Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), Sino-American Relations, 1949-71, 
New York: Praeger, 1972, pp,3-20, For another analysis of 
recent developments in relations between Washington and 
Peking, see Harry G. Gelber, "The United States and China:
The Evolution of a Policy", in International Affairs,
Vol, 46, No, 4, October 1970, pp,682-697.
1, This was particularly apparent in Secretary Laird's 1972 
posture statement. In contrast to previous reports, there 
was relatively little emphasis on the China threat. See,
1972 Defence Posture Statement. A similar trend was 
apparent in President Nixon's foreign policy report to 
Congress in February, 1972, See, Building for Peace,
289
The l a t e s t  developm ents in  American p o l ic y  tow ards b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e  de fen c e  a re  of u tm ost im portance  from th e  p o in t  of view 
of U nited  S t a t e s  e f f o r t s  to  l i m i t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A s ia .  Two 
s u c c e s s iv e  a d m in i s t r a t io n s  have argued t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e c t io n  
of th e  U.S. a g a i n s t  China could  be bought only  a t  th e  p r i c e  of 
" a r e a  de fence"  of th e  e n t i r e  American c o n t in e n t ;  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  
t h i s  l e v e l  of p r o t e c t i o n  has been sa id  to  r e q u i r e  a f u l l  1 2 - s i t e  
Safeguard  deploym ent. "Area d efence"  of th e  U .S . ,  Washington 
has s t r e s s e d ,  would, among o th e r  t h i n g s ,  enhance th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  
of American commitments in  A sia  and t h e r e f o r e  h e lp  to  
d is c o u ra g e  s t a t e s  in  th e  a re a  from a c q u i r in g  t h e i r  own n u c le a r  
c a p a b i l i t i e s .  Because Washington has argued in  t h i s  way, i t s  
a p p a re n t  w i l l in g n e s s  of l a t e ,  to  s e t t l e  f o r  something s u b s ta n ­
t i a l l y  l e s s  than  a f u l l  1 2 - s i t e  Safeguard  programme, has  c a l l e d  
in t o  q u e s t io n  th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of i t s  commitment to  non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A sia ; a t  th e  v e ry  l e a s t ,  i t  seems to  have 
in d i c a te d  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  r e a l  l i m i t s  to  th e  p r i c e  th e  U.S. i s  
p rep a red  to  pay to  a c h ie v e  t h i s  g o a l .
The re c o rd  of U.S. involvem ent i n  th e  A.B.M. f i e l d  i s  
a r e v e a l in g  one from th e  p o in t  of view  of W ash ing ton 's  
p ro fe s s e d  concern  to  l i m i t  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons in  
A s ia .  The Johnson A d m in i s t r a t i o n 's  S e n t in e l  d e c i s io n  was 
m o t iv a ted  p r im a r i ly  by concern  in  ehe U.S, about th e  expansion  
of S o v ie t  o f f e n s iv e  and d e fe n s iv e  m i s s i l e  system s. However, 
f o r  re a s o n s  of exped iency , th e  programme was p u b l i c ly  j u s t i ­
f i e d  in  term s of th e  a l l e g e d  t h r e a t  from China, The S e n t in e l  
p la n ,  which seems to  have caused c o n s id e r a b le  d isag reem en t 
w i th in  th e  ran k s  of th e  U.S, Government, r a n  co u n te r  in  many 
ways, to  American e f f o r t s  to  l i m i t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n  A sia :  
i t  had th e  e f f e c t  of c o n s id e ra b ly  enhancing th e  m agnitude of 
th e  Chinese t h r e a t ;  and, was p o o r ly  des igned  to  p e rsu ad e  
p o t e n t i a l  n u c le a r  s t a t e s  in  A sia  to  su p p o r t  th e  proposed n u c le a r
290
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y .  The Nixon A d m in i s t r a t io n ,  w h ile  openly  
espousing  th e  p r im a r i ly  S o v ie t  o r i e n t a t i o n  of i t s  Safeguard  
programme, n e v e r th e le s s  a l s o  s t r e s s e d  th e  u t i l i t y  of th e  system 
v i z - a - v i z , ,  China. Indeed ,  Defence S e c re ta ry  L a i r d ' s  remarks 
on th e  l a t t e r  a s p e c t  of th e  m a t te r  amounted to  a r e c k l e s s  
i n d i f f e r e n c e  to  p re v io u s  U.S, a t te m p ts  to  downgrade th e  m i l i t a r y  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of th e  C hinese n u c le a r  t h r e a t .  F i n a l l y ,  d e s p i t e  
a l l  t h a t  had been s a id  about th e  c h a l le n g e  from P ek ing ,  th e  
o p t io n  of dep loy ing  a f u l l  a n t i -C h in a  A.B.M, system appea rs  
to  have been abandoned; n o t ,  i t  seems, because  of any sudden 
and s u b s t a n t i a l  re a s se s sm e n t  (downwards) of th e  p e rc e iv e d  
Chinese t h r e a t ,  o r ,  because  Washington came to  acknowledge 
some of th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i t s  a n t i -C h in a  A .B J »  posed f o r  e f f o r t s  
to  l i m i t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A s ia ,  b u t ,  because  to  do so se rved  
wider U .S. p u rp o ses ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  an agreement w i th  th e  
S o v ie t  Union on th e  l i m i t a t i o n  of s t r a t e g i c  arm s, and th e  
improvement of r e l a t i o n s  between Washington and Pek ing ,
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  escape th e  co n c lu s io n  t h a t  American 
a c t io n  i n  the  f i e l d  of b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  de fen ce  was a 
h in d ra n c e  r a t h e r  than  a he lp  to  th e  cause  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
in  A s ia ,  Arguments about th e  need f o r  AoB,M, de fen c e  a g a i n s t  
China took  l i t t l e  account of th e  re q u ire m e n ts  of an e f f e c t i v e  
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y  and, in  any c a s e ,  were abandoned when 
i t  was c o n s id e re d  e x p e d ie n t ,  on o th e r  g rounds , to  do so . The 
whole e x e r c i s e  seemed to  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  g oa l of non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A sia  en joyed on ly  a low p r i o r i t y  r e l a t i v e  
to  o th e r  UoS. p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s .
CHAPTER IX
NONPROLIFERATION AND AMERICAN SECURITY 
POLICY IN ASIA, 1964-1968
It has been emphasised on a number of occasions in this 
thesis, that one important incentive for the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons is the belief that national security is thereby 
enhanced, Washington has clearly recognised this fact and 
undertakings to support countries against aggression or the 
threat of aggression have long been an important element in 
American efforts to limit the spread of national nuclear 
capabilities. This has been no less true of Asia than of 
other parts of the world. On the day of China’s first nuclear 
test, President Johnson said:
The United States reaffirms its defense 
commitments in Asia. Even if Communist China 
should eventually develop an effective nuclear 
capability, that capability would have no 
effect on the readiness of the United States 
to respond to requests from Asian nations for ^
help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression.
At the same time, Secretary of State Dean Rusk emphasised
that the U„S, had taken full account of China’s possible entry
into the nuclear club in determining its own military posture
and that there was "no possibility whatever"of "any lack of
security for the free world in the Pacific Ocean area" as a
2result of the Chinese test. Two days later, President 
Johnson again reaffirmed America’s defence commitments in
1. Quoted in Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, New 
York: Praeger, 1965, p,88,
2. Quoted in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, Washington: 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1965 
(hereafter referred to as D on D ,, 1964), pp,452-453.
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Asia and, as was noted earlier in this thesis, extended a 
unilateral undertaking that the U„S, would protect countries 
which remained non-nuclear against threats of nuclear black­
mail,'*' These assurances of support for its friends and allies 
in Asia were repeatedly reaffirmed during the years of the 
Johnson Administration,
In analysing the significance of these guarantees and 
assurances for U,S, nonproliferation policy in Asia it will 
be necessary to take account of other aspects of America’s 
security relations with each of the countries concerned, and 
also, of developments in the wider world of U,S, security and 
foreign policy in general. Viewed in this broader context, 
the question of American guarantees and assurances in Asia 
in the period 1964-68 casts a fresh and revealing light on 
Washington’s efforts to limit proliferation in the area.
In the present chapter, developments up to about the end of 
1968 only will be considered. After that date, the Nixon 
doctrine and other aspects of the new Republican Adminis­
tration’s defence and foreign policies opened the way for 
a substantial change in the character of America’s security 
relations with its friends and allies in Asia, The signifi­
cance of these latter developments for U,S, nonproliferation 
policy in Asia will be examined in the next chapter,
A, Nonproliferation and the United States-India Security 
Relationship, 1964-1968
Washington and Delhi are not linked by a formal security 
treaty. At the time of the Sino-Indian border conflict in 
October-November 1962, the U,S, did provide India with some 
military assistance and, by the manner of its response
1= See above, p,51.
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g e n e r a l ly ,  seemed to  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i t  was not p rep a red  to  see
In d ia  ove rru n  by China, However, t h i s  c o l l a b o r a t io n  between
D elh i  and Washington has  not developed  in to  a fo rm al s e c u r i t y
l i n k  between th e  two c a p i t a l s  such as th o s e  which e x i s t  between
th e  UoSo and i t s  Jap an ese  and A u s t r a l i a n  a l l i e s ,
C h in a ’ s f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t  provoked in  many In d ia n s  a
profound concern  about t h e i r  c o u n t ry ’s s e c u r i t y  and, as has
a l re a d y  been n o te d ,  s t r e n g th e n e d  dom estic  demands fo r  an In d ian  
2
n u c le a r  f o r c e , Washington c l e a r l y  acknowledged th e  c h a l le n g e  
t h a t  t h i s  development posed f o r  U,S. e f f o r t s  to  l i m i t  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A sia ;  A m erica’ s u n i l a t e r a l  u n d e r ta k in g  of 
su p p o r t  a g a i n s t  n u c le a r  b la ck m a i l  was c l e a r l y  des igned  to
3'
r e a s s u r e  n o n -n u c le a r ,  n o n -a l ig n e d  c o u n t r i e s  such as In d ia ,  
t h a t  th ey  had no need of n u c le a r  weapons of t h e i r  own. However, 
r e g a r d l e s s  of t h i s  u n d e r ta k in g ,  many o f f i c i a l s  i n  Washington 
remained concerned about th e  t h r e a t  to  I n d i a ’s s e c u r i t y  and 
about th e  im p l ic a t io n s  of t h i s  f o r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  Asia«
1, For in fo rm a t io n  on th e s e  developm ents ,  see  Lom e J« K avic, 
I n d i a ’ s Quest f o r  S e c u r i t y :  Defence P o l i c i e s ,  1947-1965, 
B erke ley  and Los A ngeles: U n iv e r s i ty  of C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s ,  
1967, pp«182 and 196; Norman D, Palm er, South A sia  and 
U nited  S t a t e s  P o l i c y , Boston: M i f f l i n ,  1966, pp«267-269; 
and A rth u r  M. S c h le s in g e r ,  J r « ,  A Thousand D ays, New York: 
F aw ce tt ,  1967, pp«490-1« In  August 1963, th e  U«S. began 
supp ly ing  In d ia  w i th  r a d a r  and r e l a t e d  communications 
equipment and in  November, American a i r c r a f t  p a r t i c i p a t e d  
in  j o i n t  a i r  e x e r c i s e s  w ith  th e  In d ia n  A ir F o rce .  For a 
s ta te m e n t  on th e s e  m a t t e r s  by th e  In d ia n  M in is t ry  of D efence, 
see  C u rre n t  Notes on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s , Canberra : 
Department of E x te rn a l  A f f a i r s  ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as 
CoNoIoAc ) , Vole 34, No, 11, November 1963, p p ,37-38,
2, See above, p p ,115-120,
3, The American u n d e r ta k in g  was announced on 18 October 1964, 
j u s t  two days a f t e r  C h in a 's  f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t .  See 
above, p ,5 1 .
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In a s ta te m e n t  i n  1965 b e fo re  th e  House A p p ro p r ia t io n s
Committee, S e c re ta ry  of D efence, McNamara, s a id :
The p ro s p e c t  of an u n f r i e n d ly  neighbour on i t s  
[ I n d i a ’ s] n o r th e rn  bo rder  armed w ith  n u c le a r  
weapons i s  u n d e rs ta n d a b ly  d i s tu r b i n g  to  th e  
In d ia n  Government and p e o p le .  A lthough th e  
p r e s e n t  Government has s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  does no t 
in te n d  to  respond  to  t h a t  t h r e a t  by s t a r t i n g  a 
n u c le a r  weapons program of i t s  own, th e r e  a r e  
p r e s s u r e s  w i th in  In d ia  to  do j u s t  t h a t .  The 
consequences of such a d e c i s io n  would be v e ry  
u n f o r tu n a t e ,  Among o th e r  t h i n g s ,  i t  would 
p ro b ab ly  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a c c e l e r a t e  th e  sp read  
of n u c le a r  weapons in  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  n o t  only 
in  A sia  bu t th ro u g h o u t th e  world
That same y e a r ,  AoCoD.A, D i r e c t o r ,  W,C0 F o s t e r ,  a l s o  drew a t t e n t i o n
2to  th e  u n s e t t l i n g  e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  Chinese t e s t s  had had in  I n d ia .
I t  was F o s t e r ’ s view t h a t  th e  IKS, m ight w e ll  have to  go f u r t h e r
than  i t  had so f a r  gone in  th e  m a t te r  of a s s u ra n c e s  to  n o n -n u c le a r  
3s t a t e s  l i k e  I n d ia ,  In  1966, Defence S e c re ta ry  McNamara ag a in
ad d ressed  h im se lf  to  th e  problem of I n d i a ’ s s e c u r i t y .  He s a id :
A n a t io n  on th e  b o rd e r  of China, Red China, w i l l  
need some a s s u ra n c e  of p r o t e c t i o n  i f  she g iv e s  up 
th e  r i g h t  to  develop  n u c le a r  weapons. There can be 
no q u e s t io n  about t h a t .  And t h a t  need f o r  a s su ra n c e  
w i l l  in c r e a s e  a s  th e  y e a rs  go by and as  C h in a ’s 
c a p a b i l i t y  to  a t t a c k  her  ne ighbours  w ith  n u c le a r  
weapons in c re a s e s » ^
1° See, Department of D efense A p p ro p r ia t io n s  f o r  1966, P a r t  3 , 
h e a r in g s  b e fo re  a Subcommittee of th e  House Committee on 
A p p ro p r ia t io n s ,  89 th  Cong,, 1 s t  S e s s , ,  W ashington, 1965 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  House H earings  on Department of 
Defence A p p ro p r ia t io n s ,  1966, P a r t  3) ,  p ,16 ,
2, See, W illiam  C, F o s t e r ,  "New D ir e c t io n s  in  Arms C o n tro l  and 
Disarmament", i n  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , Vol, 43, No, 4 , J u ly  1965, 
p ,5 8 8 ,  F o s te r  s a id :  "The r e a c t i o n  th e r e ,  . . .  seems to  have 
developed ou t of f e a r  of th e  n a s c e n t  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  i m p l i c i t  
i n  th e s e  t e s t s . "
3, i b i d , , p p , 596-597.
4, Quoted in  JoCoA.E. H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of N uclea r  
Weapons, 1966, p ,8 7 ,  For s im i l a r  rem arks , by S e c re ta ry  of 
S t a t e  Dean Rusk, see  The Times of I n d i a , 4 A p r i l  1967,
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In  1 9 6 7 ,th e  U.S. Defence S e c re ta ry  warned t h a t  China was b en t  
on weakening and d iv id in g  I n d ia  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  i t s e l f  as  th e  
m ajor p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e  in  th e  subcontinent. '* ' But d e s p i t e  
th e s e  e x p re s s io n s  of concern  about I n d i a ’s s e c u r i t y ,  and th e  
obvious f e a r  amongst many o f f i c i a l s  in  Washington t h a t  D e lh i 
m ight be d r iv e n  to  a c q u i re  n u c le a r  weapons, th e  U nited  S ta t e s  
remained u n w il l in g  to  fo rm a l ly  commit i t s e l f  to  th e  de fen ce  of 
I n d ia .  This  became c l e a r  i n  th e  y e a rs  1964-1967, d u r in g  
D e lh i ’ s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  of th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of some form of 
j o i n t  g u a ra n te e  of I n d i a ’ s s e c u r i t y .  D e lh i ’ s i n i t i a t i v e s  
in  t h i s  m a t t e r ,  and A m erica’ s r e s p o n s e ,  a r e  i s s u e s  w orthy of 
c lo s e  exam ina tion .
During a v i s i t  to  London i n  December 1964, th e  In d ia n  Prime
M in is te r  i s  r e p o r te d  to  have proposed  t h a t  th e  n u c le a r  powers
should  d e v is e  ways and means to  p r o t e c t  n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s
2
a g a i n s t  n u c le a r  a t t a c k .  On h i s  r e t u r n ,  th e  Prime M in is te r  
conceded t h a t  r e p o r t s  to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  he had su g g es ted  to  
Mr. W ilson t h a t  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  and R uss ia  should  p ro v id e  
a j o i n t  n u c le a r  s h i e l d  fo r  th e  n o n -n u c le a r  powers were "more
3
or l e s s  c o r r e c t " .  There a r e  in d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  I n d ia  su b se -
4
q u e n t ly  conducted s im i l a r  soundings in  Washington and Moscow.
I t  i s  a p p a re n t ,  however, t h a t  th e  In d ia n  p ro p o s a l  was c o o l ly  
r e c e iv e d  by th e  n u c le a r  powers,"* though th e  B r i t i s h  Government
1. See, McNamara’ s te s t im o n y ,  i n  Department of Defence Appro­
p r i a t i o n s  f o r  1968, P a r t  2, h e a r in g s  b e fo re  a Subcommittee 
of th e  House Committee on A p p ro p r ia t io n s ,  90th  Cong., 1 s t  
Sess= , March 1967, W ashington, 1967 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  
as House H earings  on Department of Defence A p p r o p r ia t i o n s , 
f o r  1968, P a r t  2) ,  p .138.
2. The Times of I n d i a , 12 December 1964.
3. Quoted in ,  A.G. N ooran i,  " I n d i a ’ s Quest f o r  a N uclear  
G uaran tee" ,  i n  A sian  Survey , Vol. 7, No. 7 , J u ly  1967, p .4 9 2 .
4. i b i d . ,  p .493.
5. i b i d . This  was a l s o  a p p a re n t  in  a s ta te m e n t  i n  p a r l i a m e n t  
by I n d i a ' s  M in is te r  fo r  E x te rn a l  A f f a i r s .  See, D ebates of 
th e  In d ia n  P a r l i a m e n t :  Lok Sabha ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as 
Lok Sabha D e b a te s ) , 21 December 1964, C o ls .  5843-4.
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appears to have considered the idea of a guarantee for the non­
nuclear states of Asia at least,'*' In May of the following year, 
Delhi temporarily abandoned its search for some sort of joint 
guarantee from the U,S, and Russia and instead submitted a five 
point proposal on proliferation and security guarantees to the 
United Nations Disarmament Commission, This proposal included 
two requests to the nuclear powers concerning the security of 
non-nuclear states: (1) that they [the nuclear powers] under­
take "not to use nuclear weapons against countries which do not 
possess them"; and, (2) that they undertake, through the U CN C,
"to safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened
by Powers having a nuclear weapons capability or about to have
2a nuclear weapons capability , In February 1966, the Soviet 
Premier, Mr, Kosygin,made his offer to include in the Soviet 
draft nonproliferation treaty "a clause on the prohibition of 
the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties 
to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their terri- 
tory", The Soviet proposal partly resembled Delhi’s sub­
mission to the UJ„ in May 1965 and was warmly applauded by
4the Indian Government, Later, in October 1966, India joined 
a number of non-aligned states in requesting the Disarmament 
Commission to consider Mr, Kosygin’s offer,^ The United States,
£
however, was quite definitely opposed to the "Kosygin proposal".
1, The Times of India, 18 December 1964,
2o Quoted in, Noorani, loc, cit,, p,494,
3, Quoted in, International Negotiations on the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington: United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 48, 
January 1969 (hereafter referred to as International Nego­
tiations on the N.PoTo), p,42,
4, See, speech by India's representative at the EoN.D.C. on 
15 February, 1966» Reproduced in "Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons" in Foreign Affairs Reports (Indian Council 
of World Affairs), Vol, 15, No, 3, March 1966, pp,29-31,
5, Noorani, loc, cit,, p,497,
6, See above, p,52.
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E a r ly  i n  1967, I n d i a ' s  e f f o r t s  to  s e c u re  a n u c le a r  g u a ra n te e  
took  on a new a i r  of urgency  and D e lh i  r e v e r t e d  to  th e  co u rse  i t  
had t r i e d  l a t e  i n  1964, v i z . ,  an approach  to  bo th  th e  U.S. and 
R u ss ia  f o r  a j o i n t  g u a ra n te e  of su p p o r t  a g a i n s t  n u c le a r  a t t a c k .
I t  seems re a s o n a b le  to  assume th a t  a m ajor re a s o n  f o r  t h i s  
f r e s h  i n i t i a t i v e  was C h in a 's  c u r r e n t  and r a p id  p ro g re s s  in  
th e  n u c le a r  weapons f i e l d .  Not on ly  was Peking i n t e n t  on 
b u i ld in g  up a s t o c k p i l e  of n u c le a r  w arheads ,,  b u t  a l s o ,  . i t  
had r e c e n t l y  dem onstra ted  s u b s t a n t i a l  p ro g re s s  i n  th e  d ev e lo p ­
ment of th e rm o -n u c le a r  e x p lo s iv e s  and m i s s i l e s . 1 P robab ly  
an o th e r  re a so n  f o r  D e l h i ' s  i n i t i a t i v e  a t  t h i s  tim e was th e  
c u r r e n t  s t a t e  of th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on th e  proposed n u c le a r  
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y .  E a r ly  i n  A p r i l ,  W ashington and 
Moscow p re s e n te d  D e lh i  w ith  s e p a r a t e  b u t  a lm ost i d e n t i c a l  
d r a f t  agreem ents  on n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  T h is  move was seen  
by s e c t i o n s  of th e  In d ia n  p r e s s  as be ing  aimed a t  im press ing  
D elh i of th e  im portance  w ith  which th e  superpowers viewed
th e  c o n c lu s io n  of a n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  and w ith  t h e i r
2a n x ie ty  t h a t  In d ia  should  go a long  w ith  th e  agreem ent.  I t  
was obv ious ,  th e n ,  t h a t  D e lh i  would soon have to  d e c l a r e  
i t s  p o s i t i o n  on th e  proposed  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  agreem ent; 
b e fo re  doing so ,  th e  In d ia n  Government seemed anx ious to  
e x p lo re  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  in  r e g a rd  to  s e c u r i t y  a s s u ra n c e s .
1„ C h in a 's  f o u r th  n u c le a r  t e s t  i n  O ctober 1966 invo lved  th e  
s u c c e s s f u l  u se  o f  a m i s s i l e .  The f i f t h ,  i n  December 1966, 
was a th e rm o -n u c le a r  experim ent and in d i c a te d  s u b s t a n t i a l  
p ro g re s s  toward th e  development of a th e rm o -n u c le a r  weapon. 
For a d e t a i l e d  accoun t of C h ina ’ s developm ents in  th e  
n u c le a r  weapons f i e l d ,  see  above, C hapter I I I .
2. The Times of I n d i a , 6 A p r i l  1967»
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D e l h i ' s  id e a s  about a j o i n t  g u a ra n te e  were ex p la in e d  by Mr«
Chagla , th e  M in is te r  f o r  E x te rn a l  A f f a i r s ,  i n  a s ta te m e n t  to
th e  Washington Post on 13 A p r i l  1 9 6 7 Mr» Chagla d ism issed
th e  id e a  of a g u a ra n te e  th rough  th e  U»N» on th e  grounds t h a t
" b e fo re  th e  S e c u r i ty  C ouncil even c a l l e d  a m eeting  we m igh t be
d es tro y e d » "  (The r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  U0N0 was no doubt prompted
by i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  W ashington was c u r r e n t l y  e x p lo r in g  th e
p o s s i b i l i t y  of some form of U J 0 g u a ra n te e  of th e  s e c u r i t y  of
2n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s o  ) M oreover, he added, P r e s id e n t  J o h n s o n 's  
u n i l a t e r a l  u n d e r ta k in g s  of O ctober 1964 d id  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  
s u f f i c i e n t  a s s u ra n c e  f o r  Ind ia»  What D e lh i  wanted was a 
"commitment which would s tan d  up ahead of tim e to  ’d e t e r ’
I n d i a ’ s one r e a l  t h r e a t ,  Communist China, from making an a t t a c k  
and a commitment f o r  immediate Sov ie t-A m erican  r e p r i s a l  i n  case
3
China d ec ided  n o t  to  be d e te r r e d » "  S h o r t ly  a f t e r  t h i s  announ­
cement, a s e n io r  In d ia n  c i v i l  s e r v a n t ,  Mr0 L.K. J h a ,  v i s i t e d
Moscow and W ashington to  e x p lo re  th e  chances of s e c u r in g  th e  s o r t
4
of g u a ra n te e  Mr0 Chagla had o u t l in e d »  In  W ashington, Mr» Jha
1» For a r e p o r t  on Mr» C h ag la ’s s ta t e m e n t ,  see  N ooran i,  l o c » c i t », 
p»498 and S h e l to n  L» W ill iam s ,  The U„S», I n d ia  and th e  Bomb, 
B a l t im o re :  The Johns Hopkins P r e s s ,  1969, p»53» For a u s e ­
f u l  e d i t o r i a l  comment on Mr» C h ag la ’s announcement, see  
The Times of I n d i a , 15 A p r i l  1967.
2» For ev idence  of W ash ing ton’s a c t i v i t y  in  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  see  
remarks by S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e  Dean Rusk, i n  U nited  S t a t e s  
Armament and Disarmament P ro b lem s, h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  Sub­
committee on Disarmament of th e  Sena te  Committee on F o re ig n  
R e l a t i o n s ,  90 th  Cong», 1 s t  S ess» ,  F ebruary  3, 6, 7, 28 and 
March 1 -3 ,  1967, W ashington, 1967 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  
Senate  H earings  on U»S» Armament and Disarmament P ro b lem s, 
1967) ,  p»179»
3» Quoted in  W il l iam s ,  op» e i t », p»53»
4» While i n  W ashington, Mr» Jha had a c c e s s  to  s e n io r  members of 
th e  UoSo A d m in is t r a t io n  in c lu d in g  P r e s id e n t  Johnson h im s e l f ;  
S e c re ta ry  o f  S t a t e ,  Dean Rusk; S e c re ta ry  of D efence, R obert 
McNamara; A»CuD„Ao D i r e c t o r ,  W illiam  F o s te r ;  and, Atomic 
Energy Commission Chairman, Glen Seaborg» See, The New York 
Tim es, 14 A p r i l  1967 and The Times of I n d i a , 21 A p r i l  1967»
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re p e a te d  th a t  th e  g u a ra n te e  being  sought by In d ia  would have to
c a r ry  th e  t h r e a t  of i n s t a n t  r e t a l i a t i o n  and t h a t  any arrangem ent
in v o lv in g  U,N. p ro ced u re s  was c o n s id e re d  q u i t e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y 0
M oreover, he added, i t  was im m ate r ia l  to  D e lh i  w hether th e
g u a ra n te e  formed p a r t  of th e  proposed n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y
or was n e g o t ia te d  s e p a r a t e l y 0 Mr«. Jha  was i n s i s t e n t ,  however,
t h a t  D e lh i  was n o t  seek ing  any quid  pro quo fo r  In d ia n
s ig n a t u r e  o f  th e  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a ty »  Even i f  th e  n u c le a r
powers were p rep a red  to  o f f e r  c r e d i b l e  g u a ra n te e s  of s u p p o r t ,
I n d ia  would n e v e r th e le s s  s t i l l  seek  s a t i s f a c t i o n  on o th e r
1
a s p e c t s  of the  t r e a t y  b e fo re  s i g n i n g .
The d i s c u s s io n s  Mr, Jha had in  Washington about I n d i a ’s
p ro p o sa l  f o r  a j o i n t  g u a ra n te e  were shrouded i n  s e c re c y .  There
were few o f f i c i a l  r e f e r e n c e s  to  th e  t a l k s  and seem ingly  none
which ex p la in ed  i n  any d e t a i l ,  th e  c o n te n ts  of th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .
In  a d d i t i o n ,  c o n g re s s io n a l  h e a r in g s  d u r in g  1967, on arms
c o n t r o l  and r e l a t e d  m a t t e r s ,  were c o n sp icu o u s ly  void  of d i r e c t
r e f e r e n c e s  to  th e  m a t t e r ,  A l l  t h i s  makes th e  t a s k  o f  a s s e s s in g
W ash in g to n 's  re sp o n se  to  th e  In d ia n  i n i t i a t i v e  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t
in d e ed .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  from th e  p u b l ic  r e c o rd
t h a t  th e  U.S. Government was u n e n t h u s i a s t i c  about th e  In d ia n
p ro p o s a l ;  Mr. J h a ’ s r e p o r t  to  th e  In d ia n  Prime M in is te r  on
h i s  v i s i t  to  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  was c l e a r l y  p e s s i m i s t i c  on
2
th e  q u e s t io n  of g u a ra n te e s .  So f a r  as  a s s u ra n c e s  to  I n d ia  
were concerned , th e  U nited  S t a t e s  seemed p rep a red  to  go no 
f u r th e r  in  th e  m a t te r  th a n  th e  u n i l a t e r a l  o f f e r  of " s t r o n g  
su p p o r t"  a g a in s t  n u c le a r  b la c k m a i l  which had been ex tended  by 
P r e s id e n t  Johnson i n  th e  wake of C h ina ’s f i r s t  n u c le a r  t e s t .
In  view of th e  im portance  Washington claim ed to  a t t a c h  to  th e  
g o a l  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  and of i t s  d e c la re d  sympathy w ith
1. As r e p o r te d  i n  The Times of I n d i a , 21 A p r i l  1967.
2. See, The Times of I n d i a , 2 May 1967,
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India’s security plight, some explanation of America's response 
is warrantedo
In the first place, the whole dialogue between Delhi and 
Washington seems to have been clouded by India's failure to 
fully consider the operational arrangements necessary for 
the provision of effective guarantees, If the reports of 
India's submissions on the question are to be believed, Delhi 
wanted an arrangement which would threaten automatic retalia­
tion o But a guarantee of this sort is considerably more 
binding in its character than most, the U.S« had previously 
entered into; perhaps even more so than say, the N,A0T.O. 
agreement. In particular, India seemed to be asking Washington 
to agree to an arrangement which would provide for American 
retaliation without the prior approval of Congress or any 
other relevant constitutional body» It is hardly surprising 
that Washington was reluctant to agree to a device of this sort. 
Also, there was the problem of just what was considered 
necessary to trigger the nuclear response. Terms like "nuclear 
blackmail" and "aggression" have no universally accepted 
definition and the weight given to them in so binding an 
arrangement as that proposed by India was no doubt a factor 
in Washington's rejection of the move.
Also on the question of operational arrangements, Delhi 
does not seem to have considered the possibility of having 
foreign defence facilities within India in order to strengthen 
the credibility and effectiveness of the guarantee it was 
seeking. In particular, Delhi did not envisage the estab­
lishment of Soviet and U0S, missile bases on its territory, 
and was even unhappy about the presence of Polaris submarines
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i n  th e  In d ia n  Ocean a r e a .  One g e t s  th e  im p ress io n  th a t  D e lh i ,  
though a p p a re n t ly  seek in g  a g u a ra n te e ,  was n e v e r th e le s s  anx ious  
to  m inim ize  th e  deg ree  of d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  involvem ent w ith  i t s  
would-be p r o te c to r s o  I t  i s  u n l i k e l y ,  however, th a t  D e lh i  could  
have secu red  an e f f e c t i v e  g u a ra n te e  w ith o u t  c l o s e r  m i l i t a r y  t i e s  
w i th  W ashington o r  Moscow, o r  botho The c r e d i b i l i t y  of Ameri­
can g u a ra n te e s  i n  Europe d e r iv e s  p a r t l y  from th e  permament 
deployment on t h a t  c o n t in e n t  of hundreds of thousands  of U,S» 
t ro o p s  as  w e l l  as  from o th e r  a rrangem ents  in v o lv in g  c lo s e
m i l i t a r y  l i n k s  between America and many of th e  c o u n t r i e s  of 
2W estern Europe» M oreover, as w i l l  be noted  s h o r t l y ,  American 
g u a ra n te e s  to  Japan  and A u s t r a l i a  have been accompanied by 
c lo s e  m i l i t a r y  c o -o p e r a t io n  between th e  U„S0 and each of th e s e  
two c o u n t r ie s o  I n d i a ’ s r e s e r v a t i o n s  about b ases  and o th e r  
m i l i t a r y  l i n k s  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  D e lh i  was s t i l l  having  d i f f i c u l t y  
r e c o n c i l i n g  th e  id e a  of n u c le a r  g u a ra n te e s ,  even m u l t i l a t e r a l  
ones ,  w ith  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i c y  of n on -a lignm en t and non­
involvem ent i n  th e  m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s  of o th e r  powerso T his  d id  
n o t  go u n n o tic e d  i n  W ashington and was seen  by many Americans, 
in c lu d in g  some who were seem ingly  sy m p a th e tic  tow ards I n d i a ’ s
s e c u r i t y  p l i g h t ,  a s  a m ajor o b s t a c l e  in  th e  p a th  of e f f e c t i v e
* 3 g u a ra n te e s  »
1
1« The Times o f  I n d ia ,  21 A p r i l  1967» R e s e rv a t io n s  such as 
th e s e  prompted one American o b se rv e r  to  remark t h a t  I n d ia  
wanted "a  n u c le a r  u m b re l la  w ith o u t  a h a n d le " , See, i b i d . 
I n d i a ’ s r e l u c t a n c e  to  c o n s id e r  th e  u l t i m a t e  n e c e s s i t y  of 
s t a t i o n i n g  n u c le a r  weapons under f o r e ig n  c o n t ro l  on In d ia n  
s o i l  was no ted  by a Times co rre sp o n d e n t  i n  1968» See,
The Times (London), 10 O ctober 1968»
2» For a comment on t h i s ,  see  Hedley B u l l ,  "W estern P o l ic y  and 
N uclear  P r o l i f e r a t i o n  i n  A s ia " ,  i n  World Review, Vol» 6,
No, 3, O ctober 1967, p c13, See a l s o ,  Mason W i l l r i c h ,  
"G uaran tees  to  Non-Nuclear N a t io n s " ,  in  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , 
Vol» 44, No» 4 , J u ly  1966, p»686»
3= e »g , ,  see  s ta t e m e n t  by AoCoD„A» D i r e c t o r ,  W,C, F o s t e r ,  as  
r e p o r te d  i n  The l im e s  of I n d i a , 6 A p r i l  1967»
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Second, the provision of a guarantee for India did not
depend on agreement between Washington and Delhi alone» India
1wanted a j_oint guarantee from both the UtS0 and Russia; an 
arrangement which would have required an unprecedented degree 
of understanding between the two superpowers» But Washington 
and Moscow were not ready for this sort of venture» It is true, 
of course, as the negotiations on the N»P»T, clearly revealed, 
that when their interests coincided, Russia and America were 
capable of a high degree of co-operation, But the question 
of nuclear guarantees was a different matter altogether» To 
have provided India with the sort of protection it wanted, 
Russia and America would need to have engaged in a level of 
joint, military planning wholly inconsistent with their res­
pective security roles» Clearly, the detente had not gone as 
far as this» Moreover, the guarantee being considered was 
clearly aimed at China, and Russia was not yet in a position
where it could safely ignore Peking’s charges of collusion 
2with the UoS» Finally, there is evidence to suggest that
Moscow regarded the provision of explicit security guarantees
to non-nuclear states as an unacceptably high price to pay
3for nonproliferation.
Third, even had agreement been possible about the 
operational arrangements necessary for the sort of guarantee
I» So far as can be discovered, India at no time sought a 
guarantee from the United States alone»
2» This fact was clearly appreciated by Secretary of State,
Dean Rusk. See his testimony in JoC»A.E. Hearings on 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.13»
3» See, Benjamin S» Lambeth, "Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet 
Arms Control Policy" in Orbis, Vol. 13, No» 2, Summ er 1970, 
pp»319-320» See also, Gerhard Wettig, "Soviet Policy on 
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966-1968" in Orbis, 
Vol» 12, No. 4, Winter 1969, pp»1073-1075»
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I n d ia  w anted, and even had R u s s ia ’ s c o - o p e ra t io n  been e n l i s t e d ,  
s t i l l  an o th e r  o b s ta c l e  rem ained . In  March 1967 S e c re ta ry  of 
S t a t e ,  Dean Rusk, emphasised t h a t  th e  p ro v i s io n  of e f f e c t i v e  
g u a ra n te e s  f o r  n o n -a l ig n e d ,  n o n -n u c le a r  c o u n t r i e s  would " in v o lv e  
a v e ry  f a r - r e a c h in g  e x te n s io n  o f  American com mitments".^  L a te r ,
th e  S e c re ta ry  emphasised t h a t  th e  Senate  d id  no t want th e  U.S.
2to  ex tend  i t s  commitments in  t h i s  way. There can be l i t t l e
doubt t h a t  t h i s  r e lu c t a n c e  to  c o n s id e r  a d d i t i o n a l  commitments
was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  no t j u s t  of C ongress ,  b u t  of th e  m a jo r i t y
of th e  American p eo p le  as  w e l l .  A m eric a 's  involvem ent in
Vietnam had a l r e a d y  provoked w idespread  concern  in  th e  U.S.
about th e  n a t i o n ’ s commitments in  A sia  and any move to  f u r t h e r
extend A m erica’s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a t  t h i s  tim e would alm ost
c e r t a i n l y  have been s t r o n g ly  opposed. In  h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e
House Committee on A p p ro p r ia t io n s  in  February  1968, Defence
S e c re ta ry  McNamara was v e ry  c r i t i c a l  of th e  a t t a c k s  in  Congress
th e  p re v io u s  y ea r  on th e  s c a le  of A m erica’s s e c u r i t y
3
commitments o v e rs e a s .  Indeed ,  such was h i s  concern  about t h i s  
developm ent, t h a t  he f e l t  i t  t im e ly  to  i s s u e  a warning about 
th e  dangers  o f  co n cep ts  l i k e  " F o r t r e s s  America"; a world from 
which th e  U.S. had s u b s t a n t i a l l y  w ithdraw n, he n o te d ,  would, 
among o th e r  th i n g s ,  be one " i n  which th e  p r e s s u r e s  f o r  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons and th e  means of t h e i r
4
d e l iv e r y  would be much s t ro n g e r "  th an  th ey  p r e s e n t l y  w ere.
1. Quoted in  Senate  H earings  on U.S. Armament and Disarmament 
Problem s, 1967, p p . 155-156.
2. See h i s  te s t im o n y  in  N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  T r e a t y , h e a r in g s  b e fo re  
th e  Senate  Committee on F o re ig n  R e la t io n s ,  90th  Cong., 2nd 
S e s s . ,  J u ly  10-12 and 17, 1968, W ashington, 1968, p .1 7 .
For a sample of Senate  o p p o s i t io n  a t  t h i s  tim e to  th e  
e x te n s io n  of American commitments, see  i b i d . , p p .1 7 ,  34, 
46-48 , 156 and 173.
3. See, Department of Defence A p p ro p r ia t io n s  f o r  1969, P a r t  1, 
h e a r in g s  b e fo re  a Subcommittee of th e  House Committee on 
A p p ro p r ia t io n s ,  90th Cong., 2nd S e s s . ,  F ebruary  1968, 
W ashington, 1968 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  House H earings  
on Department of Defence A p p ro p r ia t io n s  f o r  1969, P a r t  1) ,
p . 121.
4. i b i d .
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I t  would be going too  f a r  to  conclude  from t h i s  t h a t  McNamara 
may have favou red  o f f e r in g  In d ia  a f irm  g u a ra n te e  of i t s  s e c u r i t y .  
One s u sp e c ts  th a t  he m ight h av e , b u t in  th e  absence o f a d d i t io n a l  
ev id en ce  i t  i s  no t p o s s ib le  to  say  so c o n c lu s iv e ly . N e v e r th e le s s ,  
th e  D efence S e c r e ta r y 's  rem arks do in d ic a te  th a t  he c l e a r ly  
p e rc e iv e d  a l i n k  betw een n o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  and a co n tin u ed  
and a c t iv e  U .S. p re sen ce  in  th e  w o rld , and was anx ious to  rem ind 
h is  c o lle a g u e s  of t h i s  a t  a tim e when many o f them w ere c a s t in g  
an in c r e a s in g ly  c r i t i c a l  eye on A m erica 's  f o r e ig n  com mitments.
I t  would be u n re a so n a b le  to  su g g e s t t h a t  i t  was U .S . 
o p p o s it io n  a lo n e  w hich caused D e lh i to  abandon i t s  s e a rc h  fo r  
a n u c le a r  g u a ra n te e .^  As a lre a d y  n o te d , th e  In d ia n  p ro p o sa l 
was in  many ways an im p ra c t ic a l  one and, in  a d d i t io n ,  was 
p ro b ab ly  n o t w e ll re c e iv e d  in  th e  S o v ie t c a p i t a l  e i t h e r .  
N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  American re sp o n se  was s i g n i f i c a n t .  I t  
c l e a r ly  in d ic a te d  th a t  W ashington was p rep a red  to  l e t  p ass  an 
o p p o r tu n i ty  to  make a seem ingly  im p o rtan t g e s tu re  in  th e  
d i r e c t i o n  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t io n .  O bv iously , th e re  w ere a t  t h i s  
tim e , many American po licym akers  who reg a rd ed  th e  g o a l of non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A sia  a s  c o n s id e ra b ly  l e s s  im p o rtan t th a n  
o th e r  U .S. i n t e r e s t s .
B. N o n p ro l if e ra t io n  and th e  U n ited  S ta te s - J a p a n  S e c u r i ty  
R e la t io n s h ip ,  1964-1968
W ash in g to n 's  fo rm al s e c u r i ty  t i e s  w ith  Tokyo d a te  from th e  
s ig n in g  in  Septem ber 1951 of th e  Japan -U .S . S e c u r i ty  T re a ty ,
1 . A ll th e  in d ic a t io n s  a r e ,  th a t  by th e  end o f 1967 a t  th e  
l a t e s t ,  D e lh i had abandoned th e  id e a  o f g u a ra n te e s  w hich 
inv o lv ed  any s o r t  o f dependence on f o r e ig n  pow ers. See, 
W illiam s, o p . c i t . ,  pp .52  and 56. See a l s o ,  s ta te m e n t in  
Septem ber 1967 by I n d i a 's  Deputy Prim e M in is te r ,  Mr. M ara ji 
D esa i. R eported  in  The New York T im es, 13 Septem ber 1967,
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This pact was designed to serve two purposes; to protect a
weakened and disarmed Japan against attack from any quarter and,
to provide the U.S. with a base for military operations in the
Far East«, To facilitate these objectives America was granted
the right to station forces in and around Japan both for the
defence of the country against external attack and for the
suppression of externally inspired civil disorder. In addition,
Washington was given wide powers over the use of Japanese
territory and facilities for the support of American military
activity in other parts of the Far East.'*'
In 1960, a new defence arrangement was concluded between
Tokyo and Washington. This was called the Treaty of Mutual
Co-operation and Security and, unlike its predecessor, placed
2a firm obligation on the U.S. to defend Japan.
In October 1964, in the wake of China's first nuclear
test, President Johnson reaffirmed America's intention to
3honour all of its security commitments in Asia; the agreement 
with Japan was clearly included in this undertaking. Three 
months later, in the communique issued after talks between 
President Johnson and the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Sato,
1. For an account of some of these developments see Shunsaku 
Katoo, "Postwar Japanese Security and Rearmament: With 
Special Reference to Japanese-American Relations", in 
D.C.S. Sissons (ed.), Papers on Modern Japan, 1968,
Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968; 
Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with 
Japan, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1963; and, Martin E„ Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defence 
Policy, 1947-1968, New York and London: Columbia University 
Press, 1971.
2. See Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and 
Security. The text of this treaty is reproduced as Appendix 
II of this thesis.
3. See above, p. 291.
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th e  U»S. le a d e r  re a f f i rm e d  A m erica 's  " d e te rm in a t io n  to  ab id e  by
i t s  commitment 0»» to  defend Japan  a g a i n s t  any armed a t t a c k
from th e  o u t s i d e »" The communique f u r t h e r  noted  t h a t  i t  was
" e s s e n t i a l  f o r  th e  s t a b i l i t y  and peace of A sia  t h a t  t h e r e  be
no u n c e r t a in t y  about J a p a n 's  s e c u r i t y » " ^  The view t h a t  th e
a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  U»S. c o n s t i t u t e d  a s u f f i c i e n t  g u a ra n te e  of
J a p a n 's  s e c u r i t y ,  even in  th e  c o n te x t  of C h in a 's  n u c le a r
developm ent, was one which was r e p e a te d ly  endorsed in  o f f i c i a l
American pronouncem ents . In  J u ly  1966, th e  American S e c re ta ry
of D efence, Mr» McNamara, i n  an in t e r v ie w  w ith  a no ted  Japanese
defen ce  a u t h o r i t y ,  in t im a te d  t h a t  t h e r e  were no l i m i t a t i o n s  on
th e  k ind  of weapons th e  U.S» would be p rep a red  to  u se  in  
2
J a p a n 's  defence» E la b o ra t in g  on th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of th e  
s e c u r i t y  t r e a t y ,  Mr» McNamara s a id :
I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  would be a s e r io u s  m is ta k e  fo r  
your co u n try  [Japan] o r  any o th e r  n a t io n  on th e  
p e r ip h e ry  of Red China to  develop  i t s  own n u c le a r  
f o r c e » » 0 » I t ' s  no t a t  a l l  needed , because  we have 
t r e a t y  commitments w i th  you, under th e  terms of 
which we a r e  bound, w i th in  th e  l i m i t s  of our 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s e s ,  to  come to  your defence»
Under no c o n c e iv a b le  c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  would you 
develop  as l a r g e  a n u c le a r  f o r c e  as we p r e s e n t l y  
have, so i t  would be an u t t e r  w aste  f o r  you and 
o th e r s  who a r e  in  a s i m i l a r  p o s i t i o n »3
In  th e  second Johnson -S a to  communique which was r e l e a s e d  a f t e r  
t a l k s  between th e  American and J ap an ese  le a d e r s  in  November 
1967, n o te  was ta k en  of P e k in g 's  e f f o r t s  to  develop  a n u c le a r
1» See, t e x t  of th e  communique» Reproduced in  Department of 
S t a t e  B u l l e t i n , W ashington: U»S» Department of S ta t e  
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  DoO»S.B» ) , 1 February  1965, 
pp»134-136»
2» See, " In te rv ie w  w ith  S e c re ta ry  McNamara»" Text of an i n t e r ­
view by P ro fe s s o r  Kei Wakaizumi, Kyoto I n d u s t r i a l  U n iver­
s i t y ,  w ith  S e c r e ta r y  of Defence R obert S» McNamara, 15 J u ly  
1966, P en tagon , W ashington, 1966, p . 9 .  (Copy of in t e rv ie w  
he ld  i n  S t r a t e g i c  and Defence S tu d ie s  C e n tre ,  A u s t r a l i a n  
N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i t y ,  C anberra .  )
3» ib i d .
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arsenal and of the importance of creating conditions "wherein
Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from Communist
China»" Washington again reaffirmed its intention to maintain
the security treaty between Japan and the U„S.^ Finally, in
Congressional hearings held in Washington during 1967 and 1968,
spokesmen for the administration were adamant that Japan’s
defence needs were adequately catered for by the terms of the
2security treaty with the U„S.
These assurances of support have undoubtedly been regarded 
by Washington as an important part of its effort to persuade 
Japan to remain non-nuclear. Moreover, as was noted in Chapter 
V, there is reason to believe that they have in fact made a 
significant contribution in this regard» But the security 
relationship between Washington and Tokyo is a complex one 
and it is possible to argue that within the context of this 
arrangement the U„S» has also adopted policies which have 
weakened rather than strengthened the forces working against 
proliferation in Japan» For many years, the U»S. has worked 
hard to convince Japan to assume a greater defence burden 
and to persuade Tokyo to take a more serious view of the 
threat from China. More specifically, Washington has adopted 
policies which seem calculated to help rid the Japanese people 
of their nuclear allergy.
1» See, text of the communique. Reproduced in D c0.S»B.,
4 December 1967, pp»744-747»
2» See especially, testimony by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
in Senate Hearings on U.S» Armament and Disarmament Prob­
lems, 1967, pp.155-156, See also, statement by A.C.D.A. 
Director, W»C„ Foster, in Arms Control and Disarmament 
Act Amendments, 1968, hearings before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 1, 5-8, 
19, 20, 1968, Washington, 1968 (hereafter referred to as 
House- Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amend­
ments, 1968), p.22„
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The idea of enlisting Japan's support for the U„S» defence
effort in the Far East first arose in the late 1940's and was
reinforced by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950»^
Throughout the 1950’s Washington pressed Japan to assume a
greater share of the burden of its own defence, though
generally speaking, Tokyo declined to accept the levels of
2rearmament suggested to it by the United States» In February
1964, Defence Secretary McNamara urged that Japan was "ready
»»» to support her own forces and [was] capable of expanding
her forces to contribute to the security of the entire area»"
In hearings the following year on military procurement for
FY 1966, McNamara again urged Japan to expand its defence 
4forces» In July 1966 he told the Japanese defence authority 
Kei Wakaizumi, that: "I think your country will and should
play an increasing role in Asia, in organizing the nations 
of free Asia to defend themselves [my emphasis]»" The Defence 
Department was not alone in its appeals for a greater Japanese 
defence effort» In hearings in 1967 on the Foreign Assistance 
Act, Assistant Secretary of State, William Bundy, was insistent 
that the U„S» "should push them [Japan] to carry the burden 
of their own defence to a greater degree»"^
1» Katoo, op. cit», pp.62 and 67»
2» Weinstein, op» cit», p»65 ff.
3» See his testimony in Department of Defence Appropriations 
for 1965, Part 4, hearings before a Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong», 2nd Sess», 
February 1964, Washington, 1964, p»13»
4» See his testimony in Military Procurement Authorizations, 
Fiscal Year, 1966, hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defence 
of the Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong,, 1st Sess», 
February-March, 1965, Washington, 1965, p»20»
5» See, "Interview With Secretary McNamara", p»7»
6» See his testimony in Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, 
hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
90th Cong», 1st Sess», April-June, 1967, Washington, 1967 
(hereafter referred to as House Hearings on Foreign Assis­
tance Act of 1967), p»759»
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W ashington has o f t e n  e x h ib i t e d  d i s p l e a s u r e  over T okyo 's  
p o l i c y  tow ards China and has t r i e d  hard  to  persuade  Japan  to  
ta k e  a more s e r io u s  v iew  o f th e  p o t e n t i a l  t h r e a t  from i t s  g i a n t  
neighbouro This  b e l i e f  i n th e  U„S. about J a p a n ’s China p o l i c y  
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  obvious i n  th e  p e r io d  1964-1968 and seems to  
have been s t im u la te d  by two developm ents; C h in a ’s e n t ry  i n t o  
th e  n u c le a r  c lu b ,  and A m erica’ s in c r e a s in g  involvem ent i n  th e  
war i n  Vietnam« As has a l r e a d y  been n o te d ,  th e  communique 
r e l e a s e d  a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  S a to -Jo h n so n  m eeting  in  January  1965 
c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t e d  th e  d iv e rg e n t  v iews h e ld  by th e  two l e a d e r s  
about th e  p o t e n t i a l  danger from C h ina .^  L a te r  t h a t  y ear  
A s s i s t a n t  S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e  W illiam  Bundy denounced what he
2
re g a rd e d  as  J a p a n ’s "d a n g e ro u s ly  m is tak en  view s" about China«
In  December, James R es to n ,  th e  no ted  co lu m n is t  f o r  The New York
Times, s t r o n g ly  rebuked Tokyo f o r  i t s  r e l a t i v e  i n d i f f e r e n c e
3
tow ards th e  American p red ic am en t in  South E as t  Asia« E a r ly  
i n  1966, P h i l i p  Quigg, E d i to r - in - C h i e f  of F o re ig n  A f f a i r s  
c o n t r ib u te d  an a r t i c l e  to  t h a t  j o u r n a l  i n  which he no t on ly  
a t t a c k e d  p r e v a i l i n g  J a p a n e se  th in k in g  about China , bu t a l s o ,  
g e n e r a l ly  condemned th e  government i n  Tokyo f o r  having 
a llow ed th e  i n i t i a t i v e  on q u e s t io n s  of de fen ce  and f o r e ig n
4
p o l i c y  to  pass  in to  th e  hands of " l e f t i s t s  and p a c i f i s t s . "
L a te r  t h a t  y e a r ,  i n  th e  in t e r v ie w  w ith  Kei Wakaizumi quoted 
above, Defence S e c r e ta r y  McNamara spoke i n  th e  g r a v e s t  term s 
abou t th e  t h r e a t  from Peking« China , he n o te d ,  was "deve lop ing  
n u c le a r  weapons which [were] n o t  r e q u i r e d  to  defend  h e r s e l f . "  
There was a "p re su m p tio n " ,  he added, t h a t  she was "dev e lo p in g
I .  See above, p .158 .
2« As r e p o r te d  in  The New York T im es, 31 O ctober 1965.
3. i b i d . ,  22 December 1965.
4. See, P h i l i p  W. Quigg, " Japan  i n  N e u t r a l " ,  i n  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , 
Vol. 44, No. 2, J a n u a ry  1966, p p . 253-263.
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them to  support a program of a g g re s s io n » "  On th e  o cc a s io n  of
th e  second S a to -Johnson  m eeting  in  December 1967, th e  Japanese
Prime M in is te r  seems to  have been persuaded  to  adop t a tougher
s ta n d  on China th a n  he p r e v io u s ly  had» In  th e  communique
is s u e d  a f t e r  t h e i r  m eeting  both  le a d e r s  condemned P e k in g ’ s
" i n t r a n s i g e n t  a t t i t u d e "  and agreed  on th e  need fo r  m easures
2to  p r o t e c t  n a t io n s  i n  Asia from Chinese a g g r e s s io n „
Few th in g s  have c re a te d  more i l l - f e e l i n g  between Washing­
ton  and Tokyo th a n  th e  q u e s t io n  of th e  p re sen ce  in  Japan  of 
American n u c le a r  weapons or n u c le a r  powered v e s s e ls »  In  view 
of J a p a n ’s s p e c i a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  on th e  m a t t e r ,  mere rumours of 
th e  p re se n c e  i n  th e  co u n try  of m i l i t a r y  hardw are of t h i s  s o r t  
have been s u f f i c i e n t  to  provoke more than  one p o l i t i c a l  storm» 
But t h i s  has no t d is su ad ed  W ashington from a t te m p t in g  to  
deploy  n u c le a r  weapons in  Japan» In  th e  1950’s a v ig o ro u s  
t u s s l e  was waged w ith  th e  Hatoyama Government b e fo re  i t  was 
e v e n tu a l ly  ag reed  t h a t  no n u c le a r  warheads would be brought
in to  Japan  w ith o u t  th e  consen t of bo th  th e  American and th e
3
Jap an ese  Governments» (N uclear weapons have of co u rse  been
deployed i n  Okinawa w hich, because  i t  has been under American
c o n t r o l ,  has been f r e e  of th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  p e r t a in in g  to
Japan  p ro per» )  In  r e c e n t  t im e s ,  c o n t ro v e rsy  has su rrounded
th e  p re se n c e  i n  Jap an ese  w a te rs  of American n u c le a r  powered
v e s s e ls »  In  November 1963 th e  n u c lea r-pow ered  subm arine
4
N a u t i lu s  c a l l e d  a t  a J ap an ese  port»  By December 1968, a t o t a l  
of 24 c a l l s  had been made by U»S. nuc lea r-pow ered  v e s s e l s » ^
1» See, " In te rv ie w  With S e c re ta ry  McNamara", p»8.
2» For th e  t e x t  of th e  communique, see  D»0oS»B», 4 December 
1967, pp»744-747»
3» W ein s te in ,  op» c i t », p p . 80-83»
4» i b i d », p» 98»
5. See, Frank Langdon, " S t r a i n s  in  C u rren t  Japanese-A m erican  
Defence T h in k in g " ,  i n  A sian  S u rvey , Vol, 9, No» 9,
September 1969, p»707„
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A number of these visits provoked vigorous opposition from 
amongst the Japanese people, This was especially so during the 
visit to Sasebo in January 1968 of the American nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier, the Enterprise; it was widely alleged that 
during the visit the vessel was carrying nuclear weapons, 
Demonstrations also occurred after the visit to Sasebo in 1968 
of the nuclear-powered submarine, the Swordfish; on this occasion 
anger mounted in Japan after it was revealed that during the
2visit radioactive material was discharged into Sasebo Harbour»
In view of the commotion and bitterness which has so often
surrounded these visits one must ask why the U.S, has persisted
in the practice» One obvious answer seems to be that the visits
are necessary for the maintenance of America’s naval presence in
the Far East» However, there have been official indications
that this is not so; the visits, it seems, are convenient but
3not absolutely necessary, Some unofficial observers have 
suggested that the visits have been sponsored by IKS» officials 
in order to help rid Japan of its "nuclear allergy" and to
1. ibid», po708o
20 ibid», p,709o
3» On this point, see remarks by U 0 Alexis Johnson, Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in United States 
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Part 5, Japan 
and Okinawa, hearings before the Subcommittee on United States 
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong,, 2nd Sess,,
January 26-29, 1970, Washington, 1970 (hereafter referred 
t0 as Senate Hearings on Japan and Okinawa, 1970), p„1261.
Also relevant here is the fact that nuclear-powered ships 
are characterised by their self-sufficiency and their 
capacity for prolonged periods of continuous steaming,
Thus there is less need for frequent port calls. On this 
point, see remarks by Defence Secretary McNamara, in 
Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, 
hearings before the Senate Committee on Aimed Services and 
the Subcommittee on Department of Defence of the Committee 
on Appropriations, 89th Cong,,2nd Sess,, February-March,
1966, Washington, 1966, p,6320
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educate the Japanese people about the role of nuclear weapons in 
, 1their country s defence., Whether or not this was a primary 
motive for America’s action is difficult to say with any 
certainty; official sources are understandably silent on the 
mattero But the fact remains that by seeking to deploy nuclear 
weapons in Japan, and by arranging for port calls by American 
nuclear-powered vessels, Washington accepted the possibility 
that the Japanese people would become more accustomed to the 
presence on their soil of military nuclear hardware0 It seems 
that the United States Government was prepared, in the interests 
of wider U0So objectives, to risk weakening a uniquely powerful 
disincentive for proliferation in Japan,,
It has been emphasised on a number of occasions in this 
thesis that Japanese thinking on defence matters, at least so 
far as the period under review in this particular section is 
concerned, was characterised, among other things, by three 
important features: a strong distaste for militarism; a
tendency not to regard China as a particularly serious military 
threat; and a deep aversion to nuclear weapons0 It seems 
reasonable to argue that the presence of these three features 
could be expected to predispose Japan towards a policy of not 
acquiring nuclear weapons and that, given its declared 
commitment to the goal of nonproliferation in Asia, Washington 
would have been well advised to exploit this unusually 
promising (from the point of view of nonproliferation) state 
of affairso But quite the opposite has been the case0
lo Langdon, opc cit«, p„707o See also, George R„ Packard III, 
"Living With the Real Japan" in Robert E. Osgood, George R, 
Packard III, and John H„ Badgley, Japan and the United States 
in Asia, Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 
pp0 32-33 o Packard has suggested that, elements in the U.S. 
Navy were primarily responsible for this policy„
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Not only has the Ü0S. pressed Japan to assume a greater defence 
burden and tried hard to stimulate in Tokyo a concern about China, 
but in addition, it has adopted policies which could be expected 
to help erode Japan’s special aversion to nuclear weapons„ In 
the interests of wider UoSe goals, principally the containment of 
Chinese and, to a lesser extent Soviet power, Washington was 
prepared to adopt policies which could be said to have detracted 
from the goal of nonproliferation in Japan,, There can be little 
doubt, of course, that the U 0S. Administration remained, on the 
whole, opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons to Japan„
However, it is equally clear that there was much support for 
the idea that the objective of nonproliferation should not be 
purchased at the price of other United States goals in Japan 
and the Far East.
Nonproliferation and the United States-Australia
The origins of the security link between Washington and 
Canberra were discussed earlier in this t h e s i s T h e r e  it 
was noted that since the creation of the AoNoZiUoS« pact (the 
agreement was signed in September 1951), the United States has 
been committed, subject only to its own constitutional processes, 
to defend Australia against armed attack in the Pacific area0 
It was further noted that Canberra's reliance on the nuclear 
power of its allies, especially that of the U.So, has been an 
important determinant of the Australian Government’s non-nuclear 
policyo ^
During the years since China commenced nuclear testing, 
the UcSo has repeatedly indicated its determination to defend
lc See above, p„208o 
2, See above, pp«209-2106
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Australia under the terms of the AoN.Z.UoS, pact; this has been 
implied in general statements reaffirming America’s commitments 
in Asia, and has been noted more specifically in a host of 
official A.NoZ.U.Se pronouncements (principally in the communi­
ques released after regular meetings of the A,N.Z.U,So Council) 0 
At the same time, however, in the period under review in this 
section, Washington served notice on Canberra that there were 
clear limits to the extent to which the U„S, would be prepared 
to become militarily involved on behalf of Australia in the 
area adjacent to that continent in South East Asia. One such 
indication of this had its roots in the early 1960’s and 
concerned the squabbles between Canberra and Djakarta, first 
over West New Guinea, and then over Malaysia. In the former 
case, Washington declined to be influenced by Australian 
urgings that Indonesia’s attempt to wrest control of the 
Dutch-held territory of West New Guinea should be resisted; 
the United States Government considered that resistance to 
Djakarta’s aspirations in West New Guinea could have an 
unfavourable impact on the internal politics of Indonesia 
and upset the international balance of power in the area.^" 
Moreover, in 1965, when Australia sent troops to Borneo to 
help Malaysia in its struggle against Indonesian "confront­
ation", Canberra was unable to elicit from Washington a 
specific assurance of U„S„ military support in the event
2that the Australian forces in Borneo should need assistance. 
According to Norman Harper, Canberra’s efforts to secure a 
U.S. assurance over the Malaysian issue "aroused firm American 
opposition to what it regarded as a unilateral attempt by an
1. For a discussion of these matters, see Trevor R„ Reese, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, London:
Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.213-217,
2, ibid,, p ,224.
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a l l y  to  in v o lv e  th e  U nited S t a t e s  in  f u r t h e r  o v e rse a s  commitments
Another i n d i c a t i o n  of A m erica’ s r e lu c t a n c e  to  become too  deep ly
inv o lv ed  m i l i t a r i l y  on A u s t r a l i a ’ s b e h a l f  concerned th e  s i t u a t i o n
c r e a te d  by B r i t a i n ’ s scheduled  w ith d raw al from th e  M a lay s ia -  
2
S ingapo re  area» Though th e  U»S0 sym path ised  w ith  C a n b e r r a 's
o p p o s i t io n  to  B r i t a i n ' s  proposed w ith d ra w a l ,  t h e r e  were c l e a r
i n d i c a t i o n s  in  1968 t h a t  Washington had no i n t e n t i o n  of f i l l i n g
th e  m i l i t a r y  vacuum which would be l e f t  i n  th e  M a lay s ia -S in g ap o re
a r e a  a f t e r  th e  B r i t i s h  d epartu re , ,  The re a so n s  f o r  W ash ing ton’ s
a t t i t u d e  on t h i s  o c c a s io n  a r e  no t hard  to  d iscover»  Concern
in  th e  U.S, abou t th e  n a t i o n ’s o v e rse a s  commitments had been
s t im u la te d  by th e  war in  Vietnam and t h i s  f e e l i n g  had mounted
trem endously  by 1968; any move a t  t h i s  tim e to  commit American
f o r c e s  to  th e  M a lay s ia -S in g ap o re  a r e a  would a lm ost c e r t a i n l y
have encoun te red  s t ro n g  dom estic  o p p o s i t io n  in  th e  U.S. ( I t
i s  w orth  r e c a l l i n g  in  t h i s  c o n te x t  t h a t  dom estic  o p p o s i t io n  to
w ider s e c u r i t y  commitments was p ro b ab ly  a l s o  a f a c t o r  in
W ashington’s u n e n t h u s i a s t i c  re sp o n se  to  I n d i a ' s  r e q u e s t  in
4
1967 f o r  a j o i n t  n u c le a r  g u a ra n te e . )
These developm ents  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  1964-68 were a 
rem inder to  C anberra  t h a t  excep t presum ably where d i r e c t  
a g g re s s io n  was in v o lv e d ,  th e  U.S. would su p p o r t  A u s t r a l i a  on ly  
i f  i t  s u i t e d  i t s  w ider i n t e r e s t s  to  do so . The d e m o n s tra t io n  
of t h i s  r e a l i t y  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  i l l - t i m e d  from th e  p o i n t - o f -  
view of W ash in g to n 's  d e s i r e  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  (and o th e r  n o n -n u c le a r  
s t a t e s )  should  su p p o r t  th e  N .P .T . At a time when th e  U .S . ,  i n
L  See, Norman H arp e r ,  "Anzus and th e  American A l l i a n c e " ,  i n  
A u s t r a l i a n  O u tlo o k , Vol. 24, No. 1, A p r i l  1970, pp„82~3.
See a l s o ,  R eese , o p . :c i t . , pp .217-225 .
2. For a n o te  on th e  proposed B r i t i s h  w ith d ra w a l ,  see  above,
p p . 220-221.
3. See, Reese, op. c i t „, pp»297-298.
4. See above, p p . 302-304.
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th e  i n t e r e s t s  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  ought to  have been doing 
e v e ry th in g  i t  could  to  r e a s s u r e  C anberra  abou t th e  e f f i c a c y  and 
th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of th e  A .N.Z.U .S, p a c t ,  Washington adopted 
p o l i c i e s  which could  on ly  have th e  e f f e c t  of caus ing  d i s ­
i l lu s io n m e n t  i n  A u s t r a l i a  w i th  th e  American a l l i a n c e „
Though th e r e  was some concern  in  A u s t r a l i a  abou t A .N .Z .U .S . ,  
C anberra  does no t appea r  to  have r e a c te d  by su p p o r t in g  th e  
a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  any le ss»  On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  
Trevor Reese has shown how th e  r e b u f f  d e l iv e r e d  by W ashington, 
e s p e c i a l l y  over th e  i s s u e  of American su p p o r t  f o r  th e  Aus­
t r a l i a n  t ro o p s  in  Borneo, seems to  have s t im u la te d  in  C anberra  
n o t  on ly  an aw areness of th e  need fo r  a g r e a t e r  n a t i o n a l  
de fen c e  e f f o r t ,  bu t a l s o ,  an a n x ie ty  to  im press W ashington 
t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  was a lo y a l  and u s e f u l  a l l y .  T h is  l a t t e r  
endeavour was e v id e n t  b o th  in  A u s t r a l i a ’s s t ro n g  su p p o r t  f o r  
th e  U nited  S t a t e s  p o s i t i o n  in  Vietnam and in  th e  d e c i s io n s
to  a l lo w  th e  U.S« to  e s t a b l i s h  e l e c t r o n i c  and r a d a r  defence
2
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  in  A u s t r a l i a .
Mention of th e  American i n s t a l l a t i o n s  in  A u s t r a l i a  
r a i s e s  a g a in  th e  q u e s t io n  of w hether th e  s e c u r i t y  l i n k s  between 
Washington and C anberra  in  th e  p e r io d  1964-1968 were w holly  
conducive to  th e  cause  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A u s t r a l i a .
The n av a l  communications s t a t i o n  a t  N orth  West Cape i s  c l e a r l y  
p a r t  of A m erica 's  g lo b a l  n u c le a r  e s ta b l is h m e n t  and i t  i s  
p o s s ib le  t h a t  th e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  a t  P in e  Gap i s  a l s o .  I t  
seems re a s o n a b le  to  a rgue  t h a t  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of th e s e  
f a c i l i t i e s  in  A u s t r a l i a  has h ig h l ig h te d  f o r  many in  t h a t  co u n try  
th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of n u c le a r  weapons in  th e  d efence  of th e
1. See, R eese, op. c i t . ,  pp.225 and 290-293.
2. For a n o te  on A u s t r a l i a ’ s commitment to  Vietnam, see  above, 
p p . 216-217. For d e t a i l s  about th e  U.S. de fence  i n s t a l l a ­
t i o n s  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  see  p p . 210-212.
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Western World generally and of Australia in particular. (The 
establishment of the rocket range at Woomera and Britain*s 
nuclear test programme in Australia probably had a similar 
effecto ) It seems likely that this has raised the perceived 
value of nuclear weapons in the minds of many Australians and 
has consequently strengthened, albeit marginally, the forces 
for proliferation in Australia* On the other hand, there can 
be little doubt that in the eyes of many Australians the 
presence of these installations has enhanced the credibility 
of the American alliance; not only has Washington's capacity 
to meet its commitments in Asia been strengthened, but in 
addition, the U.S, has acquired a further interest in 
preserving Australia’s independence* Issues such as this, 
point up the fact that in response to the problem of nuclear 
proliferation, the U.S» has often had to strike a balance 
between two conflicting considerations, viz», whereas the 
pursuit of nuclear restraint requires that the United States 
keep its nuclear weapons in the background of its policies, 
the provision of guarantees sometimes demands that they be 
kept at the foreground»^
As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, an 
examination of U„S. security policy in Asia in the years 
1964-68 casts a revealing light on American efforts to limit 
proliferation» To take first the case of Washington's 
relations with Japan, United States nonproliferation policy 
with respect to that country would have been well served by 
a strategy aimed at reinforcing to the full those factors 
which tended to point Japan in a non-nuclear direction»
1. For details about Woomera and the British test programme, 
see above, pp»189-190»
2. On this point see, Hedley Bull, loc» cit», pp.6-7»
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However, because of pressure in Washington that Japan should do 
more for its own defence and be prepared to assist further the 
Western effort in the Far East, policies were adopted which 
could have the effect of undermining powerful anti®nuclear forces 
in Japan. It will be noted in the next chapter that the promotion 
of ideas which could be regarded as inimical to the policy of 
nonproliferation in Japan became more marked after the Nixon 
Administration assumed office in 1969.
So far as relations between Delhi and the United States were 
concerned, Washington was prepared to admit that India had a 
legitimate security problem and that there was a danger that 
the country might be forced to acquire nuclear weapons. Never­
theless, the U.S. was reluctant to formally commit itself to 
the defence of India, Delhi’s request for a nuclear guarantee 
came at a time when criticism of America's security commitments 
abroad was building up in the United States. Though there 
were a number of reasons for the abandonment of the Indian 
initiative, Washington’s reluctance at that time to further 
extend its defence commitments abroad was clearly a major one.
The same considerations would appear to have been a factor in 
Washington's reluctance to extend its security commitments 
into the Malaysia-Singapore area.
The provision of effective guarantees and assurances has 
long been regarded as a vital element in efforts to limit the 
spread of nuclear weapons. But by 1968, forces had begun to 
emerge in the U.S. which were destined to throw a shadow on 
America’s existing commitments and which were already making 
it difficult for Washington to enter into new ones. It did not 
bode well for the success of another important element in 
America’s nonproliferation strategy that these developments 
in U.S, thinking about the nation’s commitments abroad should
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have coincided with American (and Soviet) efforts to promote 
the NoP.To1
In the present chapter an attempt was made to examine 
the relationship between nonproliferation and U.S. security policy 
in Asia in the years 1964-68. The analysis, it is suggested, 
reinforces a point made earlier, viz,, that efforts to limit 
the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia have often had to take 
second place to the pursuit of other U.S. policy objectives.
In the next chapter the relationship between nonproliferation 
and U.S. security policy in Asia in the years 1969-71 will be 
examined.
1. The N.P.To was opened for signature at Washington, London, 
and Moscow on July 1, 1968, and signed on the same day by 
the UoS., the U.K., the U.SoS.R., and more than 50 other 
countries. It was due to enter into force when instruments 
of ratification had been deposited by the U.S., the U.K», 
the U.S.S.R., and 40 other governments.
CHAPTER X
NONPROLIFERATION AND AMERICAN SECURITY 
POLICY IN ASIA, 1969 - 1971
Since the Nixon Administration assumed office in January 
1969, U„So policy-makers have carried out a thoroughgoing 
review of America's defence and foreign policies0 A major 
stimulus to this re-evaluation was, of course, the American 
experience in Vietnam« By the end of 1968 IK So forces already 
committed to the war in S.E, Asia totalled almost half a million 
men and during that year alone the conflict had claimed the 
lives of some 15,000 Americans0 In addition, United States 
involvement in Vietnam had provoked condemnation of America 
in many parts of the world and at home had resulted in a 
bitter polarization of American society6 These pressures had, 
amongst other things, forced President Johnson to announce 
that he would not seek re-election to the White House and had 
stimulated widespread disillusionment in the U«S« with foreign 
commitments« During the campaign for the Presidency in 1968, 
Mr» Nixon was careful not to commit himself too far on the 
question of Vietnam« However, there can be little doubt that 
his victory in the election was at least partly a reflection 
of the American public's disenchantment with the previous 
administration's handling of the war and of their hope that 
the Republicans would lead the U„S0 out of its current diffi­
culties in South East Asia and find a means of avoiding similar 
entanglements in the future«
Another important stimulus to the Nixon Administration's 
reassessment of U«S« foreign and defence policies was the new 
government's belief that significant changes had taken place in
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th e  s t r u c t u r e  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  re la t io n s ; '* '  as  P r e s id e n t  Nixon put
i t ,  " th e  c o n f ig u r a t io n  of power t h a t  emerged from th e  Second World
2War — [was] gone» The changes c i t e d  by P r e s id e n t  Nixon
in c lu d ed  th e  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of Japan  and W estern Europe; th e  growth 
of many new n a t io n s  to  a s ta g e  where they  were cap a b le  of s h o u ld e r ­
ing more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e i r  own s e c u r i t y  and w e l l -b e in g ;  
th e  f ra g m e n ta t io n  of th e  " S t a l i n i s t  b lo c "  and th e  consequen t 
change in  th e  n a tu r e  of th e  communist c h a l le n g e ;  th e  expansion  
of S o v ie t  m i l i t a r y  ( e s p e c i a l l y  s t r a t e g i c - n u c l e a r )  power; and
th e  rep lacem en t of th e  r i g i d  b i - p o l a r  world of th e  1940’ s and
3
1950*s by one c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by " m u l t i l a t e r a l  d ip lom acy ."
1. The Nixon A d m in i s t r a t i o n ’s views on t h i s  m a t te r  were s e t  out 
i n  some d e t a i l  i n  P r e s id e n t  N ixon’s f i r s t  two f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  
r e p o r t s  to  C ongress. See, A New S t r a t e g y  For Peace : U.S. 
F o re ig n  P o l ic y  For The 1970’ s , A R eport to  th e  Congress by 
R ichard  Nixon, P r e s id e n t  of th e  U nited  S t a t e s ,  W ashington, 
F ebruary  18, 1970, p p d - 1 3 .  See a l s o ,  B u ild in g  For Peace :
U.So F o re ig n  P o l ic y  For The 1970’s , A R eport to  th e  Congress 
by R ichard  Nixon, P r e s id e n t  of th e  U nited  S t a t e s ,  W ashington, 
F ebruary  25, 1971, p p .1 -4 .  That th e  new governm en t 's  th in k in g  
on t h i s  and o th e r  a s p e c t s  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  and U.S. 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  drew h e a v i ly  on th e  v iew s of th e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s 
a d v i s e r  on n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  a f f a i r s ,  Henry K is s in g e r ,  i s  
ap p a re n t  from an exam ina tion  of some of th e  l a t t e r ’ s w r i t i n g s .  
See e s p e c i a l l y ,  Henry A. K is s in g e r ,  American F o re ig n  P o l i c y , 
London: W eidenfeld  and N ic o lso n ,  1969, p p . 52-97. For 
K i s s i n g e r ' s  views on p o s s i b l e  m easures f o r  a s e t t l e m e n t  of 
th e  war i n  Vietnam, see i b i d . ,  p p . 100-135.
2. See, B u ild in g  For P e a c e , p .2 .
3. A s im i l a r  v iew  had p re v io u s ly  been developed by Henry K is s in g e r .  
According to  him, th e  "age of th e  superpow ers" was drawing to  
an end and was be ing  r e p la c e d  by one c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by what he 
c a l l e d  " p o l i t i c a l  m u l t i p o l a r i t y "  i n  which weaker s t a t e s  
enjoyed g r e a t e r  in f lu e n c e  in  world a f f a i r s  th an  b e fo re  even 
though overwhelming m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  con t inued  to  r e s i d e
w ith  th e  two superpow ers. For an e x p o s i t io n  of th e s e  i d e a s ,  
see  K is s in g e r ,  op. c i t . ,  p p , 53-90.
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According to the President, these changes had undermined many of 
the assumptions and practices of post-war U,S, foreign and defence 
policies and had thus necessitated a thoroughgoing review of 
American thinking in this area, It was the task of the new 
administration he added, to "lead the nation through a fundamental 
transition in foreign policy,"'*'
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine United 
States security policy in Asia in the period 1969-1971 and to 
assess the significance of this policy for American efforts to 
limit proliferation in the area. It will be noted that the 
Nixon Government’s review of American foreign and defence policies 
had a particularly important impact on U,S. security policy in 
Asia, More importantly, it will be argued that U,S. security 
policy in Asia in the years 1969-1971 was, in many respects, 
inconsistent with the goal of nonproliferation in the area.
The approach adopted in this chapter will be as follows. In 
the first place it must be conceded that the Nixon doctrine 
has tended to overshadow all other developments concerning UoS, 
security policy in Asia in the period under review. It seems 
reasonable, then, that an attempt should be made to analyse 
the main characteristics of the Nixon doctrine and to assess, 
in general terms, its significance for American efforts to 
limit proliferation in Asia, But an analysis which took 
account of the Nixon doctrine only would be incomplete for 
the purposes of this chapter. In order to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the issues under review it will 
be necessary to supplement the examination of the Nixon doctrine 
with a somewhat more specific analysis of United States security 
policy towards India, Japan and Australia,
1, Building For Peace, p,2.
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Ao The Nixon D o c tr in e  and i t s  Si g n i f i c a n c e  fo r  
American N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  P o l ic y  in  A sia
A m ajor r e s u l t  of th e  Nixon G overnm ent's  r e a s s e s sm e n t  of
A m erica’s de fence  and f o r e ig n  p o l i c i e s  was th e  e n u n c ia t io n ,  d u r in g
th e  f i r s t  y ea r  of th e  new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  of what became known as
th e  Nixon d o c t r i n e 0 Some w r i t e r s ^  have used th e  l a t t e r  term  as  a
synonym f o r  th e  Nixon A d m in i s t r a t i o n ’ s f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  as a whole«
However, on th e  b a s i s  of th e  m a t e r i a l  c o n ta in ed  in  P r e s id e n t
N ixon’ s f i r s t  two fo r e ig n  p o l i c y  r e p o r t s  to  C ongress ,  i t  seems
re a s o n a b le  to  i n t e r p r e t  th e  Nixon d o c t r i n e  i n  a more l im i t e d  way
th a n  t h i s ,  v i z « ,  as a s ta te m e n t  of th e  b a s i s  on which th e  U nited
S ta t e s  was p rep a red  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  th e  de fen c e  and development
of i t s  f r i e n d s  and a l l i e s «  This  i s  th e  meaning which w i l l  be
2
g iven  th e  term in  t h i s  chap ter«  The b a s ic  i n g r e d i e n t s  of
th e  Nixon d o c t r i n e  were o f f i c i a l l y  r e v e a le d  f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e
in  a p r e s s  co n fe ren c e  d u r in g  P r e s id e n t  N ixon’ s v i s i t  to  Guam in  
3
J u ly  1969« They were r e p e a te d  by P r e s id e n t  Nixon in  an a d d re s s
to  th e  American n a t io n  in  November 1969« The Nixon d o c t r i n e
has s in c e  been d e s c r ib e d  on a number of o c c a s io n s :  in  a h o s t
of speeches  and in te rv ie w s  by th e  P r e s id e n t  and members of h i s
a d m in i s t r a t io n ;  i n  P r e s id e n t  N ixon’s an n u a l  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  r e p o r t s  
4
to  C ongress ; and in  a le n g th y  r e p o r t  on U,S, f o r e ig n  p o l i c y
1« See f o r  example, Zbigniew B r z e z in s k i ,  "H alf P a s t  Nixon" in  
F o re ig n  P o l i c y , No, 3 ,  Summer 1971, p p ,3 -2 1 ,
2« Of co u rs e ,  th e  Nixon d o c t r i n e  was n o t  th e  only  r e s u l t  of th e  
new governm ent’ s rev iew  of U,S, f o r e ig n  and de fen ce  p o l i c i e s .  
Among o th e r  t h i n g s ,  th e  Nixon A d m in i s t r a t i o n 's  p o l i c i e s  towards 
R uss ia  and China were p ro d u c ts  of t h i s  r e a s se s sm e n t  a l s o ,  Some 
r e f e r e n c e  has a l re a d y  been made in  t h i s  t h e s i s  to  th e s e  l a t t e r  
p o l i c i e s
3« See r e p o r t  i n  The New York T im es, 26 J u ly  1969,
4, See, A New S tr a te g y  For Peace and B u ild in g  For P e a c e ,
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by th e  S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e ,  Mr, R ogers ,^  The m i l i t a r y  a s p e c t s  of
th e  p o l i c y  have re c e iv e d  s p e c i a l  t r e a tm e n t  in  th e  d e fen c e  p o s tu r e
2
s ta te m e n ts  of th e  S e c re ta ry  of D efence, Mr, L a i rd ,
From an a n a l y s i s  of th e s e  many r e n d i t i o n s  of th e  Nixon
d o c t r i n e ,  two b a s ic  id e a s  emerge. In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  i t  has been
s t r e s s e d  t h a t  " th e  U nited  S t a t e s  w i l l  keep a l l  i t s  t r e a t y  
3
commitments", America, a cc o rd in g  to  P r e s id e n t  Nixon, has "no
i n t e n t i o n  of w ithdraw ing from th e  w o rld " .  To d e s e r t  th o s e
c o u n t r i e s  who have come to  depend on th e  U nited  S t a t e s ,  he has
added, "would cause  d i s r u p t i o n  and i n v i t e  a g g r e s s io n " .^  In  a
s im i l a r  s p i r i t ,  th e  U,S. has emphasised t h a t  i t  has no i n t e n t i o n
£
of w ithdraw ing i t s  n u c le a r  u m b re l la .  Moreover, t h i s  
r e a f f i r m a t i o n  of A m erica’ s commitment to  th e  n u c le a r  d e fen c e  of 
i t s  a l l i e s ,  and th o s e  n a t io n s  whose s u r v iv a l  i t  c o n s id e r s  v i t a l  
to  i t s  own s e c u r i t y ,  has been l i n k e d ,  among o th e r  t h i n g s ,  to  
th e  g o a l  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  As P r e s id e n t  Nixon s a id  in  
F eb ru a ry ,  1971:
. . .  we bear  s p e c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  toward n o n -n u c le a r  
c o u n t r i e s .  T he ir  concern  would be m agn if ied  i f  we 
were to  le a v e  them d e f e n s e l e s s  a g a i n s t  n u c le a r  
b la ck m a i l  or c o n v e n t io n a l  a g g re s s io n  backed by 
n u c le a r  power. N a tio n s  in  a p o s i t i o n  to  b u i l d  ^
t h e i r  own n u c le a r  weapons would be l i k e l y  to  do so .
1. United S ta t e s  F o re ig n  P o l i c y ,  1969-1970, A R eport of th e  
S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e ,  Department of S ta t e  P u b l i c a t i o n  8575, 
W ashington, March 1971 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  Rogers 
R e p o r t ) .
2. See e s p e c i a l l y ,  S ta tem en t of S e c re ta ry  of D efense M elvin 
R, L a ird  B efore  th e  House Armed S e rv ic e s  Committee on th e  
FY 1972-76 Defense Program and th e  1972 D efense Budget,
March 9, 1971, U.S, Government P r in t i n g  O f f i c e ,  W ashington, 
1971 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  1972 Defense P o s tu re  S t a t e ­
ment) .
3. B u ild ing  For P e a c e , p ,5 ,
4. A New S t r a t e g y  For P e a c e , p .6 .
5. B u ild in g  For P e a c e , p ,5 .
6. i b i d .
7. i b i d .
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By 'reaffirming its alliance and other commitments in the 
way indicated above, Washington sought to convey the impression 
that the Nixon doctrine did not involve any substantial abandonment 
of the fundamental goals and purposes of post-war American foreign 
policyo The United States, President Nixon would have the world 
believe, is still committed to maintaining the global balance of 
power; is as anxious as ever to counter aggression and uphold 
international order; is still firmly dedicated to containing 
communism on a global scale; and, most important from the point 
of view of this thesis, remains interested in promoting the idea 
of nonproliferation.
But there is a second and more significant message in the 
Nixon doctrine. Since the day the new policy was first enunciated 
at Guam, it has been repeatedly emphasised that America’s friends 
and allies had to do more for their own defence, and that the 
United States expected to do less. As President Nixon explained 
it in February, 1971:
... it is no longer natural or possible in this 
age to argue that security or development around 
the globe is primarily America’s concern. The 
defense and progress of other countries must be 
first their responsibility and second, a regional 
responsibility, ... The United States can and 
will participate, where our interests dictate, 
but as ja weight - not the weight in the scaled
More specifically, the Nixon doctrine makes it clear that, where 
possible, American forces should not be used in limited warfare 
situations, such as border skirmishes, internal insurgencies, 
internal subversion supported from outside, and even, straight­
forward low-level aggression against a friend or ally. Other 
types of military assistance, as well as economic aid, will 
continue to be made available. America’s strategic role in 
respect to its friends and allies appears to be limited to
1. ibid., p.6.
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deterring nuclear attack and, possibly, to helping resist massive 
conventional invasions«
Though the Nixon doctrine purports to be global in its 
application there can be no denying that its major impact so far 
has been in Asia« It was no coincidence, it seems, that the new 
policy was first enunciated during a presidential tour of that 
region. Almost immediately it provided a framework for what 
became known as the policy of "Vietnamization"; not only was 
South Vietnam’s contribution to the war in that country substan­
tially increased, but also, the U.S« began withdrawing large 
numbers of its own forces,^- Moreover, in addition to the run­
down of U.S. forces in Vietnam, Washington announced that large
numbers of American troops would be withdrawn from Japan,
2Okinawa, Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines also. By way of
contrast, Washington appears to have hesitated over applying
the Nixon doctrine in Europe. In December 1970 the American
President announced that the U.S. "would maintain and improve
its forces in Europe and not reduce them without reciprocal
3action by [its] adversaries." In February of the following 
year he declared that:
accurately or inaccurately, our allies [in Europe] 
would interpret a substantial withdrawal of American 
forces as a substantial withdrawal of America’s
1. The authorized strength of U.S. forces in Vietnam fell from 
484,000 to 344,000 during 1970. The current schedule pro­
vides that they should be reduced to 69,000 by 1 May 1972. 
See, Strategic Survey, 1970, London: The Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1971, p.4, and Strategic Survey, 1971, 
London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1972, p.2.
2. Plans were announced during 1970 to withdraw 20,000 men from 
South Korea, 12,000 from Japan, 5,000 from Okinawa, 6,000 
from the Philippines and 9,800 from Thailand by mid-1971. 
See, Strategic Survey, 1970, p»4.
3. As indicated by President Nixon in Building For Peace, p.12.
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commitment o
This tendency to discriminate against Asia appears to have been
further underlined in the Nixon Administration's plans for the
long-term overall structure and deployment of U.S. general purpose
forceso Secretary Laird has emphasised that, unlike the Kennedy-
Johnson Administrations which aimed at a capability for, amongst
other things, fighting large Asian and European conflicts
simultaneously (a goal which Laird claims was never attained),
the Nixon Administration intends to maintain peacetime general
purpose forces adequate only for simultaneously meeting a major
communist attack in either Europe or_ Asia, assisting allies
against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a
2contingency elsewhere. However it is clear from Secretary
Laird’s latest defence posture statement, that the U.S. forces
earmarked for, or potentially available for use in Asia, will
3be held in, or primarily committed to, the NoAoT.O. area0 
Moreover, as Earl Ravenal has pointed out, these plans to 
downgrade America’s physical presence in Asia were scheduled 
at a time when the U.S. was also acknowledging serious deficiencies
la See, ibido It is clear, though, that there was considerable 
support, at least in Congress, for the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Europe„ In May 1971 Senator Mansfield, Democratic 
Leader in the Senate, was able to obtain significant though 
far from sufficient support for a resolution in the Senate 
to halve the number of American troops in Europe. (The 
resolution was defeated 61-36o) On this occasion, President 
Nixon stated that a unilateral withdrawal of 150,000 American 
troops from Europe would constitute "an error of historic 
dimensions". On this issue see Ronald Steele, "A Spheres of 
Influence Policy", in Foreign Policy, No. 5, Winter 1971-72,
p.108.
2. See, 1972 Defence Posture Statement, pp.13 and 16. See also, 
remarks by President Nixon in A New Strategy For Peace, pp. 
128-129. President Nixon has characterised the change from the 
strategy of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations to that of the 
Nixon Administration as a change from a "2 1/2 war" to a
"1 1/2 war" strategy a
3. See, 1972 Defence Posture Statement, p.77c
326
in its lift resources and when its estimates of Asian communist 
capabilities had, if anything, edged upward since the previous 
year’s defence report, There can be no denying that, so far at
least, the practical effects of the Nixon doctrine have been much 
more marked in Asia than in Europe, So long as America’s mili­
tary commitment in the N,AcTcO, area remains substantially unchanged 
it would seem incorrect to describe the Nixon doctrine as truly 
global in its application,^
But regardless of the nature of America’s present and 
future commitments in Europe, there can be little doubt that the 
Nixon doctrine represents an historic turning point so far as 
American policy in Asia is concerned. Ever since the outbreak 
of the Korean War in June 1950, the U.S, has demonstrated a 
willingness, if necessary, to deploy large numbers of American 
forces on the Asian mainland, (Following the Korean conflict, 
though, there was widespread distaste in the U.S, for the idea 
of American involvement in land wars on the Asian mainland.
However, a substantial U.S. military presence was maintained 
in South Korea under the terms of the defence agreement between
1. See Earl C. Ravenal, "The Political-Military Gap" in Foreign 
Policy, No, 3, Summer 1971, p,29.
2, On this point, see Pierre Hassner, "Pragmatic Conservatism 
in the White House", in Foreign Policy, No, 3, Summer 1971, 
pp.41-61. Harry Gelber has also remarked on the importance 
that the Nixon Administration continues to attach to America’s 
commitments in Europe. See his contribution, "The U.S,A, and 
Australia" in H.G. Gelber (ed,), Problems of Australian 
Defence, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970, p,85.
These views should be compared with those of Hedley Bull,
See above, pp.221-222. However, even Bull has conceded that 
"Europe has so far been less affected than other areas" by 
the pattern of United States withdrawal. See, Hedley Bull, 
"The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific", in 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, No, 4, July 1971, p,671.
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that country and America» Later, during the war in Vietnam, the 
U.S» increased its military presence on the Asian mainland to 
hitherto unprecedented levels0) But the Nixon doctrine appears 
to have changed all this» The withdrawals from Vietnam and 
South Korea are concrete evidence that the U»S. is moving away 
from large scale military involvement on the Asian mainland, 
and towards what might be called a peripheral or off-shore pos­
ture» At the same time, these withdrawals have been accompanied 
by the most explicit and thoroughgoing enunciation yet of 
Washington's anxiety to reduce the likelihood of U»S» military 
entanglement, not only on the mainland, but in other parts of 
Asia as well.
There seem to be two principal ways in which the Nixon 
doctrine could be expected to influence United States efforts 
to limit proliferation in Asia: through its impact on America’s
alliance commitments and other assurances of support in the 
Asian and Pacific region; and through the presumption, implicit 
in the doctrine, of greater U»S» reliance on nuclear weapons in 
Asia» Each of these needs to be examined closely»
From evidence educed in this and other chapters it is 
clear that undertakings to support countries against aggression 
or the threat of aggression constitute an important element 
in American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia» However, 
claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the Nixon doctrine has 
inevitably raised questions about the credibility of U»S» 
commitments in Asia» Through the declaratory aspects of the 
doctrine alone, Washington has indicated that it is prepared 
to do much less than in the past to protect countries in Asia 
from aggression» (The obverse of this, viz., that countries in 
Asia must do more for themselves, has some intriguing implica­
tions so far as nonproliferation is concerned; as Hedley Bull 
has argued, "’local self-reliance', taken to its logical
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c o n c lu s io n ,  im p l ie s  th e  e x i s t e n c e  of independen t n u c le a r
i
c a p a b i l i t i e s o "  ) M oreover, th e  r e t r e a t  from a "2 1 /2  war"
to  a "1 1 /2  war" s t r a t e g y  prom ises  to  p la c e  f a r  fewer Americans
on th e  ground i n  A sia  i n  th e  f u t u r e „ T h is  must i n e v i t a b l y  r a i s e
doub ts  abou t A m erica’s w i l l i n g n e s s  (and c a p a c i ty )  to  come to  the
2
su p p o r t  of i t s  f r i e n d s  and a l l i e s  i n  th e  r e g io n  -  d o u b ts ,  
m oreover , which seem l i k e l y  to  in c r e a s e  as  China a c q u i r e s  th e  
c a p a c i ty  to  d e l i v e r  n u c le a r  weapons on to  t a r g e t s  in  the  
U nited  S t a t e s ,
The u n c e r t a in t y  which th e  Nixon d o c t r i n e  has c a s t  upon 
th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of A m erica’s commitments in  A sia  has been
I ,  See, B u l l ,  lo c ,  c i t . ,  p .6 7 4 ,
2» This  p o in t  has been made by Malcolm Hoag, He has been v e ry  
c r i t i c a l  of th e  rundown o f U .S. g e n e ra l  purpose  f o r c e s  in  
A sia  and has  argued t h a t  th e  consequen t d e c l in e  in  th e  
c r e d i b i l i t y  of U.S, commitments in  th e  a re a  w i l l  make th e  
t a s k  of c o n ta in in g  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  much more d i f f i c u l t .  See 
Malcolm W, Hoag, " P o l i t i c a l  and S t r a t e g i c  R e la t i o n s :  A View 
from W ashington", i n  Bruce Brown ( e d 0) ,  A sia  and the  P a c i f i c  
in  th e  1970’ s , C anberra : A u s t r a l i a n  N a t io n a l  U n iv e r s i ty  
P r e s s ,  1971, p p . 180-182, S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  on ly  a m in o r i ty  
o f  u n o f f i c i a l  American o b s e rv e rs  seem to  have acc ep ted  Hoag’s 
v iew s .  Most of th o se  who have w r i t t e n  on th e  s u b je c t  i n  th e  
l a s t  two or th r e e  y e a r s  have tended  to  u rg e  t h a t  th e  U,S, 
should  l i m i t  i t s  o v e rs e a s  commitments i n  one way or a n o th e r ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  in  A s ia ,  For a sample of t h i s  th i n k in g ,  see  
Graham A l l i s o n ,  E rn e s t  May, and Adam Y arm o lin sk i ,  "UcS, 
M i l i t a r y  P o l ic y  : L im its  of I n t e r v e n t i o n " ,  i n  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s , 
Vol, 48, No. 2, Jan u ary  1970, p p , 245-261; C a r l  Kayzen, 
" M i l i t a r y  S t r a t e g y ,  M i l i t a r y  F o rc e s ,  and Arms C o n tro l"  i n  
Kermit Gordon ( e d , ) ,  Agenda For The N a t io n , Washington:
The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1968, p p . 557-559; P au l  C, Warnke 
and L e s l i e  H, G elb , " S e c u r i ty  or C o n f ro n ta t io n  : The Case 
f o r  a Defence P o l ic y "  in  F o re ig n  P o l i c y . No. 1 , W inter 1970- 
71, p p .6 -1 6 ;  C h ar le s  W. Y ost ,  "World Order and American 
R e s p o n s ib i l i ty "  in  F o re ig n  A f f a i r s ,  Vol. 47, No, 1, O ctober 
1968, p p .1 -1 4 .
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re in fo rced  by an important and sim ultaneous development in  the area 
of in te r n a t io n a l s e c u r ity , v iz * ,  the emergence in  recen t years of a 
s i tu a t io n  of s t r a te g ic  nuclear p a r ity  between the U„S* and the  
U0 S 0 S 0 R0 ( I t  i s  im portant to  note in  t h is  con text th at U*S» d efence  
arrangements in  A sia have operated as a d e terren t a g a in st R ussia  
as w e ll as a g a in st  China*) There a r e , of cou rse , d i f f i c u l t i e s  
in  u sin g  p a r ity  in  the sen se  of e q u a lity  in  p a r tic u la r  dim ensions 
of m il ita r y  power as an a ccep ta b le  measure of the balance of 
m ilita r y  s tren g th  between two cou n tries*  As Hedley B u ll has 
su g g ested , such measures are an u n r e lia b le  in d ic a t io n  o f " o v era ll  
m ilita r y  strength"  and t e l l  us l i t t l e  about the l ik e ly  outcome 
of an armed c o n f l ic t * 1 However, as the same w r iter  has argued:
Where numbers of men or weapons can be measured 
and opposing s t a t e s  shown to  be equal or un-equal 
in  th ese  r e sp e c ts  a y a r d stic k  e x i s t s  by re feren ce  
to  which the im pression  can be created  th at  
s tr a te g ic  power has been gauged in  a m eaningful 
way *2
In re sp ec t of a t le a s t  two of the measures of S o v ie t and U0S 0
s tr a te g ic  nuclear power (numbers of L C 0 B0 M0 ' s  and t o t a l
d e liv e r a b le  m egatonnage), p a r ity  could be sa id  to  have been  
3
achieved  already* A s im ila r  s itu a t io n  i s  expected to  develop
lo Hedley B u ll , "The Scope for  Soviet-A m erican Agreement" in  
Hedley B u ll ( e t  a L ) , S ov iet American R ela tio n s and World 
Order: Arms L im ita tio n s and P o l ic y , Adelphi Paper No* 65, 
London: The I n s t i t u t e  for  S tr a te g ic  S tu d ie s , 1970, p J ,
2o ib id  * On th is  p o in t , see  a ls o  W alter Slocombe, The P o l i t i c a l  
Im p lica tion s of S tr a te g ic  P a r ity * A delphi Paper No* 77,
London: The I n s t i t u t e  for  S tr a te g ic  S tu d ie s , 1971, pp*3-4*
3* Between June 1968-June 1971, S ov iet I»C.B*M* stren g th  in ­
creased  from 800 -  1510» Am erica's I*CoB»M» stren g th  remained 
s ta tio n a ry  throughout the same period  a t 1054» See,
The M ilita ry  B alance, 1970-1971, London: The I n s t i t u t e  for  
S tr a te g ic  S tu d ie s , 1970, p»106 and The M ilita r y  B alance, 
1971-1972, London: The In te r n a tio n a l I n s t i tu t e  fo r  S tr a te g ic  
S tu d ie s , 1972, p » l 0 So far  as t o t a l  d e liv e r a b le  megatonnage 
(or t o t a l  fo rce  megatonnage) i s  concerned, the U»SoS»R*, 
la r g e ly  because of i t s  deployment of the very large-pay load  
SS9 m is s i le ,  i s  reported  to have a margin of 4 to  1 over 
the United S tates»  S ee , Slocombe, op» e i t », p»27»
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in respect of submarine launched ballistic missiles (S.LoBoMo’s)
1in the not-too-distant future * Moreover, the Nixon Administration, 
like the Johnson Administration before it, has accepted this 
situation, at least in the sense that Washington has rejected 
attempts at recapturing numerical superiority through accelerated 
UoS. strategic deployments in those categories where parity has 
been achieved0 As President Nixon himself has put it:
ooo an inescapable reality of the 1970’s is the Soviet 
Union’s possession of powerful and sophisticated 
strategic forces approaching, and in some categories, 
exceeding ours in numbers and capabilityo
It seems reasonable to argue that the position of strategic 
superiority which the U.S, enjoyed for so long in respect of the 
Soviet Union, clearly strengthened Washington’s bargaining 
position in relation to Moscow, This factor was vividly demon­
strated at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when 
America’s overwhelming numerical and qualitative superiority in 
strategic forces undoubtedly played an important part in the
3successful (to the U.S,) resolution of that confrontation„
But American strategic superiority was important in another
respect even more directly related to the issue under discussion;
it undoubtedly helped to reinforce America’s allies in the belief
4that they could depend on U.S0 guarantees of support. Conse­
quently, the emergence of parity could be expected to undermine 
some of this confidence in American support. This seems 
especially likely where the emergence of strategic parity has
1. The Military Balance, 1971-1972, p,l,
2„ A New Strategy For Peace, p e119o
3„ For an analysis of the significance of American strategic 
power in the Cuban crisis of 1962, see Slocombe, op, cit,, 
pp,29-32»
4. See, Bull, "The Scope for Soviet-American Agreement", p,7e
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been seen to occur in conjunction with simultaneous developments 
which have also tended to raise doubts about the credibility of 
U,S, security commitments,^ It is for this reason that the 
emergence of strategic parity is significant from the point of 
view of American commitments in Asia; parity has tended to 
reinforce the doubts about American will and purpose in the 
Asian and Pacific region which have arisen in the wake of the 
Nixon doctrine.
It seems reasonable to argue then that the Nixon doctrine 
can be expected to detract from the credibility of U,S0 
commitments in Asia and consequently from the cause of 
nonproliferation in the area as well. But this is only one 
way in which the new policy might be expected to influence 
American efforts to limit proliferation in Asia, Another 
concerns the place of nuclear weapons in the Nixon Adminis­
tration’s military strategy in that area.
The link between the role of nuclear weapons in the 
military plans of the existing nuclear powers on the ond hand, 
and efforts to limit proliferation on the other, has been 
eloquently explained by Hedley Bull, He has argued that:
The more these [nuclear] countries can minimize 
the role played by nuclear weapons in their 
diplomacy and military strategy, the less the 
gap will seem to be that divides the nuclear 
"haves” from the "have-nots" and the less imper­
ative it will seem to the latter to take steps 
to cross it o At the minimum this policy of 
restraint requires that the nuclear powers persist 
in not using nuclear weapons in the military 
conflicts in which they are from time to time
L  On this point see Slocombe, op, cit»» p,16.
2 , Slocombe has argued that the effects of parity have been 
most noticeable in respect of America’s allies in Europe, 
See, ibid„ However in arriving at this conclusion, 
Slocombe seems to have under-estimated the impact of 
parity, in conjunction with the Nixon doctrine, in Asia,
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engaged, u„, At the maximum the policy of restraint 
would require the adoption of a commitment not to 
use nuclear weapons first or not to use them against 
non-nuclear powers; and would require that the nuclear 
states conspicuously equip themselves to conduct 
military operations without recourse to nuclear arms 
and relegate the latter to the status of weapons of 
last resort,'*'
In the years 1964-68 the Johnson Administration seems to
have been anxious to minimize the significance of nuclear
2weapons in America's Asian strategy, though Washington’s 
long-standing reluctance to agree to proposals to ban the 
first use of nuclear weapons in Asia must qualify this
3assertion to some extent. In hearings in 1966 on the following
1. See, Hedley Bull, "Western Policy and Nuclear Proliferation 
in Asia", in World Review, Vol, 6, No, 3, October 1967, p,6. 
Morton Halperin has drawn attention to some of the conse­
quences resulting from America's over-emphasis on the place 
of nuclear weapons in its European strategy. According to 
him:
ec, this policy, ,,, not only vitiated the pressures 
to create adequate conventional forces in Europe, but 
also added to the prestige of nuclear weapons so as 
later to make it hard to prevent their spread in Europe,
See, Morton H„ Halperin, China and the Bomb, New York:
Praeger, 1965, p,114,
2. Writing in 1965, Morton Halperin claimed that the United 
States had not repeated in Asia the mistake it had made in 
Europe of emphasising too much the value of nuclear weapons 
in defence. See, ibid,
3. There is evidence that shortly after China’s first nuclear 
test, Peking proposed to the U,S, that both countries pledge 
that neither of them would be the first to use nuclear 
weapons. See, Morton H, Halperin and Dwight H, Perkins, 
Communist China and Arms Control, New York: Praeger, 1965, 
p,127. A proposal that the nuclear powers should enter into 
a "no-first-use" agreement has been part of the Chinese 
position on arms control ever since. For a recent statement 
on Chinese arms control proposals, see Statement of the 
People’s Republic of China on July 30, 1971, New China News 
Agency Report, Aug, 7, 1971, Reproduced in Harry G, Gelber, 
"Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy", in Problems of Communism, 
Vol, 20, No, 6, November-December 1971, p,42, Washington has 
consistently refused to enter into a "no-first-use" agreement
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year’s defence budget, Defence Secretary McNamara said:
« 0 0  the question of what our theatre nuclear posture 
in the Far East should be in the future will require 
continuing study« In this connection, there is one 
lesson that we can draw from our experience in Europe, 
and that is to avoid a strategy which relies almost 
wholly on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to cope 
with the enemy’s "massive” ground forces
In September 1967, in his speech announcing the Sentinel A.B.M«
programme, McNamara again emphasised the dangers which would
flow from too great a dependence on tactical nuclear weapons
2in the Asian theatre« That the administration could conceive 
of no circumstances in which the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Vietnam or other parts of South East Asia would 
serve American interests was reaffirmed by McNamara in 
congressional hearings in 1965 and 1966«^
3 contdo with either Russia or China,, For a view which suggests 
that the U«S« should "give serious consideration to the 
Chinese proposal to ban the first use of nuclear weapons", 
see Morton H« Halperin, "America and Asia: The Impact of 
Nixon’s China Policy", in Roderick MacFarquhar (edL), Sino- 
American Relations, 1949-71, New York: Praeger, 1972, pp«17-18«
1« See his testimony in Department of Defence Appropriations for 
1967, Part I, hearings before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong«, 2nd Sess«, Washing­
ton, 1966, p.l32o
2« See, Remarks by Secretary of Defence Robert S« McNamara 
Before United Press International Editors and Publishers,
San Francisco, Calif«, September 18, 1967« Reproduced in 
Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States 
Antiballistic Missile Program, hearings before the Sub­
committee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong«, 1st Sess«, November 6 and 7,
1967, Washington, 1968, p«104«
3« See, Military Procurement Authorizations, Fiscal Year 1966, 
hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and 
the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations, 89th Cong«, 1st Sess«, February-March,
1965, Washington, 1965, p«292« See also, Military Procure­
ment Authorizations for Fiscal Year, 1967, hearings before 
the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee 
on Department of Defence of the Committee on Appropriations, 
89th Cong«, 2nd Sess«, February-March 1966, Washington,
1966, p «282«
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There are reasons for believing that the Nixon Administration
has been less concerned than the previous government about
minimizing the significance of nuclear weapons in America’s
Asian strategy» Mr» Laird's 1972 defence posture statement
was significant, among other things, for the stress that was
placed on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Asia,'*' This,
as well as other evidence, has led a number of writers to
speculate that the Nixon doctrine involves a greater U 0S»
2reliance on nuclear weapons in Asia than previously» There 
can be no certainty, of course, that this is an accurate 
reading of the Nixon Administration’s intentions. Nevertheless, 
in view of Washington's twin goals in Asia (the maintenance of 
its security commitments and a reduction in the level of 
conventional forces to support these commitments) it is not 
a wholly unreasonable interpretation of the American Govern-3meat's thinking on the matter» It seems, then, that the
1» See, 1972 Defence Posture Statement, pp„18-19 and 75-76»
2» See, Brzezinski, loc» cit», pp»9-10; Ravenal, loc» cit», 
pp»35-37; Earl C» Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our 
Asian Commitments", in Foreign Affairs, Vol» 49, No, 2,
January 1971, pp»208-209; and Warnke and Gelb, loc» cit», 
p »2 9 »
3, According to one noted U»S» authority on Chinese military 
policy, Peking has, "to some extent" read the Nixon doc­
trine in this way» - See testimony of Alice Langley Hsieh 
in ABM, MIRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race, hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law 
and Organisation of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
91st Cong», 2nd Sess», March-June, 1970, Washington, 1970, 
p»138» Hsieh has argued that as a result of its assessment 
of increased U„S» reliance on nuclear weapons in Asia, Peking 
could be excused for believing that in some future crisis in 
the area Washington might well be faced with a choice between 
a nuclear response and no response at all» See ibid» This 
brings to mind an earlier controversy about U»S, military 
policy in Europe, In the late 1950's and early 1960's U»S» 
advocates of a substantial build-up in N»A»ToO»'s conven­
tional strength argued, among other things, that an over- 
dependence on nuclear weapons in European defence planning 
had narrowed the options available to the U»S0 in the event
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Nixon Administration may have already upgraded the significance 
of nuclear weapons in its Asian strategy and, for the reasons 
stated earlier, contributed in yet another way to strengthening 
rather than weakening the forces for proliferation in Asia.
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
U.S. security policy in Asia in the period 1969-71, and to 
assess the significance of this policy for American efforts 
to limit proliferation in the area, it is necessary to now turn 
from this analysis of the Nixon doctrine in general and to 
consider instead U.S. security policy towards India, Japan 
and Australia in the years 1969-71.
B . Nonproliferation and the United States-India Security 
Relationship, 1969-1971
Since the Republicans under President Nixon assumed office 
in January 1969, relations between India and the United States 
have deteriorated considerably. Some indication of the new 
President's thinking about India was contained in an article 
he wrote for Foreign Affairs in October 1967.^ There, Mr. 
Nixon was far from enthusiastic about India, a country which 
he called a "staggering giant". Though he conceded that, as 
the world's largest democracy, India deserved American economic 
aid, the predominant tone of Mr. Nixon’s remarks was one of 
impatience and frustration: India's population problem was
3 contd. of Soviet aggression. See, William W. Kaufmann,
The McNamara Strategy, New York: Harper and Row, 1964 
(especially Chapters II and III)„ This should be read in 
conjunction with Bernard Brodle’s commentary, "The McNamara 
Phenomenon" in World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4, July 1965, 
pp.672-686, In this article Brodie put the case that too 
much emphasis on conventional capabilities could downgrade 
the credibility of the Western nuclear deterrent. See 
especially, pp,680-683.
1. Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam" in Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 46, No. 1, October 1967, pp.119-120.
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immense; too much importance was attached to industrialization and
not enough to agriculture; the emphasis on government rather than
private enterprise was all wrong. There was an implied preference
in Mr. Nixon’s remarks for Pakistan, a preference it will be noted,
which has characterised the Republican Administration’s approach
to the problems of the subcontinent.
Relations between Delhi and President Nixon's Government
were unpromising from the start. In August 1969, the American
leader was quick to dismiss Mrs. Ghandi’s very tentative proposal
for a Regional Security Convention."*' Moreover, there was
resentment in Washington about Delhi’s criticism of America’s 
2role in Vietnam and about India’s request to the U.S, early
3in 1970, to close five of its cultural centres in India. But 
the issue which proved most damaging to Indo-U.S. relations in 
the last couple of years was Washington’s role in the troubles 
in East Pakistan. In October 1970, Washington agreed to sell a
4limited amount of military equipment to the Pakistan Government. 
This decision was a departure from the policy adopted by the U.S. 
after the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, of not selling lethal 
military equipment in the subcontinent, and was loudly condemned 
in Delhi. In March 1971, the crisis in East Pakistan, which 
had been building up ever since the victory of the Awami League 
in elections late in 1970 and the subsequent declaration of the 
state of Bangladesh, finally exploded. Three divisions of West 
Pakistani troops were despatched to East Pakistan to arrest the
1. On this point, see A.G. Noorani, "India and Asian Security" 
in The World Today, Vol. 26, No. 3, March 1970, p.113.
2. For example, see testimony of Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1969, hearings before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong,, 1st Sess., June-August 1969, 
Washington, 1969 (hereafter referred to as House Hearings on 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1969), pp,719-720.
3. Rogers Report, pp.91-92.
4. ibid., p .92.
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Awami League leadership and to suppress the revolt. The savage 
crack-down by the West Pakistani troops, which was loudly 
condemned in many parts of the world, resulted, amongst other 
things, in a massive flight of refugees from East Pakistan into 
India. Though the U.S. was generous in its support of the 
refugees, it seemed reluctant to castigate Pakistan too 
severely«, ^
Washington’s ambivalent attitude towards the crisis in
East Pakistan created great bitterness towards the U.S. in 
2India and has almost certainly further reduced Washington’s
3capacity to influence events in that country. It seems reasonable 
to argue that this development could strengthen,albiet marginally, 
the forces for proliferation in India. Not only, it seems, will 
Indian leaders be less likely in future to listen to American 
advice about the question of nonproliferation in general, but 
in addition, they will probably be more reluctant than ever to
1. See, Strategic Survey, 1971, p . 4 8 . S e e  also, Sydney H. 
Schanberg, "Pakistan Divided", in Foreign Affairs, Vol.50,
No. 1, October 1971, pp.132-135»
2. See, Ibido, p.132.
3. In August 1971, Delhi signed a twenty year friendship treaty 
with Moscow. It is difficult to determine at this stage 
just how much the policies of the current U.S. Administration 
contributed to this move. One view has it that Delhi’s 
decision to enter into the pact with Moscow reflected India’s 
views about American credibility in Asia. See Ashok Kapur, 
"Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy: A Perspective"
in The World Today, Vol. 27, No. 9, September 1971, pp.387- 
388. However Kapur does not. provide any real evidence to 
support his claim, and in any case, it seems too early to 
try to reach firm judgements about this matter.
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believe in tacit guarantees of American military assistance»
C . Nonproliferation and the United States-Japan Security 
Relationship, 1969-1971
There seems little reason to doubt that the Nixon Admin­
istration, like those before it, would prefer that Japan not 
acquire nuclear weapons. This has been clearly implied in 
official U„S. statements about America’s opposition to prolif­
eration in general as well as in references to Washington’s
2desire for a non-nuclear Japan in particular» At first glance,
1» Even prior to the events in East Pakistan journalists and 
specialist writers on defence in India were pointing out 
that the policies of the Nixon Administration clearly 
indicated that the U.S» would be reluctant in the future 
to become militarily involved in Asia on behalf of other 
states» See for example, Dilip Mukerjee, "India's Defence 
Perspectives" in Survival, Vol. 11, No» 1, January 1969, p.5; 
and, Noorani, loci, cit., pp.110-117. The Director of the 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi noted 
what he regarded as a decline in U„S. interest in South and 
West Asia in particular. See, K» Subrahmanyan, "India’s 
Security" in Survival, Vol. 13, No, 5, May 1971, p.156.
It is not only Indian observers who have noted this develop­
ment in American policy. Zbigniew Brzezinski has complained 
that in President Nixon’s 1971 foreign policy report to 
Congress (Building For Peace), U.S. interest in the future 
of South Asia was "reduced to three pages of banalities."
See, Brzezinski, loc„ cit., p.ll.
2. On this latter point, see for example, statement by Under 
Secretary of State Johnson in United States Security Agree­
ments and Commitments Abroad, Part 5, Japan and Okinawa, 
hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security 
Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., January 26,
27, 28 and 29, 1970 (hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings 
on Japan and Okinawa, 1970), p.1159.
]
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the goal of a non-nuclear Japan appears to have been assisted by 
the two most important developments in Japan-U.S» security 
relations in the period under review; the successful resolution 
of the Okinawa reversion issue and the renewal in 1970 of the 
Japan-UoSo security treatyr. Both of these developments served 
to strengthen the formal political relationship between Japan 
and the U» S» and therefore could be said to have reinforced two 
of the practices which have grown up alongside that relation­
ship, viz,, the maintenance by Japan of armed forces suitable 
only for the conventional defence of the Japanese homeland, 
and reliance by Japan on the American nuclear umbrella»
However, closer scrutiny suggests that the security 
relationship between Japan and the U.S, in the years 1969-71 
was not as conducive to nonproliferation as the reasoning here 
suggests. In the first place, notwithstanding the renewal 
of the Japan-U.S» security treaty, the Nixon doctrine resulted 
in a run-down of American forces in Japan, Under an agreement 
reached in December 1970, most of the U„S0 combat units in 
Japan proper were withdrawn by mid-1971, thus reducing the 
number of American personnel there from 40,000 to 28,0000
American forces in Okinawa were also to be cut in 1971 from 140,000 to 35,000» But perhaps equally important as the
reduction of U.S» forces in Japan was the withdrawal, during
the early months of 1971, of 20,000 American servicemen from 
2South Korea. Japan had long regarded the security of South
3Korea as vital to its own defence (a fact which was reaffirmed
.............................  4in the November 1969 agreement over Okinawa) and the American
1. See, Strategic■Survey, 1970, p 037; Rogers Report, p,40; 
and The Military-Balance, 1971-1972, p»20
2. See, Strategic Survey, 1971, ppd3 and 88.
3. See, Martin E» Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defence Policy, 
1947-1968, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 
1971, pp/99 and 135 0
4. See below, pp»345-346»
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withdrawals, against the wishes of the South Korean President,
could be expected to help undermine confidence in Japan about
America’s defence commitments in the Far East0
It was noted in the previous chapter that during the period
1964-68 (and indeed before then), Washington was anxious that
Japan should play a larger role in its own defence. It was
also argued there that this policy, to the extent that it
prqmised to help erode the anti-militarist sentiment in Japan,
could weaken the opposition to proliferation in that country»
But efforts to promote the idea of a wider Japanese security
role figured just as prominently in U.S. policy towards Japan
in the period 1969-71. It was especially obvious in the
terms of the Okinawa settlement„
Okinawa had been under U.S. control since the end of
World War II and during that time had been developed into
America’s most important, base in the Far East. Since 1951,
successive U.S. Governments had indicated their intention
that Okinawa should eventually revert to Japan. It was just
as often pointed out, however, that the strategic situation
in Asia and the Pacific made immediate return inopportune.
In recent years, the question of Okinawa’s reversion, and
more particularly, the disposition of the American bases on
the island after reversion, became explosive issues in
Japanese politics. There was mounting public and political
pressure on the Japanese Government to insist on an early 
......................1return of Okinawa without nuclear bases. In November 1969
1. For a note on these developments, see Young C. Kim,
"Okinawa Reversion as an Issue in Japanese Politics", in 
Orbis, Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 1969, pp„1144-1164; Frank 
Langdon, "Strains in Current Japanese-American Defence 
Cooperation" in Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 9, September 
1969, pp.712-721; and Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970.
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President Nixon and the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr, Sato, arrived
at an understanding on terms for the return of Okinawa to Japan
1no later than 19720 An agreement based on these principles was 
signed by Tokyo and Washington in June 1971,
In their agreement of November 1969, President Nixon and 
Mr, Sato also reaffirmed their joint intention to renew the 
Japan-U.S. security treaty. This was done in June 1970, Under 
the latest arrangement either country can withdraw from the 
agreement at a year’s notice.
The terms of the Okinawa settlement went a long way towards
accommodating Japanese feelings, especially on the nuclear
weapons issue, America will be allowed to retain non-nuclear
bases and installations in Okinawa after 1972 but these
facilities will, then be subject to the terms of the Japan-U»S,
security treaty» This requires the U,S, to consult with the
Japanese Government before using bases in Japan for combat
operations or prior to any significant weapons build up. The
U.S» has undertaken to remove all nuclear weapons from Okinawa
by the date of reversion and will not redeploy them there
2without the permission of the Japanese Government, About a 
month after the Okinawa settlement, Mr, Sato’s Liberal 
Democratic Party (L.D„P.) won a convincing victory in Japan’s 
eleventh post-war general election. The L.D.P, fought the 
election primarily on the basis of the government’s 
successful negotiation of the Okinawa issue and on the 
maintenance of the Japan-U„S, security treaty. Its victory 
was widely interpreted as a harbinger of close co-operation 
between Tokyo and Washington in the 1970’s,
1, See, Joint Communique Between President Nixon and His
Excellency Prime Minister Sato of Japan (hereafter referred 
to as Okinawa Communique) ■» Reproduced in Senate Hearings 
on Japan and Okinawa,1970, pp»1425-1428,
2» See remarks by U,S, Under Secretary of State Johnson in 
ibid», p,1177,
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But as suggested earlier, though the successful resolution 
of the Okinawa reversion issue and the renewal of the Japan-U.S. 
security agreement, implied the maintenance of close links between 
Tokyo and Washington, the Okinawa settlement in particular seemed 
to foreshadow a wider Japanese security role. To begin with, 
after reversion the Ryuku Islands, which include Okinawa, will 
be brought within the area defended by Japanese forces„ This 
will probably require some expansion of these forces and will 
involve the Japan Self Defence Agency in the security of an 
area which will continue to remain highly important for the 
Western defence effort in the Far East.^ However, it was the 
references in the Okinawa settlement to Japan’s security 
interests in areas outside the country which seemed more 
important from the point of view of future Japanese defence 
policy»
In the Sato-Nixon communique of November 1969, the Japanese
Prime Minister stated that "Japan would make further active
2contributions to the peace and prosperity of Asia". Japan,
Mr. Sato said, "was exploring what role she could play in
3
bringing about stability in the Indochina area". But more 
pointedly, the Prime Minister affirmed that "the security of
countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for
4 ........... ..........
Japan". It was specifically noted that the security of both
1. See remarks of Under Secretary of State Johnson in his 
"Backgrounder" of November 21, 1969, explaining the Sato- 
Nixon communique. Reproduced in Senate Hearings on Japan 
and Okinawaj 1970, p.1443! It should be noted that though 
the Okinawa settlement provides for the removal of all nuclear 
weapons from the island by the date of reversion, the base 
will continue to play an important role in support of 
America’s military effort in the Far East. It is expected 
that U.S. forces in Okinawa will remain at about 35,000 
after some cuts during 1971. See, Strategic Survey, 1970,
p .37 „
2. See, Okinawa Communique, p.1426.
3. ibid.
4. ibid., p »1427.
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the Republic, of Korea and of the Taiwan area was essential to 
Japan’s own security
These references to Japan’s concern for the security of
areas adjacent to it in the Far East, aroused the interest of
observers who saw in it a departure from previous Japanese policy»
Certainly, the Nixon Administration itself seemed to view the
Japanese undertakings as uniquely important» In his "Backgrounder"
explaining the Sato-Nixon communique, Under Secretary of State
Johnson emphasised that this was "the first time in an official
Japanese Government statement" that the security of Japan had
been related so directly to the peace and security of the Far 
2East. Though it would be wrong to infer from the communique,
Johnson added, that Japanese troops might be used in say the
defence of Korea, Mr» Sato’s statement nevertheless represented
"a somewhat considerable change in (sic.) Japanese public
3position on these matters". Later, in hearings before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Under Secretary Johnson 
elaborated further on the matter. He said,
Although Japan has not assumed any security commit­
ments toward her neighbours, she recognizes a 
security interest in the maintenance of a non- 
Communist South Korea and Taiwan. ... Japanese 
public opinion may not be unanimous in support of 
the Prime Minister’s views, but there is little 
doubt that most Japanese would be concerned by 
Communist takeovers in South Korea or Taiwan.^
It has to be conceded that the Okinawa settlement did not 
involve Japan in any specific security commitments toward its
1. ibid., p.1426.
2. See, Under Secretary of State Johnson’s "Backgrounder". 
Reproduced in Senate Hearings on Japan and Okinawa, 1970, 
p,1440.
3. ibid.i p.1444,
4. See his testimony in Senate Hearings on Japan and Okinawa, 
1970, pp.1210-1211.
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neighbours. Indded, the reference in the Sato-Nixon communique
to Japan’s concern about the security of certain countries in the
Far East related more to potential American military activity
than to Japanese; by acknowledging that its own security was
linked to that of Korea and Taiwan, Japan implied that in the
event of threats to the security of those countries, the U.S.
would not be denied the use of bases in Japan and Okinawa to1meet such threats. These qualifications notwithstanding,
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the wording of
those sections of the Sato-Nixon communique concerned with
Japan's security interests, gives strong encouragement to the
2idea of a wider Japanese military role* This might not be 
so significant, were it not for the fact that other statements 
by senior members of the Nixon Administration about Japan’s 
present and future role in Asia have also given encouragement 
to the same notion.
Mr. Nixon’s own thinking on the matter was revealed in
3the article he wrote for Foreign Affairs in October 1967.
There, the future president drew attention to expectations 
that Japan would soon become the world’s third-strongest 
economic power. "Along with this dramatic economic surge",
Mr. Nixon stressed, "Japan Iwould] surely want to play a 
greater role both diplomatically and militarily in maintaining 
the balance in' Asia." Imy emphasis.] In view of "the role 
Japan must play in helping secure the common safety of non-
communist Asia", he added, it had to be trusted with its own
........................ 4armed forces and with responsibility for its own defence.
1. This was made clear by Under Secretary of State Johnson.
See his remarks in ibid •„, pp .1166-1167 .
2. For a Japanese view which stresses the same point, see 
"Trends and Topics: A New Age in Japan-U.S. Security Ties" 
in Japan Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, January-March 1970,
pp .3-6.
3. See his "Asia After Viet Nam".
4. ibid.» pp.120-121.
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That Mr. Nixon had brought these ideas about Japan’s role 
in Asia with him to the White House was apparent in the President’s 
first foreign policy report to Congress in February, 19700 It 
was also obvious that these thoughts about: Japan fitted in with 
the plans for a partial American withdrawal from Asia which were 
worked out in the National Security Council during the first year 
of the new administration. As the President said in the report 
just mentioned:
We determined that our relationship with Japan had 
to be founded on our mutual and increasingly 
collaborative concern for peace and security in 
the Far East.l
Japan's partnership with the U 0S0, the President added, would
2"be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia."
Though the stress in the President’s report was on Japan's 
"peaceful" contribution to the progress of Asia, it is possible, 
without any great difficulty, to construe his remarks as 
implying a military role as well„ The question of Japan’s role 
in Asian and world affairs was taken up again in President 
Nixon’s second foreign policy report to Congress in February 
1971. There, the President drew attention to the fact that 
Japan had "a tremendous stake in the peace and stability of 
Asia" and consequently had assumed "a major role in the 
regional activities of the area»" But, as if to foreshadow 
a wider role for Japan, President Nixon declared that "as a 
permanent method of meeting her [Japan’s] interests and dis­
charging her responsibilities, ou„ these regional activities3may not prove adequate«"
President Nixon was not the only member of his adminis­
tration to give encouragement to the idea of a wider Japanese
1* A New Strategy For Peace, p.19.
2. ibid., p.58,
3. Building For Peace, p„34\,
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security role in Asia. In July 1969, Mr. Joseph Sisco, Under
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
tentatively endorsed the notion of a wider political and military1role for Japan, perhaps in conjunction with India. The idea of
a wider Japanese military role was put much more explicitly by 
Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson in hearings before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 19700 He said:
The one thing I am sure of is that they [the Japanese] 
are going to do more, as you point out - the strength­
ening nationalism, their growing economy - they are 
going to be doing more in the military field. [my 
emphasiso] ^
Johnson was equally explicit that Japan should spend more on
its own defence, though he did admit that expenditure on a
3strategic nuclear force "would be another matter/' Another
member of the current U.S. Administration who strongly supported
the idea of a wider Japanese security role, is the Secretary
of Defence, Mr. Laird. During a visit to Tokyo in July 1971,
Mr. Laird warned his hosts that budget restraints and possible
arms control agreements between the U.S. and Russia could
substantially limit America’s future military capacity in the
Far East. It was considered likely, therefore, that the U.S.
would look to Japan to play a larger part, not only in its own
defence, but in the security of other parts of Asia as well.
There were vague suggestions in what Mr. Laird said, that this
4should include a larger Japanese naval role.
1. See his testimony in House Hearings on Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1969, pp.774-775«
2. See, Senate1 234Hearings on Japan and Okinawa, 1970, p„1218.
3. ibid. For additional evidence of Johnson’s support for a 
-greater Japanese defence effort see, ibid., pp„1214-1215.
4. See, The New York Times, 8 July 1971 and The Japan Times, 
18 July 1971. At least one authority with access to the 
Nixon Administration had doubts about encouraging Japan to 
do more in the military field. In an interview published 
early in 1970, Morton Halperin, former Under Secretary of
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The attitude to Japan depicted so far is thoroughly under­
standable in terms of the Nixon doctrine„ As part of its plan 
to reduce the American presence in Asia, the UoS, has withdrawn 
some of its forces from Japan and has closed down or relinquished 
some of its facilities in that country» At the saiqe time, 
Washington expects Japan to assume a greater responsibility for 
its own defence and, perhaps eventually, to contribute to the 
security of other parts of Asia as well» But it would be wrong 
to view Washington's policy towards Japan in the period 1969-71 
in these terms alone; as well as reflecting the Nixon doctrine 
it was a product also of Washington's views about the changing 
structure of world politics» It was noted earlier in this 
chapter that President Nixon and his foreign affairs adviser, Dr0 
Kissinger, have come to believe that the bipolar structure of 
international relations which characterised most of the post­
war years has given way to some form of political multi­
polarity.^ It is apparent also that President Nixon and other 
members of the administration have come to regard Japan as 
occupying a key position in this new international power 
structure»
There were suggestions of this in President Nixon's 
foreign policy report to Congress in February 1971. There it 
was stressed that a "new international structure" was emerging 
in the Pacific region and that Japan along with the U.S.S.R., 
China, and the United States, would be one of the "major
4 contd. Defence for National Security Affairs and, at the 
time of the interview, consultant to the U.S. National 
Security Council, warned that"it would be a great mistake 
to press Japan to take a greater military role", See,
Morton H. Halperin, "The United States, Asia and Australia" 
in Pacific Community [Melbourne], No. 5, Winter 1970, p c72. 
More recently, Halperin has reaffirmed his views on this 
matter. See his contribution in MacFarquhar (ed.), op» cit.» 
p.l8„
1. See above, p.321.
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1elements" in the new edifice. A month later, Secretary of State
Rogers described Japan as "a ma.jor world factor and a source of
increasing influence for peace and prosperity in Asia" [my 
2emphasis]„ The Nixon Administration’s characterisation of Japan 
as a "major element" in Asian and world politics led one Japanese 
commentator to question Mr» Marshall Green, America’s Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, about the 
rationale behind Washington’s thinking on the matter» In reply, 
Mr. Green drew attention to Japan’s economic power, the size 
of its population, and its strategic importance. He added:
Surely, the Japanese Government and the Japanese 
people must now see Japan as one of the great powers 
in the international sphere Imy emphasis],3
The Nixon Administration has not been content to simply
describe this pattern of major power relationships which it
sees developing in Asia and the world» By its pronouncements
alone, Washington has sought to encourage the emergence of this 
4new structure. The idea that Japan, along with the U.S0,
China and the U.S.S.R», should assume some special respon­
sibility for the maintenance of international order In Asia 
not only sits well with the Nixon doctrine, but also, with 
the administration’s view that some form of "balance" or 
"equilibrium" amongst the world’s major powers is the only 
real guarantee of peace and stability in an age of "political 
multipolarity"„^  But the promotion of the idea of Japan as 
one of these major powers is significant from the point of
1. See, Building For Peace, pp»30 and 32.
2. See, Rogers Report, p.viii.
3. See, Remarks by Assistant Secretary Green during interview 
on Japanese National Television. Reproduced in The 
Department of State Bulletin, Washington: U.S„ Department 
of State, 29 March 1971, p,452.
4. See especially, Building For Peace, p»32.
5. Dr„ Kissinger has developed these ideas at some length.
See, Kissinger, op, cit., pp.53-97.
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view of America’s commitment to the goal of nonproliferation. As
suggested earlier in this thesis, there seems little reason to
believe that Japan can attain the status of a great power without
1also acquiring nuclear weapons * Also, if Japan is to play a 
true balancing role in Asia (and this seems to be clearly 
envisaged in pronouncements on the subject by the Nixon 
Government), and given that the other members of the balance 
are all nuclear powers, will not Japan feel constrained to 
acquire nuclear weapons also? Further, Japan’s graduation 
to the nuclear ranks in circumstances such as these could be 
expected to stimulate pressures for proliferation in India; 
there, the lure of great power status has had an especially
2strong appeal amongst supporters of an Indian nuclear force.
The analysis in this section suggests two points about 
United States policy towards Japan in the period 1969-71: 
first, that the Nixon Administration, like its predecessor, 
has encouraged Japan to assume more responsibility for its own 
defence; and second, that President Nixon and other senior U„S. 
officials have assiduously promoted the idea of Japan as a great 
power. For the reasons indicated earlier, both of these 
actions could be regarded as inconsistent with efforts to limit 
the spread of nuclear weapons to Japan. There seems little 
reason to doubt that the Nixon Administration would prefer Japan 
to remain non-nuclear, but it is equally clear that there is a 
limit to the price it is prepared to pay in order to achieve 
this objective. Washington obviously has other goals in respect 
of Japan and is reluctant to abandon or substantially modify 
these even though to do so would make the task of persuading 
Japan to remain non-nuclear an easier one.
1. See above, pp.184-185.
2. See above, pp.118-119, and 131.
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D. N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and th e  U nited  S t a t e s - A u s t r a l i a  
S e c u r i t y  R e l a t i o n s h i p ,  1969-1971
The Nixon A d m in is t r a t io n  has no t m od if ied  th e  e x i s t i n g
fo rm a l  s e c u r i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  U.S. and A u s t r a l i a « In
May 1969, j u s t  fo u r  months a f t e r  assuming o f f i c e ,  P r e s id e n t  Nixon
v ig o r o u s ly  r e a f f i rm e d  h i s  governm ent’s su p p o r t  f o r  th e  AoNoZ.UoSc
p a c t ; ^ a  s i m i l a r  e x p re s s io n  of su p p o r t  was made on th e  o c c a s io n  of
th e  tw e n t i e th  m ee ting  of th e  A,N„ZoU: S, C ouncil i n  September 
2
1970. But d e s p i t e  th e  ev idence  of s o l i d a r i t y  w ith  i t s  P a c i f i c
a l l y ,  th e  Nixon A d m in i s t r a t io n  n e v e r th e le s s  r e fu s e d  to  a l lo w
C anberra  to  e n t i c e  th e  U .S. i n t o  a m i l i t a r y  commitment on
A u s t r a l i a ' s  b e h a l f  i n  th e  M alay s ia -S in g ap o re  a r e a .
I t  has a l r e a d y  been no ted  t h a t  i n  January  1968 th e  B r i t i s h
Government i n d i c a te d  t h a t  i t  would w ithdraw  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  of i t s
3
f o r c e s  from th e  M a la y s ia -S in g a p o re  a re a  by th e  end of 1971, In
F eb rua ry  1969 th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Prime M in i s t e r ,  Mr. G orton ,
announced t h a t  a f t e r  le n g th y  c o n s id e r a t io n  of th e  m a t te r  Canberra
had d ec id ed  to  r e t a i n  f o r c e s  i n  M alaysia  and S ingapore  a f t e r  th e
4B r i t i s h  had w ithdraw n. According to  th e  Prime M in is te r
1. T h is  was d u r in g  a v i s i t  to  Washington by th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Prime 
M i n i s t e r ,  Mr. G orton , For th e  Prime M i n i s t e r ' s  a cc o u n t of 
t h i s  v i s i t ,  in c lu d in g  th e  remarks of P r e s id e n t  N ixon, see  
Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n ta ry  D eba te s ,  House of R e p re s e n ta t iv e s  
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  C ,P ,D . , H. of R . ) ,  C an b erra ,  No. 8,
15 May 1969, p p . 1887-1892,
2. See, communique i s s u e d  fo l lo w in g  th e  tw e n t ie th  m ee ting  of th e  
A .N .Z .U .S . C o u n c i l ,  W ashington, 26 September 1970. Reproduced 
i n  C u rre n t  N otes on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s , C anberra : D ep a r t­
ment of F o re ig n  A f f a i r s  ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  C .N .I ,A 0) ,
Vol. 41, No. 9, September 1970, p p . 481-483.
3 . See above, p .2 2 0 ,  f n .  2.
4. For th e  announcement of t h i s  d e c i s i o n ,  see  s ta te m e n t  on de fence  
by th e  Prime M in i s t e r ,  Mr. John G orton , on 25 F ebruary  1969. 
Reproduced in  C J h L A . , V ol. 40, No, 2, F ebruary  1969, p p , 41-44 . 
For a more d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s io n  of th e  A u s t r a l i a n  commitment, 
s e e  R obert Howard, " F o re ig n  P o l ic y  Review, J a n u a ry -Ju n e  1969",
i n  The A u s t r a l i a n  Q u a r t e r l y . Vol. 41, No. 3, September 1969, 
p p . 99-103,
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. . .  th e s e  f o r c e s  [would] be a v a i l a b l e  to  oppose 
any in su rg en cy  which [was] e x t e r n a l l y  promoted, 
which [was] a t h r e a t  to  th e  s e c u r i t y  of th e  
r e g io n  and which [was] beyond th e  c a p a c i ty  of  ^
th e  f o r c e s  of M alaysia  and S ingapore  to  h a n d le .
Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  Mr, Gorton emphasised t h a t  i n  th e  even t of a
s i t u a t i o n  a r i s i n g  which was beyond th e  c a p a c i ty  of th e  f o r c e s  of
th e  t h r e e  n a t io n s  to  h a n d le ,  C anberra  "would . 0. look  to  th e
2
su p p o r t  of a l l i e s  o u ts id e  th e  r e g i o n , "  The A u s t r a l i a n  Govern­
ment was c l e a r l y  h o p efu l  t h a t  i t  could  r e l y  on U.S. a s s i s t a n c e  
should  i t  ever  be needed. But developm ents  in  American th in k in g  
a t  t h i s  tim e p rov ided  l i t t l e  b a s i s  f o r  C a n b e r ra ’ s optim ism ,
W ashington had a l r e a d y  r e v e a le d  i t s  d i s t a s t e  f o r  involvem ent
3
i n  th e  M a lay s ia -S in g ap o re  a r e a  and under th e  d i r e c t i o n  of th e
Nixon A d m in i s t r a t io n  was c u r r e n t l y  engaged in  working ou t a
p o l i c y  tow ards A sia  and th e  P a c i f i c  which would make a d d i t i o n a l
U.S. commitments i n  th e  a re a  most u n l i k e l y .  During a v i s i t  to
W ashington i n  May 1969 th e  A u s t r a l i a n  Prime M in is te r  d is c u s s e d
th e  A .N .Z .U .S . p a c t  w ith  U .S. l e a d e r s .  Though Mr. G orton
re c e iv e d  a " s t r o n g ,  f o r t h r i g h t  and unambiguous r e - a f f i r m a t i o n
of th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of th e  [A .N .Z .U .S .]  T re a ty "  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t
he was u n a b le  to  pe rsuade  W ashington t h a t  i t  should  be p re p a re d ,
in  an emergency, to  suppo rt  m i l i t a r i l y  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  commitment
4
to  M alay s ia  and S ingapo re .  In  J u ly ,  th e  U.S. P r e s id e n t  
u n v e i le d  th e  Nixon d o c t r in e  and s ix  months l a t e r ,  d u r in g  a 
v i s i t  to  C an b e rra ,  th e  American V ic e - P r e s id e n t ,  Mr. Agnew, 
i n t e r p r e t e d  th e  new U.S. p o l i c y  to  mean, among o th e r  th i n g s ,  
tha t"A m erica  [would] honour p r e s e n t  t r e a t i e s ,  b u t  [would] no t 
e n t e r  i n t o  new de fen ce  o b l i g a t i o n s  in  A s i a . " “* T his  seems to  have
1. See, s ta t e m e n t  on defence  by Mr, G orton. Reproduced in  
C .N .I .A . , V o l . 40, No. 2, F ebruary  1969, p .4 3 .
2. i b i d .
3. See above, p p . 314-315.
4. See, th e  Prime M i n i s t e r ’ s r e p o r t  of h i s  v i s i t  to  th e  U.S. 
Reproduced i n  C .P ,D . , H. of R , , No. 8 , 15 May 1969,
p p , 1887-1892.
5. As quoted  in  J .L .  R ichardson ,  " P o l i t i c a l  and S t r a t e g i c  
R e l a t i o n s :  A View from C anberra" ,  i n  Brown ( e d . ) ,  o p . c i t . ,  
p. 152.
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f i n a l l y  p rec luded  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  W ashington m ight be p rep a red  
to  u n d e rw r i te  A u s t r a l i a ' s  d e fen c e  commitment to  M alays ia  and 
Singapore*
W ash ing ton 's  r e f u s a l  to  g iv e  A u s t r a l i a  th e  a s s u ra n c e s  i t  
wanted in  re g a rd  to  M alays ia  and S ingapore  was th o ro u g h ly  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i th  th e  Nixon d o c t r i n e 0 At th e  same t im e , however, th e  U.S. 
d e c i s io n  d i s a p p o in te d  one of A m eric a 's  c l o s e s t  a l l i e s  and he lped  
to  c r e a t e  doubt and u n c e r t a i n t y  in  A u s t r a l i a  about th e  f u t u r e  
d i r e c t i o n  of U.S. p o l i c y  in  A sia  and th e  P a c i f i c * ^
In  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r  an a t te m p t was made to  examine th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and U.S. s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y  in  
A sia  in  th e  y e a rs  1964-68. There i t  was sugges ted  t h a t  e f f o r t s  
to  l i m i t  th e  sp read  of n u c le a r  weapons i n  A sia  o f t e n  had to  ta k e  
second p la c e  to  th e  p u r s u i t  of o th e r  American p o l i c y  o b je c t iv e s  
i n  th e  a r e a .  In  th e  p r e s e n t  c h a p te r  i t  has been argued  t h a t  
t h i s  t r e n d  has co n t in u ed  unabated  d u r in g  th e  y e a rs  of th e  Nixon 
A d m in is t r a t io n .  Of m ajor im portance  from th e  p o in t  of view of 
U.S. s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y  in  A sia  in  th e  p e r io d  1969-71 has been th e  
e n u n c ia t io n  and im p lem en ta tion  of th e  Nixon d o c t r i n e .  Because 
of i t s  e f f e c t  in  h e lp in g  to  undermine th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of U.S. 
g u a ra n te e s  and a l l i a n c e s  i n  A sia  as  w e l l  as  i t s  tendency  to  
upgrade th e  im portance of n u c le a r  weapons in  A m erica 's  A sian 
s t r a t e g y ,  th e  Nixon d o c t r i n e  seems b a s i c a l l y  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  
th e  g o a l  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A s ia .  An exam ina tion  of U.S. 
p o l i c i e s  i n  r e s p e c t  of I n d i a ,  Japan  and A u s t r a l i a  i n  th e  p e r io d  
1969-71 s u g g e s ts  t h a t  in  many r e s p e c t s  th e s e  a l s o  have been 
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  g o a l  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  Though th e  Nixon 
Government rem ains fo rm a l ly  committed to  l i m i t i n g  th e  sp read  of 
n u c le a r  weapons in  A sia  i t  has proved a t  l e a s t  as w i l l i n g  as  th e  
p re v io u s  U.S. A d m in is t r a t io n  to  a l low  o th e r  o b j e c t iv e s  of American 
p o l i c y  in  A sia  to  ta k e  p recedence  over th e  g o a l  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
1. See above, p p . 218-223.
CHAPTER XI
THE PEACEFUL ATOM AND AMERICAN 
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN ASIA
The emphasis so far in the present part (Part III) of the 
thesis has been concerned primarily with U.S. efforts to persuade 
India, Japan and Australia not to take up the nuclear weapons 
options they already have or might come to acquire in the future. 
This has involved a discussion, among other things, of the place 
in U.S. nonproliferation policy in Asia of matters such as 
America’s military and diplomatic response to the Chinese nuclear 
force, the question of ballistic missile defence, and the issue 
of guarantees and assurances for America’s friends and allies in 
Asia. But as the analysis in Chapter I suggested, there has long 
been another and equally important dimension to America’s 
nonproliferation policy, viz., the attempt by the U.S. to deny 
other countries the wherewithal to build their own nuclear 
weapons.
From the earliest days of the nuclear era, however, 
Washington’s aims in this direction were threatened by demands 
from nations everywhere for access to nuclear technology and by 
the fact that the latter could be utilized for military as well 
as peaceful purposes. To counter this difficulty the United 
States adopted two main strategies. (These have already been 
discussed in Chapter I, but for the purposes of the analysis in 
the present chapter it will be useful to briefly recall what 
was said earlier.) First, Washington reversed its early post­
war attitude of nuclear secrecy, and, as was noted earlier in 
this thesis, actually took a lead in promoting the worldwide 
spread of nuclear technology. Since the mid-1950's the U.S. 
has sold reactors and related equipment abroad and has been 
willing to make available to cooperating states, on a long term
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basis and at reasonable prices, quantities of enriched uranium
(U235) for use as reactor fuel,^ Washington has argued that in
addition to assisting the peaceful nuclear programmes of
cooperating countries, this policy has served the cause of
nonproliferation in two ways; by providing an opening for the
application of safeguards, and by discouraging the establishment
of indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities in countries 
2overseas. Concomitant with the adoption of this policy towards
the supply of U235, the American Government has, of course, also
3attempted to limit the proliferation of enrichment technology. 
This has resulted in a number of practices: classification of
America's own enrichment technology; attempts by the U,S, 
Government to have other states classify theirs; a ban on 
exports from the U,S. of specialized equipment which could be 
used in enrichment plants; and, Federal Government ownership4of America's own gaseous diffusion plants.
Second, in conjunction with this willingness to cooperate 
with foreign countries in the development of the peaceful uses
1. For further information on America's "Atoms for Peace" plan, 
see above, pp.17-25.
2. For a recent statement along these lines, see Letter From 
Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, U.S.A.E.C. to Chet Holifield,
Chairman, J.C.A.E., June 24, 1969. Text reproduced in 
Future Ownership of AEC's Gaseous Diffusion Plants, hearings 
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong,, 1st 
Sess., July 8-August 8, 1969, Washington, 1969 (hereafter 
referred to as J.C.A.E. Hearings on Future Ownership of AEC's 
Gaseous Diffusion Plants, 1969), p.48,
3. For further information on this, see above, pp,20-22.
4. Obviously, another reason for government ownership of America's 
gaseous diffusion plants is the fact that they were used to 
produce the fissionable material for the country's nuclear 
arsenal.
•a *-
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of atomic energy the U.S. has, at the same time, taken a lead in 
urging that all international transfers of peaceful nuclear 
technology be accompanied by safeguards to ensure that the 
equipment and fuel supplied is not utilized for military purposes. 
Initially, U.S. assistance in this field was usually accompanied 
by bilateral safeguards. Since January 1963, however, Washington 
has adopted the practice of transferring its bilateral nuclear 
assistance agreements to I.A.E.A. supervision and has encouraged 
other suppliers also to make maximum use of agency safeguards.
The United States has long been a participant in the 
nuclear programmes of India, Japan and Australia. It is the 
purpose of the present chapter to examine the nature and extent 
of this involvement and to examine its significance from the 
point of view of American efforts to limit proliferation in 
Asia. It will be noted that the United States has supplied 
India, Japan and Australia with quantities of U235 and has sold 
reactors to India and Japan. At the same time Washington has 
insisted that all three recipient states accept safeguards on 
the fuel and equipment supplied to ensure that it is not used 
for military purposes. But an examination of U.S. safeguards 
policy in Asia suggests,once again, that the American Govern­
ment has been willing to allow other objectives of U.S. policy 
to take precedence over the goal of nonproliferation in Asia. 
Finally, in the last two or three years, important changes 
have taken place in American policy towards enrichment 
technology and the supply of U235. These changes have 
important implications for American nonproliferation policy 
and no analysis of U.S. efforts to limit the spread of nuclear 
weapons in Asia would be complete without some discussion of 
these matters.
1. See above, pp.23-24.
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A. The N a tu re  and E x te n t  of U n i te d  S t a t e s  In v o lv e m en t
i n  t h e  I n d i a n ,  J a p a n e s e  and A u s t r a l i a n  N u c le a r  Programmes
A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s  have  long  b e e n  numbered amongst t h o s e  w hich
have r e c e iv e d  a s s i s t a n c e  u n d e r  A m e r ic a ’ s "Atoms f o r  P e a c e"
programme. I n  1957, t h e  IL S . s u p p l i e d  t h e  f i r s t  o f  a number of
r e s e a r c h  r e a c t o r s  to  J a p a n .^  S in c e  1961, A m erica  h a s  e s t a b l i s h e d
s i m i l a r  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  Taiw an, I n d o n e s i a ,  S ou th  K o rea ,  t h e
2
P h i l i p p i n e s ,  T h a i la n d  and South  V ie tnam . I t  h a s  a l s o  c o n t r a c t e d  
to  s u p p ly  t h e  e n r i c h e d  u ran ium  f o r  t h e s e  f a c i l i t i e s  and f o r
3
A u s t r a l i a ' s  sm a l l  r e s e a r c h  r e a c t o r  a s  w e l l .  But more im p o r ta n t  
th a n  a l l  t h i s ,  b o th  i n  te rm s  o f  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  p e a c e f u l  
u s e s  o f  a to m ic  e n e rg y  and p o t e n t i a l  f o r  n u c l e a r  weapons p r o ­
l i f e r a t i o n ,  have  been  t h e  power r e a c t o r  and a s s o c i a t e d  e n r i c h e d  
u ran ium  a g re e m e n ts  w hich th e  U .S . h a s  e n t e r e d  i n t o  w i th  I n d i a  
and J a p a n .
The s t o r y  o f  Am erican c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  I n d i a  i n  t h e
power r e a c t o r  f i e l d  r e v o l v e s  a round  t h e  380 M.W. f a c i l i t y  a t
4
T a r a p u r ,  n e a r  Bombay. The T a ra p u r  a g re e m e n t ,  w hich  was s ig n e d  
by D e lh i  and W ash ing ton  i n  A ugust 1963 , was r e g a r d e d  a s  some­
what o f  a landm ark  by o f f i c i a l s  of t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  Atomic 
Energy  Commission ( U .S .A .E .C . ) ;  i t  was t h e  f i r s t  m a jo r  f o r e i g n  
n u c l e a r  power p r o j e c t  o u t s i d e  t h e  E u ropean  Atomic Energy  
Community (EURATOM) complex i n  w hich  t h e  U .S . had been  a
1. V i c t o r  G i l i n s k y  and P a u l  L a n g e r ,  The J a p a n e s e  C i v i l i a n  
N u c le a r  Programme, Rand Memorandum RM-5366-PR, S a n ta  M onica: 
The Rand C o r p o r a t i o n ,  1967, p . 2 .
2. L eonard  B e a to n ,  Must t h e  Bomb S p re a d ? H arm ondsw orth:
P e n g u in ,  1966, p .8 9 .
3. S e e ,  S e l e c t e d  M a t e r i a l s  C o n ce rn in g  F u tu r e  Ow nership  o f  AEC's 
G aseous D i f f u s i o n  P l a n t s , Com m ittee  P r i n t ,  J o i n t  Committee 
on Atomic E ne rgy , 9 1 s t  C o n g .,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  W a sh in g to n ,  1969 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  S e l e c t e d  M a t e r i a l s  C once rn ing  
F u tu r e  Ow nership  of  AEC's G aseous D i f f u s i o n  P l a n t s ) ,  p .4 6 1 .
4 . For a  n o t e  on t h i s  f a c i l i t y ,  s e e  above p .1 0 8 .
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m ajor p a r t i c i p a n t .  Under th e  term s of th e  agreement app ro v a l  was 
g iv e n  f o r  American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  of th e  s t a t i o n  
i t s e l f  ( th e  tw in r e a c to r s  were s u p p l ie d  by an American f i rm ,  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  G eneral E l e c t r i c )  and f o r  th e  supp ly  by th e  U.S. over
a 30 y ea r  p e r io d  of up to  14,500 k ilog ram s of U235 f o r  u se  in  th e
2
s t a t i o n ' s  r e a c to r s » "  To he lp  f in a n c e  th e  scheme th e  U.S. Agency
f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development (A .I .D . )  u n d er to o k  to  lend  In d ia
3
80 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  The s t a t i o n  a t  Tarapur commenced o p e ra t io n s
e a r l y  in  1969. A m erica 's  w i l l in g n e s s  and a b i l i t y  to  c o -o p e ra te
w ith  In d ia  on th e  Tarapur p r o j e c t  has no t p red isp o se d  D e lh i
tow ards g r e a t e r  dependence on th e  U.S. in  th e  n u c le a r  f i e l d .  As
a l r e a d y  n o te d ,  of th e  t h r e e  r e a c t o r s  c u r r e n t l y  o p e ra t in g  o r  under
c o n s t r u c t io n  in  I n d ia ,  only  th e  f a c i l i t y  a t  T arapur has been
4
s u p p l ie d  by th e  U nited S t a t e s .
The U nited  S ta te s  has come to  assume a much more im p o rtan t  
p la c e  in  th e  Japanese  n u c le a r  programme than  i t  has in  th e  In d ia n .  
America su p p lie d  th e  f i r s t  r e a c t o r  in  Japan  to  g e n e ra te  e l e c t r i c a l  
power. T h is  was th e  12 M.W. Japan  Power D em onstra t ion  R eac tor
1. See, remarks by Henry D. Smyth, U.S. R e p r e s e n ta t i v e ,  I .A .E .A . ,  
i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Agreements f o r  C o -o p e ra t io n , h e a r in g s  b e fo re  
th e  Subcommittee on Agreements f o r  C o -o p e ra t io n ,  J o i n t  
Committee on Atomic Energy, 8 8 th  Cong., 1 s t  and 2nd S e s s . ,  
September 5, 1963 and A p r i l  22 and June  30, 1964, Washington 
1964 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Agreements to  C o -o p e ra te ,  1963-1964) ,  p .2 7 .
2. See, Atomic Energy C o -o p e ra t io n  fo r  C i v i l  Uses: Agreement 
Between th e  U nited S ta t e s  of America and I n d i a ,  August 8 ,
1963, T r e a t i e s  and O ther I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Acts S e r ie s  5446, 
Department of S t a t e ,  W ashington 1963 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  
a s  In d ia -U .S .  Agreement to  C o -o p era te  on C i v i l  Uses of Atomic
Energy) , p p . l ,  2 and 8.
3. S ee , s ta te m e n t  of J .  P a t t e r s o n  Drew, r e p r e s e n t in g  A .I .D . 
Reproduced in  J .C .A .E . H earings  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Agreements 
to  C o -o p e ra te ,  1963-64 , p .1 7 .
4. See above, p .108 .
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(J.P.D.R.) which commenced operations in 1963.'*' The contract for
Japan's first commercial power reactor (the 160 M.W. natural
uranium fuelled installation at Tokai-mura) went to a British
rather than to an American firm but thereafter the United States
established itself as the main foreign supplier of reactors and
associated equipment for Japan's rapidly expanding nuclear
industry; according to a report published in 1971 by the
U.S.A.E.C. there were no less than twenty U.S, type power
reactors of 100 M.W. or larger currently operating, under
2construction, or on order in Japan. (This is out of a total 
of twenty-one nuclear power units listed as being in operation,
3
under construction, or on order in Japan as at 30 June 1971.)
But it is not only through the supply of reactors and 
related equipment that the United States has come to achieve 
a position of such great importance in Japan's nuclear 
programme; in addition, the U.S. has undertaken to supply, on 
a long-term basis, large quantities of enriched uranium for 
use as reactor fuel. America first agreed to sell U235 to 
Japan in 1958. However, during the next ten years the amount 
supplied was relatively small and was used mainly for research 
purposes and for the J.P.D.R. In 1968 the United States 
Government entered into a new and very substantial U235 supply
1. Gilinsky and Langer, op. cit., p.3.
2. The Nuclear Industry, 1971, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, 1971, p.107. The designation "U.S. type power 
reactor", which is a standard form of reference used by 
the U.S.A.E.C., covers a variety of different arrangements. 
It can indicate any of the following: construction by a
U.S. firm; participation by a U.S. firm through licensing 
or joint venture arrangements; and participation by a U.S. 
firm through a foreign subsidiary. U.S. type reactors use 
slightly enriched uranium as fuel. See, ibid., pp.105-106,
3. This list was compiled by the Australian Atomic Energy 
Commission (A.A.E.C.). See, Australian Atomic Energy 
Commission, Nineteenth Annual Report, June 1971, p.36.
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agreement with Japan, Under the terms of this latest undertaking, 
the U.S. agreed to supply Japan with 161,000 kilograms of U235 and 
365 kilograms of plutonium.^ This was the largest quantity of 
U235 that the U.S. had so far contracted for in bilateral agree­
ments with individual countries. (It was exceeded only by the
2contract to supply EURATOM with 215,000 kilograms,) The material
was to be supplied over a 30 year period and was calculated to
be sufficient to meet the enriched fuel requirements for 13
reactors which Japan then expected to place under construction 3
by 1973, But Japan's latest plans for the expansion of its
nuclear power generating capacity assume a faster rate of growth
than that on which the agreement of 1968 with the U.S. was 
4based. In consequence of this, the American Government has 
indicated that it is willing to amend the 1968 agreement so as 
to provide Japan with an additional 130,000 kilograms of U235.^
1. See, Letter from Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S.A.E.C. to 
Senator Pastore, Chairman, J.C.A.E., May 16, 1968, concern­
ing agreement to co-operate between Japan and the United 
States. Reproduced in International Agreements for Co­
operation, 1967-68, hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Agreements for Co-operation of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., March 20,
1967 and June 25, 1968, Washington, 1969 (hereafter referred 
to as J.C.A.E. Hearings on International Agreements for 
Co-operation, 1967-68), p.105.
2. See, remarks by Dr, Gerald Tape, Commissioner, U.S.A.E.C. 
Reproduced in ibid., p.30.
3. See, Seaborg-Pastore Correspondence on Japan-U.S. Agreement 
to Co-operate, Reproduced in ibid., p.106,
4. For details of the latest plans for the expansion of Japan's 
nuclear power generating capacity, see above, p.148.
5. See, Letter from Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S.A.E.C., to 
Chet Holifield, Chairman, J.C.A.E., March 5, 1970.
Reproduced in AEC Authorizing Legislation, Fiscal Year 1971, 
Part 4, hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess,, March 19, 1970, Washington 
1970 (hereafter referred to as J.C.A.E.. Hearings on A.E.C, 
Authorizing Legislation, FY 1971. Part 4), p.1645.
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Commercial c o n s id e r a t io n s  c l e a r l y  p layed  an im p o rtan t  p a r t
in  W ash ing ton 's  w i l l in g n e s s  to  c o -o p e ra te  w ith  Japan  in  th e
n u c le a r  energy f i e l d .  Spokesmen f o r  th e  U .S .A .E.C . were qu ick
to  p o in t  out t h a t  Japan promised to  become one of th e  w o r ld 's
le a d in g  i n d u s t r i a l  n u c le a r  powers and t h a t  c o - o p e r a t io n  w ith
such a coun try  was co n seq u en tly  v e ry  much in  A m erica 's  i n t e r e s t .
I t  was noted t h a t  th e  1968 agreem ent was expected  to  r e s u l t  i n
an e x p o r t  b e n e f i t  to  th e  U.S. of app ro x im ate ly  634 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s
and th e r e  were c o n f id e n t  p r e d i c t i o n s  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  and e q u a l ly
l u c r a t i v e  r e a c to r  and f u e l  s a l e s  to  Japan  would fo l lo w .^
Tokyo 's w i l l in g n e s s  to  e n t e r  i n t o  a lo n g - te rm  agreement
f o r  th e  supply  of U235 was i n t e r p r e t e d  by o f f i c i a l s  in
Washington as a s ig n  t h a t  Japan  had abandoned w hatever
r e s e r v a t io n s  i t  had about r e ly i n g  on a s in g l e  o u t s id e  sou rce  
2
of r e a c t o r  f u e l ,  (That i t  p r e v io u s ly  h e ld  such r e s e r v a t i o n s  
was th e  c o n c lu s io n  drawn by many in  th e  U.S. from J a p a n 's  
e a r l i e r  d e c i s io n  to  pu rchase  a n a t u r a l  uranium fu e le d  r e a c t o r  
from B r i t a i n , )  However, t h e r e  i s  much ev idence  to  su g g es t  
t h a t  Japan  was f a r  from happy about t h i s  r e l i a n c e  on America.
In  a r e p o r t  p u b lish e d  s h o r t l y  b e fo re  th e  s ig n in g  of th e  1968 
agreem ent, two American e x p e r t s  no ted  "a  g r e a t  d e s i r e  in  
Japan f o r  red u c in g  th e  d eg ree  of dependence on U.S. enrichm ent
3
f a c i l i t i e s " .  That t h i s  d e s i r e  has in c re a s e d  i s  e v id e n t  from 
s ta te m e n ts  in  r e c e n t  y e a rs  by b o th  government o f f i c i a l s  and 
th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of J a p a i i 's  n u c le a r  i n d u s t r y . ^  There seems 
to  be two main rea so n s  f o r  J a p a n 's  r e lu c t a n c e  to  depend w holly  
on American U235 s u p p l i e s .  In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h e r e  has  been
1. See, J .C oAoEp H earings  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Agreements to  Co­
o p e r a t e ,  1967-68 , pp,59  and 105-106.
2. See e s p e c i a l l y ,  remarks by Myron B. K r a tz e r ,  D i r e c t o r ,
D iv is io n  of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s ,  U .S .A .E .C . ,  i n  i b i d . ,
p p . 61-62.
3. V ic to r  G i l in sk y  and M ilto n  P l e s s e t ,  "Comments on th e  Japan­
ese  N uclear  Program" in  Atoms in  J a p a n , Vol. 12, No. 5,
May 1968, p„7.
4. For an example of t h i s ,  see  above, p .1 5 0 .
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i n c re a s in g  concern  t h a t  U.S. en richm ent p l a n t s  w i l l  e v e n tu a l ly
prove in c a p a b le  of m eeting  J a p a n ’ s f u e l  r e q u ire m e n ts .  This
f e e l i n g  has  grown w ith  every  in c r e a s e  i n  th e  e s t im a te d  r a t e  of
expansion  of J a p a n ’ s n u c le a r  indus try . '* ' Second, t h e r e  has been
an u n d e rs ta n d a b le  r e lu c ta n c e  to  r e l y  to o  h e a v i ly  on one s u p p l i e r ,
no m a t te r  how r e l i a b l e  i t  m ight b e ,  f o r  a commodity which
prom ises  to  p la y  such a v i t a l  p a r t  i n  J a p a n ’s f u t u r e  economic
grow th. Almost i n v a r i a b ly ,  th e s e  e x p re s s io n s  of concern  about
dependence on th e  U.S. have been accompanied by demands th a t
Japan  should  a c q u i re  i t s  own enrichm ent c a p a b i l i t y ,  e i t h e r
th rough  ind igenous  development o r  th rough  th e  p u rch ase  of
f o r e ig n  te chno logy . (As no ted  e a r l i e r ,  b o th  th e  gas d i f f u s i o n
and c e n t r i f u g e  methods of en richm ent have been under s tu d y  in
2
Japan fo r  s e v e r a l  y e a r s . )  W ashington t r i e d  hard  to  p e rsu ad e
Tokyo to  c l a s s i f y  th e  work be ing  done in  Japan  on c e n t r i f u g e s
' 3
but i t s  e f f o r t s  in  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  were u n s u c c e s s f u l .
(Spokesmen f o r  th e  J ,A ,E .C . have a rg u ed ,  among o th e r  t h i n g s ,
t h a t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of th e  work be ing  done in  Japan  on
c e n t r i f u g e s  would be c o n t ra ry  to  th e  c o u n t ry ’ s b a s ic  atom ic  
4
energy law .)  C le a r ly ,  th e  U.S. has been u n ab le  to  d i s ­
courage i n t e r e s t  in  Japan  in  c e n t r i f u g e  te ch n o lo g y .
By com parison w ith  i t s  involvem ent in  th e  In d ia n  
and Japanese  n u c le a r  programmes, American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  
th e  A u s t r a l i a n  programme has been v e ry  l im i t e d  in d e ed .  (This  
i s  l a r g e ly  a f u n c t i o n ,  of c o u rs e ,  of th e  r e l a t i v e  sm a l ln ess
1. For s ta te m e n ts  to  t h i s  e f f e c t ,  see  Atoms in  J a p a n , Vol.
13, No. 2, F ebruary  1969, p p .3 -6 ;  i b i d . ,  Vol. 14, No. 9, 
September 1970, p .7 ;  i b i d . ,  V ol. 15, No. 5, May 1971, p .2 1 .
2. For a n o te  on t h i s  work, see  above, p .150 .
3» V ic to r  G i l in s k y ,  Proposed AEC Rules on P r i v a t e  R e s t r i c t e d  
D a ta , Rand P-3787, San ta  Monica: The Rand C o rp o ra t io n ,
1968, p p .6 -7 .
4. See, N ucleon ics  Week, Vol. 9, No. 1, January  4 , 1968, p . 7 .
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of the Australian effort.) The U.S. first agreed to provide
Australia with enriched uranium in 1956.^ Under the terms of an
agreement signed that year (and amended in 1963) Australia was
2to receive up to 500 kilograms of U235. This material was for 
use in Australia’s small nuclear research programme based on the 
10 M,W. reactor at Lucas Heights, near Sydney. In 1967 the 
agreement was extended for 30 years but the ceiling on the
3
amount of U235 to be supplied was not raised. It was noted
at the time by the American government, that "while Australia
[had] not yet formulated a nuclear power reactor program,
assurance of the availability of enriched uranium would be4
an important factor in developing such a programme". But 
regardless of what Washington’s wishes in the matter might 
have been, Australia seems to have harboured strong reser­
vations about dependence on American or other foreign fuel 
supplies. As noted earlier, when inviting tenders for what 
was scheduled to be Australia's first nuclear power station, 
the A.A.E.C. indicated that the facility should be of such 
a type that would not be dependent on overseas fuel supplies 
and services.^ The A.A.E.C. of course, has been conducting 
work on the centrifuge process for some years and it was 
reported in 1971 that talks had taken place between Japan 
and Australia about co-operation on an enrichment project.^
1» See, Letter from Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S.A.E.C., 
to Senator Pastore, Chairman, J.C.A.E., March 17, 1967, 
concerning agreement to co-operate between the United 
States and Australia. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings 
on International Agreements to Co-operate, 1967-68, p.80.
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
4. See, Letter from Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S.A.E.C., 
to President Johnson, March 14, 1967, concerning agreement 
to co-operate between the United States and Australia. 
Reproduced in ibid., p,81.
5. See above, p.195.
6. See above, p. 199, fn, 2,
7. See, The Australian Financial Review, 10 and 11 June, 1971.
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On th e  b a s i s  of th e  ev idence  p re s e n te d  h e re  and e lsew here  
i n  th e  t h e s i s ,  i t  seems t h a t ,  though A m erica 's  c a p a c i ty  and 
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  supply  U235 may have reduced  in c e n t iv e s  in  
Jap an  and A u s t r a l i a  f o r  th e  development of ind ig en o u s  e n r i c h ­
ment c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  i t  d id  n o t  e l im in a te  them a l t o g e t h e r .
In d e e d ,  w i th  th e  p assag e  of t im e ,  i n t e r e s t  in  enrichm ent 
te c h n o lo g y  in  b o th  c o u n t r i e s  has  con t in u ed  to  in c r e a s e .
Bo N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and American Safeguards  P o l ic y  in  A sia
As a l r e a d y  n o te d ,  i t  has been th e  p r a c t i c e  of th e  
American Government to  i n s i s t  t h a t  s a fe g u a rd s  should  accompany 
th e  a id  t h a t  th e  U .S. has o f f e r e d  f o r e ig n  c o u n t r i e s  to  h e lp  
them deve lop  t h e i r  p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s .  T h is  has 
been no l e s s  t r u e  of American c o - o p e r a t io n  w ith  c o u n t r i e s  in  
A s ia  th a n  w i th  th o se  in  o th e r  p a r t s  of th e  w o rld .  But th e  
UcS. e f f o r t  to  have I n d ia  a c c e p t  s a fe g u a rd s  was a so u rce  of 
c o n s id e r a b le  d isag ree m en t between D e lh i  and W ashington. An 
e x am in a t io n  of t h i s  c o n t ro v e rsy  w i l l  n o t  on ly  i l l u s t r a t e  a 
number of im p o r ta n t  p o in t s  abou t I n d i a ' s  a t t i t u d e  to  s a f e ­
g u a rd s ,  b u t  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  w i l l  c a s t  a r e v e a l in g  l i g h t  on U.S. 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y  in  A s ia .
D isagreem en t between D e lh i  and W ashington over th e
q u e s t io n  of s a fe g u a rd s  f ig u re d  p ro m in en tly  i n  th e  d i s c u s s io n s
abou t th e  T arapur  p r o j e c t .  Both s id e s  ag reed  in  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t
s a fe g u a rd s  shou ld  be a p p l ie d  to  th e  e n r ic h e d  uranium  f u e l  to
be used  in  th e  r e a c t o r  bu t t h e r e  was a d i f f e r e n c e  of o p in io n
between th e  two governm ents w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  a t tach m en t of
s a fe g u a rd s  to  e q u ip m e n t .1 On t h i s  o c c a s io n ,  a s  in  th e  p a s t ,
1. See, AEC-State Department P r e s s  R e lea se  on U nited  S t a t e s -  
In d ia n  N e g o t i a t io n s  on T arapur P r o j e c t ,  June 29, 1963. 
Reproduced i n  JoC.A.E. H earings  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Agreements 
to  C o -o p e ra te ,  1963-64 , p .6 4 .
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D elh i  argued  t h a t  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of s a fe g u a rd s  to  equipment
s u p p l ie d  from o u ts id e  was u n f a i r  to  d eve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s ,  A
m u tu a l ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y  arrangem ent was e v e n tu a l ly  a r r iv e d  a t
whereby n e i t h e r  s id e  was r e q u i r e d  to  g iv e  up i t s  b a s ic  p o s i t i o n
on th e  a t tach m en t of s a fe g u a rd s  to  equipm ent. T h is  was ach ieved
th ro u g h  th e  i n s e r t i o n  of a p r o v i s io n  in  th e  f i n a l  agreement
which s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  th e  Tarapur s t a t i o n  would be o p e ra te d
only  on e n r ic h e d  uranium su p p l ie d  by th e  U.S. or on p lu tonium
2
produced th e re f ro m .
But th e  i s s u e  which proved most c o n te n t io u s  in  th e
n e g o t i a t i o n s  between D e lh i  and W ashington was th e  q u e s t io n  of
I .A .E .A . in s p e c t io n  of th e  Tarapur p l a n t .  In  January  1963
th e  U.S, dec ided  to  p la c e  most of i t s  b i l a t e r a l  n u c le a r
3
a s s i s t a n c e  agreem ents  under I .A .E .A . s u p e r v is io n .  In  th e
n e g o t i a t i o n s  over Tarapur l a t e r  t h a t  y e a r ,  W ashington i n s i s t e d
t h a t  th e  agreem ent between In d ia  and th e  U.S. shou ld  c o n ta in
p r o v i s io n  f o r  IoA.E.A. i n s p e c t io n  of T arapur as  soon as
p o s s i b l e  a f t e r  th e  agency had d ev ised  a s a fe g u a rd s  system
cap a b le  of be ing  a p p l ie d  to  th e  ty p e  of r e a c t o r  to  be
4
i n s t a l l e d  i n  th e  In d ia n  p l a n t .  However, D e lh i  was most
1 © See, rem arks on t h i s  b ^ H e n r y  D. Smyth, U.S, R e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  
I .A .E ,A . ,  i n  i b i d , ,  p ,2 9 .
2, See, AEC-State Department P re s s  R e le a s e ,  i n  i b i d . ,  p .6 4 .
3, For a comment on t h i s ,  see  above, p .2 3 .
4, See, L e t t e r  from Glenn T, Seaborg, Chairman, U .S .A .E .C . ,  
to  S e n a to r  P a s t o r e ,  Chairman, J .C .A .E . ,  March 1, 1963, 
co n ce rn in g  U .S , - I n d i a  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on T arapur p r o j e c t .  
Reproduced i n  i b i d , ,  p ,6 2 .  See a l s o ,  rem arks by James T. 
Ramey, Commissioner, U .S ,A .E .C . ,  i n  i b i d . ,  p ,4 .  I .A .E .A . 
s a f e g u a rd s  were th e n  l im i t e d  to  r e a c t o r s  of 100 M.W. o r  
l e s s .  The U.S, sought to  have t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  l i f t e d  and 
a p ro p o s a l  to  t h i s  e f f e c t  was accep ted  by th e  I .A .E .A . in  
September 1963, See above, p .2 3 ,  and Henry D. Smyth, 
"N uc lear  Power and P r o l i f e r a t i o n " ,  i n Department of S t a t e  
B u l l e t i n  ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  D.O^S^JB.) 3 January  
1966, p .3 4 .
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reluctant to accept I.A.E^A, safeguards. Throughout the
negotiations, Delhi sought some kind of arrangement whereby the
U.S. might have a continuing association with the implementation
of safeguards during an initial trial period while the I.A.E.A.'s
expanded system was going through a "shakedown" period,^" It was
not till 1971 (eight years after the removal of the 100 M.W.
limit on the I.A.E.A. safeguards system) that India finally
signed a trilateral (India, U.S., I.A.E.A.) arrangement for
2agency inspection of Tarapur.
There seem to have been two main reasons for India’s
stand on this matter= In the first place, Delhi had been an
opponent of I.A.E.A, inspection since the time the question
3
of agency safeguards was first raised in the late 1950’s.
Indeed, at the very time of the negotiations over Tarapur,
Indian representatives at the I.A.E.A. were attempting to
frustrate American moves in that organization to have the
I.A.E.A. safeguards system modified so as it could cope with
4reactors as large as those to be installed at Tarapur.
Delhi’s opposition to agency inspection of the proposed India-
1. See, remarks by James T. Ramey, Commissioner, U.S.A.E.C., 
in J.C.A.E. Hearings on International Agreements to 
Co-operate, 1963-64, p»4.
2. See Atomic Energy: Agreement Between the United States of 
America, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Signed at Vienna, January 27, 1971, Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 7049, Department of State, 
Washington, 1971. The India-U.S. agreement included a 
provision stipulating that Washington would not insist on 
IoA.E.A. inspection of Tarapur until such time as agency 
safeguards had been "widely accepted" by other U.S. bi­
lateral partners. See, remarks by Henry D. Smyth, U.S. 
Representative, I.A.E.A. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings 
on International Agreements to Co-operate, 1963-64, p.28.
3. For a note on India's earlier opposition to I.A.E.A. safe­
guards, see above, pp.137-139.
4. See above, pp.23 and 137.
3@
U.S. reactor was consistent then with India’s long-standing
opposition to LA.E.A, safeguards in general» But an equally
important explanation for Delhi’s stand on the issue concerned
the privilege accorded America's European allies in the matter
of safeguards, A review of some of the background to this
development would seem in order here.
In August 1958 the thS, concluded an agreement with
EURATOM to co-operate in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.^
However, as indicated earlier, instead of providing for
inspection by the U„S. or, as in the case of later agreements,
by the I0A»E0A 0, the agreement provided for a safeguard system
2operated by EURATOM itself, A major reason for the favourable
treatment accorded EURATOM seems to have been Washington’s
3anxiety to promote the concept of European integration. In
addition to this arrangement with the EURATOM organization
itself, the UoS. entered into a number of bilateral agreements
4with individual member states of EURATOM. The responsibility 
for inspection under these bilateral agreements resided with 
the U.S,^ When Washington decided to place its bilateral
1. See, United States Foreign Policy on Nuclear Energy, A 
Report by the U.S.AoE.C. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings 
on International Agreements to Co-operate, 1967-68, p.208.
2. See above, p.20.
3c See, United States Foreign Policy on Nuclear Energy, in
JcCoAoEo Hearings on International Agreements to Co-operate, 
1967-68, p„207o See also, remarks by John A. Hall, Assistant 
General Manager for International Activities, U.S.AoE.C., in 
his "Atoms For Peace, or War", in Foreign Affairs, Vol, 43, 
No. 4, July 1965, pp,611-612. See also, Lawrence Scheinman, 
"Euratom : Nuclear Integration in Europe", in International 
Conciliation, No, 563, May 1967, p.30.
4o Hall, IOC» cito, p«612.
5, See, Mason Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for 
Nuclear Arms Control, Charlotesville, Virginia: The Michie 
Company, 1969, p.60.
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agreements under IeA.E.A. safeguards, an important exception
was made in the case of those between the U.S. and a number of
the individual members of EURATOM; it was decided that when
these agreements came up for renewal they would be allowed to
lapse and that the flow of fissionable material between the U.S.
and each of the countries concerned would thereafter be
channeled through EURATOM^ It seems that this action was
designed, among other things, to strengthen EURATOM at a time
2of increasing nuclear nationalism in Western Europe; it was 
one further indication of Washington's support for the concept 
of European integration,, However, an important consequence 
of the move was that EURATOM came to be entrusted with safe­
guards responsibilities in a number of European states which
3had previously been exercised by the U.S. Alternatively, 
Washington could have passed these safeguards responsibilities 
over to the I.AoE.A. By transferring them to EURATOM, the 
UoS. chose to support the regional body rather than the 
international one.
The privilege accorded America's European allies in
the matter of safeguards was a source of much dissension during
the Tarapur negotiations; the idea that Delhi should accept
I.A.E.A. safeguards but that the EURATOM states should be
exempted from such inspection was clearly regarded as repug-
4nant by Indian negotiators. That facilities in EURATOM 
countries should be subject to I.A.E.A. safeguards was a 
regular theme in Indian Government statements on the matter 
in the period immediately following
1. ibida, and Hall, loc. cit., p.612„
2. Willrich, ope cit., p.60c 
3 c ibid c
4. See, remarks by Henry D. Smyth, one of the principal U.S. 
negotiators of the Tarapur agreement, in J.C.A.E. Hearings 
on International Agreements to Co-operate, 1963-64, pp.28-29.
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th e  c o n c lu s io n  of th e  Tarapur ag ree m en t. W ash ing ton 's  
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  d i s c r im in a t e  i n  th e  m a t te r  of s a fe g u a rd s  between 
In d ia  (and o th e r  Asian s t a t e s )  on th e  one hand and A m erica 's  
European a l l i e s  on th e  o th e r  was c l e a r l y  a m ajor f a c t o r  in  
D e l h i ' s  o p p o s i t io n  to  L A SE.A, in s p e c t io n  of In d ia n  n u c le a r  
f a c i l i t i e s .  S im ila r  c o n s id e r a t io n s  a l s o  he lped  to  r e i n f o r c e  
th e  o p p o s i t io n  of bo th  D e lh i  and Tokyo to  th e  N .P .T .
Co S afeguards  and th e  N .P .T .
So f a r  as  sa fe g u a rd s  were concerned , th e  o r i g i n a l
American d r a f t  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  of August 1965 was
q u i t e  p e rm is s iv e  and no t d i s c r im in a to r y  as  between n u c le a r
and n o n -n u c le a r  s t a t e s ;  A r t i c l e  I I I  of t h a t  d r a f t  co n ta in e d
only  a weak o b l i g a t i o n  t h a t  a l l  s t a t e s  " c o -o p e ra te  in
f a c i l i t a t i n g  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of I .A .E .A . or e q u iv a le n t
2
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s a f e g u a rd s ."  During th e  n ex t  two and a h a l f  
y e a r s ,  however, a number of developm ents took  p la c e  which 
helped  to  d r a s t i c a l l y  re sh ap e  th e  sa feg u a rd s  p r o v i s io n  in  th e
1. See, remarks by Dr. Homi Bhabha, Chairman of th e  In d ia n  
Atomic Energy Commission, a t  a m eeting of th e  A d m in i s t r a t iv e  
and Legal Committee of th e  I .A .E .A . on 27 September 1963. 
Quoted in  A l i  A. M azrui, "Num erical S t r e n g th  and N uclear 
S ta tu s  in  th e  P o l i t i c s  of th e  T hird  W orld", in  The J o u rn a l  
of P o l i t i c s , Vol. 29, No. 4 , November 1967, p p . 791-820.
See a l s o ,  remarks by Mr. T r i v e d i ,  I n d i a ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
to  th e  E .N .D .C .,  a t  a m eeting  of t h a t  com mittee i n  March 
1964« Reproduced i n ,  V erbatim  Record of th e  Conference of 
th e  E igh teen  N ation  Committee on Disarmament, Geneva 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  E .N .D .C ./P .V . ) ,  174, p .1 9 .
2. See U nited  S ta t e s  P ro p o sa l  Subm itted to  th e  E ig h teen  N ation  
Disarmament Committee : D ra f t  T rea ty  to  P re v e n t  th e  Spread 
of N uclear Weapons, August 17, 1965. Reproduced in  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t ia t io n s  on th e  T re a ty  on th e  N o n p ro l i f ­
e r a t i o n  of N uclear Weapons, Washington: U nited  S t a t e s  Arms 
C on tro l  and Disarmament Agency, P u b l i c a t i o n  48, J an u ary  1969 
( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N e g o t i a t io n s  on th e  
N .P .T . ) , p p . 133-135.
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proposed nonproliferation treaty* One of these was the 
support which developed during this period, both abroad and 
in circles in the U.S* concerned with atomic energy and arms 
control matters, for the widest possible application of 
IoAaEoA® safeguards* This sentiment was well reflected in 
the UoSo Senate where, on 18 January 1966, Senator Pastore, 
Vice-Chairman of the J.CoAcE,, introduced a resolution 
supporting the efforts of the administration to secure a 
nonproliferation treaty* In doing so, Pastore vigorously 
attacked what he called the "noncommittal phrasing" of the 
safeguards requirement in the existing (August 1965) U*S. 
draft and recommended that non-nuclear signatories of the 
proposed nonproliferation treaty be obliged to accept I.A.E.A. 
or "similar international safeguards" on all of their nuclear 
activities*^ Despite the provision in Senator Pastore’s
1* See, Speech by Senator John 0. Pastore on the floor of the 
Senate, January 18, 1966, on "Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
and Thermonuclear Weapons*" Reproduced in Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, hearings before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 89th Cong«, 2nd Sess., February 23, and 
March 1 and 7, 1966, Washington, 1966 (hereafter referred 
to as JoCoAeEo Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1966), p.147. The text of Senate Resolution 179 
is reproduced in ibid *, p*179. For evidence of additional 
support in the U.S. for the widest possible application of 
IcAoEoA* safeguards see Report of the Committee on Arms 
Control and Disarmament of the National Citizens’ Commission 
on International Co-operation, November 28, 1965. Reproduced 
in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, United States Arms Con­
trol and Disarmament Agency, 1966 (hereafter referred to as 
D on D *, 1965), p.578. See also, recommendations by The 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of the 
National Citizens’ Commission on International Co-operation 
[convened, November-December, 1965]. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. 
Hearings on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.163. 
See also, Report of the Advisory Panel on Safeguarding 
Special Nuclear Material, March 10, 1967 [a non-government 
report to the U.S.A*E.C.]. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings 
on International Agreements to Co-operate, 1967-68, p.329.
For evidence of support for IcA.E.A. safeguards .by Norway, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, see Arnold Kramish, The Watched 
and the Unwatched; Inspection in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
Adelphi Paper No*36, London: The Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1967, p.4.
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recommendation for recourse to "similar [to the I.A.E.A.] 
international safeguards", it is significant that there appears 
to have been some support in Congress for the idea that EURATOM 
signatories of the proposed nonproliferation treaty should 
accept IoAoEoAo inspection of all of their nuclear activities;'*’ 
provision for this was included in the text of a draft Article
III which was shown to NoAdcO. and EURATOM countires in March
21966c Another relevant development during this period
concerned the attitude of the Soviet Union to safeguards. The
original Soviet draft nonproliferation treaty of September
1965 had been even more permissive and non-discriminatory in
3this matter than the first American one. However, Moscow had
since come around to insisting that all non-nuclear signatories
accept IoA,E „Ao inspection; the Soviet Union was especially
concerned that EURATOM facilities should pass under I.A.E.A.
safeguards. The EURATOM states were just as adamant, of course,
that the I.A.E.A. safeguards system should not replace their
own. It was against the background of these developments that
intensive discussions on the safeguards issue took place during
1967 between Washington and Moscow and between Washington and
4the EURATOM states,
1, e,g,, See remarks by Senator R. Kennedy in support of Senate 
Resolution 179. Reproduced in J.C.A.E. Hearings on Non­
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966, p.175.
2, The text of this draft is reproduced in Kramish, op.cit., p.4.
3, Article III of the Soviet draft merely stated that: "The 
Parties to this Treaty shall refrain from offering any 
support, encouragement or inducement to states seeking to 
own, manufacture or exercise control over nuclear weapons." 
See, Soviet Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, September 24, 1965. Reproduced in International 
Negotiations on NoP.T., pp„135-138.
4c For a fascinating account of these discussions by a major 
UcS, participant, see testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy 
Director, U.SeA.C.D.A,, in Arms Control and Disarmament 
Act Amendments, 1968, hearings before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong,, 2nd Sess., February 1, 5-8,
19, 20, 1968, Washington, 1968 (hereafter referred to as 
House Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments, 
1968), pp,59-63.
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After lengthy consideration of the matter a totally 
revised Article III was included in the draft nonproliferation 
treaty which was presented by the IK So and the U.S.SoR, in 
January 1968»^ In the wording of the new Article III, reference 
to "equivalent international safeguards" (implicitly, those of 
EURATOM) had been dropped. However, though the U.S. had backed 
away from the somewhat permissive and non-discriminatory 
language of its 1965 draft, it had nevertheless preserved 
much in the matter of safeguards for which its European allies 
could feel grateful» The latest formulation did not charac­
terise the safeguards under the proposed nonproliferation 
treaty as "l»AcE0A, safeguards" but merely stated that they 
had to be safeguards "set forth in an agreement to be negotiated 
and concluded with the IoA.E.A, in accordance with its statute 
and its safeguards system," Moreover, the new version of 
Article III stipulated that non-nuclear parties to the 
proposed treaty could conclude their agreements with the 
IoAcEoAo "either individually or together with other states";
U.S» officials were careful to indicate publicly that the
latter could include "regional organizations such as 2Euratom." It was the view of U.S.A.E.C. Chairman, Glenn 
Seaborg, that the EURATOM safeguards system was "adequate" 
for the purposes of the N.P.T. and that in those cases where 
EURATOM safeguards were already in operation it would be the
1, See, Revised Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, January 18, 1968. Text reproduced in International 
Negotiations on NoP.T», pp.150-154. Article III in this 
revised draft was incorporated unchanged into the N.P.T. 
of July 1, 1968. The latter is reproduced as Appendix IV 
of this thesis»
2» See, testimony of Glenn T. Seaborg, in Nonproliferation 
Treaty, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 10-12 and 17, 1968, 
Washington, 1968 (hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings 
on Nonproliferation Treaty, Part I, 1968), p 0101.
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f u n c t io n  of the  I.AoE.A. to  s im ply  " o v ersee  or v e r i f y "  t h e ir
a p p l ic a t io n , ,^  The p r e c i s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between EURATOM and
the  I 0 A 0 E 0 A 0 in  th e  im plem entation  o f  A r t i c l e  I I I  has y e t  to  
2
be worked out» However, i t  seems u n l i k e l y  th a t  th e  r e g io n a l  
o r g a n iz a t io n  w i l l  be s e r i o u s l y  d ep r ived  of  i t s  sa fegu ard s  
fu n c tio n «
I t  was apparent from th e  wording of  th e  new A r t i c l e  I I I  
t h a t ,  so  fa r  as sa feg u a rd s  were concern ed , n on -n u clear  s ig n a ­
t o r i e s  of the  N .P .T . would be d iv id e d  in t o  two c a t e g o r ie s :  a
m a jo r ity  which would be o b l ig e d  to  a c c ep t  I .A .E .A .  in s p e c t io n
of a l l  of  t h e ir  n u c le a r  a c t i v i t i e s ;  and a m in o r i ty ,  made up of
3
a l l  th e  EURATOM s t a t e s  excep t  F rance, which seem in g ly  would 
be a llow ed  to  e sca p e  d i r e c t  I .A .E .A .  s u p e r v is io n  and be  
p erm itted  to  u t i l i z e ,  in  one way or an o th er , EURATOM’ s own 
sa fegu ard s  system . This development c l e a r l y  he lped  to  reduce  
th e  appeal of th e  N .P .T . in  th e  eyes  o f  major n o n -n u c le a r ,  
non-Euratom s t a t e s  such as In d ia  and Japan. Even b e fo r e  the  
f i n a l  t e x t  o f  th e  t r e a t y  was p u b l i s h e d ,  D e lh i  demanded th a t  
th e  sa feg u a rd s  p r o v i s io n s  should be " n o n -d iscr im in a to r y  and
1. i b i d . ,  p .106 .
2. A r e p o r t  by th e  Safeguards Committee which was s e t  up by 
th e  I . A. E. A.  to  fo rm u la te  th e  s t r u c t u r e  and c o n te n t  of  
th e  agreem ents between s i g n a t o r i e s  and the  agency in  
co n n e c t io n  w i th  th e  N.P.T.  was adopted by th e  I . A. E . A.
Board of Governors in  A p r i l  1971. The I . A. E . A.  i s  now 
in  a p o s i t i o n  to  attem pt to  n e g o t ia t e  w ith  s t a t e s  which  
have r a t i f i e d  th e  N.P.T.  th e  a c tu a l  sa fegu ard s  agreem ents  
requ ired  by th e  p r o v i s io n s  o f  A r t i c l e  I I I  o f  th e  t r e a t y .  
See , A u s t r a l ia n  Atomic Energy Commission, N in e te e n th  Annual 
R ep ort , June 1971 , p . 1 1 2 .
3.  France did  not p a r t i c i p a t e  in  th e  d i s c u s s i o n s  between  
EURATOM and th e  U.S.  and probably w i l l  not become a party  
to  the  N.P.T.  Even i f  i t  d i d ,  a s  a n u c lear  power France  
would not be o b l ig e d  to  a c c ep t  sa feg u a rd s  under A r t i c l e  
I I I .
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u n i v e r s a l . " ' " '  L a t e r ,  i n  announcing  t h e i r  g o v e rn m e n t’ s d e c i s i o n
n o t  to  s ig n  t h e  N .P .T . ,  I n d ia n  spokesmen l o u d ly  condemned th e
a p p a r e n t  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i n  f a v o u r  of EURATOM i n  t h e  m a t t e r  of 
2
s a f e g u a r d s .  O p p o s i t i o n  i n  J a p a n  to  I .A .E .A .  i n s p e c t i o n  had
b een  much l e s s  o b v io u s  th a n  i n  t h e  c a s e  of I n d i a .  In d ee d  Ja p a n
had been  th e  f i r s t  n a t i o n  i n  t h e  w orld  to  e n t e r  i n t o  a t r i l a t e r a l
3
s a f e g u a r d s  ag re e m e n t  w i th  t h e  U .S , and t h e  I . A. E . A.  T h is  was i n  
1963 and s i n c e  t h e n  a l l  n u c le a r  m a t e r i a l s  and equ ipm en t t r a n s ­
f e r r e d  by t h e  U .S . to  J a p a n  had been  s u b j e c t  to  agency  i n s p e c t i o n .  
However, J a p a n ' s  warmth towar<ls t h e  I . A . E . A.  i n s p e c t i o n  sys tem  
soon c o o le d .  F o l lo w in g  agency  i n s p e c t i o n  of  t h e  s t a t i o n  a t  
T oka i-m ura  i n  May 1968 t h e r e  was some c r i t i c i s m  i n  J a p a n e s e
4
a to m ic  e n e rg y  c i r c l e s  o f  t h e  m ethods u se d  by I .A .E .A .  i n s p e c t o r s .  
T h e r e a f t e r ,  o p p o s i t i o n  i n  J a p a n  to  I .A .E .A .  s a f e g u a r d s  grew and 
f o c u s s e d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  on A r t i c l e  I I I  o f  t h e  N .P .T .  L ik e  t h e i r  
I n d i a n  c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  J a p a n e s e  o f f i c i a l s  a rg u e d  t h a t ,  among 
o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h e  s a f e g u a r d s  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  N .P .T .  d i s c r i m -
1. S ee ,  rem a rk s  by Mr. T r i v e d i ,  I n d i a ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  to  t h e  
E .N .D .C . ,  d u r in g  a m ee t in g  of t h a t  com m ittee  i n  Septem ber
1967. R eproduced  i n  E .N .D . C. / P . V. 327 , p p . 26 -27 .
2. S ee ,  rem a rk s  by Mr. H usa in  d u r in g  d e b a te  on t h e  N .P .T .  i n  
t h e  F i r s t  Com m ittee of t h e  U.N. G e n e ra l  A ssem bly , May 14,
1968, R eproduced  i n  F o r e ig n  A f f a i r s  R e c o rd , New D e lh i :  
M in i s t r y  o f  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s ,  Government o f  I n d i a  ( h e r e a f t e r  
r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  F o r e ig n  A f f a i r s  R eco rd ) ,  May 1968, p e l l 7 .
3. S ee ,  JoC.AoEo H e a r in g s  on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A greem ents  t o  
C o - o p e r a t e ,  1 9 6 7 -6 8 , p ,3 2 .
4. See , Atoms i n  J a p a n , V ol, 12 , No. 6 ,  J u n e  1968, p p . 1 0 -1 1 .  
T here  was f u r t h e r  c r i t i c i s m  f o l lo w in g  an I .A .E .A .  i n s p e c t i o n  
of t h e  T su ruga  s t a t i o n  i n  December 1970. One r e p o r t  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  f o l l o w in g  t h i s  i n s p e c t i o n  "haw k ish"  e le m e n ts  
i n  t h e  r u l i n g  L i b e r a l  D em ocra tic  P a r t y  u rg e d  t h a t  J a p a n  
sh o u ld  demand changes  i n  t h e  I . A . E . A . ' s  i n s p e c t i o n  m ethods 
b e f o r e  i t  c o n s id e r e d  s ig n in g  th e  N .P .T .  S e e ,  The W ashing­
to n  P o s t , 15 J a n u a r y ,  1971.
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in a te d  in  favour of EURATOM. ± On th e  o cca s io n  of i t s  s ig n a tu r e
of th e  N .P.T . in  February  1970, th e  J a p an ese  Government in d ic a te d
t h a t  r a t i f i c a t i o n  would depend upon Japan  being  p la ced  on an
2
equa l  f o o t in g  w ith  EURATOM in  r e s p e c t  of s a fe g u a rd s .
W ash ing ton 's  perfo rm ance  d u r in g  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n  of 
A r t i c l e  I I I  of th e  N .P.T . c a s t s  a r e v e a l in g  l i g h t  on th e  
p r i o r i t y  accorded th e  g o a l  of g lo b a l  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  by th e  
U.S. Government. Throughout th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  W ashington 
appea rs  to  have been more anx ious  to  accommodate th e  w ishes  of 
i t s  European a l l i e s  than  to  champion th e  cause  of I .A .E .A . 
s a fe g u a rd s .  Evidence has a l re a d y  been educed to  s u p p o r t  t h i s ,  
b u t  th e  p o in t  was made ab u n d an tly  c l e a r  in  rem arks d u r in g  1968 
by A drian  F i s h e r ,  Deputy D i r e c to r  of U .S .A .C .D .A ., and a 
le a d in g  U.S. p a r t i c i p a n t  in  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i th  th e  EURATOM 
c o u n t r i e s .  He s a id :
The problem of n e g o t i a t i n g  a s a fe g u a rd s  a r t i c l e  
w ith  our NATO a l l i e s  was as im p o rtan t  in  our  ^
minds as  n e g o t i a t i n g  one w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union.
and
We [d id] no t w ish to  be a p a r ty  to  any a t te m p t 
to  undermine th e  s t r u c t u r e  of Euratom in  term s of 
n a t io n a l  programs.
We worked v e ry  hard  to  g e t  an a r t i c l e  in  th e  
t r e a t y  [N .P .T .]  which made p o s s i b l e  th e  u t i l i z a ­
t i o n  by th e  I .A .E .A . of th e  Euratom s a fe g u a rd s  
s t r u c t u r e . ^
1. For a n o te  on t h i s ,  see  above, p .1 7 6 .  The im portance  of 
t h i s  f a c t o r  in  J a p a n 's  o p p o s i t io n  to  th e  N .P .T . was 
emphasised in  Jan u a ry  1970 by Under S e c re ta ry  of S t a t e ,
U. A le x is  Johnson. See h i s  te s t im o n y  in  U nited  S ta t e s  
S e c u r i ty  Agreements and Commitments Abroad, P a r t  5, Japan  
and Okinawa, h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  Subcommittee on U nited  
S ta t e s  S e c u r i ty  Agreements and Commitments Abroad of th e  
Senate  Committee on F o re ign  R e l a t i o n s ,  91 s t  Cong., 2nd 
S e s s . , January  26, 27, 28 and 29, 1970 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  
to  as  Senate  H earings  on Japan  and Okinawa, 1970) ,  p .1160 .
2. See, S ta tem en t of th e  Government of Japan  on th e  O ccasion 
of th e  S igning  of th e  T rea ty  on th e  N o n - P r o l i f e r a t io n  of 
N uclear Weapons, F eb ruary  3 , 1970. Text s u p p lie d  by 
c o u r te sy  of th e  Jap an ese  Embassy, C anberra .
3. See h i s  te s t im ony  in  House H earings  on Arms C o n tro l  and 
Disarmament Act Amendments, 1968, p .6 0 .
4. i b i d . ,  p = 61.
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America's action in regard to Article III of the N.P.T. 
was consistent with the preference the U.S. had always accorded 
its European allies in the matter of safeguards» But one conse­
quence of this approach was to further reduce support for I.A.E.A. 
safeguards and the N„PoTe amongst non-nuclear, non-EURATOM nations; 
this was especially significant in respect of India and Japan, 
two of the most important countries in this category» In 
negotiating the N.P.T., the United States Government appears to 
have paid relatively little attention to the wishes of the 
latter two nations on the question of safeguards; Congressional 
hearings on this and related issues abound with official 
references to the interests of the EURATOM states in the matter 
of safeguards but there is virtually no acknowledgement of 
Indian and Japanese interests» Moreover, Washington finally 
settled for a nonproliferation treaty, the safeguards provisions 
of which, India and Japan could only regard as discriminatory 
vis-a-vis the EURATOM and the non-EURATOM states (but also, of 
course, vis-a-vis the nuclear and the non-nuclear nations).
Had Washington pressed throughout for the application 
of I.A.E.A» safeguards in EURATOM countries, such action would 
have been consistent with America's avowed support for global 
nonproliferation and would certainly have made it easier for 
India and Japan to accept I.A.E.A. safeguards and the N.P.T. 
However, such action would have been inconsistent with U.S. 
support for European nuclear integration. The latter, it seems, 
was a goal Washington was not prepared to sacrifice to the 
cause of global nonproliferation.
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D, Recent Developments in United States Policy Towards 
Enrichment Technology and the Supply of U235 : The 
Significance of These Developments for American 
Nonproliferation Policy in Asia
At the beginning of this chapter an attempt was made to 
characterise America’s traditional policy towards enrichment 
technology and the supply of U235. It was also pointed out 
there, that in the last two or three years some important changes 
have taken place in this policy. It is appropriate at this stage 
to examine these changes and to assess the significance of these 
developments for United States efforts to limit proliferation in 
Asia,
In the first place, the U.S. has altered the basis on 
which it is prepared to contract for the supply of enriched 
uranium. Previously, the total or ceiling amount of U235 to 
be supplied in an agreement was calculated on the basis of the 
enriched fuel requirements for reactors scheduled to be placed 
under construction by the co-operating country within five 
years of the signing of the agreement. In March 1970, the 
U.S.A.E.C. indicated that, in future, it would be prepared to 
meet reactor fuel requirements consistent with an advance 
construction period of only two or three years.^ Moreover, 
whereas in the past, agreements to supply have constituted 
firm undertakings on the part of the U.S, to furnish the 
amounts of enriched uranium stipulated in the ceiling provisions 
of the agreements, under arrangements announced in June 1971, 
future commitments to supply reactor fuel abroad will be made 
at the time supply contracts are entered into for individual
1. See, Letter from Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S.A.E.C., 
to Chet Holifield, Chairman, J.C.A.E., March 5, 1970. 
Reproduced in, J.C.A.E, Hearings on A.E.C. Authorizing 
Legislation, FY1971, Part 4, p.1645.
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r e a c t o r  p ro je c ts »  New agreem ents  w i l l  c o n t in u e  to  c o n ta in  
c e i l i n g s ,  b u t  th e  l a t t e r  w i l l  m ere ly  p la c e  an upper l i m i t  on th e
amount of e n r ic h in g  s e r v ic e s  to  be su p p l ie d  under any p a r t i c u l a r
2
agreem ent. This change of p o l i c y  in  reg a rd  to  th e  supp ly  of 
U235 was j u s t  one of a number of U.S. r e a c t io n s  to  th e  p ro s p e c t  
of an enormously in c re a s e d  w orld -w ide  demand f o r  en r ic h e d  uranium 
and to  th e  l i k e l y  im p l ic a t io n s  of t h i s  f o r  A m erica’ s c a p a c i ty
3
to  meet th e  f u t u r e  needs of i t s  f o r e ig n  and dom estic  cus tom ers .
In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  new p o l i c y  seek s  to  match more c l o s e l y  
req u ire m e n ts  w ith  c a p a c i ty ,  and to  h e lp  ensu re  t h a t  as  th e  
f u l l  u t i l i z a t i o n  of th e  p r e s e n t  c a p a c i ty  of th e  c o u n t ry ’ s 
d i f f u s i o n  p l a n t s  draws c l o s e r ,  s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  n o t  a r i s e  where 
enrichm ent c a p a c i ty  might be encumbered b u t  no t s u b se q u e n tly  
ta k en  up by f i rm  c o n t r a c t s .
The second m ajor development concerns  th e  q u e s t io n  of 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  in  A m erica’s uranium 
enrichm ent in d u s t r y .  T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  m anufac tu re  of U235 
has been a F e d e ra l  Government monopoly; a m ajor re a s o n  fo r  
t h i s  was th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e
1. See AEC S ta tem ent on Uranium Enrichm ent S e rv ic e s ,  U .S.A .E.C. 
News R e lea se ,  No. 0-90 , June 8, 1971.
2. This  b r in g s  f o r e ig n  buyers  of U235 in t o  l i n e  w ith  th e  
c o n d i t io n s  o p e ra t in g  in  r e l a t i o n  to  dom estic  (U .S .)  b u y e rs .
3. In  1970 th e  U.S. d i f f u s i o n  complex was o p e ra t in g  a t  only  
40 per  cen t  c a p a c i ty  and even th en  was p roducing  more 
en r iched  uranium than  th e  n u c le a r  power in d u s t r y  ( f o r e ig n  
and dom estic )  c u r r e n t l y  r e q u i r e d .  However, th e  U .S .A .E.C . 
has c a l c u la te d  t h a t  by 1976 th e  demand fo r  en r ic h ed  uranium 
w i l l  have s a tu r a t e d  th e  e x i s t i n g  (1971) c a p a c i ty  of A m erica 's  
d i f f u s i o n  complex and by 1985 w i l l  be abou t t h r e e  t im es  t h i s  
c a p a c i ty .  See, Extended s ta te m e n t  of c o n s id e r a t io n s  by 
U.S.A.E.C. conce rn ing  p r i v a t e  a c c e s s  to  A m erica 's  enrichm ent 
te chno logy . Reproduced in  AEC A u th o r iz in g  L e g i s l a t i o n  F i s c a l  
Year 1972, P a r t  4 , h e a r in g s  b e fo re  th e  J o i n t  Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 92nd Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  March 18, 23 and May 
13, 1971, W ashington, 1971 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  J .C .A .E . 
H earings  on A.E.C. A u th o r iz in g  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  FY1972, P a r t  4) ,  
p . 2258.
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would in c r e a s e  th e  r i s k  of u n a u th o r iz e d  d i s c l o s u r e  of c l a s s i f i e d  
in fo rm a t io n  and co n seq u en tly  would enhance th e  r i s k s  of n u c le a r  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n .  However, i n  November 1969, P r e s id e n t  Nixon 
announced t h a t  he was in  favou r  of e v e n tu a l ly  t r a n s f e r r i n g  
ownership of th e  n a t i o n ’ s t h r e e  d i f f u s i o n  p l a n t s  to  p r i v a t e
e n t e r p r i s e . ^  In  June 1971 th e  U .S .A .E .C .,  a f t e r  some h e s i -
2
t a t i o n  of i t s  own, and in  th e  f a c e  of some c r i t i c i s m  of th e
3
move by th e  J.CoA.Eo, announced th a t  i t  would p ro v id e  acc ess
1. See, White House S ta tem en t Issu ed  November 10, 1969, 
Concerning F u tu re  Ownership of Uranium Enrichment F a c i l i t i e s .  
Reproduced in  J.C.AoE. H earings  on F u tu re  Ownership of 
A .E .C .’ s Gaseous D i f fu s io n  P l a n t s ,  1969, p p .493-494.
2. In  1966, Chairman Seaborg d e c la re d  t h a t  th e  U.S. should  
keep s e c r e t  th e  d e t a i l s  of i t s  enrichm ent te ch n o lo g y .  See 
h i s  remarks in ,  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t io n  of
N uclear Weapons, 1966, p .6 2 .  As r e c e n t l y  as  J u ly  and 
August of 1969, U .S .A .E.C . spokesmen were adamant t h a t  
p r i v a t e  a c c ess  to  enrichm ent techno logy  would in c r e a s e  
th e  r i s k  of u n a u th o r iz e d  d i s c l o s u r e  of c l a s s i f i e d  in form ­
a t io n  and th e re b y  enhance th e  t h r e a t  of n u c le a r  p r o l i f e r ­
a t i o n .  The U.S.A .E.C. was e s p e c i a l l y  concerned about th e  
consequences in  t h i s  re g a rd  of p r i v a t e  a c c e s s  to  c e n t r i f u g e  
techno logy . See, rem arks by James T. Ramey, Commissioner, 
U .S.A.E.C. and Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U .S .A .E.C . in  
J .C .A .E . H earings  on F u tu re  Ownership of A .E .C .’ s Gaseous 
D if fu s io n  P l a n t s ,  1969, p p .5 7 ,  58, 94 and 61 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
See a l s o ,  s ta te m e n t  by U .S.A .E.C. i n  answer to  q u e s t io n s  
subm itted  by J .C .A .E . Reproduced in  i b i d . ,  p p . 103-4.
For a n o te  on th e  s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of c e n t r i f u g e  
technology  f o r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of n u c le a r  weapons, se e  above,
p . 21.
3. At l e a s t  one prom inent member of th e  J .C .A .E . exp ressed  
s e r io u s  doubts  abou t th e  move and ,even  now, th e  committee 
as a whole co n t in u e s  to  r e s e r v e  judgement on th e  q u e s t io n  
of f u t u r e  ownership by p r i v a t e  companies of a l l  or p a r t  
of th e  n a t i o n ’ s enrichm ent complex. See, L e t t e r  from 
Chet H o l i f i e ld  to  Glenn T. Seaborg , Chairman, U .S .A .E .C . ,  
June 21, 1971. Reproduced in  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on A.E.C. 
A u th o r iz in g  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  FY1972, P a r t  4 , p .2262 . See a l s o ,  
A u th o r iz in g  A p p ro p r ia t io n s  f o r  th e  Atomic Energy Commission 
fo r  F i s c a l  Year 1972, r e p o r t  by th e  J o i n t  Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 92nd Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  J u ly  8 , 1971, 
W ashington, 1971 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as  J .C .A .E . R eport 
on A.EoC. A u th o r iz in g  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  FY1972) , p .1 5 .
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to  i t s  uranium enrichm ent te chno logy  (bo th  gaseous d i f f u s i o n  and
gas c e n t r i f u g e )  to  a l im i te d  number of U.S. owned com panies.
These f i rm s  would be expec ted  to  c a r r y  ou t independen t r e s e a r c h
and development work on enrichm ent techno logy  and to  a s s e s s  th e
b u s in e s s  p ro s p e c ts  of uranium enrichm ent or e n r ic h in g  equipment
manufacture.'* ' The r a t i o n a l e  fo r  t h i s  somewhat r e v o lu t io n a r y  move
i s  n o t  hard  to  d iscover«  The U .S .A .E.C . has concluded  t h a t  in
2view of expected  f u t u r e  demands f o r  U235, th e  f i r s t  inc rem ent
of new e n r ic h in g  p l a n t  c a p a c i ty  w i l l  p ro b ab ly  be r e q u i r e d  as 
3
e a r ly  as 1980 and t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  inc rem en ts  w i l l  be needed in
subsequen t y e a r s .  But th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  of new e n r ic h in g
c a p a c i ty  prom ises to  be a v e ry  expens ive  b u s in e s s ;  Chairman
Seaborg has e s t im a ted  th a t  i t  w i l l  r e q u i r e  a c a p i t a l  in v es tm en t
4
of abou t t h r e e  b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  Because of t h i s ,  and in  o rd e r  
to  ta k e  advan tage  of th e  b e s t  know-how a v a i l a b l e  i n  American 
in d u s t r y ,  th e  government has decided  to  seek  p r i v a t e  p a r t i c i p a ­
t i o n  in  th e  f u t u r e  expansion  of th e  n a t i o n ’s e n r ic h in g  c a p a c i ty .
1« See, N ucleon ics  Week, Vol. 12, No. 25, June 24, 1971, p . l .
For a more extended o u t l i n e  of th e  U .S .A .E.C . p ro p o s a l ,  see  
"AEC to  Perm it Access to  Enrichment Technology", e n c lo s u re  
subm it ted  to  Chet H o l i f i e l d ,  Chairman, J .C .A .E .  by Glenn T. 
Seaborg, Chairman, U.SoA.E.Cc, June 16, 1971. Reproduced in  
J .C .A .E ,  H earings  on A.E.C. A u th o r iz in g  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  FY1972, 
P a r t  4 , p p . 2261-2262.
2. For a n o te  on t h i s ,  see  above, p .380 , f n .3 .
3. See, L e t t e r  from Glenn T. Seaborg to  Chet H o l i f i e l d ,  June 
24, 1969. Reproduced in  J .C .A .E . H earings  on F u tu re  Owner­
sh ip  of AoEoCo’ s Gaseous D i f fu s io n  P l a n t s ,  1969, p .5 0 .
The U.S. ex p ec ts  to  be a b le  to  meet th e  f o r e c a s t  w orld  demand 
f o r  enrichm ent s e r v i c e s ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  1980, th rough  
improvements in  e x i s t i n g  enrichm ent c a p a c i ty ,  n o ta b ly  th e  
Cascade Improvement and Cascade U pra ting  Programmes ( C . I .P .  
and C o U .P .) . For a n o te  on t h i s ,  see  A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic 
Energy Commission, N in e te e n th  Annual R e p o r t , June 1971, p .3 4 .
4. See, remarks by Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U .S .A .E .C . ,  in  
J .C .A .E .  H earings  on A.E.C. A u th o r iz in g  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  FY1972, 
P a r t  4 , p .2240 .
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The t h i r d  new development to  r e s u l t  from th e  r e c e n t  rev iew
of U,S« enrichm ent p o l ic y  has been  th e  announcement of A m erica 's
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  c o -o p e ra te  w ith  i n t e r e s t e d  f r i e n d l y  s t a t e s  in  th e
e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of one or more m u l t i n a t i o n a l  uranium enrichm ent
p la n ts «  The f i r s t  i n d i c a t i o n s  of th e  new th in k in g  were a p p a re n t
abou t s ix  months a f t e r  th e  Nixon A d m in is t r a t io n  took  o f f i c e  in
1969.'*' L a t e r ,  i n  h i s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  r e p o r t  to  Congress in
F eb ru a ry  1971, P r e s id e n t  Nixon r e v e a le d  t h a t  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  had
ta k e n  p la c e  w i th  th e  J .C .A .E .  co nce rn ing  ways in  which th e  U.S.
m igh t a s s i s t  i t s  a l l i e s  to  c o n s t r u c t  a m u l t i n a t i o n a l  enrichm ent 
2
p l a n t .  In  J u ly  1971, th e  U.S.A«E.C. announced t h a t  th e  U.S.
was a t  l a s t  ready  to  d i s c u s s  t h i s  q u e s t io n  w ith  c o u n t r i e s
o v e r s e a s  which had expressed  i n t e r e s t  i n  c o n s t r u c t in g  uranium
enrichm en t f a c i l i t i e s  based on U.S. gaseous d i f f u s i o n  te ch n o lo g y .
( I t  was s p e c i f i c a l l y  noted t h a t  c e n t r i f u g e  techno logy  would no t
3
be in c lu d ed  in  th e  proposed d i s c u s s io n s » )  N o tic e  of A m erica 's
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  u n d e r ta k e  enrichm ent c o o p e ra t io n  d i s c u s s io n s  was
communicated, in  J u ly  1971, to  th e  member c o u n t r i e s  of th e
European Economic Community (E .E .C .)  and to  th e  U .K ., A u s t r a l i a ,
4
Canada and Japan ,
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  l a t e s t  p o l i c y  change was, in  p a r t  
a t  l e a s t ,  a r e sp o n se  to  th e  e v id e n t  d e te rm in a t io n  of a number
1» See, remarks by Glenn T« Seaborg , Chairman, U .S .A .E .C . and 
James T. Ramey, Commissioner, U .S .A .E.C . in  J .C .A .E . 
H earings  on F u tu re  Ownership of A .E .C . 's  Gaseous D if fu s io n  
P l a n t s ,  1969, p .55  and pp,57 and 59 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
2, B u ild in g  For Peace : U.S. F o re ig n  P o l ic y  For The 1 9 7 0 's ,  A 
R eport to  th e  Congress by R ichard  Nixon, P r e s id e n t  of th e  
U nited  S t a t e s ,  W ashington, F ebruary  25, 1971 ( h e r e a f t e r  
r e f e r r e d  to  as B u ild in g  For P eace ) , p .7 0 .
3» See, U.SoAcEoC.  News R e le a se ,  No. 0 -130, J u ly  28, 1971.
4. See, U.S.A.E.C» News R e le a s e ,  No. 0-195, O ctober 30, 1971. 
This  news r e l e a s e  r e v e a le d  t h a t  Washington had communicated 
i t s  i n t e n t i o n s  to  th e  above m entioned c o u n t r i e s  in  J u ly  
1971»
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of f r i e n d l y  c o u n t r i e s  to  develop independen t uranium enrichm ent
c a p a b i l i t i e s , '* '  Mention has a l re a d y  been made of J ap an ese  and
2
A u s t r a l i a n  i n t e r e s t  in  enrichm ent te ch n o lo g y . But more im portan t  
has been  th e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  between B r i t a i n ,  H olland and West Germany 
on th e  developm ent of th e  gas c e n t r i f u g e  p ro cess  f o r  p roducing  
e n r ic h e d  u ranium . Agreements r e l a t i n g  to  th e  t r i p a r t i t e  organ­
i s a t i o n  embracing th e s e  t h r e e  s t a t e s  came in to  f o r c e  in  A p r i l  
1971 and p la n s  a r e  a l r e a d y  in  hand to  e s t a b l i s h  two p i l o t  
c e n t r i f u g e  p l a n t s ,  one in  Almelo (H olland) and one in  Capenhurst 
(U .K ,) .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  B r i t a i n ,  Holland and West Germany 
a r e  r e p o r te d  to  have o f fe re d  a s s o c i a t e  membership in  t h e i r  
e n t e r p r i s e  to  Belgium and I t a l y  and to  have in t im a te d  a 
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  make t h e i r  c e n t r i f u g e  techno logy  e v e n tu a l ly  
a v a i l a b l e  to  A u s t r a l i a .  France has announced p la n s  f o r  a 
f e a s i b i l i t y  s tu d y  f o r  a l a r g e  new d i f f u s i o n  p la n t  w hich, i t  
i s  hoped, w i l l  in v o lv e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  a s  w e l l .  
Canada a l s o  i s  c o n s id e r in g  a c o l l a b o r a t i v e  e f f o r t  which w i l l  
make u s e  of i t s  own uranium h y d r o - e l e c t r i c  r e s o u r c e s .  F i n a l l y ,
South A f r ic a  c la im s  to  have s u c c e s s f u l ly  developed  an e n r ic h ­
ment method based on an " e n t i r e l y  new p r i n c i p l e " .  So f a r ,  
however, i t  has n o t  r e l e a s e d  any d e t a i l s  about th e  new p ro c e s s .
1. For a rev ie w  of r e c e n t  w orld-w ide developm ents  in  th e  a re a  
of uranium  enrichm ent s e e ,  D.R. G r i f f i t h s ,  "A Review of 
O verseas  N uc lea r  Power Developments" in  Atomic Energy 
[ A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy Commission], Vol. 14, Nos. 3 and 
4, J u ly -O c to b e r  1971, p p . 10-11; A u s t r a l i a n  Atomic Energy 
Commission, N in e te e n th  Annual Report; ,June 1971, p p .34-35; 
rem arks by Under S e c re ta ry  of S ta t e  Johnson in  J .C .A .E . 
H earings  on AoE.C. A u th o r iz in g  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  FY1972, P a r t  4 , 
p p . 2243-2244; and , s ta tem en t  by U .S .A .E.C . i n  r e p ly  to  
q u e s t io n  su b m it ted  by J .C .A .E . ,  i n  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on 
F u tu re  Ownership of A . E . C . ' s  Gaseous D i f fu s io n  P l a n t s ,  1969, 
p p .105-106, The m a t e r i a l  in  t h i s  s e c t io n  i s  d e r iv e d  from 
th e s e  s o u rc e s ,
2» See above , p .150  (Japan) and p .199  ( A u s t r a l i a ) .
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That th e  t ren d  towards a w ider d i f f u s i o n  of enrichm ent techno logy  
had im pressed U»S. o f f i c i a l s ,  i s  o bv ious .  As U. A le x is  Johnson , 
Under S e c re ta ry  of S ta t e  fo r  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s ,  s a id :
These developments abroad  a r e ,  I  b e l i e v e ,  
im p re s s iv e .  They i n d i c a t e  a d e s i r e  to  d i v e r s i f y  
t h e i r  sources  of supp ly  [of U235]; a r e c o g n i t i o n  
of th e  need fo r  in c re a s e d  enrichm ent c a p a c i ty ;  a 
w i l l in g n e s s  to  in v e s t  s u b s t a n t i a l  sums to  accom­
p l i s h  th e s e  g o a l s ;  and a co n f id e n ce  in  t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  to  overcome th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l  problem s -  
p r e f e r a b l y  w i th ,  b u t  i f  n e c e s s a ry ,  w ith o u t  our 
help.-*-
I t  was w idely  he ld  by U.S. spokesmen t h a t  t h i s  t r e n d
towards th e  development abroad of ind igenous  enrichm ent
c a p a b i l i t i e s  could  no t be r e v e rs e d  and t h a t  th e  most s e n s ib l e
th in g  f o r  th e  U.S. to  do i n  th e s e  c i rc u m s tan c es  was to  o f f e r
America’ s d i f f u s i o n  techno logy  to  s e l e c t e d  f o r e ig n  c o u n t r i e s
in  th e  hope of d i v e r t i n g  them from th e  development of th e
2
c e n t r i f u g e  p ro c e s s .  T h is ,  i t  was p o in te d  o u t ,  would no t only
help  red u ce  th e  t h r e a t  of p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  b u t  a t  th e  same t im e ,
would b r in g  f i n a n c i a l  g a in  to  th e  U.S. from th e  s a l e  of i t s
enrichm ent techno logy  and h e lp  r a t i o n a l i z e  th e  expansion  of
3
o v e r a l l  e n r ic h in g  c a p a c i ty .  The t re n d  tow ards th e  d i f f u s i o n  
of enrichm ent te ch n o lo g y , and th e  American r e s p o n s e  to  t h i s  
c h a l le n g e ,  i s  b u t  th e  l a t e s t  example of how te c h n o lo g ic a l  
change h a s ,  from tim e to  t im e , worked to  a l t e r  American 
n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y .
1. See h i s  te s t im ony  in  J .C .A .E .  H earings  on A.E.C. A u th o r iz in g  
L e g i s l a t i o n ,  FY1972, P a r t  4 , p .2244 .
2. See e s p e c i a l l y ,  th e  views of James T. Ramey, Commissioner, 
UcSoA.E.Co, in  i b i d . , p .2246 .
3. See, remarks by Glenn T. Seaborg , Chairman, J .C .A .E . ,  and 
James T. Ramey, Commissioner, U .S.A .E.C», in  i b i d . ,  p .2242 
and p p . 2246-2247 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
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One of the most interesting aspects of the move to assist 
America's allies in the establishment of a multinational enrich­
ment plant was the enthusiasm with which the White House supported 
the proposal. The underlying rationale for President Nixon's 
stand on the matter was outlined in his foreign policy report to 
Congress in February 1971,1 23 45 There the President loudly condemned 
the idea of restricting the flow of scientific and technological 
expertise to other nations; this he denounced as a "Maginot Line" 
approach to the issue. Only through the broadest possible 
exchange of information, he emphasised, could American interests 
and those of mankind as a whole be best served. It was conceded 
that there would be some areas where restrictions would have to 
remain. However, it would be American policy "to keep those 
areas as circumscribed as possible, and to take the leadership
in encouraging the exchange of scientific and technological
2information". The proposal to co-operate with foreign powers 
in the establishment of a multinational enrichment plant was 
also strongly supported by the State Department and the
UoS,A,E.C.3
As one might have expected, though, the J.C.A.E. was
opposed to the move. Individual members of the committee
denounced the proposal in the strongest terms (Vice-Chairman
Holifield called it a "civilian version of the multilateral 
, 4force",) and the J.C.A.E. as a whole has reserved its judge­
ment on the matter,3 A major concern amongst committee
1. Building For Peace, p.70,
2. ibid,
3. According to Chairman Seaborg, the plan to co-operate was 
developed by the U,S.A,E.C, in collaboration with the 
State Department. See his testimony in J.C.A,E. Hearings 
on A.E.C. Authorizing Legislation, FY1972, Part 4, p.2242.
4. See, remarks by Holifield on J.C,A.E. reaction to the 
administration proposal, in ibid,, p.2238.
5. See, J.C.A.E. Report on A,E,C. Authorizing Legislation,
FY1972, p, 15,
members was t h e  f e a r  t h a t  any d i s c l o s u r e  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  a bou t
d i f f u s i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  would l e a d  i n e v i t a b l y  t o  p r e s s u r e  f o r
a c c e s s  t o  c e n t r i f u g e  t e c h n o l o g y  a s  w e l l , ^
Taken t o g e t h e r ,  t h e  t h r e e  cha nges  o u t l i n e d  above
c o n s t i t u t e d  a m a jo r  s h i f t  i n  UcS, t h i n k i n g ,  b o t h  a b o u t
A m e r i c a ’ s own n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y ,  and a b o u t  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h
f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  p e a c e f u l  u s e s  of  a tom ic  e n e r g y .  T h i s
d r i f t  i n  American p o l i c y  was r e i n f o r c e d  i n  August  1971 by t h e
n o m in a t i o n  of Dr,  J ,Ro S c h l e s i n g e r  a s  Chairman of  t h e  U .S .A .E .C ,
P r i o r  t o  j o i n i n g  t h e  Nixon A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  S c h l e s i n g e r  was
D i r e c t o r  of  S t r a t e g i c  S t u d i e s  a t  t h e  Rand C o r p o r a t i o n ,  S a n ta
Monica ,  and w h i l e  t h e r e ,  d i r e c t e d  a  s t u d y  on t h e  p rob lem  of
3
n u c l e a r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  U0S, gove rnm en t .  ( I n  1968,  
S c h l e s i n g e r ’ s v i e w s  were quo ted  by Congressman Hosmer t o  h e lp  
s t r e n g t h e n  an argument  t h e  l a t t e r  was t h e n  making a g a i n s t  t h e
4
NoPiTo) ,  I t  i s  S c h l e s i n g e r ' s v i e w s  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  which  make h i s  r e c e n t  a p p o in t m e n t  so s i g n i f i c a n t  
f o r  American  p o l i c y  on t h e  p e a c e f u l  u s e s  of  a to m ic  energy,"*
1, See e s p e c i a l l y ,  r em a rks  by V ic e -C ha i rm a n  H o l i f i e l d ,  i n  
JcC.A.E.  H e a r i n g s  on A.E.Cc A u t h o r i z i n g  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  FY1972, 
P a r t  4,  ppc 2277 and 2279-2280,
2, See ,  K e e s i n g ' s  Contemporary  A r c h i v e s , August  2 1 - 2 8 ,  1971, 
p , 24772,
3,  N u c l e o n ic s  Week, Vol ,  12,  No, 28,  J u l y  15,  1971,  p , l ,
4,  See ,  S t a t e m e n t  of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  C r a ig  Hosmer,  Reproduced 
i n  S e n a t e  H e a r i n g s  on N o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  T r e a t y ,  P a r t  I ,  1 9 6 8 , 
p , 167 o
5, S c h l e s i n g e r ’ s v i ew s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  may be found  i n  t h e
f o l l o w i n g :  J , R 0 S c h l e s i n g e r ,  N u c l e a r  S p re ad :  The S e t t i n g
of  t h e  P r o b l e m , Rand P-3557 ,  S a n ta  Monica:  The Rand C orpo r ­
a t i o n ,  1967;  J , R ,  S c h l e s i n g e r ,  " N u c le a r  S p r e a d " ,  i n  Ya le  
Review,  Vol ,  57 ,  No, 1 ,  O c to b e r  1967,  p p . 66-84 ;  and J . R .  
S c h l e s i n g e r ,  The S t r a t e g i c  Consequences  of  N u c le a r
P r o l i f e r a t i o n , Rand P - 3393 ,  S a n t a  Monica:  The Rand C orpo r ­
a t i o n ,  1966,  The m a t e r i a l  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  drawn from 
t h e s e  s o u r c e s .
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In  c o n t r a s t  to  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of U ,S . a u t h o r i t i e s  on t h e  s u b j e c t ,  
S c h l e s i n g e r  seems c a u t i o u s l y  o p t i m i s t i c  a b o u t  t h e  prob lem  of 
n u c le a r  s p r e a d ;  a c c o r d in g  to  h im , f u r t h e r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i s  much 
l e s s  l i k e l y  th a n  some have s u g g e s te d  a n d ,  i n  any c a s e ,  such  a 
deve lopm en t need n o t  l e a d  to  d i s a s t e r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  t h e  U n i ted  
S t a te s o  S c h l e s i n g e r  h as  conceded  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  A m e r ic a 's  
i n t e r e s t s  to  t r y  to  l i m i t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  b u t ,  a s  he t o l d  t h e  
T h ird  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Arms C o n t r o l  Symposium i n  P h i l a d e l p h i a ,  
i n  A p r i l  1966:
. . .  s i n c e  I  b e l i e v e  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
would be l e s s  s e v e r e  t h a n  c u r r e n t l y  a n t i c i p a t e d ,
I would be i n c l i n e d  to  s e t  a low er p r i c e  on what 
t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  s h o u ld  be w i l l i n g  to  pay to  
p r e v e n t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  th a n  would some o t h e r  
members of t h e  P a n e l . ^
S c h l e s i n g e r  acknow ledges  t h a t  t h e  d i v e r s i o n  of f i s s i o n ­
a b l e  m a t e r i a l  from p e a c e f u l  n u c l e a r  programmes c o u ld  make i t  
e a s i e r  f o r  n o n - n u c l e a r  s t a t e s  to  a c q u i r e  n u c l e a r  w eapons. 
M oreover, he  s u p p o r t s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of s a f e g u a r d s  and b e l i e v e s  
th e y  can  e f f e c t i v e l y  l i m i t  such  d i v e r s i o n .  But a t  t h e  same t im e ,  
he h as  s t r o n g l y  em phas ised  t h a t  t h e  d i v e r s i o n  of p lu to n iu m  from  
a p e a c e f u l  n u c l e a r  programme i s  n o t  synonymous w i th  t h e  
a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  u s a b l e  n u c l e a r  weapons and t h a t  to  a t t e m p t  to  
c o n t r o l  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  by t r y i n g  to  p r e c l u d e  t h e  deve lopm en t
o f  n u c le a r  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  m odern i n d u s t r i a l  s t a t e s  i s  b o th
2
f u t i l e  and c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e .  A m e r ic a 's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  
J a p a n ,  he has  s u g g e s t e d ,  i s  a c a s e  i n  p o i n t ;  S c h l e s i n g e r  a rg u ed  
i n  1967 t h a t  "A m ericans  ough t  n o t  p e r s u a d e  th e m s e lv e s  t h a t  t h e  
d e n i a l  of a s s i s t a n c e  t o  J a p a n  on , s a y ,  a p lu to n iu m  s e p a r a t i o n
3
p l a n t  w i l l  p r e v e n t  h e r  from  a c q u i r i n g  one i n d e p e n d e n t l y . "
1. See , The S t r a t e g i c  C onsequences  of N u c le a r  P r o l i f e r a t i o n ,
p. 2.
2. See , "N u c le a r  S p r e a d " ,  p .7 7 .
3. i b i d .
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Schlesinger’s nomination to the U.S.A.E.C. would seem 
to have important implications for United States policy in the 
area of uranium enrichment technology« The new chairman 
seems less concerned about the problem of nuclear spread than 
many other Americans and certainly sets a lower value than 
most on the price the U.S« should be willing to pay in order 
to achieve the goal of nonproliferation« On these grounds 
alone Schlesinger seems predisposed to strongly support 
current moves to open America’s enrichment business to private 
enterprise and to assist foreign governments in the establish­
ment of multinational enrichment facilities«
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the moves 
to involve private enterprise in the nation’s enrichment 
business and to share the secrets of America’s diffusion 
technology with countries overseas will have the effect of 
weakening the cause of nonproliferation, not just in Asia, but 
in the world generally. It has already been noted that one 
reason for the U.S. Government’s long-established monopoly in 
the manufacture of U235 was the belief that participation by 
private enterprise would increase the risk of unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information and hence heighten the 
danger of proliferation. There seems to be little reason to 
believe that these fears are any less valid now than they were 
previously. Notwithstanding this, it has now been proposed 
that American firms be granted access to both diffusion and 
centrifuge technology with an eye to active participation by 
private enterprise in the nation’s enrichment business. So 
far as co-operation with foreign countries in the establishment 
of multinational enrichment facilities is concerned, the pros­
pects that this move will increase the risks of proliferation 
seem equally great. Though it is almost certain that any 
assistance in this area will be accompanied by safeguards to
389
ensure that there is no diversion to military purposes, the record 
of international co-operation in the field of reactor technology 
suggests that experience gained through collaboration in the 
construction and operation of foreign-built nuclear facilities 
can be utilized to establish indigenous capabilities. As a result 
of the proposed collaboration on enrichment technology between the 
U.S. and certain other countries, Japanese and Australian scien­
tists, among others, will inevitably learn much about the 
construction and operation of diffusion plants.
The changes during the last two and a half years in 
United States policy towards the supply of U235 and access to 
America's enrichment technology is a good example of how 
technological and other developments have, from time to time, 
worked to alter U.S. nonproliferation policy. Clearly, recent 
developments in centrifuge technology have opened up the 
possibility of future widespread proliferation of an alter­
native (to diffusion) means of enrichment and promise to make 
redundant many of the present restrictions on access to U.S. 
enrichment technology. Also, the prospect of a rapidly 
increased world-wide demand for enriched uranium has caused 
the U.S. Government to invite participation by private 
enterprise in America’s enrichment business. (Of course 
American firms needed little persuading that it was in their 
interests to compete in what promises to be a very lucrative 
market.)'*' But notwithstanding the significance of these
1. One of the most characteristic aspects of the J.C.A.E. 
hearings in 1969 on the future of America's gaseous 
diffusion industry was the strong representations on 
behalf of private participation which were made by U.S. 
industrial interests. See, statement by president of 
Consolidated Enrichment Corporation, in J.C.A.E. Hearings 
on Future Ownership of A.E.C.’s Gaseous Diffusion Plants,
1969,pp.236-240. See also, testimony of K.D. Nichols,
Chairman, Atomic Industrial Forum Study Committee on 
Private Ownership and Operation of Uranium Enrichment 
Facilities. Reproduced in ibid., pp.254-255.
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pressures it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the changes 
in U.S, policy described above were made easier by feelings on the 
part of certain elements within the administration that the U.S. 
should not take a strong stand in the face of this latest challenge 
to America's efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It 
has already been suggested that though the Nixon Administration 
has generally supported the goal of nonproliferation, the latter 
has not enjoyed a very high priority in the hierarchy of U.S. 
policy objectives. (This emerged in the discussions about both 
ballistic missile defence and American security policy in Asia 
in the period 1969-71. It is also worth noting in this context, 
that though the Nixon Administration itself ratified the N.P.T., 
it was nowhere near as anxious as the previous government had 
been to persuade other nations to adhere to the agreement.)^
In the area of enrichment technology and the supply of U235 
the White House in particular displayed a clear disposition 
not to maintain traditional U.S. policy in its entirety.
President Nixon took a lead in proposing both the opening of 
America's enrichment business to private enterprise and the 
sharing of U.S. diffusion technology with countries overseas. 
Moreover, the appointment of Dr. Schlesinger to the chairman­
ship of the U.S.A.E.C. ensured that the Commission would be led 
by a man sympathetic to the views of the White House in these 
matters.
1. Spokesmen for the Nixon Administration repeatedly emphasised* 
that the U.S. Government would not "twist arms" or use other 
pressure to persuade nations to sign the N.P.T. See, remarks 
by President Nixon during press conference on February 6,
1969. Reproduced in Documents on Disarmament, 1969, United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1970, pp.34-35.
See also, remarks by President Nixon during press conference 
on March 4, 1969. Reproduced in ibid,, p.66. See also, 
remarks by A.C.D.A. Director Gerard Smith and Secretary of 
State Rogers, in Military Implications of the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 
February 27 and 28, 1969, Washington, 1969, pp.124 and 339 
respectively. See also, remarks by M.B. Kratzer, Director, 
Division of International Affairs, U.S.A.E.C., in Nuclear 
Explosion Services for Industrial Applications, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., May 8-July 17, 1969, Washington, 1969, p.75.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In keeping with the outline of aims at the beginning of 
the thesis it seems reasonable to present the conclusions in 
three separate sections.
I
The desire to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to 
other countries was present in United States policy from the very 
beginning of the nuclear era and was the primary motivation 
underlying both the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the Baruch 
Plan of the same year. The Atomic Energy Act was amended in 1954 
in order to help facilitate America’s tactical nuclear planning 
in Europe. The amendment of the Act also enabled the United 
States to begin assisting foreign countries in the development 
of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, with few 
exceptions, assistance rendered under the "Atoms for Peace" plan 
has been accompanied by safeguards designed to prevent diversion 
to military purposes. Concomitant with the launching of the 
"Atoms for Peace" plan, Washington called for the creation of 
an International Atomic Energy Agency which, among other things, 
would eventually assume responsibility for the management of a 
multinational nuclear safeguards system.
As the 1950’s drew to a close a new sense of urgency 
began to characterise American efforts to limit proliferation. 
This was largely prompted by indications that the capacity to 
build nuclear weapons promised to become more widespread than 
previously imagined and by fears that a number of European 
nations might be tempted to follow France down the nuclear 
weapons path. Washington’s initial response to this challenge 
took three main forms : renewed efforts were made to support 
the I.A.E.A. and to encourage widespread acceptance of the
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agency ’ s sa fe g u a rd s  system ; d ip lo m a t ic  and o th e r  p r e s s u r e  was 
b rough t to  bear  on A m erica 's  European a l l i e s  in  an e f f o r t  to  
pe rsuade  them no t to  a c q u i r e  t h e i r  own n u c le a r  weapons; and, 
s t ro n g  U.S. su p p o r t  was g iven  to  moves to  s e c u re  a n u c le a r  t e s t -  
ban t r e a ty »  More r e c e n t l y  th e  U nited  S ta t e s  helped  sponso r  th e  
n u c le a r  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y ;  th e  N .P .T . was e v e n tu a l ly  s igned  
by B r i t a i n ,  R uss ia  and th e  U.S. in  J u ly  1968.
W ash ing ton 's  su p p o r t  f o r  th e  N .P.T . was no t on ly  a 
m easure of A m erica 's  concern  about th e  problem of n u c le a r  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n ,  bu t a l s o ,  was th e  most d ram a tic  i n d i c a t i o n  t i l l  
th e n  of th e  changing r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  U.S. and th e  
U .S .S .R .;  Washington c l e a r l y  r e v e a le d  t h a t  i t  was de te rm ined  to  
r e a c h  agreement w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union on th e  N .P .T . even a t  th e  
c o s t  of some d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in  r e l a t i o n s  between th e  U nited  
S ta t e s  and i t s  a l l i e s .
U nited  S t a t e s  spokesmen have sought to  r a t i o n a l i s e  
A m erica 's  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  p o l i c y  on a number of g rounds . The 
con tinued  spread  of n u c le a r  weapons, i t  has been a l l e g e d ,  would 
s e v e re ly  i n j u r e  th e  economies of many c o u n t r i e s  and would make 
p ro g re s s  in  th e  a re a  of arms c o n t r o l  ex ceed in g ly  more d i f f i c u l t .  
But th e  crux of A m erica 's  s t a t e d  o p p o s i t io n  to  n u c le a r  sp read  
has been summed up in  what might be d e s c r ib e d  as  th e  "n th  
co u n try  r a t i o n a l e " .  According to  t h i s  view any in c r e a s e  in  
th e  number of n u c le a r  powers p r e s e n t s  d a n g e rs ,  or more p r e c i s e l y ,  
th e  more n u c le a r  powers t h e r e  a r e ,  th e  more th e r e  a r e  l i k e l y  to  
b e ,  and th e  more th e r e  a r e ,  th e  g r e a t e r  th e  chances of n u c le a r  
c o n f l i c t .  U nderlying much of th e  concern  in  th e  U.S. about 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  has been th e  f e a r  t h a t  th e  f u r t h e r  sp read  of 
n u c le a r  weapons would red u ce  W ash ing ton 's  a b i l i t y  to  r e g u l a t e  
c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s  and p re v e n t  them from d eve lop ing  in t o  g e n e ra l
war.
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To date, China is the only country in Asia which has 
developed its own nuclear weapons. Peking's first test explosion 
was in October 1964 and altogether China has so far conducted 
eleven nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. Concomitant with warhead 
development, China has made considerable progress in the develop­
ment of a missile delivery system. About 20 M.R.B.M.'s have 
been deployed already and tests of an I.R.B.M. have been reported. 
Indications are that work on an I.C.B.M. is also being pushed 
forward as rapidly as possible. The primary motivations behind 
Peking's development of nuclear weapons seem to have been China's 
desire for great power status and its anxiety to acquire, as soon 
as possible, a credible deterrent against U.S. (and Soviet) 
attack.
The proliferation problem in Asia arises from the 
possibility that a number of nations in the area might be 
persuaded to follow China in the development of nuclear weapons.
It has long been agreed that the country most likely to do this 
is India.
For some time now, India has been pursuing a fairly 
substantial industrial nuclear programme which, among other 
things, has been designed to eventually make the country self- 
sufficient in reactor technology and the manufacture of 
fissionable materials other than U235. In addition, princi­
pally because of the emergence of China as a nuclear power, 
widespread support has developed in India for the creation of 
a national nuclear force. However, Delhi has decided that, 
for the present at least, the disadvantages of going nuclear 
still outweigh the advantages. For the time being India seems 
content to keep open an option on going nuclear by not signing 
the N.P.T. and by developing its nuclear industry to the point 
where any decision to develop nuclear weapons could be put into 
immediate effect.
II
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The s i t u a t i o n  w ith  r e g a rd  to  Japan  and n u c le a r  weapons i s  
somewhat d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  of I n d ia .  Japan  i s  one of th e  w o r ld ’ s 
le a d in g  i n d u s t r i a l  and economic powers and has e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  
fo u n d a t io n s  of a v e ry  e x te n s iv e  n u c le a r  r e a c to r  programme. I t  has 
a l s o  b u i l t  up c o n s id e r a b le  e x p e r t i s e  in  r o c k e t r y  and o th e r  forms 
of space  techno logy . Though i t  would undoub ted ly  e x p e r ie n c e  a 
number of d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  th e  a r e a  of raw m a t e r i a l s  
su p p ly ,  Japan  c l e a r l y  has th e  p o t e n t i a l  to  develop  a s u b s t a n t i a l  
a r s e n a l  of n u c le a r  (and e v e n tu a l ly ,  th e rm o -n u c le a r )  w arheads and 
a m i s s i l e  d e l iv e r y  system . However, d e s p i t e  J a p a n 's  p o t e n t i a l  
in  th e  n u c le a r  weapons f i e l d ,  suppo rt  th roughou t th e  c o u n t ry  f o r  
a n a t io n a l  n u c le a r  d e t e r r e n t ,  though g r e a t e r  now th an  p r e v io u s l y ,  
n e v e r th e le s s  s t i l l  rem ains  v e ry  l i m i t e d .  The un ique  d i s t a s t e  f o r  
n u c le a r  weapons amongst l a r g e  segments of th e  Jap an ese  p e o p le ,  
th e  c o u n t ry ’ s a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  United S t a t e s ,  and th e  a b se n c e ,  
a t  l e a s t  so f a r  as  most Jap an ese  have been concerned , of an 
obvious t h r e a t  to  th e  n a t i o n ’ s s e c u r i t y ,  have a l l  c o n t r ib u te d  
to  J a p a n 's  n o n -n u c le a r  p o l i c y .
Though nowhere n e a r ly  so w e ll  advanced as I n d ia  and 
Japan  in  th e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of a tom ic en e rg y ,  A u s t r a l i a  cou ld  
be r i g h t l y  regarded  as a p o t e n t i a l  n u c le a r  power. At th e  v e ry  
l a t e s t ,  A u s t r a l i a  could  b e g in  to  produce p lu tonium  weapons 
w i th in  about e ig h t  or n in e  y e a r s  of th e  s t a r t - u p  of th e  f i r s t  
r e a c to r  bought from o v e r s e a s .  As w e ll  as  t h i s ,  i t  seems t h a t  
by th e  l a t e  1 9 7 0 's A u s t r a l i a  could  be in  a p o s i t i o n  to  produce 
a modest s u r fa c e - la u n c h e d ,  s e a -b o rn e  m i s s i l e  d e l i v e r y  f o r c e .  
Throughout th e  pos t-w ar  y e a r s  s u c c e s s iv e  A u s t r a l i a n  Governments 
have tended to  re g a rd  n u c le a r  weapons as  a u n iq u e ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  W estern s e c u r i t y .  However, though i t  has  no t 
u n d e r ta k en  never to  produce n u c le a r  weapons, C anberra  has 
eschewed th e  development of i t s  own d e t e r r e n t  and has chosen  
in s te a d  to  r e l y  on th e  n u c le a r  might of i t s  a l l i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
th e  United S t a t e s .
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It seems reasonable to argue that the United States has 
been opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia since the 
very commencement of the nuclear era; the goal of nonproliferation 
in Asia has been implicit in America’s policy of global non­
proliferation, However, as the analysis in Chapter I suggests, 
U.S, concern about the spread of nuclear weapons was, for about 
the first twenty years after World War II, focussed mainly on 
Europe, But China’s first nuclear test in October 1964 tended 
to alter this picture. Thereafter, the problem of proliferation 
in Asia in particular became a distinct concern of American 
policymaking.
Washington’s initial response to China’s emergence as 
a nuclear power was to try to downgrade the military and 
political significance of Peking's feat. However, in September 
1967 the Johnson Administration announced that it would shortly 
begin deployment of the Sentinel A.B.M. system. Eighteen 
months later the Nixon Administration announced details of 
a revised A.B.M. system called Safeguard. In seeking to 
justify the deployment of their respective A.B.M. systems 
both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations used arguments 
which tended to enhance the military significance of the 
Chinese nuclear force. This ran counter to previous efforts 
to minimize the significance of China's capability and tended 
to reinforce rather than diminish the forces for prolifer­
ation in Asia. Ultimately the A.B.M. was substantially 
abandoned in a manner which seemed to indicate that the goal 
of nonproliferation in Asia enjoyed only a low priority 
relative to other U.S. policy objectives.
Some valuable insights into the priority accorded 
the goal of nonproliferation in American policy in Asia can 
be gained from an analysis of developments in U.S. security 
policy in the area. Evidence suggests that so far as the
III
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p e r io d  1964-68 i s  concerned th e  g o a l  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f te n  
took  second p la c e  behind  o th e r  UoS. p o l i c y  o b je c t iv e s  in  A sia .  
W ashington was r e l u c t a n t  to  meet D e lh i ’ s w ishes  in  th e  m a t te r  of 
s e c u r i t y  g u a ra n te e s ;  was a p a r ty  to  moves which could  be expected  
to  undermine pow erfu l a n t i - n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  in  Japan ; and adopted 
p o l i c i e s  which could only  cause  d i s i l l u s io n m e n t  in  A u s t r a l i a  
w ith  th e  A .N.Z.U.S, p a c t .  In  th e  y e a rs  1969-71 t h i s  t r e n d  was 
p robab ly  even more e v id e n t .  The Nixon d o c t r i n e ,  p r im a r i ly  
because  of i t s  e f f e c t  in  h e lp in g  to  undermine th e  c r e d i b i l i t y  
of U.S. g u a ra n te e s  and a s s u ra n c e s  in  A sia  and i t s  tendency  to  
upgrade th e  im portance of n u c le a r  weapons in  A m erica 's  A sian 
s t r a t e g y ,  seems w holly  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  g o a l  of non­
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  th e  a r e a .  U.S. p o l i c i e s  in  th e  p e r io d  in  
r e s p e c t  of I n d i a ,  Japan  and A u s t r a l i a  a l s o  seem to  have been 
in c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  g o a l  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
Another u s e f u l  i n s i g h t  in t o  th e  p r i o r i t y  t h a t  Washing­
to n  has accorded  th e  g o a l  of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n  in  A sia  can be 
ga ined  from an a n a l y s i s  of developm ents  in  th e  f i e l d  of 
p e a c e fu l  n u c le a r  te ch n o lo g y . The U.S, has su p p l ie d  I n d ia ,
Japan  and A u s t r a l i a  w ith  q u a n t i t i e s  of U235 and has so ld  
r e a c t o r s  to  I n d ia  and Japan .  At th e  same tim e Washington 
has i n s i s t e d  th a t  a l l  th r e e  r e c i p i e n t  s t a t e s  a c c e p t  b i l a t e r a l  
or m u l t i l a t e r a l  s a fe g u a rd s  on th e  f u e l  and equipment su p p lie d  
to  ensu re  t h a t  i t  i s  no t used f o r  m i l i t a r y  p u rp o ses .  However, 
in  i t s  i n s i s t e n c e  on I .A .E .A . s a fe g u a rd s ,  W ashington has 
p r a c t i s e d  a form of d i s c r i m in a t io n  between th e  EURATOM s t a t e s  
on th e  one hand and th e  A sian (and many o th e r )  n a t io n s  on th e  
o th e r  as  a r e s u l t  of which th e  EURATOM s t a t e s  appear to  have 
re c e iv e d  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a tm e n t .  This  development made i t  
e a s i e r  f o r  I n d ia  and Japan  in  p a r t i c u l a r  to  oppose b o th  th e  
I .A .E .A , s a fe g u a rd s  system and th e  N .P.T . I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
escape  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  su p p o r t  f o r  th e  European i n t e g r a t i o n  
movement seems to  have ta k en  p recedence  in  U.S. p o l i c y  over 
th e  g oa l of g lo b a l  n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
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The analysis in Part III of the thesis suggests that in the 
period 1964-71 the goal of nonproliferation in Asia did not enjoy 
a very high priority in the hierarchy of U.S. policy objectives. 
Despite President Johnson’s characterisation of the problem of 
proliferation as the "gravest of all unresolved human issues"^ 
there appears to have been a distinct lack of urgency and deter­
mination in U.S. efforts to deal with the problem of nuclear 
spread in Asia. Clearly, the goal of nonproliferation in Asia 
did not have the wholehearted support of all sections of either 
the Kennedy-Johnson Administration or of the Nixon Government.
At the very least there would appear to have been little 
agreement about the price the United States should have been 
prepared to pay in order to secure the goal of nonproliferation 
in Asia.
Many of the policies of the Nixon Administration appear 
to have been especially inconsistent with efforts aimed at 
limiting the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia. Admittedly 
the Johnson Administration found it difficult to reconcile 
the goal of nonproliferation with the requirements of U.S. 
security policy in Asia and at times adopted policies at 
variance with efforts to limit nuclear spread. But notwith­
standing this, the general thrust of American policy under that 
particular government was towards maintaining a strong U.S. 
presence in Asia and this in itself helped to reinforce efforts 
to limit proliferation in the area, But the Nixon doctrine 
represents a major change in the whole direction of U.S. policy 
in Asia and, for the reasons outlined in Chapter X, is in a 
very basic sense inconsistent with the goal of nonproliferation 
in the area. A further consideration is the Nixon Administra­
tion’s policy in regard to enrichment technology transfer.
1. See above, p«57.
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The Johnson Administration, like those before it, had, largely 
in the interests of nonproliferation, gone to great lengths to 
maintain a high degree of secrecy in this area. By contrast, 
the Nixon Administration made little effort to resist the 
challenge of new technologies in uranium enrichment and 
Washington's latest policies in this area promise to make it 
easier than previously for countries in Asia (and elsewhere) to 
gain access to supplies of U235, Finally, it is clear that the 
Nixon Administration does not share its predecessor's enthusiasm 
about the N.PoT, and is less inclined to urge states to support 
the agreement» This is of special significance in the case of 
India which has yet to even sign the N.P.T.
It seems reasonable to argue that the lower status which 
appears to have been accorded the goal of nonproliferation in 
the hierarchy of the Nixon Administration's policy objectives 
is related to recent changes in the structure of world politics, 
and more particularly, to the Nixon Government's perceptions of 
these changes. The idea of nonproliferation was characteris­
tically a product of the era of bi-polarity; it represented an 
attempt by the U.S» (and the U.S.S.R.) to retain a virtual 
monopoly in the nuclear weapons area and was conceived at a 
time when the two superpowers had considerable confidence in 
their capacity to dictate the course of world affairs. But 
when the Nixon Administration assumed office not only had the 
world changed in many ways but, perhaps more importantly, the 
new government in Washington perceived that it had changed.
As the President himself said, "the configuration of power 
that emerged from the Second World War ... [was] gone" and the 
bi-polar world of the 1940's and 1950's had been replaced by 
one characterised by "multilateral diplomacy."^"
1. See above, p.321.
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There was an appreciation in Washington that America’s ability
to influence world affairs had been reduced."^ It was a corollary
of this that the Nixon Administration was pessimistic about its
capacity to limit proliferation in Asia (and elsewhere) and
consequently devoted less attention than its predecessor to this
endeavour* But there is a further dimension to this* Running
through much of what the Nixon Administration has had to say
about the structure of world politics is the belief that in some
2respects a multi-polar world is preferable to a bi-polar one.
Not only has this made it easier for the U.S. to reconcile 
itself to the reality of a nuclear-armed China, but in addition, 
could help to explain why Washington has espoused a view of the 
balance of power in Asia which, taken to its logical conclusion, 
implies the acceptance of a nuclear-armed Japan.
1. See especially, Building For Peace : U.S. Foreign Policy For 
The 1970’s, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, 
President of the United States, Washington, February 25, 
1971, p.3.
2* ibid * This idea has been explained in greater detail in the 
writings of Dr. Henry Kissinger. See especially, his 
American Foreign Policy, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1969, pp.53-90.
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APPENDIX I
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, 
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
The P a r t i e s  to  t h i s  T r e a t y ,
R e a f f i r m in g  t h e i r  f a i t h  i n  t h e  p u r p o s e s  and p r i n c i p l e s  of 
t h e  C h a r t e r  o f  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  and t h e i r  d e s i r e  t o  l i v e  i n  
pe a ce  w i t h  a l l  p e o p le s  and a l l  G overnm en ts ,  and d e s i r i n g  to  
s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  f a b r i c  o f  p e a c e  i n  t h e  P a c i f i c  A re a ,
N o t in g  t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  a l r e a d y  h a s  a r r a n g e m e n ts  
p u r s u a n t  to  w hich  i t s  armed f o r c e s  a r e  s t a t i o n e d  i n  t h e  
P h i l i p p i n e s ,  and has  armed f o r c e s  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e s p o n ­
s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  Ryukyus, and upon t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  o f  
t h e  J a p a n e s e  P e a c e  T r e a t y  may a l s o  s t a t i o n  armed f o r c e s  i n  and 
a b o u t  J a p a n  to  a s s i s t  i n  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y  
i n  t h e  J a p a n  a r e a ,
R e c o g n iz in g  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a  and New Z ea land  a s  members o f  
t h e  B r i t i s h  Commonwealth o f  N a t io n s  have  m i l i t a r y  o b l i g a t i o n s  
o u t s i d e  a s  w e l l  a s  w i t h i n  t h e  P a c i f i c  A re a ,
D e s i r i n g  t o  d e c l a r e  p u b l i c l y  and f o r m a l l y  t h e i r  s e n s e  of  
u n i t y ,  so  t h a t  no p o t e n t i a l  a g g r e s s o r  c o u ld  be  u n d e r  t h e  
i l l u s i o n  t h a t  any o f  them s ta n d  a lo n e  i n  t h e  P a c i f i c  A re a ,  and 
D e s i r i n g  f u r t h e r  to  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  
d e f e n s e  f o r  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y  p e n d in g  t h e  
d e ve lopm en t o f  a more c o m p re h en s iv e  sy s tem  of r e g i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  
i n  t h e  P a c i f i c  A re a ,
T h e r e f o r e  d e c l a r e  and a g r e e  a s  f o l l o w s :
«
ARTICLE I
The P a r t i e s  u n d e r t a k e ,  a s  s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h e  C h a r te r  o f  t h e  
U n i ted  N a t i o n s ,  to  s e t t l e  any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u t e s  i n  w hich  
th e y  may be in v o lv e d  by p e a c e f u l  means i n  such  a manner t h a t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p e a c e  and s e c u r i t y  and j u s t i c e  a r e  n o t  e n d an g ered  
and to  r e f r a i n  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  from t h e  t h r e a t  
o r  u s e  o f  f o r c e  i n  any m anner i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  p u r p o s e s  
o f  t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s .
ARTICLE I I
I n  o r d e r  more e f f e c t i v e l y  to  a c h ie v e  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  
T r e a ty  t h e  P a r t i e s  s e p a r a t e l y  and j o i n t l y  by means o f  c o n t i n u ­
ous and e f f e c t i v e  s e l f - h e l p  and m u tu a l  a id  w i l l  m a i n t a i n  and 
d e v e lo p  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  to  r e s i s t  
armed a t t a c k ,
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ARTICLE III
The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of 
any of them the territorial integrity, political independence 
or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.
ARTICLE IV
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific 
Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace 
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result 
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when 
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security.
ARTICLE V
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the 
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropoli­
tan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territor­
ies under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed 
forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
ARTICLE VI
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as 
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties 
under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility 
of the United Nations for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
ARTICLE VII
The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their 
Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters 
concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council 
should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.
ARTICLE VIII
Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of 
regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by 
the United Nations of more effective means to maintain inter­
national peace and security, the Council, established by 
Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relation­
ship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of 
States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position
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to  f u r t h e r  th e  purposes  of t h i s  T re a ty  and to  c o n t r i b u t e  to  
th e  s e c u r i t y  of t h a t  area»
ARTICLE IX
T his  T re a ty  s h a l l  be r a t i f i e d  by th e  P a r t i e s  in  acco rd an ce  
w ith  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p ro c e s s e s .  The i n s t r u ­
ments of r a t i f i c a t i o n  s h a l l  be d e p o s i te d  as soon as  p o s s i b l e  
w ith  th e  Government of A u s t r a l i a ,  which w i l l  n o t i f y  each of 
th e  o th e r  s i g n a t o r i e s  of such d e p o s i t .  The T re a ty  s h a l l  e n t e r  
i n t o  f o r c e  as  soon as  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n s  of th e  s i g n a t o r i e s  
have been d e p o s i te d .
ARTICLE X
T his  T re a ty  s h a l l  rem ain  in  f o r c e  i n d e f i n i t e l y .  Any P a r ty  
may c ea se  to  be a member of th e  C ouncil e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
A r t i c l e  VII one yea r  a f t e r  n o t i c e  has  been g iv en  to  th e  
Government of A u s t r a l i a ,  which w i l l  inform  th e  Governments 
of th e  o th e r  P a r t i e s  of th e  d e p o s i t  of such n o t i c e .
ARTICLE XI
T his  T rea ty  in  th e  E n g l ish  language  s h a l l  be d e p o s i te d  in  
th e  a rc h iv e s  of th e  Government of A u s t r a l i a .  Duly c e r t i f i e d  
co p ies  th e re o f  w i l l  be t r a n s m i t t e d  by t h a t  Government to  th e  
Governments of each of th e  o th e r  s i g n a t o r i e s .
IN WITNESS WHEREOF th e  un d ers ig n ed  P l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s  have 
s igned  t h i s  T re a ty .
DONE a t  th e  c i t y  of San F ra n c isc o  t h i s  f i r s t  day of 
September, 1951.
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APPENDIX I I
TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN.
Text of th e  T re a ty  of M utual C oopera t ion  and S e c u r i ty
The United S t a t e s  of America and Jap an ,
D es ir in g  to  s t r e n g th e n  th e  bonds of peace and f r i e n d s h ip  
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  e x i s t i n g  between them, and to  uphold th e  p r i n ­
c i p l e s  of democracy, i n d i v id u a l  l i b e r t y ,  and th e  r u l e  of law,
D es ir in g  f u r t h e r  to  encourage  c l o s e r  economic c o o p e ra t io n  
between them and to  promote c o n d i t io n s  of economic s t a b i l i t y  
and w e l l -b e in g  in  t h e i r  c o u n t r i e s ,
R eaffirm ing  t h e i r  f a i t h  i n  th e  pu rposes  and p r i n c i p l e s  of 
th e  C h ar te r  of th e  U nited  N a t io n s ,  and t h e i r  d e s i r e  to  l i v e  
in  peace w ith  a l l  peop les  and a l l  governm ents ,
Recognizing t h a t  they  have th e  in h e re n t  r i g h t  of i n d i v id u a l  
or c o l l e c t i v e  s e l f - d e f e n s e  as  a f f i rm e d  in  th e  C h a r te r  of th e  
U nited  N a t io n s ,
C onsidering  t h a t  they  have a common concern  in  th e  m a in ten ­
ance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i t y  in  th e  Far E a s t ,
Having re s o lv e d  to  conclude  a t r e a t y  of m utual c o o p e ra t io n  
and s e c u r i t y ,
T h e re fo re  ag ree  as fo l lo w s :
ARTICLE I
The p a r t i e s  u n d e r ta k e ,  as  s e t  f o r t h  in  th e  C h a r te r  of th e  
U nited N a tio n s ,  to  s e t t l e  any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i s p u te s  in  which 
they  may be invo lved  by p e a c e fu l  means in  such a manner t h a t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i t y  and j u s t i c e  a r e  no t endangered 
and to  r e f r a i n  in  t h e i r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  from th e  t h r e a t  
or use  of f o rc e s  a g a i n s t  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  or p o l i t i c a l  
independence of any s t a t e ,  o r  in  any o th e r  manner i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w ith  th e  purpose  of th e  U nited  N a t io n s .
The p a r t i e s  w i l l  endeavour in  c o n c e r t  w ith  o th e r  p e a c e - lo v in g  
c o u n t r i e s  to  s t r e n g th e n  th e  U nited  N ations  so t h a t  i t s  m iss io n  
of m a in ta in in g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i t y  may be 
d isch a rg e d  more e f f e c t i v e l y .
ARTICLE I I
The p a r t i e s  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  toward th e  f u r t h e r  development 
of p e a c e fu l  and f r i e n d l y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  by s t r e n g t h ­
ening t h e i r  f r e e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  by b r in g in g  about a b e t t e r
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u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  p r i n c i p l e s  upon which th e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
a r e  founded ,  and by prom oting c o n d i t io n s  of s t a b i l i t y  and w e l l ­
be ing  » They w i l l  seek  to  e l im in a te  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e i r  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  economic p o l i c i e s  and w i l l  encourage economic 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n  between them»
ARTICLE I I I
The p a r t i e s ,  i n d i v i d u a l l y  and in  c o o p e ra t io n  w ith  each  o t h e r ,  
by means of con t in u o u s  and e f f e c t i v e  s e l f - h e l p  and m u tua l a i d ,  
w i l l  m a in ta in  and d ev e lo p ,  s u b je c t  to  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r o v i s io n s ,  t h e i r  c a p a c i t i e s  to  r e s i s t  armed a t t a c k .
ARTICLE IV
The p a r t i e s  w i l l  c o n s u l t  to g e th e r  from tim e to  t im e  r e g a r d ­
ing th e  im p lem en ta t ion  of t h i s  t r e a t y ,  and, a t  th e  r e q u e s t  of 
e i t h e r  p a r t y ,  whenever th e  s e c u r i t y  of Japan  or i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
peace and s e c u r i t y  in  th e  Far E as t  i s  th r e a te n e d ,
ARTICLE V
Each p a r ty  r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  an armed a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  e i t h e r  
p a r ty  in  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  under th e  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  of Jap an  
would be dangerous to  i t s  own peace and s a f e t y  and d e c l a r e s  
t h a t  i t  would a c t  to  meet th e  common danger i n  acco rd an ce  w ith  
i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v is io n s  and p rocesses»
Any such armed a t t a c k  and a l l  m easures tak en  as a r e s u l t  
th e re o f  s h a l l  be im m ediate ly  r e p o r te d  to  th e  S e c u r i ty  C ouncil  
of th e  U nited  N a tio n s  in  accordance  w ith  th e  p r o v is io n s  of 
a r t i c l e  51 of th e  c h a r t e r .  Such m easures s h a l l  be te rm in a te d  
when th e  S e c u r i ty  C ouncil has taken  th e  m easures n e c e s s a ry  to  
r e s t o r e  and m a in ta in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i t y .
ARTICLE VI
For th e  purpose  of c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  th e  s e c u r i t y  of Jap an  
and th e  m a in tenance  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i t y  i n  th e  
Far E a s t ,  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  of America i s  g ra n te d  th e  u s e  by 
i t s  l a n d ,  a i r ,  and n av a l  f o rc e s  of f a c i l i t i e s  and a r e a s  i n  
Japan .
The u s e  of th e s e  f a c i l i t i e s  and a re a s  as  w e l l  as  t h e  s t a t u s  
of U.So Armed Forces  in  Japan  s h a l l  be governed by a s e p a r a t e  
ag reem en t,  r e p la c in g  th e  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  agreem ent under a r t i c l e  
I I I  of th e  S e c u r i ty  T re a ty  Between th e  U nited  S ta t e s  of America 
and Ja p a n ,  s igned  a t  Tokyo on February  28, 1952, as  amended, 
and by such o th e r  a rrangem ents  as  may be agreed  upon,
ARTICLE VII
T his  t r e a t y  does n o t  a f f e c t  and s h a l l  n o t  be i n t e r p r e t e d  as 
a f f e c t i n g  in  any way th e  r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s  of th e  p a r t i e s
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under th e  C h a r te r  of th e  U nited  N a tio n s  o r  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
of th e  U nited  N ations  f o r  th e  m a in tenance  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
peace  and s e c u r i t y .
ARTICLE V II I
T his  t r e a t y  s h a l l  be r a t i f i e d  by th e  U nited  S t a t e s  of 
America and Japan  in  acco rdance  w i th  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p ro c e sse s  and w i l l  e n t e r  in t o  f o r c e  on th e  d a te  
on which th e  in s tru m e n ts  of r a t i f i c a t i o n  th e re o f  have been 
exchanged by them in  Tokyo.
ARTICLE IX
The S e c u r i ty  T rea ty  Between th e  U nited  S t a t e s  of America 
and Japan  s igned  a t  th e  c i t y  of San F ran c isco  on September 8, 
1951, s h a l l  e x p i re  upon th e  e n t e r in g  in to  f o r c e  of t h i s  t r e a t y .
ARTICLE X
T h is  t r e a t y  s h a l l  rem ain  in  f o r c e  u n t i l  i n  th e  o p in io n  of 
th e  Governments of th e  U nited  S t a t e s  of America and Japan  
th e r e  s h a l l  have come in to  f o r c e  such U nited  N a t io n a l  a r r a n g e ­
m ents as w i l l  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  m a in tenance  of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  peace and s e c u r i t y  in  th e  Japan  a r e a .
However, a f t e r  th e  t r e a t y  has been in  f o r c e  fo r  10 y e a r s ,  
e i t h e r  p a r ty  may g iv e  n o t i c e  to  th e  o th e r  p a r ty  of i t s  
i n t e n t i o n  to  te rm in a te  th e  t r e a t y ,  in  which case  th e  t r e a t y  
s h a l l  t e rm in a te  1 y ear  a f t e r  such n o t i c e  has been g iv e n .
In  w i tn e s s  whereof th e  u n d e rs ig n ed  p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s  have 
s igned  t h i s  t r e a t y .
Done in  d u p l i c a t e  a t  W ashington in  th e  E n g l is h  and Japanese  
la n g u a g e s ,  bo th  e q u a l ly  a u t h e n t i c ,  t h i s  19 th  day of J a n u a ry ,  
1960.
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APPENDIX I I I
TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, 
IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER
The Governm ents o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  of  A m erica ,  t h e  U n i te d  
Kingdom of G re a t  B r i t a i n  and N o r th e r n  I r e l a n d ,  and t h e  Union 
o f  S o v i e t  S o c i a l i s t  R e p u b l i c s ,  h e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  
" O r i g i n a l  P a r t i e s " ,
P r o c la im in g  as  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  aim t h e  s p e e d i e s t  p o s s i b l e  
a c h ie v e m e n t  o f  an ag reem en t  on g e n e r a l  and c o m p le te  d i s a r m ­
ament u n d e r  s t r i c t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  
t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  w hich  would p u t  an  end 
to  th e  arm aments r a c e  and e l i m i n a t e  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  and t e s t i n g  of a l l  k in d s  o f  w eapons ,  i n c l u d i n g  
n u c l e a r  w eapons,
S e e k in g  to  a c h ie v e  t h e  d i s c o n t i n u a n c e  o f  a l l  t e s t  e x p lo ­
s io n s  o f  n u c l e a r  weapons f o r  a l l  t im e ,  d e te rm in e d  to  c o n t i n u e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  to  t h i s  end , and d e s i r i n g  to  p u t  an  end t o  t h e  
c o n ta m in a t io n  o f  m an’s en v iro n m en t by r a d i o a c t i v e  s u b s t a n c e s ,
Have a g re e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
ARTICLE I
1» Each o f  t h e  P a r t i e s  to  t h i s  T r e a t y  u n d e r t a k e s  t o  p r o h i b i t ,  
to  p r e v e n t ,  and n o t  to  c a r r y  o u t  any n u c l e a r  weapon t e s t  
e x p l o s i o n ,  o r  any o t h e r  n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n ,  a t  any p l a c e  
u n d e r  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o r  c o n t r o l :
(a )  i n  t h e  a tm o sp h e re ;  beyond i t s  l i m i t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
o u t e r  s p a c e ;  o r  u n d e r w a te r ,  i n c l u d i n g  t e r r i t o r i a l  
w a te r s  o r  h ig h  s e a s ;  o r
(b )  i n  any  o t h e r  e n v iro n m en t  i f  such  e x p lo s i o n  c a u s e s  
r a d i o a c t i v e  d e b r i s  to  be p r e s e n t  o u t s i d e  t h e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  S t a t e  u n d e r  whose j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  o r  c o n t r o l  such  e x p lo s i o n  i s  c o n d u c te d .
I t  i s  u n d e r s to o d  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  t h a t  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n s  of t h i s  s u b - p a r a g r a p h  a r e  w i th o u t  
p r e j u d i c e  to  t h e  c o n c lu s i o n  o f  a t r e a t y  r e s u l t i n g  
i n  t h e  pe rm anen t b an n in g  o f  a l l  n u c l e a r  t e s t  
e x p l o s i o n s ,  i n c l u d in g  a l l  such  e x p lo s io n s  u n d e r  
g ro u n d ,  t h e  c o n c lu s i o n  o f  w h ic h ,  a s  t h e  P a r t i e s  
have  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  P ream b le  to  t h i s  T r e a t y ,  th e y  
s e e k  to  a c h i e v e .
2. Each o f  t h e  P a r t i e s  to  t h i s  T r e a t y  u n d e r t a k e s  f u r t h e r ­
more to  r e f r a i n  from c a u s i n g ,  e n c o u r a g in g ,  o r  i n  any way 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n ,  t h e  c a r r y i n g  o u t  o f  any n u c l e a r  weapon t e s t
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explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would 
take place in any of the environments described, or have the 
effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.
ARTICLE II
1» Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text 
of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary 
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this 
Treaty» Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or 
more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene 
a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to 
consider such amendment»
2» Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a 
majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, 
including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The 
amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the 
deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all 
the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of 
all the Original Parties.
ARTICLE III
1» This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature»
Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry 
into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article 
may accede to it at any time»
2» This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signa­
tory States» Instruments of ratification and instruments of 
accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
Original Parties - the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics - which are hereby designated 
the Depositary Governments»
3» This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratifi­
cation by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification»
4» For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force 
of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5» The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all 
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, 
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of 
and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into 
force, and the date of receipt of any requests for confer­
ences or other notices»
6» This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations»
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ARTICLE IV
T his  T rea ty  s h a l l  be of u n l im i te d  d u r a t io n .
Each P a r ty  s h a l l  i n  e x e r c i s in g  i t s  n a t io n a l  s o v e re ig n ty  
have th e  r i g h t  to  w ithdraw  from th e  T rea ty  i f  i t  d e c id e s  
t h a t  e x t r a o r d in a r y  e v e n t s ,  r e l a t e d  to  th e  s u b je c t  m a t te r  of 
t h i s  T re a ty ,  have je o p a rd iz e d  th e  supreme i n t e r e s t s  of i t s  
country» I t  s h a l l  g iv e  n o t i c e  of such w ithdraw al to  a l l  
o th e r  P a r t i e s  of th e  T rea ty  t h r e e  months in  advance.
ARTICLE V
T his  T r e a ty ,  of which th e  E n g l is h  and R uss ian  t e x t s  a r e  
e q u a l ly  a u t h e n t i c ,  s h a l l  be d e p o s i te d  i n  th e  a r c h iv e s  of th e  
D ep o s i ta ry  Governments. Duly c e r t i f i e d  c o p ie s  of t h i s  
T rea ty  s h a l l  be t r a n s m i t t e d  by th e  D e p o s i ta ry  Governments 
to  th e  Governments of th e  s ig n a to r y  and acced ing  S t a t e s .
IN WITNESS WHEREOF th e  u n d e rs ig n e d ,  du ly  a u t h o r i z e d ,  have 
s igned  t h i s  T re a ty .
DONE in  t r i p l i c a t e  a t  th e  c i t y  of Moscow th e  f i f t h  day 
of A ugust,  one thousand n in e  hundred and s i x t y - t h r e e .
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APPENDIX IV
TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, JULY 1, 1968
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to 
as the "Parties to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all 
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every 
effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures 
to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would 
seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General 
Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the 
prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of 
International Atomic Energy safeguards on peaceful nuclear 
activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other 
efforts to further the application, within the framework of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the 
principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and 
special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other 
techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful 
applications of nuclear technology, including any technological 
by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from 
the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be avail­
able for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, 
whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all 
Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and 
to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, 
the further development of the applications of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest 
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to 
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of 
this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 
1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear 
weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, 
Desiring to further the easing of international tension 
and the strengthening of trust between States in order to
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facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elim­
ination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means 
of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, States must refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that 
the establishment and maintenance of international peace and 
security are to be promoted with the least diversion for 
armaments of the world's human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not 
to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons 
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any 
way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon 
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons 
or explosive devices«,
ARTICLE II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under­
takes not to receive the transfer from any transferor what­
soever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, 
or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek 
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices«,
ARTICLE III
1«, Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement 
to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the Inter­
national Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards 
system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the 
fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with 
a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peace­
ful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices» Procedures for the safeguards required by this 
article shall be followed with respect to source or special 
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed 
or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any
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such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall 
be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all 
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, 
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
anywher e »
2o Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: 
(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment 
or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, 
use or production of special fissionable material, to any 
non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the 
source or special fissionable material shall be subject to 
the safeguards required by this article»
3o The safeguards required by this article shall be imple­
mented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this 
Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological 
development of the Parties or international cooperation in 
the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the inter­
national exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the 
processing, use or production of nuclear material for peace­
ful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this 
article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the 
Preamble of the Treaty.
4» Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall 
conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to meet the requirements of this article either 
individually or together with other States in accordance with 
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days 
from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For 
States depositing their instruments of ratification or 
accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agree­
ments shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. 
Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen 
months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
ARTICLE IV
1» Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affect­
ing the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity 
with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, 
and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and techno­
logical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co­
operate in contributing alone or together with other States 
or international organizations, to the further development 
of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
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especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of 
the developing areas of the world,
ARTICLE V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate 
measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under 
appropriate international observation and through appropriate 
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful 
applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to 
non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondis- 
criminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the 
explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude 
any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such 
benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or 
agreements, through an appropriate international body with 
adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. 
Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible 
after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits 
pursuant to bilateral agreements.
ARTICLE VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament; and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.
ARTICLE VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of 
States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the 
total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories.
ARTICLE VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this 
Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted 
to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all 
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by 
one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary 
Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall 
invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an 
amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a 
majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty,
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Including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment 
is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency» The amendment shall enter 
into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of 
ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of ratification 
by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of 
ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty 
and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is 
circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the Inter­
national Atomic Energy Agency, Thereafter, it shall enter 
into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its 
instrument of ratification of the amendment,
3, Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, 
a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, 
Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty 
with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and 
the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At inter­
vals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to 
the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this 
effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of 
further conferences with the same objective of reviewing 
the operation of the Treaty,
ARTICLE IX
1, This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature.
Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry 
into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article 
may accede to it at any time,
2, This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by sig­
natory States, Instruments of ratification and instruments 
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments,
3, This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratifi­
cation by the States, the Governments of which are desig­
nated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States 
signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments 
of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear- 
weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 
January 1, 1967.
4, For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force 
of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the 
despoti of their instruments of ratification or accession.
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5, The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all 
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, 
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, 
and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a 
conference or other notices..
6, This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations,
ARTICLE X
1, Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty 
have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that 
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. 
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties 
to the Treaty and to the United National Security Council 
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests,
2, Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the 
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be 
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This 
decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the 
Treaty,
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and 
Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments,
Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted 
by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the 
signatory and acceding States,
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, 
have signed this Treaty,
Done in triplicate, at. the cities of Washington, London 
and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred 
sixty-eight,
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APPENDIX V
TRIPARTITE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON SECURITY 
ASSURANCES, MARCH 7, 1968
The Security Council
Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of 
States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive 
the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; 
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive 
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices,
Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these 
States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appro­
priate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,
Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the 
use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security 
of all States,
lo Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the 
threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State 
would create a situation in which the Security Council, and 
above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would 
have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations 
under the United Nations Charter;
2 o  Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States 
that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in 
accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State 
Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat 
of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;
3» Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized 
under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
securitye
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APPENDIX VI
UNITED STATES DECLARATION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES TO 
NON-NUCLEAR NATIONS, JUNE 17, 1968
The Government of the United States notes with appreciation 
the desire expressed by a large number of States to subscribe 
to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons»
We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not 
to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of 
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or 
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek 
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices»
The United States also notes the concern of certain of 
these States that in conjunction with their adherence to the 
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, appro­
priate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security»
Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons 
would endanger the peace and security of all States»
Bearing these considerations in mind, the United States 
declares the following:
Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such 
aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create 
a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon 
States which are permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council would have to act immediately through the 
Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter 
such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for 
taking "effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace"» 
Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied 
by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such 
aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered 
effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove 
the threat of aggression»
The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek 
immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in 
accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State 
party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object 
of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used»
417
The United States reaffirms in particular the inherent right, 
recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and 
collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear 
attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security,,
The United States vote for the draft resolution before us 
and this statement of the way in which the United States intends 
to act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
are based upon the fact that the draft resolution is supported 
by other permanent members of the Security Council which are 
nuelear-weapon States and are also proposing to sign the 
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that 
these States have made similar statements as to the way in 
which they intend to act in accordance with the Charter0
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APPENDIX VII
SIGNATORIES AND RATIFICATIONS TO THE TREATY ON THE NON- 
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Up to 5th March 1970, the date on which the N<,P=,To entered 
into force, the following 97 governments had signed the 
treaty and 48 of them had ratified,, The ratifying governments 
are underlinedo
Afghanistan
Australia
Austria
Barbados
Belgium
Bolivia
Botswana
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
Ceylon
Chad
China, Republic of
Colombia
Congo (Kinshasa)
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Dahomey
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Equador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Finland
Gambia
German Democratic 
Germany, Federal 
Republic of 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Luxembourg
Malagasy Republic
Malaysia
Maidive Islands
Mali
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Roumania
San Marino
Senegal
Singapore
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Togo
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
United Arab 
Republic 
United Kingdom 
Union of Soviet 
Socialist 
Republics 
United States 
Upper Volta 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam,
Republic of 
Yemen 
Yugoslavia
Southern Yemen
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